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Abstract 
This is an original study analysing the staging of the German national holiday - the 
Day of German Unity - commemorating the accession of the German Democratic 
Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 rd October 1990. By examining the 
mise-en-sc6ne and rhetoric of the unity commemorations, it highlights the way in 
which political actors attempted to redefine ideas about united Germany's past, 
present and future from 1990 to 2005. Adopting the innovative approach of the 
cultural history of politics - NNhich understands representations such as national 
holidays as key mechanisms that not only reflect but also have the potential to 
influence agendas and discourses - the thesis is based on extensive research of 
German, French and British newspaper articles, televised reporting, speeches, 
organisational documents, Bundestag debates and structured interviews with Day of 
Unity organisers. The study concludes that the Day of Unity functioned as a stage on 
which political actors attempted to present a specific image of Germany, to redefine 
Germany's 'official' interpretation of the National Socialist and German Democratic 
Republic pasts and to improve intra-German relations. Furthermore, it contends that 
the German national holiday was staged to some extent as a postriational event: on the 
one hand, through emphasis at the unity celebrations on sub-national (regional) 
aspects; on the other hand, through manifestations of supra-national aspects visible in 
the 'EU-isation' of the event, that is to say, through an emphasis on the European 
Union in the staging and in the prioritisation of bilateral relations. The thesis relates 
to a number of theoretical debates including Benedict Anderson's understanding of 
nations as 'imagined communities', Eric Hobsbawrn and Terence Ranger's study of 
the 'invention of tradition', Rogers Brubaker's work on civic and ethnic nationalism, 
Maurice Halbwachs concept of 'collective memory', Jan and Aleida Assmann's 
concepts of 'cultural memory' and 'communicative memory' and Edgar Wolfrum's 
work on Geschichtspolitik. The research also contributes to the debate about the 
resilience and transformation of the nation-state in a phase of Europeanisation and 
globalisation. 
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A note on terminology 
Throughout the thesis, in line with the prevailing discourse in Germany, I refer to 
German 'unification' rather than 'reunification' to stress the coming together of an 
entity that had not previously existed in precisely that form. I refer to 'unity' as the 
post-1990 process of Germans from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the 
Federal Republic growing together politically, socially, economically and 
psychologically. I describe the states of 'East Germans' and 'West Germans' from 
1949 to 1990 as the 'GDR' or 'East Germany' and the 'Federal Republic' and 'West 
Germany' respectively (and not 'FRG' as used in the GDR's official language). For 
the period after 1990,1 refer to 'eastern Germany' and 'western Germany' and to 
'eastern' and 'western Germans'. I also use the 'Federal Republic' and 'united 
Germany' interchangeably to describe post-unification Germany. To avoid 
confusion, I refer to both the European Community (EQ and the European Union 
(EU) as the 'EU', even though the EU only came into existence with the Maastricht 
Treaty on I't November 1993. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German 
or French are mine. Specific concepts that possess particular significance in their 
own language remain in their original. 
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Introduction 
Project outline 
On Yd October 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) acceded to the Federal 
Republic of Germany after more than forty years of division. 3 rd October 
subsequently became the national holiday of united Germany - the 'Day of (German) 
Unity' (Tag der Deutschen Einheit). 3 rd October has since been described as 'a 
meaningless and empty date'. ' This thesis does not deny that the German population 
eschewed their national holiday in its first fifteen years. It will demonstrate, 
however, that from 1990 to 2005, political actors used the Day of Unity 
commemorations - yearly 'snapshots' of united Germany - as platforms from which 
to address key questions facing united Germany: how should a unified Germany deal 
with the National Socialist past? How was the GDR past to be remembered? How 
could eastern and western Germans be integrated with one another? How could 
extremism be countered? How could enthusiasm and awareness be raised for 
federalism and regionalism? How could commitment to the European Union (EU) be 
expressed? Where did Germany's international diplomatic interests lie in a post-Cold 
War world? What was Germany's interpretation of the nation-state, its character and 
its role in an era of Europeanisation and globalisation? This thesis will show that the 
political actors tackled these questions in a number of ways on the Day of Unity: by 
staging united Germany as an extension and continuation of the Federal Republic, 
presenting specific interpretations of Germany's past, attempting to improve intra- 
German relations, promoting to some extent postriational - specifically sub-national 
(regional) and supra-national (EU) - allegiance and attempting to influence the 
strategic diplomatic interests of united Germany. 
The work focuses on the staging of the Day of Unity, specifically the mise-en- 
scýne of the aesthetic elements of the unity celebrations and the rhetoric of the 
various actors. The actors of particular interest to the work include the regional 
organisers of the unity events, the Minister-Presidents of the host LAnder, the German 
1 See historian Arnulf Baring's remarks cited in Schroder, G. (1999). Rede von Bundeskanzier Gerhard 
Schroder. Bulletin, 62,635-637, here 637. 
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Chancellors, German Federal Presidents, the Bundestag Presidents, other German 
politicians and political leaders involved in the organisation or speeches of the Day of 
Unity, foreign heads of statesjoreign politicians, both in and out of office, and where 
relevant also prominent writers and poets involved in the Day of Unity celebrations 
from 1990 to 2005. The main official, central celebrations form the core of the 
research, (supplemented where relevant with brief references to the privately-funded 
Berlin celebrations), as these events, organised and attended by key political actors, 
served as the most significant platform for the analysis of the intentions of actors in 
'staging Germany'. 
The research addresses a number of key questions: What was the role of post- 
war commemorations in the GDR and Federal Republic? How can the core institutional 
elements of the Day of Unity be explained? How did the nature of the staging limit the 
effectiveness of the Day of Unity? What were the motivations and objectives of the 
political actors in selecting P October as the Day of Unity.? Which actors advocated 9 th 
November as a more suitable date for celebrating German unification, and why? Did 
the Day of Unity serve as a site of party politics or was there widespread consensus on 
the main topics? Were the celebrations dominated by West German structures and 
views? If so, why? Were there demonstrations on the Day of Unity? What were the 
main themes of the protests? How did German political actors present the National 
Socialist and GDR pasts? Did this correspond to the depiction of the German past by the 
international actors? Did the interpretations of the past change over the time period of 
analysis? How did political actors on the Day of Unity attempt to construct a sense of 
Wir-Geffihl (sense of belonging together) among eastern and western Germans? What 
role did sub-national (regional) elements play in the mise-en-sc6ne of the Day of Unity 
celebrations? What was the role of supra-national (EU) elements? Which bilateral 
relations were prioritised on the Day of Unity? What do the unity celebrations tell us 
about nationalism and memory in Germany? What do the commemorations indicate 
about the resilience of the nation-state in a phase of Europeanisation and globalisation? 
The thesis explores eight main assumptions about 3d October. Firstly, the Day 
of Unity served as a tool for political actors in the process of constructing and redefining 
ideas on the German past, present and future to convey a specific image of united 
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Germany to Germans and the international community. Secondly, there were shifts and 
changes in the presentation of key ideas on 3d October in the period from 1990 to 2005, 
which reflected the changing concerns of the Gen-nan and international political actors. 
Thirdly, on the German national holiday, German political actors from across the 
mainstream political spectrum presented a largely consensual interpretation and 
portrayal of fundamental guiding ideas and topics. Fourthly, the German and 
international actors used the Day of Unity to construct, and influence attitudes about, 
Germany's past. Fifthly, the Day of Unity was used to improve relations between 
eastern and western Genrians. Sixthly, the German national holiday served as a 
mechanism for what I will be describing in the thesis as 'cultural synchronisation' by 
extending West German value systems and frameworks to eastern Germans through the 
promotion of specific (West Gen-nan) versions of the past, present and future. 'Cultural 
synchronisation' can be understood as the convergence and uniformity of fundamental 
beliefs and value systems across eastern and western Germany. 2 Seventhly, the Gen-nan 
national holiday was presented to some extent as a postriational national holiday, 
however oxymoronic this may initially sound, as a result of some degree of 
denationalisation of the Day of Unity celebrations through sub-national (regional) and 
supra-national (EU) elements. 3 Unlike 'nationalism' -a concept that stresses the 
centrality of nation, be it in terms of territorial, cultural or ethnic identification and 
interests - 'postnationalism' is a concept that moves beyond the notion that the nation- 
state must be the dominant point of reference. In this thesis, postnational elements are 
thus understood as those that do not place the nation at the centre but instead overcome 
the national and nation-state focus through an emphasis on elements below (sub- 
national) and above (supra-national) the nation. 'Denationalisation' refers to the process 
2 The term 'cultural synchronisation' was adapted in the early 1980s as an alternative to 'cultural 
imperialism' within the context of globalising communication structures. See Hamelink, C. J. (1983). 
Cultural autonomy in global communications: planning national information policy. New York: 
Longman. I have adapted the idea in terms that better address the nature of the cultural 'relationships' 
between eastern and western Germans and eastern and western Germany. 
3 The terms 'sub-national' and 'supra-national' are not used in this thesis as elaborated concepts but 
rather as pragmatic means of highlighting the aspects of the national holiday that focus not on the 
nation but rather 'below' or 'above' the nation-state level. I have also selected these terms to avoid 
the, in this case unintended, connotations of terms such as regionalism, with all its multifarious 
associations, particularly in the German context. 
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by which attention and emphasis is removed from national aspects. Eighthly, the Day of 
Unity was used by German political actors to influence bilateral relations. 
The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter One provides the historical, 
institutional and political context of the Day of Unity. The chapter consists of three 
main sections. Section one situates the Day of Unity in its historical context by 
briefly examining the post-war history of German commemorative days, particularly 
17'hJune (the former Day of Unity, Tag der deutschen Einheit, and 'national' holiday 
of the Federal Republic) and 7d' October (the Day of the Republic, Tag der Republik 
and 'national' holiday of the GDR). Section two considers the institutional context of 
the Day of Unity: it critically examines, firstly, the organisation of 3 rd October 
anniversaries; secondly, the western German dominated nature of the 
commemorations; and thirdly, the limits to the effectiveness of the unity celebrations 
as a consequence of the staging. Section three sheds light on the political context of 
the Day of Unity in three sub-sections: firstly, by examining the origins and 
motivations of the choice of date of 3 rd October in contrast to 9hNovember, the date 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; secondly, it explores the relation between party 
politics and the Day of Unity; finally, it examines the way in which the Day of Unity 
served as a site of protest for left and right-wing extremists. The conclusion to the 
chapter places the findings in the context of theoretical debates on nationalism. 
Chapters Two and Three, which focus predominantly on the rhetoric of the 
unity commemorations, explore how the Day of Unity served as a platform for 
redefining ideas about national topics. Chapter Two focuses in two sections on the 
redefinition of the national past, specifically the National Socialist and GDR pasts. It 
explores the way in which the Day of Unity was used to present specific versions of 
the past both to influence attitudes in the international community and to encourage 
cultural synchronisation of the historical consciousness of eastern and western 
Germans. 'Historical consciousness' can be understood in this context as the 
fientirety of the forms and content of thinking with which a group of people classes 
itself in time, relates to the past and orientates itself in the present with regard to the 
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future'. 4 Section one firstly examines in detail the shifts and changes in the official 
interpretations of the National Socialist past in the process of 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (coming to terms with the past) by the German political 
actors from 1990 to 2005 and examines the extent of the trend towards 
'normalisation'. 'Normalisation', expressed either in terms of a reduction of rhetoric 
about the National Socialist past or through emphasis on other aspects of German 
history, describes the promotion of Germany as a 'normal state' -a state in which 
the legacy of the Nazi past is not considered the defining feature of the country's self. 
understanding but rather a chapter in its history. Secondly, it briefly sketches the way 
in which international guest speakers framed the National Socialist past differently to 
the German actors. Section two highlights the way in which the GDR past was 
renegotiated by emphasising the extent to which negative aspects of the Socialist 
Unity Party (SED)-led state stood at the fore of the depiction of the GDR. The 
conclusion to the chapter examines the findings in relation to the Historikerstreit 
(historians' dispute) of the 1980s. It also relates the work to key theoretical debates 
on memory. 
Chapter Three examines, in three sections, the various ways in which political 
actors sought to improve intra-German relations on the Day of Unity to foster ties 
between eastern and western Germans. Section one explores the way in which 
political actors attempted to redefine attitudes about unification and the unity process. 
Section two examines the legal, moral, social and economic arguments used by the 
political actors on the Day of Unity to improve the image of eastern Germans and 
eastern Germany among western Germans. Section three sketches the way in which, 
on the one hand, actors stressed the elements that united Germans, yet on the other 
hand paradoxically also presented differences as positive. The chapter concludes by 
commenting on the political actors' understanding of nationhood in united Germany. 
Chapters Four and Five, which focus principally on the mise-en-sc6ne of the 
unity celebrations, explore the postnational elements of the staging to highlight signs 
of denationalisation of the German national holiday. Chapter Four discusses the sub- 
4 Leo, A. (2003). Keine gemeinsaine Erinnerung. Geschichtsbewusstsein in Ost und West. Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, B40-41,27-32. 
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national, regional aspects of the celebrations to explore the way in which political 
actors sought to stress the importance of federalism, that is to say a decentralised 
(political) system that encourages unity in diversity, 5 in united Germany's self- 
understanding. The first of five sections examines the degree to which the Day of 
Unity can be described as a sub-national national holiday. The sections that follow 
offer explanations for this. Section two examines the way in which actors fostered 
sub-national pride by promoting 'regional identity', understood in this context as a 
form of self-identification with a specific Land. Section three unearths the motives of 
regional actors in maintaining the decentralised character of the unity celebrations 
while section four examines the financial benefits of the sub-national arrangement for 
the LAnder. Section five explores the way in which the commemorations served as a 
platform for attempting to encourage the cultural synchronisation of western German 
liberal democracy and federalism. The conclusion to the chapter explores certain 
tensions on the Day of Unity and situates the work in the broader public debate about 
nationalism in the press at the time of unification. 
Chapler Five examines, in two sections, the supra-national, EU elements of 
the staging to highlight examples of denationalisation of 3 rd October anniversaries 
through 'EU-isation'. 6 To avoid the ambiguity of 'Europeanisation', replete with 
geographic and ideological complexities, that is to say concerning what and where 
'Europe' is, I use the term EU-isation, which refers to a concrete entity and territory: 
it can be understood here specifically as the process by which agendas, rhetoric and 
other aspects of the staging related to the EU replaced national elements on the Day 
of Unity. Section one explores the way in which political actors used the Day of 
Unity as an arena within which to stress united Germany's continued commitment to 
the EU to overcome international fears of German hegemony and to maintain German 
public support for, and interest in, the EU: firstly, by emphasising continuity with the 
Federal Republic's main foreign policy tenets; secondly, by promoting the EU in 
3 Umbach, M. (2002). German federalism in historical perspective. In M. Umbach (Ed. ), German 
federalism: past, presentfuture. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-14, here 1. 
' This term has occasionally been used in political science studies of the EU and Europeanisation 
effects of EU integration on the member states. See, for example, Flockhart, T. (2008). 
Europeanisation: the myths and the facts. Public Policy Research, 13(2), 86-91 and Major, C. (2005). 
Europeanisation and foreign and security policy - undermining or rescuing the nation-state? Politics, 
25(3), 175-190. 
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times of 'Euro-scepticism' and thirdly, by endorsing eastern enlargement of the EU 
and presenting German unity as a contribution to European unity. Section two 
examines the hierarchy of diplomatic interests presented by the Gennan political 
actors. It explores the way in which the Day of Unity served as a forum for 
strategically fostering specific bilateral, predominantly EU, relations important in 
terms of history, trade and security: firstly, it examines relations between Germany 
and the United States of America (US); secondly relations with EU states, 
particularly France and the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland; finally, it briefly explores relations that received less 
attention at the unity celebrations. The chapter concludes by placing the findings in 
the contested debate about postnationalism. 
The conclusion of the thesis summarises the main findings of the project and 
highlights crucial further research that the project has identified. 
Context 
Conceptual approach 
The project design is informed by a number of conceptual approaches. The research 
draws, first and foremost, on recent publications on the cultural history of politics, 
particularly Thomas Mergel's article in Geschichte und Gesellschqfý and Barbara 
Stollberg-Rilinger's recent edited volume. 8 Originally, the concept of political 
culture was developed by the political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 
their pioneering work in cross-national survey research of the degree of participatory 
democratic culture in five countries published in 1963.9 Their work, which explored 
the political interests, values and views that influenced politics, has largely fallen into 
disrepute among social scientists not least because of its normative presuppositions 
on liberal democracy. In historical research on political culture as in this project, 
however, the aim is not to quantify attitudes to democracy or to use 'civic 
7 Mergel, T. (2002). Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 
28(4), 574-606. 
8 Stollberg-Rilinger, B. (Ed. ). (2005). Was heisst Kulturgeschichte des Politischen? Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot. 
9 Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: political attitudes in five nations. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
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propensities' to explain the stability of governments, but rather to examine 
representational forms of political engagements. 
A number of different conceptual approaches exist, which explore these 
representations. This project rejects the concept of Murray Edelmanlo of Political 
culture as symbolic representations that are detached from the 'real' politics of 
decision-making by elites. Instead, it adopts the cultural history of politics approach 
that can be traced back to the work of Roger Chartierl 1 in the late 1980s and that has 
more recently been developed and expanded by Mergel and Stollberg-Rilinger. This 
approach takes representations, such as commemorations, seriously as political 
instruments used to influence agendas and discourses (formal, extended expressions 
of thoughts or ideas on a subject). In this analytical perspective, politics are 
conceived of as communicative action broadly in line with the approach of the 
German social theorist Niklas Luhmann. 12 Interests, power and conflicts are thus 
understood as communicatively produced and symbolically represented phenomena. 
In what social scientists would call a 'constructivist' understanding, information is 
exchanged via a set of symbols and cultural representations that are used as strategic 
devices for influencing contested issues, establishing political hegemony for 
particular guiding ideas and transforming the polity. In this way, this 'new political 
history' moves away from the interpretation of history as guided solely by the 
decisions of 'great men' or underlying socio-economic structures and interests. The 
focus is rather on the dynamic and ever-changing processes by which politics are 
constructed. 
In addition to this the research draws on Benedict Anderson's understanding 
of nations as 'imagined communities'. 13 In Anderson's work, nations are not 
understood as natural entities but rather as 'cultural artefacts'. By exploring the 
changes in, and the decline of, the religious and dynastic communities, the alterations 
in the conception of temporality and space, the interaction between capitalism and 
10 Edelman, M. (1971). Politics as symbolic action: mass arousal and quiescence. Chicago: Markham; 
Edelman, M. (1985). The symbolic uses ofpolidcs. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
11 Chartier, R. (1988). Cultural histo? y. ý between practices and representations. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
'2 Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Luhmann, N. (2000). Die 
Politik der Gesellschaj?. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
13 Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities. London: Verso. 
18 
print and the development of 'languages-of-state', Anderson has demonstrated that 
nations are constructed through various processes. Furthermore, he has illustrated 
that the model of nationalism - originating in the Americas - could be appropriated 
or 'pirated' to other contexts. Following Anderson, this work thus conceives of the 
nation as an imagined community: it is imagined in the sense that most members of 
the community will never meet or know each other but nevertheless feet a sense of 
cohesion and solidarity with one another. Crucially, this imagined community is 
limited in the sense that it has finite boundaries. 
Alongside this, the research adopts Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's 
concept of the 'invention of tradition'. 14 Like Anderson, Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
who understand nations as products of social engineering, have similarly stressed that 
nations are constructed or 'invented'. In their edited volume of case studies ranging 
from eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain to colonial Africa and India, they have 
shown how 'traditions' were invented for various political and social purposes. They 
have illustrated that many 'traditions' were in fact deliberately fabricated or were at 
least more recent than they appeared. Above and beyond this, Hobsbawin and 
Ranger have demonstrated that invented traditions have the potential to create or 
symbolise social cohesion, to establish or legitimise institutions and to encourage 
socialisation and the promotion of beliefs and value-systems. In one example 
pertinent to this work's concerns, Hobsbawm has shown, for instance, how invented 
traditions - most notably primary education, public ceremonies and public 
monuments - contributed to the process of maintaining the legitimacy of, and social 
cohesion within, the Third Republic in France. 15 
Alongside this, the research is also informed by Rogers Brubaker's work on 
16 idioms of nationhood. Brubaker's analysis of citizenship and nationhood in France 
and Germany has shown how specific 'cultural idioms', that is to say ways of 
thinking and talking about nationhood - whether based on understandings of the 
14 Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds. ). (2006). The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
15 See Hobsbawm, E. (2006). Mass-producing traditions: Europe 1870-1914. In E. Hobsbawm & T. 
Ranger (Eds. ), The invention of1radition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 263-307. 
16 Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
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nation as an ethnic (blood) or civic (state-centred) community - influence the way in 
which citizenship of a nation is defined. According to Brubaker, for whom the 
modem state is not merely a territorial organisation but rather also a membership 
organisation, particular definitions of citizenship are thus moulded by certain 
understandings of nationhood. Brubaker rejects purely instrumentalist arguments - 
that particular idioms of nationhood derive directly from specific agendas of political 
actors - and solely cultural explanations. However, he acknowledges that specific 
idioms of nationhood are triggered and strengthened in certain historical, institutional 
and political contexts. Elite idioms, as Brubaker argues, cannot be taken as 
representative of popular idioms. However, at the very least, analysing elite 
understandings of nationhood provides insights into how specific definitions of 
citizenry are constructed and maintained. In this vein, how political actors frame 
nationhood on the Day of Unity both reflects and has the potential to influence the 
way in which citizenship is defined in united Germany. Put simply, the German 
political actors contribute to the process of defining what it means to be German. 
The work also relates to Edgar Wolfrum's concept of 'Geschichtspolitik'. 17 
According to Wolfrum, in plural societies, political actors - who contribute to 
defining the norms and values of a political system - present specific images of the 
past that serve particular political interests at a given time. Wolfrum has explored at 
length the Geschichispolilik of the commemorations in the post-war Federal Republic 
of the uprising of 17th June 1953. In his work, be highlighted the way in which the 
former Day of Unity commemorations served as indicators of the self-understanding 
of the post-war Federal Republic - particularly regarding the German Question. In 
this way, he underlined that the role of political actors in presenting particular 
versions of the past deserves attention since it highlights how history can be used as a 
political tool to influence the masses and to achieve cultural hegemony. He has 
demonstrated, for instance, that history can be politicised to create a sense of 
cohesion among diverse groups as well as to foster political legitimacy. 
l" Wolfrum, E. (1998a). Geschichtspolitik und deutsche Frage. Der 17. Juni im nationalen Gedächtnis 
der Bundesrepublik. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 24(3), 382-411; Wolfrum, E. (1998b). 
Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1989. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B45, 
3-15; Wolfrum, E. (1999). Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der Weg zur 
bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990. Dannstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
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In addition to this, the work critically relates to the sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs' concept of 'collective memory'. 18 Halbwachs has argued that memory 
cannot not be considered solely with reference to an individual in isolation but rather 
is socially constructed. By exploring the collective memories of families, religious 
groups and the nobility, he has reasoned that remembering takes places within 
collective frameworks: individual memory relies on collective memory. For 
Halbwachs, memory is moulded by the concerns of the present. Through his 
empirical analysis of sacred sites in the Holy Land, for example, he demonstrated that 
the perceived location of key events associated with the origins of Christianity, 
altered according to the needs of the contemporaries. ' 9 Pilgrims who sought to draw 
links between the Old and the New Testament, for instance, perceived Old Testament 
sites as having also been holy Christian sites. Halbwachs thereby highlighted that 
collective memory is also highly selective. What is more, according to Halbwachs, 
since one relies on others to remember, through commemoration a past is evoked that 
might otherwise be forgotten. 
The research is complemented, finally, by the work of Jan and Aleida 
Assmann on 'cultural memory' and 'communicative memory'. 20 The Assmanns have 
responded to Halbwachs' notion of collective memory by differentiating between 
cultural and communicative memory. For them, cultural memory, constructed by 
experts, does not fade away with time but rather is intended to remain as part of a 
society's heritage and to stabilise a country's self-image. Cultural memory comprises 
objectified culture: monuments, texts, buildings or rites, constructed to recall specific 
events, are key organisational forms of cultural memory. Communicative memory, 
by contrast, represents everyday communications of the past. It takes place in the 
context of an individual's biography; it is expressed in everyday speech and is 
therefore accessible to all. It is thus inherently disorganised, unstable and non- 
specialised. Importantly, communicative memory is generational and spans at most 
" Halbwachs, M. (1992). On collective memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
19 Nd., 193-235. 
20 Assmann, J. (1992). Das kulturelle Geddchtnis. Munich: C. 11. Beck; Assmann, J. (1995). Collective 
memory and cultural identity. New German Critique, 65,125-133; Assmann, A. (1999). 
Erinnerungsräume - Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses. Munich: C. H. Beck. 
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one hundred years: it is therefore, by definition, shaped for the most part by 
contemporaries of the respective event. 
Utilising and relating where appropriate to these conceptual approaches, the 
research will explore the Day of Unity as a political instrument that has been used by 
political actors to attempt to influence agendas and discourses and to construct and 
propagate particular versions of Germany's past, present and future. To highlight the 
relevance of the research, the review of literature that follows deals specifically with 
key texts on the various functions of representations in redefining the nation, 
legitimising the state, sustaining democracy, highlighting shifts in the political 
culture, creating consensus, fostering a sense of belonging, shaping ideas on the past 
and influencing international relations, which further shaped the research questions of 
the project. Finally, the review highlights the deficiencies and gaps of the scarce 
existing literature on the Day of Unity. 
Existing literature on thefunctions of representations 
Many works have emphasised the significant role of 19'h century commemorations in 
the nation-building process. 21 Recent literature has indicated that in the 20th and 20 
centuries, when the nation-state was largely taken for granted, contemporary national 
days have served by contrast as a platform on which a nation can redefine itself or 
replace existing notions of the nation-state. Sabine Behrenbeck and Alexander 
Niltzenadel, 22 for example, have highlighted the significance of the staging of 
commemorations, be it speeches or aesthetic elements, in the process of a nation 
continually reconstructing its own self-perception. As Beate Binder, Wolfgang 
21 See, for example, Nora, P. (Ed. ). (1994-1992). Les lieux de mgmoire: 1-3. Paris: Gallimard; 
FranQois, E., & Schulze, H. (Eds. ). (2001). Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: 1-3. Munich: C. H. Beck; 
Schneider, U. (1995). Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert. die Rheinprovinz von der 
französischen Zeit bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806-1918). Essen: Klartext Verlag. 
22 Behrenbeck, S., & Nützenadel, A. (Eds. ). (2000). Inszenierung des Nationalstaals: Politische Feiern 
in Italien und Deutschland seit 1860171. Cologne: Sil-Verlag. See, in particular, Behrenbeck, S., & 
Nützenadel, A. (2000). Politische Feiern im Nationalstaat: Perspektiven eines Vergleichs zwischen 
Italien und Deutschland. In S. Behrenbeck & A. Nützenadel (Eds. ), Inszenierung des Nationalstaats: 
Politische Feiern in Italien und Deutschland seit 1860171. Cologne: SH-Verlag, 9-26. 
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Kaschuba and Peter NiedermtIller 23 have shown, speeches, remembrance events and 
other elements of political culture thus serve as central mechanisms for 'producing' 
nations. Moreover, as Gabriella ElgeniUS24 has shown, and as will become clearer 
throughout this analysis of the Day of Unity, commemorations allow nations to 
project and advertise specific images of themselves not only to 'insiders' but also to 
'outsiders'. 
In this way, commemorations also serve as instruments for reinforcing state 
legitimacy. As Jan Andres, Alexa Geisth6vel and Matthias Schwengelbeck's edited 
volume of examples from the 18'h to 20'h century25 has illustrated, representations 
have long been used as tools by states to demonstrate their power and legitimacy. 
Through their publication on 7 th October, Matthias Kitsche, 26 Monika Gibas, Rainer 
Gries, Barbara Jakoby and Doris Willer 27 have observed that in the GDR 
commemorations were used by the ruling SED party as platforms for constructing the 
illusion of legitimacy of the Socialist state. In this context, adopting the terminology 
28 
of Herfried Mijnkler' Birgit Sauerý9 has maintained that political events not only in 
the GDR but also those in western democracies, serve as forums that bring together 
'visible' and 'invisible' manifestations of power. Modem-day political events, such 
as the Day of Unity, thus also stand as a resource for the state to demonstrate its 
authority and legitimacy. In this way, as Sabine R. Arnold, Christian Fuhrmeister 
23 Binder, B., Kaschuba, W., & Niedermüller, P. (Eds). (2001). Inszenierung des Nationalen: 
Geschichte, Kultur und die Politik der Identitäten am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Cologne: Böhlau. 
24 Elgenius, G. (2005). National days and nation-building. In L. Eriksonas & L. Maller (Eds. ), 
Statehood before and beyond ethnicity: minor states in Northern and Eastern Europe, 1600-2000. 
New York: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 363-386; Elgenius, G. (2007). The appeal of nationhood: national 
celebrations and commemorations. In M. Young, M, E. Zuelow & A. Sturin (Eds. ), Nationalism in a 
global era: the persistence of nations. London: Routledge, 77-92. 
25 Andres, J., Geisthdvel, A., & Schwengelbeck, M. (Eds. ). (2005). Die Sinnfichkeit der Macht: 
Herrschaft und Repräsentation seit der Frühen Neuzeit. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
26 Kitsche, M. (1990). Die Geschichte eines Staatsfelertages: Der 7. Oktober in der DDR. Cologne: 
Universität zu Köln. 
27 Gibas, M., Gries, R., Jakoby, B., & Müller, D. (1999). Wiedergeburten: zur Geschichte der runden 
Jahrestage der DDR. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag. 
" Münkler, H. (1995). Die Visibilität der Macht und die Strategien der Machtvisualisierung. In G. 
Göhler (Ed. ), Macht der Öffentlichkeit - Öffentlichkeit der Macht. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 213- 
230. 
29 Sauer, B. (1998). Politische Leiblichkeit und die Visualisierung von Macht: Der 40. Jahrestag der 
DDR. In S. R. Arnold, C. Fuhrmeister & D. Schiller (Eds. ), Politische Inszenierung im 20. 
Jahrhundert. - Zur Sinnlichkeit der Macht. Cologne: Böhlau, 123-145. 
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and Dietmar Schiller" have persuasively argued, political Inszenierung plays an 
important role in representative democracies as it has the ability to reinforce or 
undermine the power of specific actors, groups, governments or states. Indeed, 
although the thesis will show that the Day of Unity served on the whole as a platforrn 
for reinforcing specific ideas and values, as briefly explored in Chapter One, the way 
in which some actors staged protests provides some indication of the dialectic 
character of any such staging. Put simply, political staging can serve as a resource for 
reinforcing legitimacy but can also open the door to inadvertent political demands, 
influences and consequences. 
Consequently, as Ajume H. Wingo3l has recognised, in modem states, 
representations such as political symbols, rituals, mythologies and traditions, have the 
power to help sustain liberal democracies. As will be explored further in Chapter 
Four of this project in particular, these elements, which Wingo terms 'veil politics', 
can serve as mechanisms to highlight core liberal democratic values and impress 
these on the people. Given this function of contemporary representations, it is not 
surprising then, that commemorations can also be examined to highlight 
transformations in the political culture, as George Mosse stressed in his in-depth 
exploration of the emergence of a 'new politics' of mass ceremonial used to organise 
the masses for fasciSM. 32 Indeed, as Dieter Dfiding, Peter Friedemann and Paul 
MUnch's edited volume on commemorations in Germany from the Enlightenment to 
World War I and Fritz Schellack's assessment of national days in Germany from 
1871 to 194533 have illustrated, the nature of the staging of national holidays 
transforms with the changing concerns and priorities of its contemporaries. For this 
30 Arnold, S. R., Fuhrmeister, C., & Schiller, D. (Eds. ). (1998). Politische Inszenierung im 20. 
Jahrhundert., Zur Sinnlichkeit der Macht. Cologne: B6hlau. To see how political careers can be made 
or destroyed by commemorations see, for example, how Bundestag President Philipp Jenninger's 
controversial speech on the fiftieth anniversary of the anti-Jewish pogrom of Vh November 1938 led to 
his resignation in Domansky, E. (1992). 'Kristalinacht', the Holocaust and German unity: the meaning 
of November 9 as an anniversary in Germany. History &Afemory, 4(l), 60-94. 
31 Wingo, A. H. (2003). Veil politics in liberal democratic states. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
32 Mosse, G. (1975). The nationalization of the masses: political symbolism and mass movements in 
Germanyfrom the Napoleonic wars through the Third Reich. New York: Howard Fertig. 
33 Dilding, D., Friedernann, P., & M(Inch, P. (Eds. ). (1988). Offentliche Festkultur: Politische Fesle in 
Deutschland von der Aujklarung bis zum ersten Weltkrieg. Reinbeck: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag; 
Schellack, F. (1990). Nationatreiertage in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1945. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang. 
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reason, as epitomised by Martin Kramer's detailed study of 17'h June, 34 it is important 
to study commemorations within their historical, institutional and political context - 
the task of Chapter One. 
Furthermore, Schiller 35 has advanced the idea, briefly explored in the context 
of the Day of Unity celebrations in Chapter One, that since they necessitate a 
reduction and narrowing of key ideas across the political spectrum, commemorations 
also serve as a medium through which political consensus can be created. 
Consequently, as illustrated by John R. Gillis' edited book on various forms of 
commemorationS36 and as explored with regard to intra-German relations in Chapter 
Three, representations can, on the one hand, encourage the members of groups, 
societies or nations to identify with one another and develop a sense that they belong 
together. On the other hand, as a wealth of literature has shown, and as explored with 
reference to the Day of Unity throughout Chapter Two, commemorative events can 
be used to redefine ideas about the past. Karl-Ernst Jeismann 37 and Annette Leo 39 
respectively have asserted that Geschichisbilder (conceptions of history) and 
historical consciousness shape 'memory culture '39 and influence ideas about the 
present and future. In line with Halbwachs and Wolfrum, Ute Frevcreo has pointed 
out that the elements of the past that are disputed alter with the current needs and 
views of contemporaries. 
In this context, Jan-Werner M01ler's study of intellectuaWl demonstrated that 
in post-unification Germany particular interpretations of the past we re presented to 
34 Krämer, M. (1996). Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni und sein politisches Echo in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bochum: Brockmeyer. 
35 Schiller, D. (1993a). Politische Gedenktage in Deutschland: Zum Verhältnis von öffentlicher 
Erinnerung und politischer Kultur. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B25,32-39; Schiller, D. (1993b). 
Die inszenierte Erinnerung. Politische Gedenktage im öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: zwischen Medienereignis und Skandal. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
36 Gillis, J. R. (Ed. ). (1994). Commemorations: the politics of national identify. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
31 Jeismann, K-E. (2002). Geschichtsbilder: Zeitdeutung und Zukunftsperspektive. Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichle, B51-52,13-22. 
3' Leo, 2003, Keine gemeinsame Erinnerung. 
39 See Rf1sen, J., & Jaeger, F. (2001). Erinnerungskultur. In K-F_ Korte & W. Weidenfeld (Eds. ), 
Deutschland-Trendbuch: Fakten und Orientierungen. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 397-428. 
40 Frevert, U. (2003). Geschichtsvergessenheit und Geschichtsversessenheit revisited. A us Politik und 
Zeilgeschichle, B40-41,6-13. 
41 Miller, J-W. (2000). Another counfry. ý German intellectuals, unification and national identify. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. For an interesting analysis of how other representations such as prose, 
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renegotiate the perception of Gennany in the present. Moller's more recent edited 
volume, focusing on memory and power in post-war Europe, 42 served to illustrate that 
the specific construal of the past could thus influence not only domestic but also 
43 international politics. Pierre Nora's book on France , reaffirmed by Etienne Frangois 
and Hagen Schulze's project on Germany, 44 demonstrated more specifically the way 
in which lieux de mimoire (sites of memory), such as commemorations, contributed 
to this process of redefining the past by crystallising memory in the I 9th and 20th 
century. Timothy Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper's international case 
studies of the agents and arenas of commemorationS, 45 together with Aleida 
Assmann's exploration of museums and the media in 21't century German 6 and 
Wolfrum's publications on 17 Ih Jun e47 have emphasised that contemporary 
representations also serve as important forums of 'inszenierte Geschichle' (staged 
history) (Assmann). 48 
Alongside their function as platforms for redefining and transmitting specific 
interpretations of the past, recent studies have also underlined a more future-oriented 
role of commemorations. Johannes Paulmann's edited volume on German cultural 
diplomacy, 49 for example, recently demonstrated that elements as diverse as state 
visits, receptions at cultural institutes and sporting events served as mechanisms in 
the process of conveying a specific image of the Federal Republic and the GDR to the 
poetry and drama reflected and influenced the presentation of the past in post-1990 Germany see 
Amold et al., 1998, Politische Inszenierung. 
42 Mailer, J-W. (Ed. ). (2002). Memory and power in postwar Europe: studies in the presence of the 
past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
43 Nora, 1984-1992, Les lieux de m9moire. 44 Franqois & Schulze, 2001, Deutsche Erinnerungsorte. 
4" Ashplant, T. G., Dawson, G., & Roper, M. (Eds. ). (2000). The politics of war memory and 
commemoration. London: Routledge. 
46 Assmann, A. (2007). Geschichle im Geddchtnis. Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur bffenflichen 
Inszenierung. Munich: C. H. Beck. 
47 See, in particular, Wolfrum, 1998a, Geschichtspolitik und deutsche Frage; Wolfrum, 1998b, 
Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Wolfrum, 1999, Geschichispolilik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
4' For recent examination of how other representations such as street names reflect and shape historical 
consciousness see, for example, Jaworski, R., & Stachel, P. (Eds. ). (2007). Die Beselzung des 
6ffentlichen Raumes. Politische Platte, Denkmaler und Strassennamen im eurcpd1schen Pergleich. 
Berlin: Frank & Timme and P6ppinhege, R. (2007). Wege des Erinnerns. Was Strassennamen aber das 
deutsche Geschichisbewusstsein aussagen. MOnster: Agenda Verlag. 
49 Paulmann, J. (Ed. ). (2005). Auswartige ReprasentationetL Deutsche Kulturdiplomalie nach 1945. 
Cologne: B6hlau. 
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international community in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, works by scholars 
such as Wolfrum, 50 Wolfgang Kraushaar5l and Manfred Wilke, 52 have focused 
specifically on the role of contemporary national holidays in this process of 
influencing and shaping international relations. They highlighted, for instance, the 
way in which the commemoration of an event that essentially condemned the SED, 
17ffi June, became problematic during a period of improved relations with the GDR in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. These works underscored the way in which the 
staging of the 17'h June anniversaries in that period were carefully orchestrated so as 
not to jeopardise further improvements in German-German and West German-Soviet 
relations. United Germany faces a very different geo-strategic environment to the 
Federal Republic yet the function of its national holiday as a tool for improving 
bilateral relations is no less significant, as Chapter Five will demonstrate. 
The existing literature on representations has highlighted the important role of 
commemorations in redefining the image of the nation, legitimising the state, 
promoting democracy, highlighting transformations in the political culture, fostering 
a sense of belonging, creating consensus, shaping ideas on the past and influencing 
international relations. Given the significance of commemorations, it is thus not 
surprising that a vast number of works have explored the post-war German 
commemorations of 7h October 53 and particularly 17"' June. 54 What is striking, 
however, is that, to date, analysis of the new Day of Unity has been largely neglected. 
50 Wolfrum, 1998a, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik; Wolfrum, 1998b, Geschichtspolitik und 
deutsche Frage; Wolfrum, 1999a, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik-, Wolfrum, 1999b, 
Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
51 Kraushaar, W. (2003). Die wechselvolle Geschichte: der 'Tag der deutschen Einheit' in der 
Bundesrepublik. In S. Wahl & P. W. Wagner (Eds. ), Der Bitterfelder Aufstand. der 17. Juni und die 
Deutschlandpolitik. Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 148-159. 
52 Wilke, M. (2004a). 'Der Tag der deutschen Einheit' in den Gedenkreden des Deutschen 
Bundestages. In H-J. Veen (Ed. ), Die abgeschnittene Revolution des 17. Juni 1953 in der deutschen 
Geschichte. Cologne: Böhlau, 109-128. 
5' See, in particular, Gibas et al., 1999, Wiedergeburten; Kitsche, 1990, Die Geschichte eines 
Staatsfeiertages and Sauer, 1998, Politische Leiblichkeit. 
54 See, in particular, Flemming, T. (2003). 17. Juni. ý Kein Tag der deutschen Einheit. Berlin: Be. Bra 
Verlag; Fricke, K. W. (2003). Die nationale Dimension des 17. Juni 1953. Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 1323,5-10; Gallus, A. (1993). Der 17. Juni im Deutschen Bundestag von 1954 bis 
1990. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B25,12-25; Gallus, A. (2003). 17. Juni 1953: Ostdeutscher 
Aufstand und Westdeutscher Feiertag. Mut: Forumfür Kultur, Politik und Geschichte, 430,425-436; 
Holzweissig, G. (2003). Der 17. Juni 1953 und die Medien. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B23,33- 
38; Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand-, Kraushaar, 2003, Die wechselvolle Geschichte; Veen, H-J. 
(2004). Die abgeschnittene Revolution des 17. Juni 1953 in der deutschen Geschichte. Cologne. 
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Existing literature on 3 rd Octoher 
Existing literature on 3d October has been almost exclusively limited to brief journal 
articles - and there, only in German - offering solely normative analyses on one 
aspect of the Day of Unity, namely the suitability of Yd October as the date for 
55 commemorating the Day of Unity. While Rolf Gr6schner, for example, used legal 
arguments to challenge the appropriateness of the Day of Unity, a small number of 
historians have used specific interpretations of the German past to criticise 3rd 
October 56 or to promote 90' November as a more suitable alternative. 57 Equally 
normative was Gunnar Peter's recent journal article, 58 which sketched in brief some 
elements of the process by which the Day of Unity was selected as the German 
national holiday, in an attempt to defend 3 rd October as the holiday date. Three 
scholars, on the other hand, have approached the topic of 3 rd October less 
normatively. However, as we shall now see, their treatments are both superficial and 
insuff icient. 
Firstly, using a discourse analysis approach, Ruth Geier has briefly examined 
Day of Unity speeches in a chapter of an edited volume on the German language 
since the fall of the Berlin Wal 1.59 Instead of focusing on the content of the speeches, 
as in this study, however, Geier predominantly commented on the style of the 
B6h1au; Wahl, S., & Wagner, P. W. (Eds. ). (2003). Der Bitterfelder Aufstand. - der 17. Juni und die 
Deutschlandpolilik. Leipzig: Forum Verlag; Wilke, 2004a, 'Der Tag der deutschen Einheit'; Wolfrum, 
1998b, Geschichtspolitik und deutsche Frage; Wolfrum, 1999a, Geschichispolilik in der 
Bundesrepublik and Wolfrum, E. (2003). Neue Erinnerungskultur? Die Massenmedialisierung des 17. 
Juni 1953. Aus Polifik und Zeitgeschichle, B40-41,33-39. 55 Gr8schner, R. (1993). Der oktroyierte dritte Oktober: staatsrechtliche und staatsphilosophische 
Grande far die Streichung eines von oben verordneten Feiertags. Krifische Vierte1jahresschrififir die 
Gesetzgebung undRechiswissenschaft, 76(3), 360-366. 
56 See, for example, Schlenke, M. (1991). Der neue Nationalfeiertag: Unbehagen cines Historikers. 
Evangelische Kommentare: Monalsschrift zum Zeitgeschehen in Kirche und GeselIschaft, 24,10 and, 
more recently, Wilke, M. (2004b). Der Tag der Deutschen Einheit: ein Staat - aber kein 
Nationalfeiertag. Mut: Forumfir Kultur, Politik und Geschichte. 442,62-75. 
57 See, for example, Steinbach, P. (1999). Der 9. November in der deutschen Geschichte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts und in der Erinnerung. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B43-44,3-11 and Brendthauer, 
K. D. (2000). Höhen und Tiefen: oder: Der deutsche Tag. Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik, 12(45), 1443-1450. 
58 Peters, G. (2005). Vom Beitrittstermin zum Nationalfeiertag: Zur Geschichte des 3. Oktober 1990. 
DiepolitischeMeinung. - Monatsschrifizu FragenderZeit, 40(431), 47-52. 
59 Geier, R. (2000). 'Alle Jahre wieder... ' Zehn Reden zur deutschen Einheit. In R. Reiher & A. 
Baumann (Eds. ), Mit gespaltener Zunge? Die deutsche Sprache nach dem Fall der Mauer. Berlin: 
Aufbau-Taschenbuch Verlag, 115-130. 
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language, such as the use of personal pronouns, and limited her examination to a very 
small sample of just ten speeches, which she analysed in isolation, removed from 
their historical context. Consequently, Geier was unable to identify shifts and 
changes in the selection of topics for the speeches over time or comment in any way 
on the staging of the unity celebrations. Furthermore, as Geier discussed at length the 
numerous possible techniques for examining rhetoric, little appeared in the article 
about the Day of Unity speeches themselves. 
Secondly, a number of works have also provided cursory closing remarks on 
the Day of Unity in volumes dedicated to other commemorative days but never in the 
detail or for the time-period explored in this project. The most thorough of these was 
to be found in Frank K6nig's monograph on political commemorations in the Federal 
Republic, in which the author dedicated one small chapter to the analysis of the Day 
of Unity. 60 K6nig's sources include only a small number of speeches, newspaper 
articles and surveys, not directly relating to the Day of Unity celebrations, however, 
and his examination is limited to just two years, 1990 and 2000. The present project, 
on the other hand, offers an examination of a full fifteen years of the 
commemorations, covering a period of time long enough to identify and explain 
important developments over time. Above and beyond this clear limitation, K6nig's 
work does not comment at all on the role of the Day of Unity in redefining ideas 
about the past or about intra-German relations or on the sub-national or supranational 
elements of the staging. Instead, it attempts, unsuccessfully, to trace the nebulous 
link between the Day of Unity and 'the German national identity' -a concept now 
largely discredited for its failure to acknowledge that multiple identities of 
individuals, groups and societies exist and overlap. 
Finally, Jochem Schdfer has dedicated two books to 3d October, entitled 'Der 
Peterzug: Dem Nationalfeiertag besonders Verbunden. Der 3. Oktober als Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit, 61 and 'Der 3. Oktober: ein weltweites Symbolfür denfriedlichen 
'0 König, F. (2003). Politische Gedenk- und Feiertage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Tage des 
Vergessens oder geschichtspolitische Mittel mit Zukunft? Berlin: Logos Verlag. 
61 Schäfer, J. (2001). Der Peterzug. ' Dem Nationayelerlag besonders verbundem Der 3. Oktober als 
Tag der Deutschen Einheit. Kelkheim: M. G. Schmitz-Verlag. 
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Dialog'. 62 Although the titles suggest that these works deal with the Day of Unity, 
they are in fact bizarre texts completely removed from the actual 3 rd October 
celebrations. They read as political manifestos that frame the Day of Unity as a 
symbol for world peace and link it with other events that (coincidentally) also took 
place on 3rd October from the thirteenth century to the present day. 
This scarcity of contemporary historical works can be explained in part by the 
reluctance of many historians, not only in Germany, to engage with 
Gegenwartsgeschichle (history of the present), or very recent history. At the same 
time, the increasingly theoretical and qualitative turn of (German) political science 
and the current unpopularity of research on political culture in the social sciences 
more generally help to explain why these disciplines have also contributed little to a 
better understanding of the role of 3rd October for united Germany. 
Thus the existing literature has highlighted the relevance and significance of 
conducting original research into contemporary national holidays. What has been 
missing so far is a comprehensive and contextualised historical, empirical analysis of 
the staging of the Day of Unity from 1990 to 2005 from the perspective of the 
cultural history of politics. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. The work will 
thereby shed light on an entirely new area and make a number of contributions to our 
understanding of the cultural history of politics generally and to our understanding of 
post-unification Germany more specifically. Firstly, by highlighting the functions 
that the Day of Unity attempts to fulfil, the work will contribute to the history of the 
role of national holidays in contemporary liberal democracies. Secondly, the research 
will identify and analyse those elements which German and international political actors 
considered the key issues, as showcased in the staging of each Day of Unity 
anniversary. In this way, it provides insight into the changing priorities and concerns of 
these actors from 1990 to 2005. The research will, thirdly, contribute to theoretical 
debates about the politics of memory in united Germany by exploring which 'official' 
versions of the past were selected for Germany's national holiday in the first fifteen 
years after unification. Fourthly, by exploring how the Day of Unity was used to 
62 Schäfer, J. (2006). Der 3. Oktober: ein weltweites Symbol für den friedlichen Dialog. Kelkheim: 
M. G. Schmitz-Verlag. 
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improve intra-German relations, the research will contribute to debates about the politics 
of identity construction and understandings of nationhood in Gennany. By exploring 
the sub-national and supra-riational elements of the staging of the Day of Unity, the 
research will, fifthly, contribute to debates about nationalism and the role of the nation- 
state in Germany. Finally, analysis of the relative weight of particular bilateral relations 
on the Day of Unity will provide insights into the strategic diplomatic interests of post- 
unification Germany. 
Methodology 
In line with the conceptual framework of the cultural history of politics, which does 
not infer causal links between topics of study, I adopted a case study approach for the 
analysis of the Day of Unity. This approach was particularly appropriate for this 
project as its holistic focus encouraged detailed, intensive and contextualised research 
of a case in a specific arena (the capital of the Land holding the Presidency in the 
Bundesrat in any given year) and at a precise time (3 rd October each year). Since 
there was no desire to statistically generalise from the findings of the research, this 
limitation of the method was not problematic. 
There were a number of stages in the research process. Firstly, I reviewed the 
literature on representations to establish the various potential ftinctions of 
commemorations in liberal democracies. Given that the literature had highlighted the 
central role of speeches in analysing festivities, secondly, I collected full transcripts 
of all speeches given by all speakers at the main unity ceremonies from 1990 to 2005. 
1 supplemented this source base where relevant with the televised addresses of the 
Chancellor on the eve of or during the Day of Unity as well as with planned and 
impromptu speeches by German and international political actors at the citizens' 
festivals, the Federal President's receptio. n or on other occasions at the central 
celebrations in the respective Land capital or at the celebrations in Berlin, albeit to a 
lesser extent as these sources were less readily available. 
The German media often dismissed Day of Unity speeches as Sonntagsreden 
- that is to say, speeches that were humdrum and predictable. Indeed, to some degree 
the content of many speeches was unsurprising. However, the fact that the content of 
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the speeches could to some extent be foreseen made them no less worthy of analysis. 
On the contrary, the fact that the choice of topics and the specific discourses on those 
topics were so dominant that Germans could predict them in itself deserves attention, 
not least to examine how such a high level of consensus on the projected 'official' 
image of united Germany could be achieved. Indeed, the speeches on the Day of 
Unity celebrations can be understood as having contributed to the process of 
reproducing and disseminating certain forms of consensus. Moreover, in their largely 
standardised format, the speeches illuminated continuities and subtle changes in these 
dominant 'official' discourses from 1990 to 2005 to reveal the changing priorities and 
agendas of the speakers. In this context, the appearance of unexpected discourses, 
predominantly from international guest speakers, similarly justified closer analysis of 
the speeches. 
As I sought to identify specific themes of the Day of Unity speeches and 
explore how these changed from 1990 to 2005,1 opted to analyse the Day of Unity 
speeches using a qualitative content analysis approach. Such a method of 
systematically classifying codes and identifying themes, allowed examination of the 
Day of Unity speeches in their specific political, economic and social contexts. In 
this way, it permitted me to explore not only the manifest content (what the speaker 
explicitly said) but also the latent content (what the speaker implied). Thus I was 
able to explore both the formal aspects of the texts as well as their themes and main 
ideas in their specific contexts. In the third stage of the research, I therefore carried 
out a pilot study using qualitative content analysis. On a sample of ten speeches, I 
inductively developed codes from the speeches. I then applied the codes deductively 
to the analysis of a further ten speeches. Subsequently, in a fourth stage of the 
research process, I analysed the remaining speeches. Throughout my analysis of the 
speeches, I developed and redefined the codes in a cyclical process (for a full list of 
the final coding system see Appendix 1). Having established that the codes provided 
a well-informed reflection of the themes of the speeches, I developed tentative 
assumptions about the Day of Unity celebrations. I thus initially developed the main 
assumptions about the unity festivities from the review of existing literature on 
32 
representations and from my analysis of the speeches. As I went along, the material I 
gathered highlighted what further data I needed to collect. 
I combined the analysis of the speeches with examination of a number of 
other sources. Such a strategy of using multiple sources of data (data triangulation) 
sought to enhance the rigour of the research. By using different types of data, I was 
able to further develop and refine the assumptions about the Day of Unity 
commemorations. Thus, I decided, in a fifth stage of the research, to analyse 
newspaper coverage of the unity events. This was particularly important in light of 
the fact that through examination of the speeches alone, I would have been unable to 
comment on details of the wider celebrations. I collected and analysed articles from 
five different German domestic newspapers to provide a sample of newspapers with 
different political tendencies and to allow reliability checks between the data of 
different newspapers. I selected: the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, SOddeutsche 
Zeitung and the Frankfurter Rundschau (the most popular national broadsheets), the 
Bild-Zeitung (a tabloid owned by the Springer group with a very wide readership), 
and Neues Deutschland (the newspaper of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 
which presented an extreme left-wing former GDR perspective on the unity 
celebrations). Where possible, I supplemented this sample with articles from a range 
of regional newspapers. The articles from the German print press allowed me to 
comment on specific details of the staging of the unity events including their location, 
details of speakers, guests and demonstrations and also provided information about 
the political climate and context in which the unity events took place. In addition to 
the German domestic newspapers, I also conducted a selective study of international 
reporting of the Day of Unity celebrations, namely The Times and The Guardian (two 
of the most popular British broadsheets) and Le Figaro and Le Monde (leading 
French broadsheets). I selected this sample of reporting as Britain and France stand 
out as two fortner great power adversaries and as principal partners of Germany in the 
EU. The newspaper articles of the international press complemented those of the 
German press by offering an external perspective on the unity events as well as 
strikingly different material on elements of the commemorations and on the broad 
political context of the events. I systematically collected and analysed articles from 
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all the selected newspapers from I" to 50' October of each year from 1990 to 2005, 
that is to say two days before and two days after each Day of Unity celebration. This 
time frame of analysis provided information regarding what was planned to take 
place on the Day of Unity, which was particularly important for the analysis of the 
intentions of the key political actors that forms the focus of this research. It also 
allowed any discrepancy to be highlighted between the planned events and what 
actually did take place. 
Having analysed the newspapers, it was clear that they provided insufficient 
visual images of the unity celebrations to allow me to comment on the aesthetic 
elements of the Day of Unity. For this reason, in a sixth stage of the research process, 
I collected a broad range of televised reporting from various broadcasters. From RTL 
(Radio Television Luxembourg), a leading German private channel, I extensively 
analysed coverage from the special Day of Unity programmes (Sondersendungen), 
where produced, as well as news coverage from RTL Aluell and RTL NachYournal, 
which predominantly provided images of the ceremony and demonstrations of the 
central celebrations. For an overview of the Berlin celebrations, by contrast, I 
analysed footage from various unity programmes from ZDF (Second German 
Television), one of the two German domestic public channels. I collected and 
analysed data from these broadcasters from every second year from 1990 to 2005 as 
this offered a representative selection of Left/Right and East/West organised events 
that took place in Schwerin (1992), Bremen (1994), Munich (1996), Hanover (1998), 
Dresden (2000), Berlin (2002) and Erfurt (2004). Besides the RTL and ZDF 
coverage, reporting of the Day of Unity citizens' festival was traditionally carried out 
on a regional level by broadcasters under the umbrella of ARD (Consortium of public- 
law broadcasting institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany). For this reason it 
was also necessary for me to collect and analyse all available Day of Unity summary 
programmes for each of the 3 rd October anniversaries; these were the main sources of 
data for my analysis of the festivities organised for the general public. They included 
programmes produced by NDR (North German Broadcasting), Saarldndischer 
Rundfunk, Radio Bremen, Bayerischer Rundfunk, SWR (Southwest Broadcasting), 
RBB (Berlin-Brandenburg Broadcasting) and WDR (Western German Broadcasting 
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Cologne). The televised coverage made it possible for me to examine the visual 
staging of the Day of Unity such as the use of flags and music at the ceremonies and 
citizens' festivals. It also allowed me to explore how different elements of the mise- 
en-scýne were organised to examine the extent to which they supported, contradicted 
or commented on each other. In my analysis of the television coverage I took into 
consideration the associations of the specific elements of the mise-en-sc6ne as well as 
the codes of meaning on which they drew. Through examination of the television 
coverage I was able to tighten and further develop assumptions about the Day of 
Unity. 
Analysis of the speeches, newspapers and televised coverage had highlighted 
a number of key questions that remained unanswered regarding the staging of the 
unity celebrations and the intentions of those organising the events. In the seventh 
phase of the research, after being granted ethical approval of the research by the 
University of Portsmouth, I therefore conducted structured interviews, with open 
answers, with key organisers of the Day of Unity celebrations to provide a further 
valuable source of information (see Appendix 2 for questionnaire template). I 
selected for interview leading civil servants, predominantly from the protocol 
departments of the various State Chancelleries of those Ldrider, which had been 
directly involved in organising the main central unity celebrations (for a full list of 
interview partners see the Bibliography). In some instances, it was necessary to 
interview only one individual who had been responsible for managing the 
organisation of both the ceremony and citizens' festival; in other cases, however, it 
was necessary to interview one person for the ceremony and another for the citizens' 
festival where these two elements had been organised independently. After 
consenting to complete the questionnaire in awareness of the possible uses and 
dissemination of the information they provided, the interview partners completed the 
questionnaire themselves and returned the document electronically. In one case, I 
conducted the interview via telephone at the request of the State Chancellery, as the 
respective organiser wished to remain anonymous. I supplemented the questionnaires 
with follow-up emails and telephone calls where data supplied required further 
elucidation. I also liaised via telephone and email on a number of occasions with 
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various speech writers and, most notably, with the Manager of the Protocol 
Department of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Christian K6nig) to verify certain 
details of the events and state protocol. In contrast to semi-structured or structured 
face-to-face interviews, which would not have been possible with the time and 
financial resources available for this project, the structured interviews facilitated 
relatively low-cost, prompt and detailed data collection. Consequently, I was able to 
conduct numerous interviews, which provided a wealth of useful information about 
the intentions of the organisers and the respective regional actors in the staging of the 
event. The interviews played an important role in further refining assumptions about 
the Day of Unity celebrations. 
To complement the structured interviews, I was able to retrieve a number of 
organisational and procedural documents concerning the unity celebrations from the 
various organisers. Several event managers provided a broad range of materials: 
guest lists for the ecumenical service and main ceremony, templates of invitations to 
the ecumenical service, ceremony, Federal President's receptions and other unity 
events such as the opening of exhibitions, samples of the programme for the 
ecumenical service and ceremony, security guidelines for the event, hand-outs for 
those involved in ensuring the protocol ran smoothly on the day, marketing material 
used to attract sponsors, plan layouts of the location of each aspect of the celebration 
within the host city and brochures with photos of the event produced by the 
respective State Chancelleries following the celebrations. This valuable primary 
material complemented the structured interviews by providing further insight into the 
intentions of the political actors involved in staging the unity celebrations. 
The speeches, newspapers, televised coverage, interviews and organisational 
material had provided me with in-depth details of the staging of the unity events. it 
became clear, however, that it was necessary to place the Day of Unity in a broader 
context. To further enhance the rigour of the research, in the final stage of the 
research process I therefore gathered transcripts of numerous Bundestag debates from 
1990 to 2005.1 selected discussions relating to the economic or social impact of 
German unification, intra-German relations since unification and topics concerned 
with the actual Day of Unity celebrations. These debates highlighted shifts and 
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changes in political attitudes towards, and key challenges resulting from, unification. 
Moreover, they provided valuable material on key controversies regarding the Day of 
Unity. 
Methodological difficulties and limitations of the research 
As a number of historians have acknowledged, examining the reception of 
commemorations is notoriously challenging as it is difficult to state with certainty the 
effect of the festivities on participants. 63 Often, the most that can be explored 
convincingly is the nature of messages that were sent out, how the event was staged 
and the intentions of the political actors that guided these. For a number of pragmatic 
reasons, this study therefore focuses exclusively on the mise-en-scýne and rhetoric of 
the unity celebrations to provide insights into how political actors intended to make 
the Day of Unity work for them, their goals, and the images of Germany they sought 
to foster. The research therefore cannot comment in any detail on the way in which 
the staging and messages of the Day of Unity were received. It is possible that letters 
to the editor in the German print press and surveys would shed some light on the 
reception of the Day of Unity. However, very few such letters were published and to 
date only a very limited number of surveys offer any statistical information on 
attitudes toward 3 rd October; moreover, existing surveys ask simply 'if' and not 
6 why' Germans like or dislike the Day of Unity. Given that the entire German nation 
would inevitably serve as the subject of an in-depth reception-based analysis, any 
self-conducted survey that would hope to be representative and credible would go 
beyond the time and budgetary scope of this project. Where relevant, however, I 
include brief references to the popularity (or lack thereof) of the celebrations in the 
form of attendance statistics of the unity events, retrieved from organisers and the 
media, to complement the analysis of the staging. Although I do not claim to be able 
to comment on the extent to which each possible factor contributed to the 
unpopularity of Day of Unity, in Chapter One, I also provide analysis of the possible 
63 See, for example, Schneider, 1995, Polifische Fesikultur, 20 and Green, A. (2001). Falherlands: 
state-building and nationhood in nineteenth-century Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 20. 
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limits to the effectiveness of the Day of Unity in terms of the scope and 
transformation of the messages of the political actors resulting from specific 
characteristics of the staging. 
As Gegenwarisgeschichle, the research also encountered a number of 
practical difficulties, most notably regarding the structured interviews and 
organisational documents. Interview partners were occasionally unwilling to divulge 
certain details of the organisation of the unity events due to the perceived political 
sensitivity of the information. Similarly, with only a few exceptions, organisers were 
reticent to provide confidential records of the actual negotiations for planning the 
event. As a result of this it was difficult to track developments and changes in 
intentions during this process. While in many respects it was the contemporary 
nature of the topic that imposed limitations on the research, it was paradoxically also 
the time period of analysis that produced a very different practical difficulty: a 
number of individuals who had organised the events in the early 1990s were no 
longer able to remember precise details of the staging preparations, had misplaced 
documents or, in a few cases, had retired and were unavailable for interview. It was 
therefore necessary to supplement the information provided by the organisers with 
details from the newspaper articles and television coverage. 
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1. The Day of Unity in context 
This chapter places the Day of Unity in its broad historical, institutional and political 
context. It traces the recent history of commemorative days in Germany, the 
institutional arrangement of 3 rd October and the political scope of the German 
national holiday in arenas beyond its official celebrations. The chapter comprises 
three main sections. To explore the historical context, section one briefly examines 
the key commemorative days of post-war Germany. On the one hand, it analyses the 
functions of 17th June, commemorating the GDR workers' uprising of 1953. On the 
other, it explores 7th October, commemorating the founding of the GDR in 1949. 
Section two discusses the institutional context of the Day of Unity by analysing three 
key aspects: firstly, the nature of its core organisational elements; secondly, the 
western German dominance of the celebrations in the context of the legal framework 
of unification in 1990 and, thirdly, the way in which certain elements of the staging 
may have limited the effectiveness of the Day of Unity. Section three explores in 
three sub-sections the political context of the Day of Unity. By exploring the origins 
of 3 rd October and suggestions for alternative dates, particularly 9 th November, it 
highlights how date preferences for the German national holiday of certain actors 
corresponded to their contrasting visions for united Germany. Next, it demonstrates 
that while the Day of Unity celebrations themselves were largely removed from 
partisan politics and enjoyed a high degree of cross-party consensus on key issues, 3rd 
October as a symbol of unification was nevertheless utilised for political party 
purposes. This is explored with particular reference to use of the 10th anniversary of 
German unification by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Finally, it examines the way in which the Day 
of Unity was instrumental ised as a site of protest by both right and left-wing 
extremists. 
1.1 Historical Context 
The origins of German Festkultur can be traced back to the French revolutionary 
celebrations of the late 18th and early 19th century when, through the conflict with 
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Napoleon, Germans, particularly Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, discovered the potential of 
the Volksfest and Nationalfest as political mechanisms. 64 Although Jahn sought to 
distance himself from the French commemorative culture, the revolutionary 
celebrations nevertheless strongly influenced his conception of core elements of the 
Fest in Germany as outlined in his 1810 publication Teutsches VolkstUM,. 61 TbiS 
French-inspired German format of celebration, first applied to festivals of male choir 
societies, sharpshooting societies and gymnasts organisationS66 and to celebrate the 
Battle of Leipzig of 18'h October 1813, became the model for national 
commemorations throughout the 190' century. 67 
Owing to the 'late' formation of the German nation-state in 1871, 
commemorative and 'national' days in Germany in the I 9th century were originally 
celebrated at the regional level of the German states (Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia etc. ). 
Later, the newly created nation-state never officially declared a national holiday, 
though Sedantag on 2 nd September, celebrating the decisive victory of the Prussian 
troops in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, essentially served as such in the German 
Empire of 1871 to 1918 . 
6' The Weimar Republic later selected I I'h August as its 
national holiday, the date on which Reich President Friedrich Ebert signed the 
Weimar constitution, whereas the National Socialists, who created a number of highly 
politicised commemorations, selected I st May, the so-called 'Day of National Work' 
as their national holiday. 
Tn post-war Germany, remembrance days also found their place in the 
memory cultures of both German stateS. 69 In the Federal Republic, largely because of 
the legacy of National Socialism, the search for commemorative days generated 
64 Schneider, 1995, Politische Festkultur, 15. 
65 Ibid. ' 16. 66 Mosse, 1975, The nationalization ofthe masses, 28. 
67 Schneider, 1995, Politische Festkultur, 16. 
" See Schellack, F. (1988). Sedan- und Kaisergeburtstagsfeste. In D. Düding & P. Münch (Eds. ), 
Öffentliche Fesikultur: Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Au/klärung bis zum ersten Weltkrieg. 
Reinbeck: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 278-297 and Schneider, U. (2000). Sedantag im Kaiserreich. 
In S. Behrenbeck & A. Nützenadel (Eds. ), Inszenierung des Nationalstaats: Politische Feiern in Italien 
und Deutschland seit 1860171. Cologne: SII-Verlag, 27-44. 
'59 Schiller, 1993, Die inszenierte Erinnerung, 37. 
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considerable difficulties. 70 Commemorations in the post-war West German state 
served to mark state identity, as in the case of 23d May, the day the constitution was 
promulgated in 1949, or to commemorate the two World Wars and the Nazi 
dictatorship or, as with 17'h June, German division. 71 17'h June, which 
commemorated the workers' uprising in the GDR in 1953, served as an important 
public holiday from 1954 and as the 'national' holiday of the Federal Republic from 
1963. In contrast, the GDR, which also staged a variety of commemorations 
(including 8flMay, commemorating the 'Day of Liberation' in 1945 and I" May, the 
'Workers' Day'), selected 7th October, as its 'national' holiday, commemorating the 
foundation of the GDR in 1949. 
To place 3 rd October in its historical context, this section determines the 
historical role of these contemporary 'national' days in Germany. 17th June differed 
from 3 rd October in three main ways, which influenced the nature of its 
commemoration: firstly, it was a day of sadness, secondly, it remembered an event 
not directly experienced by those commemorating it, and thirdly, with its goal of 
unification, it was future-oriented. 72 These differences notwithstanding, 17 ffi June is 
considered in more detail below than 7ýh October, both because the latter was a 
commemoration of a party dictatorship with very different forms of representation 
from a liberal democracy, and because 3 rd October celebrations were to a large extent 
used to delineate Germany from the GDR. Moreover, as the institutional predecessor 
to unified Germany, the Federal Republic and its representations are more relevant to 
analysis of the historical context of 3 rd October. 
11'4 June: theformer Day of Unity 
In response to the severe political and economic difficulties of the early post-war 
years of the GDR, at its second party congress in July 1952, the SED announced the 
4planned construction of Socialism'. This declaration signified, among other 
changes, a rise in work norms; put in simple terms, East Germans were expected to 
" Hattenhauer, 11. (1992). Nationalsymbole. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), Handw6rierbuch 
zur deutschen Einheil. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 505. 
71 Schiller, 1993, Die inszenierle Erinnerung, 37. 
72 See Kramer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 174. 
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work more for the same money or risk pay cuts. Angered by the threat of a reduced 
salary, on l6fl' June 1953 East Berlin construction workers carried out a protest 
march, which sparked a widespread uprising against the SED government the 
following day. On 17fl' June, tens of thousands of protestors in Berlin and perhaps as 
many as two million demonstrators across the GDR, 73 called for free elections and for 
the government to stand down. 74 In a symbolic act indicating a desire for German 
unity, demonstrators in Berlin sang the third verse of the West German national 
anthem while tearing down red flags from the Brandenburg Gate and replacing them 
with the West German flag. 75 To put an end to the uprising, Soviet troops moved in, 
arrested, injured and killed hundreds of people. 76 
Political actors in the GDR and the Federal Republic interpreted the protests 
very differently. In the GDR, where such an uprising of the people against the party 
was at variance with party ideology, the SED framed the events as a 'fascist 
putsch' '77 that is to say, as a West German plot to destabilise the GDR . 
78 By contrast, 
in the Federal Republic, 17th June was propagated as a symbol of uprising against 
Communist oppression and of a desire for unification. 
Immediately after the event, the CDU/CSU and SPD began thinking about 
how 170' June could best be remembered. In a discussion just before the 1953 general 
election, which brought unification into the debate as a key topic, the CDU rapidly 
suggested that 17 th June should be a commemorative day. The SPD's more ambitious 
proposal, namely that it be remembered as a work-free holiday on which shops would 
close, subsequently achieved widespread consensus across the political spectrum, 
with the exception of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). On 4th August 1953, 
17 th June thus became the legal holiday of West Germany according to article 82 of 
the Basic Law: 'unity and freedom' became the concept of the day, named the Tag 
73 Fricke, 2003, Die nationale Dimension, 5. 
74 Spittmann, 1. (1992). Tag der deutschen Einheit. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), 
Handw6rierhuch zur deutschen Einheit. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 660-667, here 661. 75 Aid, 661-662. 
76 Although the exact number of victims remains unclear, the recent collection of data from as many as 
700 different locations has highlighted that the number of victims was substantially higher than 
initially estimated. For an examination of the different estimates of the number of victims see Fricke, 
2003, Die nationale Dimension, 6. 
77 Ihid, 8.9. 
78 See Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 224. 
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der deutschen Einheit differing from its 3rd October successor of the same name only 
by the lack of capitalisation of the word 'deulschen'. 79 A decade later, Federal 
President Heinrich LQbke proclaimed the Tag der deutschen Einheit a 'national 
commemoration day of the German people 80 even though 17 th June was never 
81 registered as a national holiday with the United Nations (UN). 
17th June represented in many ways a moral demarcation of the Federal 
Republic from the GDR 82 and thus served as a vehicle to legitimise the Federal 
Republic as the 'better' Germany and to undermine the 'other' Germany. The 
uprising thus not only became part of GDR history but also had an effect on, and an 
evolving meaning for, West Germany. 83 In that vein, shlifts and changes are 
discernible in the nature of commemoration of 1701 June from 1954 to 1990. In many 
respects, the staging of the commemorations played an important political role and 
reflected the domestic political climate, political party aspects, generational divisions, 
international conditions and socio-economic changes in the Federal Republic. 84 In 
the 1950s, for example, West German politicians and the West German public 
displayed considerable interest in the day, actively remembering victims of the 
uprising and politically discussing the possibility of re-establishing German unity. 85 
Over time, however, West Germans gradually participated less and less in festivities 
for 17 1h June 86 so that by the 1960s, enthusiasm for the day had waned so much that 
Federal President LUbke felt it necessary to raise the profile of the day by declaring it 
a national holiday. Despite the Federal President's efforts, by the 1970s the date had 
come for many to represent a Tag der Freizeit (a day of leisure) rather than a day for 
87 commemorating the victims of the 1953 uprising. The change in attitudes toward 
170' June in the 1960s and 1970s can be attributed to a number of factors, most 
notably the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the mounting tensions between 
79 Kraschaar, 2003, Die wechselvolle Geschichte, 158. 
8') Wolfrum, 1998b, Geschichtspolitik und deutsche Frage, 403. 
81 Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 177-230. 
82 Kraushaar, 2003, Die wechselvolle Geschichte, 156. 
83 Gallus, 2003, Der 17. Juni, 12. 
84 Wolfrum, 2003, Neue Erinnerungsk-ultur, 36. 
85 Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 190. 
:6 Spittmann, 1992, Tag der deutschen Einheit, 666. 
7 Gallus, 2003, Der 17. Juni, 12; Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 190; Kraushaar, 2003, Die 
wechselvolle Geschichte, 159. 
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the two German states in the Cold War, as a result of which many West Germans, 
increasingly uninterested in the economic, political and social aspects of the GDR, 
considered unification less and less likely. 88 At the same time, the Social-Liberal 
coalition governments of Willy Brandt (1969-1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974- 
1982), reduced the emphasis on the goal of unification and introduced a phase of 
d6tente in German-Gcrman relations. Consequently, emphasis also shifted from calls 
for unity to a focus on the status quo among many political leaders of the Federal 
Republic. Given that the preamble to the Basic Law outlined a commitment to 
German unity, 89 17th June, as a symbol of that commitment could not be entirely 
neglected. Yet the date had become an unwelcome inheritance of a 'colder' period of 
the Cold War, which threatened to potentially damage relations with the GDR in the 
context of the Ostpolifik d6tente policies. 90 The election of Helmut Kohl as 
Chancellor on I" October 1982, however, signified a shift in the commemoration of 
17ý' June in the 1980s. Countering numerous suggestions that first emerged in the 
spring of 1968 that 17th June be demoted to a remembrance day, 91 the new Chancellor 
declared unequivocally in 1983 that it would remain a national holiday. 92 During the 
1980s, an increased interest in questions of national identity and self-awareness arose 
that reached its zenith during the Historikerstreit. 93 In this era of a new discursive 
emphasis on unity by the Christian Democrat-led coalition government, words such 
as 'nation', 'state' and 'fatherland' as well as the concept of national identity also re- 
94 emerged in the context of 17th June. By the beginning of the decade that followed, 
the Berlin Wall had fallen and in 1990, for the first time, freely elected 
parliamentarians of the GDR's Volkskammer spoke on 17th June, in the East Berlin 
Schauspielhaus. 95 
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When 3 rd October replaced 17t" June as the new national holiday of united 
Germany in 1990, the former Day of Unity was relegated to a remembrance day. 96 
On 17 th June 1991,17'h June was demoted yet further when Minister of the Interior 
Wolfgang Schduble declared that it would no longer be a public holiday. As with 
other important commemorative dates in Germany, however, flags would 
nevertheless be flown on that date. 97 While 17 th June experienced a European-wide 
remembrance boom for its 50th anniversary in 2003, a decade after it ceased to be a 
remembrance day, an Emnid survey nevertheless revealed that the majority of 
98 Germans no longer knew what the date represented . The former Day of Unity, no 
longer needed as an instrument with which to demarcate the Federal Republic from 
the GDR became a relic of divided Germany. 
; "ý Octoher: a Socialist holiday 
17'h June was clearly an unthinkable commemorative day for the GDR. Moreover, 
the GDR had already established its own official holiday. On 21" April 1950, at its 
fifteenth sitting, the Volkskammer passed a law to introduce 7 th October as the 
official holiday of the GDR. This Tag der Republik, marking the creation of the 
GDR in 1949, became the 'national' holiday of the GDR in the mid-1970s. The 
change in status of 7th October did not result from a formal act but rather from the 
introduction of a new Sprachregelung on the 26h anniversary of the GDR. This 
prescribed terminology reflected the definition of the GDR as a Socialist nation, no 
longer part of the German nation, as outlined in the altered constitution implemented 
exactly one year earlier. 99 
In stark contrast to commemorative days in the Federal Republic, 7d, October 
was largely ritualised and used as a platform on which to maintain and reinforce the 
state and party rule: the SED used 7 th October to cultivate the image of the GDR and 
to symbolically demonstrate its own power and control. Moreover, the Day of the 
Republic, as Martin Kitsche has demonstrated, was neither ideologically nor 
96 Spittmann, 1992, Tag der deutschen Einheit, 666. 
97 Krämer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 279. 
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aesthetically dramatically different from other commemorative days in the GDR. It 
sought to integrate and emotionally link its citizens to the East German state. 100 For 
the SED, participation of GDR citizens in the 7th October celebrations, despite being 
largely compulsory, served as a yearly manifestation of public support for the regime 
and thus as a symbol of legitimacy. 101 
As with 17'h June, various different phases were discernible in the nature of 
the commemorations on the Day of the Republic, which reflected the changing 
function of the celebrations as well as the political and ideological developments in 
the SED and GDR. In the early 1950s, in an attempt to construct a GDR 
consciousness, 7fl' October anniversaries were ideologically-loaded. On 7 th October 
1953 more East Germans celebrated than on any previous anniversary: the re-election 
of President Wilhelm Pieck was strategically chosen to take place on the same day to 
deflect attention from the 17th June uprising months earlier. In the mid-1950s, 
celebrations became less driven by ideology and began to develop as a festival of and 
for the citizens. 102 Under the influence of First Secretary of the SED Walter 
Ulbricht's suggestion of a Confederation between the two German states, on 30 th 
December 1956, subsequent 7th October anniversaries explicitly incorporated the 
GDR's interpretation of the German Question. In the late 1950s, particularly on the 
tenth anniversary, the SED staged large-scale celebrations of the GDR state. 103 In the 
1960s, following the construction of the Berlin Wall, a return to the ideological form 
of celebrations characteristic of the early 1950s was the consequence of the SED's 
attempt to propagate that, more than ever, the people supported their state and 
party. 104 The transferral of SED leadership from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker 
in 1971 marked a new phase in the history of the GDR, yet did not initially influence 
the form of the 7th October commemorations. A shift was first noticeable in the mid- 
"0 Ibid., 88. 
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1970s following the declaration of 7h October as a 'national holiday'. In this context, 
during the mid and late 1970s, the SED reverted to representative forms of self- 
portrayal of the GDR state. This trend of ritual self-projection intensified in the 
1980s. 1 05 The 40th anniversary in 1989 witnessed the last celebration of the creation 
of the GDR and demonstrated that even on its final anniversary 7 th October operated 
as an instrument to symbolise an allegedly high degree of support and legitimacy for 
the failing SED regime and the crumbling GDR state. Just two days later, the Leipzig 
Monday Demonstrations commenced, signifying the beginning of the end of the 
GDR. 
The creation of 3 rd October as the Day of Unity as the national holiday of all 
Germans in 1990 marked an official conclusion to the celebration of 17 th June and 7 th 
October as 'national' holidays. Having explored the historical context of the Day of 
Unity, the chapter now shifts to examine its institutional framework. 
1.2 Institutional context 
Core organisational elements 
The defining characteristics of the Day of Unity were: its rotational arrangement, its 
organisation by civil servants, an ecumenical religious service, a ceremony and a 
citizens' festival. 
While in both post-war German states, the main celebrations of the respective 
national days were hosted in Berlin, 106 the Day of Unity festivities were organised 
regionally. 'With a view to federalism', this was decided between the heads of 
federal and state government to give each Land the 'opportunity to arrange a national 
celebration from their perspective and under their auspices'. 107 From 1990 to 2005, 
the official Day of Unity celebrations took place in the state capital of whichever 
Land held the rotating presidency in the Bundesrat at the time of the celebrations. As 
105 Kitsche, 1990, Die Geschichte eines Staalsfeiertages, 94-139. 
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a result of the rotational arrangement, 3 rd October anniversaries took place in a 
different Land each year: 
0 1990 Official unification of the two German states, Berlin, Capital of 
Germany 
9 1991 in Hamburg, Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg 
0 1992 in Schwerin, State Capital of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
0 1993 in Saarbracken, State Capital of Saarland 
0 1994 in Bremen, State Capital of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen 
0 1995 in Dosseldorf, State Capital of North Rhine-Westphalia 
0 1996 in Munich, State Capital of Bavaria 
1997 in Stuttgart, State Capital of Baden-WUrttemberg 
1998 in Hanover, State Capital of Lower Saxony 
9 1999 in Wiesbaden, State Capital of Hesse 
0 2000 in Dresden, State Capital of Saxony 
0 2001 in Mainz, State Capital of Rhineland-Palatinate 
0 2002 in Berlin, Capital of Germany 
0 2003 in Magdeburg, State Capital of Saxony-Anhalt 
0 2004 in Erfurt, State Capital of Thuringia 
0 2005 in Potsdam, State Capital of Brandenburg 
Although no official protocol outlined the core elements of the central Day of Unity 
celebrations, ' 08 the organisers nevertheless adopted a similar approach for the 
organisation of the unity events. As the organisers of the first Day of Unity 
anniversary celebrations in Hamburg agree, 109 it would seem that the 1991 
commemorations served as an archetype for the organisation of subsequent Day of 
Unity events. Future organisers emulated the Hamburg celebrations, adopting the 
basic structures and later adding specific elements, such as the civic delegation. 
Similarly, in terms of the misc-en-scýne of each aspect, no set protocol for 
celebrations existed per se. 110 The host federal state was able to stage the ecumenical 
service, ceremony and the citizens' festival as they saw appropriate, "' thus affording 
a large degree of autonomy to the regional actors. Although a strict seating protocol 
existed for the ceremony, organisers, customarily with agreement from the relevant 
state's Minister-President, were able to select what, if any, regional, national and 
108 C. K6nig, personal communication, October 25,2006. 
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European symbols and flags were used to stage the venue. 112 Organisers similarly 
had authority over choosing symbols and flags for the citizens' festival., 13 The 
organisation and staging of the celebrations were therefore not based on protocol but 
rather on guidelines that established themselves over the years. 114 The organisers of 
the Day of Unity thus established invented traditions in the sense that numerous 
elements of the organisation and staging that were not mandatory continued as a 
result of 'quasi-obligatory repetition'. 115 
In post-war Germany, the parties responsible for the organisation of the state 
days were indicative of the respective functions of the commemorations. Reflecting 
the pluralist democracy of the Federal Republic, a number of organisations and 
institutions 116 had organised 17th June commemorations in order to maintain an 
awareness of national unity throughout the Federal Republic. The most influential of 
these, Unteilbares Deutschland, ' 17 a cross-party organisation comprised politicians, 
philosophers, historians and writers, initially selected by its founder Jakob Kaiser 
(CDU), Federal Minister for all-German questions. 118 By contrast, in the GDR, to 
ensure that 7 th October corresponded to party ideology and served as a 'societal 
weapon', 119 the SED had involved itself directly in every stage of the Day of the 
Republic organisation. The organisers of the Day of Unity events similarly reflected 
one of the key functions of the national holiday of united Gen-nany, namely the 
promotion of federalism: as regional actors, civil servants from the State 
Chancelleries of the respective host state were best placed to promote the regional 
dimension of the Day of Unity. 
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Throughout the 19'h century, national festivities included religious services to 
encourage the 'religious consciousness of the community'. 120 As an atheist state, it is 
unsurprising that the GDR did not create a place for religion in the staging of its 
'national' day, yet religious services played a role, albeit minor, in the Fesikultur of 
the Federal Republic. As Behrenbeck and Niltzenadel have argued, this can be 
explained by the role of religion in the Federal Republic: while the state did not 
directly draw its legitimacy from a particular religious belief, the Basic Law was 
nevertheless indirectly based around Christianity and the Christian Churches enjoyed 
a privileged position. 121 In this vein, as an extension of the traditions established in 
the Federal Republic, religious services also played a part in the representation of 
united Germany on the P October anniversaries. Key actors from the local Catholic 
and Protestant churches, as representatives of the two most popular denominations in 
contemporary Germany, served as the main organisers of the ecumenical Christian 
service. These services, comprising speeches, prayers and choir music, normally took 
place around l0arn on the morning of 3 rd October in the largest Christian church of 
the respective host federal state. 122 The Catholic and Protestant church organisers 
were permitted, without influence from the State Chancelleries, to select the topic for 
the sermons. 123 From 1990 to 2005, the services were attended by between 1000 and 
2000 guests each year, depending on the size of the respective host church. In 
general, if the selected church was Catholic, the organisers chose a Protestant speaker 
for the main address and vice versa. 124 
The respective churches also possessed full discretionary powers over the 
execution of the staging within church, 125 albeit church and federal protocol 
determined the invitation and seating order 126 and, as a televised event, the service 
120 Mosse, 1975, The nationalization of1he masses, 77. 
121 Behrenbeck & Natzenadel, 2000, Politische Feiern, 21. 
122 C. Schroter, personal communication, November 14,2006; A. Buchhold, personal communication, 
November 28,2006; M. Filger, personal communication, November 28,2006. 
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was limited to one hour. 127 In an attempt to involve other denominations and 
religions, organisers, customarily invited representatives of other Christian 
denominations as well as Jewish and Islamic leaders to attend the service alongside a 
selection of guests from the protocol list supplied by the federation and the host 
Land. 128 The traditional guests from the respective protocol lists included individuals 
from the top five constitutional bodies, (the Federal President, the Federal Chancellor 
and the Presidents of the Bundestag, Bundesrat and Federal Constitutional court), 129 
to confer political legitimacy to the proceedings, alongside national and regional 
VIPs, representatives of the 2+4 States (France, Britain, the US and Russia in place of 
the former Soviet Union), of the Visegrdd States (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia), and other foreign ambassadors. 130 In order to promote and strengthen 
relations between Germans from the different Lander, 131 the church authorities 
additionally invited a 'civic delegation' 132 comprising fifteen citizens from each of 
the 16 Lander, selected for their academic, cultural, sporting or voluntary 
achievements. 
Following the ecumenical service, traditionally at noon, all guests from the 
religious service attended a unity ceremony together with further guests from the 
protocol lists of the federation and the host Land if space pertnitted. Similar to the 
ecumenical service, federal and local protocol only influenced seating and 
133 134 th 135 invitations. As on 17th June and 7 October, speeches formed the core of the 
ceremony, allowing political actors to attempt to (re)define ideas about the past, 
present and future. Although the choice of speakers was not officially prescribed, 136 
the Minister-President of the respective federal state and incumbent President of the 
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Bundesrat, typically gave a speech together with the Federal President and either the 
Federal Chancellor or the President of the Bundestag. 137 The State Chancelleries, in 
communication with their respective Minister-President, frequently also invited an 
international guest as main speaker or a writer or poet as an additional orator. 
National and international speakers were permitted to select the topic of their 
address 138 even though some State Chancelleries discussed the content of the 
speeches with the writers of the German political actors' speeches before the 
celebrations. 13' Alongside the speeches, orchestra and choir music accompanied the 
ceremony, which traditionally concluded with the national anthem. For pragmatic 
reasons, as the largest available venues, the ceremony tended to take place in the 
theatre, exhibition centre or stock exchange of the respective Land, which the host 
State Chancelleries decorated with regional, national and EU flags. 
In addition to the unity events for the VIPs, to actively involve the general 
public in the celebration of German unification, the respective federal state also 
customarily hosted a 'citizens' festival' (Bfirgerfest) on 2 nd and 3 rd of October. They 
had full jurisdiction over its staging. 140 The notable absence of a citizens' festival in 
1998 and its replacement by an Objektmeile, discussed in Chapter Four, underlined 
the degree to which the core elements of the Day of Unity were invented traditions 
and not based on protocol. Within the invented tradition of the citizens' festival, 
developed a further invented tradition: visible in its basic form from the first 
celebrations, the Landermeile was immediately adopted as a defining 'traditional' 
element of the unity celebrations and was consequently emulated in later years, 
established further by the Baden-Wurttemberg organisers in 1997,14 1 and staged as 
the central attraction from 1999.142 While no criterion stipulated its inclusion, all 
organisers, with the exception of those in 1998, decided to adopt the Landermeile 
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format, acting independently in choosing to perpetuate what established itself as a 
'traditional' aspect of the festivities. In this exhibition area of uniform white 
marquees, funded by the host state, 143 each of the Llinder presented themselves with 
cultural and culinary specialities alongside marquees of the Federal Government the 
Bundesrat and the EU. Information stands, discussion rounds, activities for children, 
sporting events, fireworks, multimedia events, classical orchestras, multicultural 
bands and pop concerts traditionally complemented the Ldridermeile. In some years 
unity organisers also staged carnival style parades, comedy shows and street dances. 
In addition to the core elements of the official Day of Unity celebrations 
organised by the regional state Chancelleries, other actors organised additional 
events: the Federal President hosted a drinks and hors d'oeuvres reception for the 
guests of the ceremony, including the citizens' delegation in the respective state 
capital's most elegant venue and the House of Representatives, Bundesrat and 
representations of the Linder and mosques held open days for the general public. 
Furthermore, across Germany federal authorities flew the German flag at all buildings 
operated by them as well as at statutory corporations, institutions and foundations 
under their control. 144 
Alongside the official central celebrations, Berlin and the other Liffider also 
staged unity celebrations. In Berlin, sponsors entirely organised and funded the unity 
event, staged at the Brandenburg Gate and entitled Deuschlands Fest until the late 
1990s when its organisation was taken over by the Berlin event management 
company Wohithat Entertainment. 145 A parade of 3000 to 4000 people through the 
Brandenburg gate, music concerts and kiosks of regional foods formed the core 
elements of this large-scale event that traditionally attracted between a quarter and 
half a million spectators. At the time of unification, other German states as well as 
towns along the former East-West German border also staged numerous unity 
celebrations with religious services, Volksfeste and fireworks; 146 Bonn, Frankfurt and 
Koblenz, each with tens of thousands of revellers and Hamburg, with around 200,000 
143 The host state provided each state with a pavilion and its necessary infrastructure: K-H. Petry, 
ersonal communication, December 13,2006. fZ 
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people, staged the largest celebrations. 147 In the years that followed, however, the 
events organiscd in the Ltinder not hosting the central celebrations were very small 
and only the attendance of key political guests attracted large audiences. 148 
Due to the different functions of commemorative days in post-war Germany 
numerous forms of representation central to the 17th June and 7th October 
anniversaries were excluded from the Day of Unity celebrations. Ceremonial fires, 149 
the renaming of streets'50 and torchlight processions, 151 for example, while important 
elements for the commemoration of victims of 17'h June uprising in the Federal 
Republic, were not considered appropriate representative forms for the celebration of 
German unity. In the SED's attempt to demonstrate its power, in the GDR, a military 
parade, introduced in 1977, was a major element of the 7th October celebrations. ' 52 
The Federal Republic, by contrast, forced to confront the Nazi legacy and deeply 
rooted in the West, avoided such demonstrations of martial force on 17 th June. 
Conscious of united Germany's international responsibility and eager to reassure an 
international community anxious about renewed German hegemony and military 
power, the political actors similarly avoided staging a military parade on the 
country's new national holiday. 
A western German event? 
Although united Germany in many respects faced challenges different from those of 
the Federal Republic, the fundamental framework and guiding values of the post-war 
Federal Republic nevertheless dominated the staging of the Day of Unity 
anniversaries. Given that the GDR was an undemocratic, Socialist state with a 
planned economy it is hardly surprising that the value-codes, representations of 
constitutional structures, and 'official' notions of the past and present of the former 
147 Der Jubel über die Einheit hielt sich in Grenzen. (1990, October 4). Frankfurter Rundschau, 2. 
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Federal Republic should dominate united Germany. Moreover, the Federal Republic 
possessed several resources at the time of unification that contributed to its cultural 
hegemony over the legacies of the GDR: it was closely integrated within Western 
Europe, which enhanced its legitimacy, and this, together with its ability to operate 
within the existing international framework, secured its substantial power over the 
political structures of the unified state and influence over its political culture after 
1990. Above and beyond this, however, the western German dominance on the Day 
of Unity anniversaries can be explained by the legal form in which German 
unification took place. In 1990, two main legal options were discussed for the form 
of unification - unification through article 146 or through article 23 of West 
Germany's Basic Law of 1949. Unification through article 146, favoured by the SPD 
as the more democratic and legitimate option, would have necessitated a new 
constitution to be created for united Germany. Advocates of this approach, which 
would have entailed a lengthy process of negotiation, argued that it would allow 
elements from the GDR to be incorporated into united Germany, thereby allocating a 
greater place to the eastern Germans in united Germany's sclf-understanding. 
Instead, however, as favoured predominantly by the CDU/CSU, unification took 
place through article 23, an article originally developed to allow the Saarland to 
rejoin the Federal Republic. 153 Put simply, through this dynamic approach to 
unification, adopted to facilitate an accelerated process of unification in a volatile 
international climate, the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic. Constitutionally, the 
GDR was thus incorporated into the existing structures of the Federal Republic so 
that united Germany essentially ended up as an enlarged or extended Federal 
Republic. 
This western German dominance was made explicit and continually 
reinforced at the Day of Unity celebrations, beginning with Berlin Mayor Walter 
Momper's speech at the unification ceremony in 1990. He did not welcome all 
Germans to a united - Germany but rather welcomed East Germans to West 
Germany. 154 With only a few exceptions, most notably the celebrations in 1998, 
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strongly influenced by the newly elected Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der, and Minister- 
President Matthias Platzeck's speech in 2005, western German dominance of the 
celebrations was both comprehensive and unquestioned. Political actors spoke about 
the GDR only in the context of its dictatorial past and elements such as phrases, 
symbols, images and music from the GDR were for the most part entirely excluded 
from the Day of Unity celebrations. Political actors and citizens of the former GDR, 
at least initially, had few economic resources or moral arguments to counter or resist 
the cultural hegemony of the new Ldnder by western Germany. In any case, for the 
most part many welcomed the opportunity to take the 'fast train' to the West for 
which many of the other post-Communist states would have to wait several years. 
Emphasis on the cultural hegemony of western Germany from 1990 to 2005 
served two main functions on the Day of Unity. Firstly, it allowed political actors to 
use the national holiday to encourage the cultural synchronisation of eastern Germany 
with western Germany. Owing to the manner of unification, former GDR citizens did 
not unite with their Federal Republic compatriots as 'equal partners', but instead had 
to be socially integrated and assimilated into West Germany. West German political 
actors therefore faced a number of problems in 1990: how were East Germans with 
very different interpretations of the National Socialist and the GDR pasts, with little 
tradition of democracy, federalism or attachment to the EU - elements so central to 
the Federal Republic's self-understanding - to be incorporated into united Germany? 
The Day of Unity offered one solution to this: it could serve as a mechanism for 
extending West German value systems and frameworks to eastern Germans by 
promoting specific (West Gen-nan) versions of the past, present and future. In this 
way, the German political actors attempted to encourage cultural synchronisation of 
united Germany on West German terms. In simple terms, they attempted to use the 
Day of Unity to 'create' democratically, regionally and EU-minded Germans who 
were aware of their past. Consequently, cultural synchronisation on the Day of Unity 
for the most part took one form - synchronisation of the East with the West. The Day 
of Unity thereby served as a tool in the broad, ongoing process of integration, 
convergence and cohesion of eastern and western Germans. 
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The western German dominance of the unity celebrations served, secondly, to 
ensure the status quo and to reinforce and perpetuate the western German hegemony 
that had been laid out in the manner of unification. Following the transformation of 
1989 and the unification of 1990, it was important for German political actors from 
the West to demonstrate both stability and continuity with West German fundamental 
structures and values as well as to ensure western German hegemony in united 
Germany. The Day of Unity served to some degree to disguise the transformation of 
1989/90 (in tenns of the economy, society, territory and population size). It 
reinforced and reproduced the stability, continuity and preservation of the Federal 
Republic's values and structures by underlining its legitimacy in a period of 
upheaval. Although the specific elements of the staging of the Day of Unity were not 
comparable with 17th June, as we have seen, they nevertheless corresponded to the 
values of the Federal Republic, particularly Christianity, liberal democracy, 
regionalism, federalism and attachment to the EU. For eastern German actors, 
adherence to the 'traditional' key elements of the celebrations demonstrated their 
ability to adapt to West German structures. Indeed, for the most part, eastern German 
political actors on the Day of Unity not only staged the unity events with the same 
core elements but also adopted the same rhetoric as their western German compatriots 
by, for example, condemning the GDR. It is probable that this served not only to 
reinforce the western German cultural hegemony and encourage the process of 
cultural synchronisation but also assisted their own entry and acceptance into the 
mainstream politics of united Germany. Moreover, the unity celebrations also served 
another function: they signalled stability and continuity of the values of the Federal 
Republic in united Germany to the international community. The very name of the 
German national holiday, almost identical to that of the national holiday of the 
Federal Republic, similarly served to stress the extent to which united Germany relied 
on its continuity with the Federal Republic for its self-definition. How effective this 
and other elements of the staging could be, however, requires analysis, as we will 
now see. 
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Limits to the effectiveness of3"d October 
The Day of Unity, widely regarded as little more than a day off from work, enjoyed 
little popular success among the broad general German public from 1990 to 2005. 
Whilst a representative Forsa survey of 1005 people in 2006 showed that 80% of 
those asked felt that the Day of Unity should remain a work-free day, 155 merely 32% 
felt that the Day of Unity was actually a reason to celebrate. 156 The civic 
participation in the celebrations themselves was also extremely limited, with 
attendance figures at the citizens' festivals, though varying in some years from 
around 150,000 (in Mainz three weeks after the 9/11 attacks) to just under a million 
(in the capital Berlin), reaching on average only 350,000 people. 157 As The Times 
described, Germany even celebrated its tenth birthday 'with all the carnival spirit of a 
state funeral' . 
158 At least in part, this lack of popularity as exhibited in the modest 
turn-out can be explained by the way in which the Day of Unity was intrinsically 
linked with the social and economic difficulties of the unity process: as a symbol of 
unification it was to some extent also a symbol of the problems and challenges that 
emerged from that unification. The German national holiday was then perhaps 
fighting a losing battle from the start. 
There can be little doubt however, that certain elements of the staging also 
played a role in hindering the effectiveness of the Day of Unity: on the one hand, by 
limiting the scope of the messages of the political actors; on the other hand, by 
inadvertently encouraging the messages to be transformed and distorted. As 
representations are produced and received within a social, political and historical 
context, any representation, such as a national holiday, has its own dynamic. 
(Political) messages do not exist in a vacuum. 159 Instead, they are fragmented and 
transformed so that the influence of political actors is instantly limited as soon as they 
enter a political arena. In that respect all representations could be seen as 'failing' or 
155 Tag der Deutschen Einheit. (2006). Retrieved January 29,2007, from http: //www. bpb. de/themen/ 
y4w8gq,, O, tag_der_deutschen_einheit. html. 
136 Ibid. 
157 Statistics calculated through figures supplied by the various Day of Unity organisers. 
158 Boycs, R. (2000, October 4). Hard work is the future for German unity. The Times, 18. 
09 See, for example, Stollberg-Rilinger, 2005, Was helsst Kullurgeschichte des Polinschen and 
Luhmann, 1995, Social systems. 
58 
'ineffective' if understood as vehicles with which specific actors attempt to present 
specific images and promote specific ideas without hindrance. Political actors, 
unable to simply manipulate representations one-sidedly as political instruments with 
which to influence people without restraint, particularly in liberal democracies, are 
instead themselves merely agents of a dynamic cultural process. This was made clear 
on the Day of Unity by the way in which a number of elements contributed to a 
potential dichotomy between the messages as they were intended and transmitted and 
their reception by individuals or groups. Six main aspects of the staging limited the 
effectiveness of the Day of Unity. 
First and foremost, the media provided the most striking manifestation of such 
subversion of the intended messages. The Day of Unity generally received only 
modest national and international media attention. Even on the main anniversaries of 
unification in 1995,2000 and 2005, although the topic of unification and intra- 
German relations dominated much of the German media coverage, the Day of Unity 
itself attracted only marginally more comment than in other years. Moreover, 
reporting on the Day of Unity declined gradually from 1990 to 2005, a trend bucked 
only during the key anniversary years. 160 The diminished interest in the Day of Unity 
celebrations manifested itself by the way in which less articles appeared about the 
events as time went on. Also, after the first few anniversaries, German newspaper 
articles about the celebrations for the most part failed to feature on the first page. 161 
English and French newspapers similarly relegated articles on the Day of Unity from 
the front pages for the most part after the early 1990s and traditionally dedicated, at 
"0 See, for example, the extra articles dedicated to the Day of Unity by the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung for the tenth anniversary of unification: Bei der Feier zur deutschen Einheit Bekenntnisse zur 
Einheit Europas. (2000, October 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1-2; Anschlag auf Synagoge. 
(2000, October 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 and Hennis, W. (2000, October 6). Nutzen und 
Nachteil: Für einen mythosfähigen Feiertag. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, n. p. 
161 See, for example, Bremen feiert mit Andrzej Szczypiorski. (1994, September 13). Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 2; Boeker, A. (1998, October 5). Würdig bis zum letzten Takt. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4; Ein 
Festzug vielfältiger Stereotype. (1994, October 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2; Kauntz, E. 
(200 1, October 4). Der 11. September überschattet den 3. Oktober. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4; 
Hebel, S. (1994, October 4). Sponsoren statt Parolen zur Feier der Einheit in Berlin. Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 4; Krawalle bei Einheitsfeier Herzog reiste vorzeitig ab. (1994, October 4). Bild-Zeitung, 
2; 'Die Deutschen sind ein wunderbares Volk'. (2002, October 5). Bild-Zeitung, 2. 
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most, one brief article to the celebrations in any given year. 162 In this way, the Day of 
Unity failed to receive a high profile in both the German and the international press, 
as a result of which the scope and impact of the political actors' messages were 
considerably limited. 
Above and beyond this, the media transformed and fragmented messages 
further through their process of selection, influenced in particular by the political 
inclination of the press, readers' expectations and the extent to which the news would 
sel 1.163 Newspapers tended for the most part to focus on the rhetoric of the key 
political actors whereas the televised media favoured images from the unity 
celebrations. As a result of the selection criteria, the press also placed emphasis on 
specific actors and certain events. 164 The Bild-Zeitung and RTL, for instance, in the 
main only reported on the speech given by the Federal President and occasionally 
also the Federal Chancellor. 165 Consequently, readers remained entirely uninformed 
about the content of the speeches by actors such as the Minister-President of the host 
Land, the Bundestag President or the international speaker. The Bild-Zeitung in 
particular developed an overall theme for the Day of Unity from the Federal 
President's speech each year, normally the need to be grateful for unification, so that 
the complex staging of the unity celebrations was reduced to one simple message. 166 
In contrast, the German broadsheets presented a more nuanced interpretation 
of the messages of the Day of Unity and did not contribute in the same way to the 
162 See, for example, Bresson, H. (1991, October 4). Le gouvernement affinne que les attaques contre 
les immigrds sont 'une honte'. Le Monde, 6; La morositd a domind le troisiýme anniversaire de la 
rdunification. (1993, October 5). Le Monde, 6; Sixiýme anniversaire morose de la rdunification 
allemande. (1996, October 4). Le Monde, 4; Boccv, P. (2004, October 4). La protestation contre 
Schr6der s'essouffle. Le Figaro, 5; Gow, D. (1992, October 2). Political claws show at party for 'dear 
Helmut'. The Guardian, 8; Connely, K. (2002, October 3). Zipper gate Clinton to undress Berlin's 
famous diva. The Guardian, 14; Gow, D. (1990, October 4). Germany united: Weizsacker says 'learn 
to share'. The Guardian. 11; Lieven, A. (1992, October 5). Fear of history repeating itself marks 
German anniversary. The Times, 6; McEvoy, A. (1994, October 3). Steady Rise of the cx-Communists 
blights Kohl's unification jamboree. The Times, 12 and Boyes, 2000, Hard work, 18. 
163 For an overview of the extent to which the media shaped the memory culture of the former Day of 
Unity see Wolfirum, 2003, Neue Erinnerungskultur, 33-39. 
'6' For an overview of the way in which television transforms and influences interpretations of specific 
events see, for example, Brockmann, A. (2006). Erinnerungsarbeit im Fernsehen. Das Beispiel des 17. 
Juni 1953. Cologne: Bbhlau. 
"5 See, for example, Wir Deutschen milssen Opfer bringen. (1992, October 5). Bild-Zeilung, I and 
Mierke, C., & Hofmann, G. (Eds. ). (1998, October 3). Gute Stimmung beim Festakt zum Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit [Televised news report]. In RTL Aktuell. Cologne: RTL. 
"' See, for example, Vier Jahre deutsche Einheit, 1994,2. 
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dichotomy between the messages transmitted by the actors at the festivities and those 
covered in newspaper reporting. The Frankfurter Rundschau, Saddeutsche Zeitung 
and above all the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung tended to provide their readers with 
a brief summary of the speeches with direct quotes in context and occasionally also 
published unabridged one or two of the key speeches from the celebrations. 167 
However, what was striking about the German national broadsheet articles on the Day 
of Unity from 1990 to 2005 was the way in which they focused almost entirely on the 
speeches at the ceremony and almost completely neglected the citizens' festivals. As 
a result of this, they presented the Day of Unity to the German public as a dry 
political event with no popular, Volksfest appeal. This can, at least in part, be 
accounted for by the low-scale nature of the citizens' festivals of the central 
celebrations. As a consequence of this, a vicious circle took hold: the Day of Unity 
citizens' festivals were not considered newsworthy and thus failed to attract media 
attention so that the little that was reported about the Day of Unity painted a picture 
of a dull event; as a result of this, the German public were less likely to attend future 
celebrations or consider the Day of Unity with enthusiasm. Even in years where 
large-scale events were staged at the citizens' festivals in the mid-2000s, such as the 
multi-media event in Erfurt, the tendency of the German media to report solely on the 
speeches had become such an ingrained tradition that the other events failed to 
receive any mention. 168 Moreover, those topics of the unity speeches that the German 
press did choose to report on, be it the National Socialist and GDR pasts, social and 
economic problems or the need for improved intra-German relations, were unlikely to 
rouse Germans from their armchairs. To reinforce the drab image of the Day of 
Unity to a further section of the population, the extreme-Left newspaper. Neues 
Deutschland predictably provided solely mordacious, cheerless accounts of the Day 
of Unity proceedings. 169 Furthermore, to complete the unflattering image of the Day 
of Unity presented by the German press, if photographs of the celebrations featured at 
all in the period from 1990 to 2005, then the images shown were not those of the 
167 See, for example, Die Deutschen am Einheitstag gemahnt. (1992, -Oetober 5). Frankfurier 
Rundschau, 1; Boeker, 1998, Würdig bis zum letzten Takt, 4 and Bei der Feier, 2000,1-2. 
168 For further information on 'description bias' in the media see Rucht, D. (2003). Die 
medienorientierte Inszenierung von Protest. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1353,30-3 8. 
169 See, for example, Feiern - immer feste druff. (1992, October 5). Neues Deutschland, n. p. 
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citizens' festival - not least because the large white tents of the citizens' festival did 
not particularly lend themselves to newspaper-sel ling images - but rather images of 
the audience of political figures at the unity ceremony, an event which the German 
public could not attend. Such a visual portrayal could hardly arouse enthusiasm 
among Germans for attending the unity events open to them. 170 
It is evident that the modest staging of the celebrations contributed to a trend 
in the international press even more detrimental to the organisers' intentions: the 
English and French newspapers, considering there to be little to report about the Day 
of Unity celebrations themselves, instead reported on right-wing extremism on and 
around 3 rd October. This trend is most noticeable in The Times, where lurid reports 
of right-wing extremist attacks across Germany dominated reporting about the unity 
171 celebrations in the majority of years from 1990 to 2005. The Guardian also tended 
to devote more of its reporting to demonstrations and anti-Semitic attacks than to the 
unity celebrations themselves and rarely reported more than one or two comments 
from the unity speeches, if at all. 172 In France, Le Monde and Le Figaro, similarly 
focused reporting on demonstrations, and although they often devoted articles on and 
around 3 rd October to the social, economic and political issues Germany faced since 
unification, little was written about the celebrations themselves. 173 
German political actors sought to use the Day of Unity celebrations to 
reassure the international community that there would be no resurgence of German 
nationalism and that Germany was a democratic, united, federal country rooted in the 
EU. Ironically, however, it was the very lack of ostentation, born of these concerns, 
in the staging of the events - low scale, poorly attended, indeed occasionally vapid, in 
towns little known to the majority of the international public - which served to 
undermine its ability to catch the media's attention. The Day of Unity could hardly 
170 See, for example, the photograph accompanying Schmidt, T. E. (1997, October 4). Das vereinte 
Deutschland in einem vereinten Europa. Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 1. 
"' See, for example, Murray, 1. (1991, October 4). Violence mars German unity. The Times, 8; Lieven, 
1992, Fear of history, 6 and Youths on rampage. (1995, October 4). The Times, 12. 
172 See, for example, Gow, D. (1992, October 5). Kohl warns against the threat of racism. 77ie 
Guardian, 8. 
173 See, for example, Bresson, H. (1991, October 3). L'unitd allemande, un an apr6s. Le Monde, 1-2 
and Antisdmitisme: Schr6der appelle A 'un soulývcment dcs gens biens'. (2000, October 5). Le F(garo, 
n. p. 
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provide headline-gripping material and the international press evidently judged 
reporting on right-wing extremist demonstrations far more compelling. As a result, 
the message conveyed by the newspapers' coverage to their readers was that the unity 
celebrations evoked nationalist sentiment and imparted the image of a nation plagued 
by Neo-Nazis and anti-Semitism - that is lo say the complete opposite of the image 
the Day of Unity actors attempted to propagate. Reports of Neo-Nazi demonstrations 
and attacks dominated the articles in the international press to such an extent that the 
intended, carefully orchestrated, crafted and considered messages of the German and 
international actors on the Day of Unity were almost entirely lost. 
Secondly, in addition to the subversion of the intended messages of the 
political actors by the media, the effectiveness of the Day of Unity was arguably also 
obstructed by the rotating organisation of the central celebrations in three main ways. 
Firstly, the regional organisation led to a competition for sponsors of the unity 
celebrations in the host Land and Berlin. Secondly, the regional organisation. created 
a number of practical difficulties. Unlike Berlin - the eastern part of which had been 
rebuilt after 1949 as a stage for demonstrations of power and state representations 174 
- the other host cities of the central celebrations were not constructed for hosting 
national events. This affected not only the ecumenical services, the ceremonies and 
the Federal President's receptions, where the largest venues in the city were 
frequently too small to house all invited guests, 175 but also the citizens' festivals. At 
the celebrations in Schwerin, for example, a city surrounded by lakes, organisers of 
the Mecklenburg-Westem Porneranian State Chancellery encountered serious 
organisational difficulties due to insufficient parking and traffic routes,, 76 which 
potentially limited the number of people able to attend the celebrations. Moreover, 
the fact that the small local police force of the host Land was responsible for the 
celebrations, rather than the larger Berlin police force, enabled demonstrators to more 
easily disrupt the proceedings, as was the case in Bremen, discussed below. Thirdly, 
the regional organisation. limited the appeal of the Day of Unity celebrations and 
'7" Sauer, 1999, Politische Leiblichkcit, 136 
175 This was particularly true of the Schwerin and Magdeburg celebrations: Anonymous, personal 
communication, December 18,2006; Zutn Nationalfeiertag starke Sicherheitsvorkehrungen in 
Schwerin. (1992, October 2). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2. 
"' Zurn Nationalfeiertag starke Sicherheitsvorkehrungen, 1992,2. 
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hence the scope and impact of the intended messages of the carefully staged citizens' 
festivals. Berlin, as theý capital and location largely associated with German unity, 
succeeded in attracting Einheitstouristen (unity tourists) from countries such as Japan 
and the US. 177 Such success was, however, singular to the new capital; international 
travellers and the international press were far less likely to take the trip to attend 
festivities in cities like Schwerin. The same was true for Germans from other 
regions. Whereas the festivities in Berlin could pull upon the city's draw as a modem 
metropolis - for Germans and non-Germans alike - towns like Magdeburg or Mainz 
enjoyed no such appeal. 
Thirdly, in addition to the subversion of messages by the media and the 
regional organisation, the finguafiranca of the events also played a role. German and 
international actors on the Day of Unity attempted to frame the Day of Unity as an 
EU-event. However, the staging did little to encourage members of the international 
community to be actively involved in the celebration of German unity. The unity 
events were uninviting not only because of their location, but also because everything 
at the citizens' festival was in German. With the exception of the citizens' festival in 
SaarbriUcken, which provided some material in French, 17' all aspects of the citizens' 
festivals, from the signposts to the programme and the literature available at the 
Bundestag tents, was available in German only. A non-German speaking visitor 
would therefore have been largely excluded from many aspects of the citizens' 
festival. As a result, the Day of Unity could hardly be described as an event for 
citizens of the EU. 
Fourthly, advertising subverted the messages of the actors and served as a 
potential additional obstacle to the popularity of the Day of Unity. The scale of the 
Day of Unity advertising was surprisingly limited from 1990 to 2005; the host Land 
produced leaflets and publicised the citizens' festivals in the local press yet 
advertising on a national or international level was virtually non-existent. The 
German broadsheets occasionally dedicated one very small paragraph to the Day of 
"' See, for example, Schubmann, P., & Hofmann, G. (Eds. ). (2000, October 2). Feicrlichkeitcn zurn 
10. Jahrestag der deutschen Wiedervcreinigung haben begonnen [Televised news report]. In RTL 
Nachtiournal. Cologne: RTL- 
178 See Kauntz, E. (1993, October 3). Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band - wie vom Winde verweht. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3. 
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Unity celebrations the day before the event, stating in which town they would take 
place, but failed to mention details of the programme of events or to give details of 
where one might find such information. It could not be taken for granted that 
Gen-nans knew in advance where the unity celebrations were to take place. The 
reason for the rotation of the celebration through the different states was by no means 
widely known. If they did know, however, an internet site of the host Land provided 
the full programme of events. This was of little use to the non-German speaking 
international community though, since, once more, everything was in German only. 
Fifthly, the lack of symbols on the Day of Unity may have contributed to 
Germans' lack of identification with their national holiday. The founder of the 
national festival in Germany, Jahn, emphasised in the 19 th century that no festival 
could be successful without symbols. 179 The Day of Unity, however, lacked a motto 
(such as the French 10 July's revolutionary slogan fiberti, egaliti, ftaterniti), and, 
until 2000, a symbol of its own. Moreover, though a national holiday, national 
symbols were to some extent excluded from the unity celebrations and replaced by 
regional and EU elements to avoid any expressions of what could have been 
construed as resurgent German nationalism. 180 
As a 'verspatete Nation', 181 Germany's historically complex relationship to 
the nation-state has been reflected in difficulties in constructing representations of the 
German nation. 182 Germany's rapport with its national symbols is one key example 
of this. The interminable debate about the appropriate national symbols in the 
Weimar Republic, ' 83 for example, led to a lack of symbols later exploited by Adolf 
Hitler. The politicised use of national and party symbols during the National 
Socialist era meant that few national symbols survived untainted. ' 84 While the GDR 
179 Mosse, 1975, The nationalization of1he masses, 92. 
"0 For an interesting explanation of why certain national symbols, particularly flags and anthems, are 
selected see Cerulo, K. A. (1995). Identity designs: the sights andsounds ofa nation. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Plessner, 11. (1982). Die verspatele Nation. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
See in particular Franqois & Schulze, 200 1, Deutsche Erinnerungsorte. 
183 See, for example, Buchner, B. (2001). Um nationale und repuhlikanische Identildt: die deutsche 
Sozialdemokratie und der Kampf um die politischen Symhole in der Weimarer Repuhlik. Bonn: Dietz 
Verlag. 
194 Reichel, P. (2005). Schwarz-Rol-Gold. - Kleine Geschichle deutscher Nationalsymbole. Munich: 
C. H. Beck, 10. For further examples of how the connotations of symbols, specifically the swastika, 
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adopted numerous state symbols for its self-representation, ' 85 the Federal Republic, 
deeply rooted in the western international community, struggled with national 
symbols; 196 the negative legacy of National Socialism led to a suspicion of national 
symbols in post-war West Germany as well as of expressions of nationalism more 
generally. 
In 2000, aware of the deficiency of symbols on the Day of Unity, Dresden 
organisers developed a symbol comprising small black, gold and yellow blocks 
around the text 'Tag der Deutschen Einheit', which subsequent organisers adopted in 
the true style of invented traditions on the Day of Unity. The lack of symbols on the 
Day of Unity in the first decade after unification can partly be explained by the fact 
that P October 1990 itself lacked symbols. Unlike 9h November, associated with 
jubilant scenes, such as those of people standing on the Berlin Wall and tapping the 
roofs of Trabants, ' 97 which established the Berlin Wall and the Brandenburg Gate as 
icons of the peaceful revolution, 188 the sombre P October celebrations in front of the 
Reichstag offered no such easily transportable visual symbols. Indeed, the German 
televised media, struggling to find emotive images for their reporting of the unity 
celebrations frequently used archive footage of the fall of the Berlin Wall at the 
Brandenburg gate rather than the Reichstag celebration of 1990 or the unity 
commemorations. ' 89 Even the unity organisers borrowed the Brandenburg Gate as a 
symbol for the 3rd October celebrations in Berlin in 2002 by inviting Former US 
President Bill Clinton to give his address alongside the Brandenburg Gate; following 
were altered through National Socialism see Weeber, E. (2007). Das Hakenkreuz: Geschichle und 
Bedeutungswandel eines 5ý, mhols. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang and Lorenz, J. (2006). Das 
Hakenkreuz. Zeichen im Welfbargerkrieg., Eine Kulturgeschichte. Vienna: Karolinger Verlag. 
185 Reichel, 2005, Schwarz-Rol-Gold, 11.1 
186 For an overview of Germany's political self-representation from 1945 to 2002 see Maier, 11. (2003). 
Politische Sel bstdarstel lung - cin deutsches Problem? In 11. Vorlander (Ed. ), ' Zur Jsthetik der 
Demokrafie: Formen derpolifischen Selbstdarstellung. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 95-110. 
187 Interestingly, an Allensbach survey conducted in 1990 suggested that the events of 1989 remained 
in the memory of eastern Germans more so than 3rd October: when asked what event in the history of 
the GDR they remembered most positively 35% selected the opening of the Wall, while only 3% 
named unification. Noelle-Neumann, E., & Kocher, R. (Eds. ). (1993).. 41lensbacher Jahrbuch der 
Demoskopie, 1984-1992. Munich: K. G. Saur. 
"' Peter Reichel has gone so far as to describe the Brandenburg Gate as a 'Logo Deutschlands', see 
Reichel, 2005, Schwarz-Rol-Gold, 100. For an interesting overview of the changing meaning of the 
Brandenburg gate since its erection in 1789 see, in particular, ibid., 99-110. 
189 See, for example, Schubmann & Hofmann, 2000, Feierlichkeiten, RTL. 
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the speech, school children presented him with a miniature version of the 
monument. 190 
Finally, the actual choice of date of the unity celebrations may paradoxically 
have limited the effectiveness of the Day of Unity due to four main factors. Firstly, 
the date itself, commemorating the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic 
merely supported the status quo. As Mosse has demonstrated, historically, festivals 
based on 'unfulfilled longings' for unity or 'concrete impetus for action' against 'the 
Establishment', such as the Wartburg Festival of 18'h October 1817 or the Hambach 
Festival of 1832, were able to rouse considerably more popular support and interest 
than festivals such as Sedantag, which celebrated existing traditions. 191 Secondly, by 
commemorating something so recent, namely the unification of Germany in 1990, the 
Day of Unity could not be mythologised but rather remained in the memories of the 
German population and, on account of this, was in many respects overshadowed by 
ongoing problems resulting from the event. These negative associations served to 
undermine the potential of political mythologisation. Thus the Day of Unity, like 
Constitution Day in the Weimar Republic, 192 was marked by pessimism, sapping its 
popularity. Thirdly, unlike many national holidays in other EU states, which took 
place in the warmer summer months, the occasionally rainy, autumnal weather of 3 rd 
October arguably contributed to the poor attendance at the celebrations in some years. 
Finally, and most paradoxically, it could be argued that the date for the German 
national holiday was to some degree actually chosen to avoid pathos or mass 
excitement. Like Sedantag, which sought to foster order and prevent mass 
movements, 193 the sobriety and lack of enthusiasm and emotion that 3 rd October 
produced among the German population suited the desires of mainstream political 
actors of united Germany, particularly those on the Right, suspicious of 
revolutionary-type popular movements on account of the powerful role of extremist 
left and right-wing ideas in Gennan history. It is to the choice of date for the Day of 
190 See Robeck, C. (Ed. ). (2002, October 3). Feiern zum Tag der Deutschen Einheil - teils kauf 
[Televised news report]. In RTL Akluell. Cologne: RTL. 
191 Mosse, 1975, The nationalization ofthe masses, 89-96. 
192 See Aid., 124. 
193 Ibid, 93. 
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Unity that the chapter now turns in this final section, which explores the political 
context of the Day of Unity in arenas beyond the official celebrations. 
1.3 Political context 
1.3.1 Why 3`1 October? 
3"d Ocloher: a constitutional date 
In a special session on 23 rd August 1990, following a complicated process of 
negotiation, the East German Volkskammer selected 3 rd October 1990 as the date for 
German unification for largely pragmatic reasons. 194 Various actors initially favoured 
a number of different dates. In order to avoid an undemocratic interval without 
government or parliament in the GDR, 195 the Bonn government, like GDR Prime 
Minister Lothar de Maizi&e, ' 96 had originally favoured unification on 14 th October, 
the date of the Land elections in the new Under. 197 De Maizi6re and Chancellor 
Kohl had also agreed verbally that the national, all-German elections would take 
place on that date, though this was later moved to I st December. 198 However, eager 
to select their own date for unification independent of the will of the Bonn 
government, with the exception of de Maizi&re, virtually no-one within the 
Volkskammer coalition of SPD, CDU, FDP (Free Democratic Party) and DSU 
(German Social Union), a partner of the CSU, supported the date proposed by their 
West German counterparts. ' 99 As the earliest possible date following the signing of 
the 2+4 treaty of 120' September (in which it was agreed that Germany renounce its 
right to atomic, biological and chemical weapons and would reduce its army to 
194 Schröder, R. (2000, October 5). Zeitverschobene Vernunft. Fra«urter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5; 
Baum, K-11. (1997, October 2/3). Wie Gregor Gysi die deutsche Einheit im ersten Anlauf sicherte. 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. For an impressive overview of the unification process see, in particular, 
Korte, K-R., Grosser, D., Jäger, W., & Weidenfeld, W. (Eds. ). (1998). Geschichte der deutschen 
Einheit: 1-4. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt and Weidenfeld, W., & Korte, K-R. (Eds. ). (1999). 
Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. For a 
shorter summary see Ritter, G. A. (2008). Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung. Historische Zeitschrift, 
286,289-339. 
"" Schröder, 2000, Zeitverschobene Vernunft, 5. 
196 ibid. 
197 Baum, 1997, Wie Gregor Gysi, 1. 
l"8 Schröder, 2000, Zeitverschobene Vernunft, 5. 
' Baum, 1997, Wie Gregor Gysi, 1. 
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370,000 troops, that Soviet troops would leave German soil and that Germany would 
regain full sovereignty including the prerogative to enter into alliances), West 
German SPD Chancellor Candidate Oskar Lafontaine had favoured 15"' September. 
This was a suggestion that the SPD on the whole largely rejected for fear that in the 
coming elections voters, excited by unification, would be inclined to vote for the 
200 CDU. Since the Allied residual rights remained in force until Ist October, 
Lafontaine's proposal would in any case not have been practicable. Furthermore, 
when the SPD left the Grand Coalition in the GDR, they were excluded from the 
negotiations about the date for unification. 20 1 At the same time, the East German 
CDU and the DSU, eager for rapid unification, promoted the earliest possible date 
while the citizens' initiative Alliance 90 sought to completely defer unification. 
Other parties, largely undecided, favoured a date after 14th October. 202 
The question then arose of what to do with 7th October. It was widely agreed 
that a 41" anniversary of the GDR must be avoided at all costs; unification thus had 
to take place before 7th October. In the early hours of the special session in the 
Volkskammer, FDP politician Conrad-Michael Lehment telephoned Bonn's Foreign 
Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher to corroborate dates for the international 
preparations for German unity. 203 Genscher confirmed that the 2+4 conference would 
take place on 12th September. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) states would not meet to be informed of the results of the 2+4 talks 
until 0 October in New York however. Lehment consequently called out '3 rd 
October at the earliest' to a fatigued Volkskammer. since, with the time difference, 
this was the earliest possible date allowing Genscher to return from New York. 204 
Within minutes, at three o' clock in the morning, the Grand Coalition, with 249 for, 
62 against and 7 abstentions, 205 agreed to 3 rd October as the date for German 
200 Schr6der, 2000, Zeitverschobene Vemunft, 5. 
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unification; a date before 7h October and far enough from 15 th September and the 
Bonn government's wish of 14'h October. 206 
Just over a week later, on 31" August, the one thousand page Unification 
Treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR stated not only that with effect 
from 3 rd October, the GDR would accede to the Federal Republ iC, 207 but also, in 
chapter one, article two, paragraph two, 208 that '3 rd October, as the Day of German 
Unity, is a legal holiday'. 209 The same article stated that 3 rd October thereby replaced 
17th June as the national holiday of the Germans. 210 On 23d August, in East 
Germany, FDP Volkskammer MP Conrad-Michael Lehment had suggested the date 
of unification as the date for the national holiday; in West Germany on the same day, 
Chancellor Kohl had proposed the date during a meeting for negotiations of the 
Unification Treaty211 with the eleven Minister-Presidents of the Western LAnder, who 
largely agreed with the West German Chancellor. 212 Yet why did the date of 
unification, a date since criticised by many as simply bureaucratic, characterless and 
meaningICSS213 as well as unrooted in the 'hearts and minds' of the people, 214 become 
the date for the national holiday of united Germany? East and West German political 
actors could easily have selected a national holiday quite separate from the date of 
unification. Contrary to Gunnar Peter's supposition that the decision to make the date 
of unification the German national holiday was 'obvious' '21 
5 the reasons for the 
consensus on the date are more complex; they can perhaps best be understood by 
examining how 3d October was able to unite the way in which CDU and SPD 
political actors envisaged united Germany. 
For both CDU and SPD politicians, as well as Germans from across the 
mainstream political spectrum, selecting the German national holiday as the date of 
206 Baum, 1997, Wie Gregor Gysi, 1. 
207 Kramer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 275. 
2'8 Der Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 2007, www. bund. de. 
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unification was appealing. 3 rd October represented a date that rooted Germany into 
Europe: it commemorated the unification of Germany, which had been supported by 
the whole international community. 216 Furthermore, Yd October signified not only 
the end of the GDR but also the end of a century-long problem, the German Question, 
as well as the end of the border disputes with Poland through the fonnal recognition 
of the Oder-Neisse border and the realisation of a hope dating from 1848 - 'unity in 
freedom'. 217 For the CDU, particularly for Chancellor Kohl, the association of the 
date for unification with the date for the German national holiday presented a yearly 
platform for praise and self-promotion of the so-called Chancellor of Unity. 3 rd 
October also virtually coincided with the date on which Kohl's chancellorship 
commenced, on I't October 1982. As a result of this, as on the 10th anniversary of his 
chancellorship in 1992, which attracted considerable national and international media 
attention, this timely 'coincidence' allowed the CDU to celebrate the unification 
achievements of its Chancellor just two days before the official Day of Unity 
commemorations. 218 
Most importantly, however, both the CDU and SPD could see the advantage 
of creating a national holiday that placed at its core the constitution; as a day 
commemorating the legal integration of the GDR into the Federal Republic, 3 rd 
October located the German constitution at the centre of united Germany's self- 
understanding. As Peter Haberle has demonstrated in his work on public holidays 
within the context of the constitutional state, holidays not only form 'cultural 
constitutional law' but are also an exhibit for 'constitution as culture'. 219 In this vein, 
the SPD, proponents of 'constitutional patriotism' and nervous of a 'renewed' nation- 
state, could see the advantages of 3 rd October. Constitutional patriotism 
(Verfassungspatriotismus), a concept initially introduced by political scientist Dolf 
216 Schröder, R. (2000, October 2). Der 3. Oktober: Der Wunsch nach der Wiedervereinigung kam aus 
dem Osten: Eine Apologie. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 56. 
217 'Der 3. Oktober wird notorisch unterschätzt'. Heinrich August ; Vinkler zur Feiertagsdebalte. 
(2006). Retrieved February 27,2006, from http: //www. spieget. de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,326468, 
OO. html. See also how Chancellor Schr6der linked Yd October with the revolution of 1848 in his Day 
of Unity address in 1999: Schr6der, 1999, Rede, 637. 
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Stemberger in 1958 220 and later popularised by sociologist and philosopher JOrgen 
Habermas, 221 4 pointed beyond itself to ... more abstract, inclusive and increasingly 
universalist forms of political belonging'. 222 Although a sense of constitutional 
patriotism remained somewhat of an elite rather than a widespread notion, the 
selection of 3rd October can nevertheless be understood in this context. In this way, 
like the core organisational elements of the Day of Unity, the very date of the Day of 
Unity served a function and propagated a specific form of identification among 
Germans, namely identification with the legal and constitutional framework of united 
Germany. A very different Germany was proposed by advocates of 9th November. 
yh November: an alternative datefor an alternative Germany? 
As long as national festivals have existed in Europe, the choice of the correct date for 
the celebrations has provoked contestation on account of the political meaning and 
connotations attached to specific dates. 223 As early as the 19th century in Germany, 
political opponents of a Prussian-dominated Reich attempted to promote alternative 
commemorative dates as a form of political dissent. 224 Selection of the German 
national holiday also provoked heated debate in the Weimar Republic 225 whilst in the 
Federal Republic, the changing role of 170' June resulted in numerous discussions of 
alternative dates, 226 particularly 23 rd May (Verfassungstag) and 18 th March 
227 (beginning of the Mdrzrevolulion of 1848). In united Germany, contestation of the 
choice of date for the national holiday can be explained as politically motivated: the 
respective dates proposed reflected the kind of Germany specific political actors and 
parties wished to promote. While the CDU and SPD propagated a very specific 
image of Germany through 3 rd October -a constitutional Germany - advocates of 
other dates for the German national holiday in 1990 promoted an 'alternative 
220 Müller, 2000, Another country, 93. 
221 Habertnas, J. (1990). Die nachholende Revolution. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkainp. See also 
Habermas, J. (2001). Theposinationalconstellation: polilicalessays. Cambridge: PolityPress. 
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Germany'. 23 rd May, the date of the signing of the Basic Law in West Germany, was 
suggested as an alternative date for the former Day of Unity in the late 1960s and 
again in 1990.228 Like advocates of 3 rd October, supporters of 23 rd May as the 
national holiday of united Germany also proposed a representation of Germany with 
the constitution at its core, yet by selecting a date completely removed from East 
Germany, they further emphasised the representation of united Germany as merely a 
continuation of the Federal Republic. In contrast, Leipzig MPs promoted 9 th 
October, 229 the day of the first dramatic Montagsdemo in Leipzig in 1989, to place the 
achievements of East Germans at the centre of united Germany's self-understanding. 
At the same time, those who supported the continued commemoration of the national 
230 holiday on 17th June, sought to place the years of division at the heart of the 
representation of united Germany; those supportive of 8h May, the end of World War 
11, meanwhile were keen to frame the remembrance of the National Socialist era as 
the defining feature of united Germany. 
9th November was initially dismissed as a potential national holiday in 1990 
not only because it may have allowed a 4l't celebration of the GDR but also because 
of the ambiguity of the date 231 which, it was feared, could cause embarrassment and 
scandals. 232 Revolutionary Robert Blum's execution on 9h November 1848 marked 
the beginning of 9th November's history-laden fate. Seventy years later, 9th 
November 1918 marked the abdication of the Kaiser and the declaration of the 
Weimar Republic by Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann in Berlin. 233 However, 
as Peter Steinbach explains, the failure of the first German democracy discredited 9 th 
November in many respeCtS, 234 not least because of the 'Beer Hall Putsch' on the 
same date five years later. On 9h November 1923, in an attempted coup d'itat, 
Hitter, the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party) and followers of 
228 Kraushaar, 2003, Die wechselvolle Geschichte, 156. 
229 See Krdmer, 1996, Der Volksaufstand, 281. 
230 Ibid., 282. 
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General Erich Ludendorff marched to commemorate the Kaiser and scizc power in 
Munich. Though the march failed, the Nazis honoured those killed as martyrs. 
Fifteen years later, the pogrom of 9th November 1938, during which Nazis destroyed 
and plundered synagogues, shops and flats of Jews, killed hundreds of people and 
removed around 30,000 Jews to concentration camps, 235 came to symbolise Nazi 
persecution. 236 9h November of the following year nearly marked a very different 
course of German history when cabinetmaker Johann Georg Eisner attempted a bomb 
attack on Hitler in the Munich Bargerbrdukeller. 237 9h November did not emerge 
again as a key date in German history, however, until 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. 
Following unification, particularly around the tenth anniversary of German 
unification, 9th November became the centre of an attempt to propagate a different 
image of united Germany. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the main advocate of 
9th November, used both the media, particularly a controversial interview with Die 
Zeit, 238 and the OsIkongress of the Greens in Berlin to spark a debate about the 
suitability of 9h November as the German national holiday just days before the 10 th 
unity anniversary. 239 Alliance 90/The Greens had proposed 9h November as the 
national holiday even before unification and following unification some SPD 
politicians 240 as well as a number of academics and journalists, such as political 
scientist Wilhelm HenniS, 241 historian Lucien H61sche r242 and Le Figaro Berlin 
correspondent Jean-Paul Picaper, 243 supported the idea. Former GDR civil rights 
campaigner and Alliance 90/The Greens speaker, Wemer Schulz, who had promoted 
235 Reichel, 2005, Schwarz-Rot-Gold, 95 
236 Steinbach, 1999, Der 9. November, 8. 
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9th November in the media a year before Fischer, 244 continued the debate in 2004 by 
drawing it into a Bundestag discussion on 12th November. 245 
Advocates of 9th November, on the one hand, promoted a Germany that was 
ever aware of the complexities of its past. Arguing that the date could act not only as 
a commemoration for German unity but also as a remembrance day of the German 
past, particularly National Socialism, advocates of 9th November presented the date as 
the 'Schicksalstag' (day of fate) of the German nation to place Germany's chequered 
history at the centre of the country's self-rcpresentation. They contended that the date 
could reflect both the positive and negative aspects of German history in an 'all- 
purpose holiday'. 246 The remembrance of different events on this day would, they 
argued, facilitate the commemoration of the early hopes of 1918, the disgrace of 1923 
and 1938 and the joy of an 'unexpected happy ending' in 1989.247 They thereby 
sought to make a new national holiday a platform for addressing the past in order to 
place an awareness of German history at the centre of united Germany's self- 
understanding. 
On the other hand, and to a lesser extent, like supporters of 9 th October, 
advocates of 9th November stressed the centrality of the actions of East German 
citizens and their contribution to unification. By focusing on 9 th November rather 
than 3 rd October, advocates emphasised that it was predominantly the actions of 
former civil rights campaigners that had paved the way for unification, even though 
many of the latter were in fact actively opposed to the unification process, at least in 
the form it took in 1990. It is thus perhaps not surprising that former East German 
dissidents were the main advocates of 9h November. Their motives lay partly in the 
desire to emphasise their own contribution to German unification, rather than that of 
the West German political actors: commemoration of 9th November would have 
symbolised a celebration of the achievements of civil rights campaigners in bringing 
down the Wall. In this context Fischer's support for 9th November, given the Green 
politician's own biography as a West German political activist in the late 1960s and 
244 See Schulz, W. (1999, November 9). Unser faischer Nationalfeiertag. Die Well, 8. 
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1970s, can be understood in the context of his identification with such 'alternative' 
social movements and their role in promoting direct citizen engagement in politics. 
9th November laid emphasis on popular movements, rather than focusing on the 
constitutional elements of united Germany inherent in 3 rd October. The promotion of 
9th November as an alternative date for the German national holiday can therefore be 
understood as an attempt to redefine ideas about the past in an attempt to influence 
the present. It is to a further example of the latter that we now turn. 
1.3.2 German unity: a political weapon? 
As Stollberg-Rilinger has argued, one of the most important functions of political 
representations is to suppress differences in positions and interests behind a 'fagade 
of consensus'. 248 Indeed, a high degree of consensus in the presentation of key issues 
from the German speakers across the mainstream political spectrum, from the 
moderate Left to the moderate Right, shaped the Day of Unity anniversaries. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the western German dominance of the celebrations 
extended the West German elite consensus to eastern Germany so that a high degree 
of consensus also existed among both eastern and western German actors. In many 
respects 3 rd October could thus be termed, to borrow David Cannadine's terminology, 
a 'celebration of consensusi. 249 In that sense, although the Day of Unity served as a 
convenient platform for the self-preservation of German political parties either 
seeking to be elected (1994) or having recently been elected (1998,2002) in the 
Bundestag election years, the official Day of Unity celebrations were on the whole 
immune to moderate partisan politics throughout the period from 1990 to 2005. The 
general agreement regarding the values and understandings of the past, present and 
future in many ways simplified the process of cultural synchronisation with the 
Federal Republic's model by presenting a homogenous value system to export to or 
import into eastern Germany. Owing to the high degree of consensus, combined with 
... Stollberg-Rilinger, B. (2005). Einleitung: Was heisst Kulturgeschichte des Politischen? In B. 
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the sense of stability and continuity accorded to the unity celebrations through the 
invented traditions, core (West German) values and messages of the Day of Unity 
were simplified and reinforced. This provided the potential for a higher degree of 
cultural synchronisation of fundamental structures and values than would likely have 
been possible if issues were presented as more complex, fragmented and contested by 
the German political actors. Although messages changed in the time period from 
1990 to 2005, reflecting shifts and changes in the political climate, the Day of Unity 
developed a somewhat didactic character as regards the main messages of the 
German political actors. The broad consensus also served to present an image to 
Germans and the international community of a Germany that was not ambiguous and 
struggling to define itself, but rather was assertive, grounded, deeply rooted and 
secure in its democratic and constitutional values, responsibility for its history, 
federal structure and commitment to the EU. 
Although the central unity celebrations could therefore hardly be described as 
partisan events, beyond the official staging of 3 rd October, the Day of Unity, as a 
symbol of German unification, served as an important device for inter-party point- 
scoring in: other arenas. This was best exemplified by the strategic political dispute 
between the CDU and the SPD around the 10th anniversary of German unity. In the 
media, at their party congress and in the Bundestag, the CDU and SPD used a debate 
about the 'ownership, of unification to present an interpretation of the past politically 
beneficial to the respective parties. 
CDU: we were there, where was the SPD? 
In 1989 and 1990, unlike the majority of CDU members, many in the SPD did not 
advocate German unification. 250 Such opponents were, as Milller notes, 'inspired by 
certain despair about the supposedly final loss of a socialist utopia and, more 
significantly, melancholy about the loss of a Federal Republic which had seemed to 
be safely on the path to a genuinely postnational and postmaterialistic society'. 251 
'5' For an overview of the attitudes of individual SPD actors at the time of unification see Sturm, D. F. 
(2006). Uneinig in die Einheit: Die Sozialdemokratie und die Vereinigung Deutschlands 1989190. 
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Many Social Democrats, sceptical of a 'return to "nation-state normality.. even 
publicly renounced the aim of unification in favour of a European peace structure 
with two German states. 252 At its party congress on V' October 2000, two days 
before the 10th anniversary of German unity, representatives of the CDU drew 
attention to the 'anti-unity' stance of the SPD and of many of its leading figures. 
Former Chancellor Kohl, the main critic at the provocatively named '10 Years: One 
CDU for One Germany' congress, echoed remarks he had made in numerous 
television interviews in the preceding weeks. Using emotive language, he argued that 
the SPD, which had been prepared to 'piteously abandon ... their countrymen in the 
GDR9,253 had 'not wanted unity right up until the very end'. 254 Referring to the stated 
goal of unification in the preamble of the 1949 Basic Law, the ex-Chancellor asserted 
that many on the Left had given up on the 'constitutional obligation of German unity 
in freedom' ; 255 he described the SPD's position towards unity, unchanged despite the 
demonstrations in the GDR in 1989, as a 'betrayal of humanity'. 256 In this way, he 
sought to imply that Social Democrats had not only been unsupportive of unification 
but had in fact betrayed the goal of unification and by association, the German 
people. Indeed, the former Chancellor explicitly stated, 'What the Social Democrats 
did amounted to treachery -I say quite explicitly, treachery. 257 
In an attempt to humiliate not only the SPD as a whole but also specific 
individual SPD leaders, numerous representatives of the CDU quoted remarks made 
by their opponents shortly before unification. While former Minister-President of 
Saarland and Chancel lor-candidate in 1990, Lafontaine, received criticism for having 
opposed the Economic, Monetary and Social Union, 258 the majority of criticism 
targeted Chancellor Schr6der, Minister-President of Lower Saxony at the time of 
unification. CDU leader Angela Merkel sought to discredit Schr6der, stating that, 
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like Lafontaine, he had been against the Economic, Monetary and Social Union; 259 
she also explicitly attempted to use the past as a mechanism with which to undermine 
Schr6der's legitimacy in the present, arguing that 'from a historical point of view it 
does matter who is Chancellor in the present. 260 Correspondingly, like many other 
CDU members, CDU parliamentary party leader Friedrich Merz called for Schr6der 
to admit his mistakes during the unification phase. 26 1 Kohl meanwhile, in a further 
attempt to undermine the moral integrity of the Chancellor, quoted Schr6der as 
saying a decade earlier, 'after forty years of the Federal Republic a new generation in 
Germany should not lie to itself about the chances of unification. There aren't any. ' 262 
CDU accusations of 'treachery' of the SPD and its leaders re-emerged four 
years later when, on 3 rd November 2004, Finance Minister Hans Eichel of the SPD 
proposed moving the celebration of the Day of Unity to the first Sunday in October. 
Chancellor Schr6der, who had endorsed Eichel's suggestion of shifting the unity 
celebrations to a non-working day in order to accelerate economic growth, 263 once 
more became the main target of attack. The initiative, which attracted substantial 
media attention, received considerable criticism from many across the political 
spectrum, from the general public 264 and even from Federal President Horst 
K6hler. 265 Although the suggestion was withdrawn just one day after being 
announced, 266 the CDU nevertheless strategically continued the debate in the 
Bundestag sitting of 12 th November. For the CDU, this highly unpopular, highly 
publicised topic served as an instrument with which to further discredit the SPD and 
Schr6der and to dredge up the SPD's former 'unpatriotic' anti-unity stance. The 
CDU emotively spoke of the SPD wanting to 'get rid of the Day of Unity. Arnold 
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Vaatz, who, before joining the CDU in February 1990 had been part of the civic 
movement in the GDR in the autumn of 1989, quoted embarrassing anti-unification 
statements from Schr6der and Eichel, Oberbiirgermeister of Kassel during 
unification. He argued that the motivation for the SPD wanting to scrap the Day of 
Unity lay in its desire to free the party from a yearly reminder of its 
'collective... failure'. 267 While Reinhard Grindel ironically remarked that if the Day 
of Unity were moved to a Sunday it would occasionally fall on 7 th October, 268 the 
former Day of the Republic, Eckhard von Klaeden went so far as to implicitly 
compare the SPD government with the SED, which had scrapped the celebration of 
Whit Monday and Ascension Day as holidays in the GDR . 
269 The SPI) responded by 
drawing attention to the similarity of CSU leader Edmund Stoiber's suggestion to the 
Bundestag in February 1994 to move the Day of Unity to a Sunday as a solution for 
financing long-term care insurance. 270 
By emphasising the SPD's 'treachery', the CDU sought to question the 
integrity and legitimacy of both the party and the Chancellor. To juxtapose the 
position of the SPD and CDU, the latter also used the debate to frame itself as the 
'party of unity'. In a climate where the majority of Germans across the political 
spectrum had no longer considered unification a realistic possibility, from the 
beginning of his chancellorship on I't October 1982, Kohl had stressed his desire for 
German unification. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kohl's steps towards unity 
focused on rhetoric rather than policy: on the one hand, he extended personal contacts 
between East and West Germany, on the other, he fostered relations with the Soviet 
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Union by presenting the Federal Republic as a potential economic partner rather than 
a threat. 271 
Following the fall of the Wall, Kohl's contribution to unification shifted from 
rhetoric to policies: on 28th November 1989 he presented his ten-point plan for 
unification to the Bundestag; 272 on I 1ý' February 1990, he held decisive talks with 
Gorbachev; five months later, on Ist July, the Economic, Monetary and Social Union 
treaty that he had initiated came into being and on 3 rd October the Unification Treaty 
came into force. 273 In this context, at the I" October 2000 party congress, the CDU 
heavily stressed its role in the unification process in order to increase its popularity. 
Merkel traced a path of unification from Adenauer to Kohl274 while the latter, 
presenting himself as the 'Chancellor of unity' and the CDU as the 'party of unity', 
stressed that 'the Union never stopped working for unity'. 275 Despite a fleeting 
reference by Kohl to SPD Chancellor Brandt's contribution to convincing Gorbachev 
to feel less threatened in the crucial phase after opening the Berlin Wall, 276 the CDU 
made very little reference to the contribution of any other party or person in the 
unification process. The only outsider praised, Brandt, had been dead for eight years. 
The SPD responded to these CDU accusations in the media, in the Bundestag 
debate of 29t" September 2000 and at the SPD party congress in Stuttgart on V 
October 2000. 
SPD: CD U Geschichtsfdlschung to hide partyfailures 
In a ZDF interview on 16'h December 1999, Kohl admitted receiving between 1.5 and 
2 million deutschmarks of donations between 1993 and 1998, from a donor he 
271 See Grosser, D. (Ed. ). (1992). German unification: the unexpected challenge. Oxford: Berg. 272 See Ton konfoderafiven Strukturen zu einer F6deration' - Zehn-Punkle-Programme. (2007). 
Retrieved May 25,2008, from http: //www. glasnost. de/hist/verein/89/zehnp. httn 1. 
273 For a detailed overview of Kohl's Deutschlandpolitik see, for example, Korte, K-R. (1998). 
Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzierschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen, 1982-1989. In 
K-R. Korte, D. Grosser, W. Jager & W. Wcidenfeld (Eds. ), Geschichle der deutschen Einheit (Vol 1). 
Stuttgart: Deutsche Vcriags-Anstalt, 720-75 1. 
274 Streit um 1erdienste der Einheit. (2000). Retrieved October 12,2003 from http: //www. rhein- 
zeitung. de/on/00/10/01/topnews/einheit. html. 
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refused to name, without declaring it in the CDU's accounts. 277 With reference to 
this donations scandal, SPD Secretary General Franz Muntefering, in a remark 
representative of the SPD response to the CDU's accusations, told Reuters television 
on I" October 2000 that the CDU was hiding behind its achievements during 
unification in order to play down the failures of the party and of ex-Chancellor 
278 Kohl. What he described as the 'halo' of German unity did not, he argued, justify 
or explain Kohl's failure in the donations scandal . 
279 At the SPD party congress on 
the same day, Schr6der echoed his fellow Social Democrat's remark and accused 
280 Kohl of attempting to draw attention away from the scandal . Meanwhile, to imply 
that personal glory, rather than the German people, had motivated Kohl, Lafontaine 
argued that Kohl's aim was to go down in history as the Chancellor of unification. 281 
As a result of the donations scandal, a debate developed between the SPD and 
CDU and even within the CDU itself about whether or not Kohl should be permitted 
to speak at the I Oh unity anniversary. 282 The majority of SPD politicians argued that 
it would not be appropriate for Kohl to give a speech at the unity events since, by 
breaking party finance laws, he had put into question his integrity. A Dimap opinion 
poll revealed that 54% of Germans, 63% of those from eastern Germany, nevertheless 
wanted Kohl to speak on P October. 283 However, to the delight of the SPD, due to 
an intra-CDU vendetta, it was announced in July 2000 that Kohl was not invited to 
deliver a speech on 3 rd October 2000.284 As host of the central celebrations, Minister- 
President of Saxony, Kurt Biedenkopf exploited his authority to select the unity 
speakers to avenge himself upon Kohl, who in 1977 as leader of the CDU had 
277 Kohls politisches Leben: ein Drama in vier Akten. (2000). Retrieved October 2,2003, from http: 1/ 
www. spiegel. de/politik/deutschland. 
278 Bei der Feier, 2000,2. 
279 Wähls Abrechnungen sind kleinlich. (2000). Retrieved October 18,2003, from http: //www. spiegel. 
de/politik/deutschland. 
210 Schröder. ý Kohl will die Geschichtefälschen, 2000,1. 
291 Politischer Schlagabtausch vor Einheitsfeier. (2000, October 2). Die Welt, 2. 
1112 Templin, W. (2000). Helmut Kohl sollte keine offizielle Ansprache am 3. Oktober in Dresden 
halten. Retrieved November 12,2004, from http: //www. tagesspiegel. de/archiv/2000/07/23/ak-po-de- 
39252. html. 
283 Picaper, J-P. (2000, August 23). Vancien chancelier laisse planer le doute sur sa participation ä 
l'anniversaire de la reunification, dont il fut Vartisan. Le Figaro. n. p. 
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removed Biedenkopf as the party's Secretary General . 
285 Denied status as a guest 
speaker, Kohl refused to attend the IOh unity anniversaries. Ironically, despite his 
absence, Kohl was nevertheless at the heart of the Day of Unity celebrations where all 
unity speakers emphasised the former Chancellor's achievements in the unification 
process. Commendation of Kohl also spread to the national and international press 
attracted by the irony of, as The Guardian described it, 'a case of Hamlet without the 
prince' . 
286 In 1998 as Chancel lor-Elect, Schr6der had thanked his predecessor for his 
role in unification on the Day of Unity, stating that he was certain 'the people in 
Germany will not forget it'. 287 By the time of the SPI) party congress in 2000, 
however, Schr6der was instead stressing his own party's involvement in unification. 
Accusing Kohl of falsifying history, 298 the SPD was keen to emphasise that 
Kohl's contribution to unification had only been made possible through that of the 
SPD's, namely the d6tente policies of Brandt and Schmidt. During his chancellorship 
from 1969 to 1974, Brandt undertook numerous practical steps towards d6tente with 
the 'other' Germany. In a climate of virtual stagnation from the mid-1950s following 
the establishment of the Hallstein Doctrine, he agreed to negotiate with the GDR 
leadership in an attempt to ease tensions in Europe. For the first time since 1948, 
dialogue consequently resumed between the top politicians of East and West 
Germany when, in a symbolic reopening of lines of communication, Brandt met East 
German Prime Minister Willi Stoph in Erfurt and Kassel. Subsequently, through his 
Ostpolitik, Brandt secured the signing of treaties with the Soviet Union (August 
1970), Poland (December 1970) and Czechoslovakia (June 1973) as well as the 
Quadripartite Agreement of Berlin (September 1971) and the Basic Treaty 
(Grundlagenvertrag) with the GDR. The latter was considered by the Brandt 
government as an 'opportunity for rescuing the idea of a single German nation within 
the framework of two states, of puncturing the Iron Curtain while recognising that it 
285 ibid. 
286 Hooper, J. (2000, October 4). Open gate: Kohl stays aNvay as Germany celebrates I Oth anniversary 
of unification he masterminded. The Guardian, 15. 
297 Schr6der zolit Kohl Respekt. (1998, October 5). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7; Mierke, C. 
(Eds. ). (1998, August 14). Bundesregierung lehnt Hymnen-Mix fUr Einheitsfeier ab [Televised news 
report]. In RTL Aktuell. Cologne: RTL. 
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could not be removed in its entirety'. 28' The treaty could thus be understood as 
having contributed to keeping open the German Question on a psychological, 
political and legal level. Brandt's successor, Schmidt, who served as Chancellor 
from 1974 to 1982, continued working towards d6tente with the East. Most notable 
was the SPD Chancellor's work towards the signing of the Final Act: Schmidt met 
with SED Secretary General Erich Honecker in Helsinki on I't August 1975 at the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the context of the signing of a 
d6tente treaty that became a key instrument for ftirthering human rights and freedoms 
in Eastern Europe. 290 During the debate around the 10th anniversary of unification, 
the SPD sought to emphasise the contribution of their post-war chancellors to 
challenge the interpretation of the past presented by their opponents, namely of 
unification as solely a CDU achievement. 
The debate between the CDU and SPD about who 'owned' unification, which 
importantly was not a united German, but rather a West German debate, received 
considerable domestic and international criticism. While numerous SPD members, 
the main targets of the debate, were unsurprisingly critical '291 Bundestag President 
Rita SUssmuth (CDU) and Federal President Johannes Rau (SPD) also argued that the 
petty and embarrassing dispute was undignified for an event as important as the I Oth 
anniversary of German unity. 292 Moreover, in the national and international press, the 
debate of 'the power and publicity seeking egomaniacs 293 was criticised as untimely. 
1.3.3 A site of protest? 
As mentioned above, the 'correct' date for commemorative days has been contested 
since the 19th century. Likewise, since the 19th century, commemorative days have 
299 Pulzer, P. (1995). German Politics 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 117. 
'90 For an overview of the d6tente policies and 0stvertrage see Fischer, F. (2001). 'Im deutschen 
Interesse'. - die 0stpolilik der SPD 1969 his 1989. Husum: Matthiesen. 
291 Chancellor Schr8der, SPI) Chairman, Bundestag President and eastern German Thierse and 
Brandenburg SPIJ leader Platzeck were particularly critical of the debate. See 'Kohl: Die SPD hat in 
der Schicksalsfrage der Nation versagt'. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1; Bundestag 
Plenarprotokoll. ' Gerhard Schröder, SPD (141122). (2000, September 29). Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1170 1; Wohls Abrechnungen sind kleinlich, www. spiegel. de. 
292 'Schröder wollte die Einheit nicht', 2000,2. - 29' Bielig, J., Ungrad, S., & Hofmann, G. (Eds. ). (2000, October 2). Feier zehnter Jahrestag 
Wiedervereinigung [Televised news report]. In RTL Aktuell. Cologne: RTL. 
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served as platforms for demonstrations. 294 While in the 19th century commemorations 
provided a venue for the protests of groups from across the political spectrum, 295 on 
the Day of Unity demonstrations have been the domain of left and right-wing 
extremiStS, 296 excluded from the official ceremonies of the mainstream political 
parties. The Day of Unity therefore served on the one hand as an inclusive 
mechanism, by projecting consensus among the mainstream political actors in an 
effort to encourage cultural synchronisation between East and West, yet on the other 
hand, also acted as a mechanism of exclusion, by relegating other actors (and their 
concerns) to the margins. 297 The demonstrations on the Day of Unity thus also 
highlighted the divisions, tensions and conflicts of other actors in united Germany. 
As Dieter Rucht has shown, demonstrations in liberal Western democracies are rarely 
spontaneous but rather timed and planned for maximum attention, resonance and 
agreement among the general publiC. 298 In light of the social and economic problems 
following unification, the Day of Unity, the official commemoration of unification, 
was a particularly fitting arena for the extreme Left to publicise and propagate their 
criticisms about unification. For right-wing extremists, the German national holiday 
also served in many regards as an effective site of protest since even small 
demonstrations and isolated attacks on and around the anniversaries frequently 
received considerable national and, as we have seen above, international media 
attention. Even the speakers at the celebrations regularly alluded to extremist 
behaviour around the time of the unity anniversaries. 299 Although the media 
294 Schneider, 1995, Polifische Festkultur, 346. 
295 ihid. 
296 For an analysis of the different definitions of left and right-wing extremism see Neugebauer, G. 
(2008). Extremismus - Linksextremismus - Rechisextremismus. Retrieved May 26,2008, from http: // 
www. bpb. de/themen/ uxbbfn. html. 
297 For an overview of the way in which political celebrations function as inclusive and exclusive 
mechanisms see Behrenbeck & Niltzenadel, 2000, Politische Feiern. More generally, see Luhmann, N. 
(1994). Inklusion und Exklusion. In 11. Berding (Ed. ), Nationales Bewusstsein undkollektive Identildt. 
Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewussiseins in der Neuzeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
15-45. 
299 Rucht, 2003, Die medienorientierte Inszenierung, 30. 
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Von Weizslcker, R. (1992). Ansprache des BundesprAsidenten Richard von Weizsacker. Bulletin, 
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criticised the extremist behaviour and the mainstream political actors used the Day of 
Unity to deliver didactic messages on the topic, the demonstrations and attacks 
nevertheless threatened to overshadow the specific representation of Germany the 
unity organisers sought to project on 3 rd October. In this way, the Day of Unity 
served as a powerful platform for extremists to attempt to propagate their 'vision' for 
Germany both at home and abroad. 
Righl-wing extremists: a Germany withoutforeigners 
Right-wing extremists exploited what they interpreted as a celebration of an enlarged, 
more powerful, nation-state on 3rd October. 300 Neo-Nazis used the anniversaries as a 
yearly occasion on which to propagate a neo-fascist image of a united Germany, from 
which foreigners and Jews would be excluded. Interpreting unification of the 'two 
Germanies' as a sign of desirable German expansionism, they commemorated 
unification with various demonstrations and attacks in 1990. While in Schwerin 
hundreds of extremists shouted the National Socialist phrase 'Sieg Hei 19,301 police 
were forced to intervene against a number of neo-Nazi activities in Hamburg, Bonn 
and Leipzig. In Aachen and Magdeburg, jubilant skinheads attacked passers-by with 
baseball bats; others accosted foreigners in Bielefeld. 302 
In the years that followed, the majority of right-wing extremist activities 
around the Day of Unity took place in eastern Germany, reflecting a greater degree of 
xenophobia, or at least less hesitation in showing it, in the former GDR. The Landtag 
elections in Saxony on 19'h September 2004 and in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
on 17th September two years later, in which the neo-Nazi NPD won 9.2% and 7.3% of 
the vote, respectively, 303 demonstrated the extent of extreme right-wing attitudes in 
eastern Germany. A Forsa survey of 2003 showed that while 16% of western 
Germans had right-wing extremist attitudes, among eastern Germans the figure was 
that racist attacks would negatively influence the image of Germany abroad: Seite, B. (1992). 
Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundesrates Berndt Seite. Bulletin, 106,2008. 
300 For a recent overview of right-wing extremism in united Germany see Stass, R. (2005). 
Rechtsextremismus im Wandel. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
301 Der Jubel fiber die Einheit, 1990,2. 
302 ihid. 
303 Germany alarmed at far-right gains in East. (2006, September 18). Retrieved March 15,2007, 
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as high as 23%. 304 However, this was a case of 'xenophobia without foreigners': 305 
compared to 10.3% in western Germany, 306 foreigners represented merely 2.3% of 
the population in the eastern Ldndcr, a discrepancy largely due to the restrictive GDR 
immigration policy, which only allowed temporary worker migration from other 
Communist countries such as Vietnam. In western Germany, too, where xenophobia 
had largely ceased to be a major problem before unification, a high rate of asylum 
seekers, high unemployment and major social problems resulting at least in part from 
unification contributed to a rise in right-wing extremiSM. 307 Estimates of the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution placed the number of violent right-wing 
308 extremists across Germany at around 10,400 people in 2006 . 
During 1991 and 1992 extremists carried out major violent attacks on 
foreigners and asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda, Wismar and Rostock, 309 in response 
to which Germans from across the political spectrum demonstrated in their thousands 
on the first and second Day of Unity anniversaries. 310 More so than in the years that 
followed, the first and second anniversaries of unification saw a plethora of racially 
motivated attacks across the country, reflecting the extent of xenophobic sentiments 
in these early post-unification years. On P October 1991, in Luckenwald in eastern 
Germany, for example, neo-Nazis raided a hostel from which 32 Ghanaians had 
already been evacuated. 311 In western Germany there were also a number of attacks: 
among at least a dozen other incidents, at Hunxe near Dilsseldorf, two Lebanese 
304 St6ss, Rechisextremismus, 2005,66. 
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children were severely burnt when bombs were thrown into their hostel bedroom, 312 
while in Kassel, a group of two dozen neo-Nazis armed with iron bars destroyed a 
hostel for immigrants. 313 In 1992, following the arson attack at the Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp on 26h September, which provoked a counter-protest by 7,000 
people including politicians and pop stars a week later, 314 on the Day of Unity, neo- 
Nazis used the unification anniversary as a forum to further demonstrate their 
rejection of a multi-cultural united Germany. Right-wing extremists attacked at least 
a dozen refugee hostels with petrol bombs, 315 predominantly in eastern GermanY316 
and desecrated Jewish graves in Dortmund and Stuttgart. 317 In Halle, Arnstadt and 
Dresden they also gathered on the streets in hundreds shouting, 'Foreign pigs out, out, 
outV and displaying the Hitler salute; 318 meanwhile in the village of Massen near 
Finsterwalde in Brandenburg thousands of neo-Nazis congregated for a concert of 
extreme right-wing music groups. 3 19 Although extreme right-wing demonstrations 
and attacks on the Day of Unity continued throughout the period from 1992 to 2005, 
the attacks peaked on the tenth anniversary. Right-wing extremists exploited the 
important round anniversary of German unity to propagate anti-Semitic views: on the 
eve of 3 rd October neo-Nazis attacked a Jewish couple in Schwerin, 320 carried out an 
f 32' and graffitied the Buchenwald arson attack on a synagogue in DUsseldor 
concentration camp. 
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Left-wing extremists and civil rights campaigners: 'Hurra Deutschland - nein danke' 
Particularly in the early years after unification, numerous clashes took place between 
left and right-wing extremists during their attempts to transmit opposing ideas about 
Germany on the Day of Unity. In stark contrast to rigbt-wing extremists, left-wing 
activists and extremists used the Day of Unity celebrations to frame unification and 
unity as negative as well as to attempt to influence political reforms. For many left- 
323 
wing extremists, of which an estimated 25,000 existed in Germany in 2006 , 
unification symbolised a return to an undesired, powerful nation-state. 324 In this 
context, they staged events on the German national holiday under mottos such as 
'Hurra Deutschland - nein danke 325 (Hooray Germany - no thanks) and 'Halt's Maul 
Deutschland' (Shut your face, Germany). 326 
In 1990, they protested in Berlin in their tens of thousands 327 against a 
unification that signified for them 'expansive German imperialism', and the 
328 beginning of a 'Fourth Reich' . The demonstration mottos of the following years 
reflected an unabated cynicism towards unification. In 1991, for example, having 
refused their invitation to the official central celebration, the PDS329 - the former 
SED party - organised a rally in Berlin under the motto 'Protest statt Fest 9330 (protest 
instead of celebration) while in 1993, left-wing extremists protested in Berlin against 
323 Linksextremismus. (2008). Retrieved May 27,2008, from http: //www. verfassungsschutz. de/de/ 
arbeitsfelder/af linksextremismus. htm. 
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the 'annexation of the GDR 9 331 under the slogan 'Es gibt nichts zu jubeln' (there's 
nothing to cheer about). 332 
As the former capital of the GDR and capital of united Germany, left-wing 
extremists often chose Berlin as their main arena for attempting to redefine ideas on 
the Day of Unity. In 1994, however, at an event less than two weeks before the 
Bundestag elections of 16th October, protestors violently demonstrated at the central 
unity celebrations in Bremen, thereby directly impacting upon the official staging of 
the central unity event more than in any other year from 1990 to 2005. The 
ecumenical service, for example, could not be held in the cathedral333 due to security 
concerns, while Federal President Roman Herzog was forced to leave the celebrations 
early for fear of attack. 334 In an attempt to publicly demonstrate disapproval over the 
continued social and economic problems resulting from unification and the 
unUfilled promise of equal living standards in eastern Germany by 1994, extremists 
and left-wing organisations staged a variety of anti-unification events. The Bremen 
Council for Cultural Affairs (Kulturrat), an amalgam of independent and public 
cultural institutions and the main organiser of the counter-events, staged discussion 
rounds, music and theatre 335 to present unification as synonymous with 
'unemployment, xenophobia and the decay of social democratic rights'. 336 
Meanwhile, 1,000 demonstrators took to the street, 337 329 of whom police had 
arrested by the end of the day. 33 8 To prevent further disturbances, municipal 
authorities, who had engaged 2,500 extra police from neighbouring Lander, 339 had 
banned a planned 'unity divides' demonstration of the Bremen-based 'Alliance 
Against the Celebration of the Day of Unity', a group of what The Guardian 
33 1 La morositd a dom ini, 1993,6. 
332 Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993 [Television broadcast]. (1993, October 3). Saarbrücken: 
Saarländischer Rundfunk. 
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described as 'Communists, anarchists and professionally disaffected 9.340 
Demonstrations continued throughout the years that followed, predominantly in 
Berlin, where in 2000, critical of a decade of social and economic difficulties 
resulting from unification, the PDS marked the Wh anniversary of German 
unification with a counter-demonstration of 10,000 people on the Alexanderplatz. 341 
Alongside their criticism of unification and its consequences, left-wing 
extremists also used the Day of Unity as a medium to attempt to influence political 
reforms. The proposed change to the asylum law in 1992 and, to a lesser degree, 
Schroder's reforms of the social security system in 2004 provoked considerable 
demonstrations. In light of the 438,191 people who had applied for asylum in 
Germany by the end of 1992,342 a discussion emerged around the time of the second 
anniversary of German unity about restricting the asylum law as outlined in article 
16, paragraph 2, sentence 2 of the Basic Law. The proposed change, implemented on 
Is' July 1993 following a compromise solution between the CDU, CSU, SPD and 
FDP on 60' December 1992, aimed to continue to offer protection and refuge for the 
genuinely politically persecuted, but to prevent unjustified appeals. 343 Nevertheless, 
many on the Left, particularly extremists, interpreted the proposed alteration as a sign 
of a political shift to the Right. 344 Left-wing extremists, together with members of the 
Green party, trade unions, citizens' initiatives and students consequently protested in 
their tens of thousands across the country on 3 rd October 1992 345 as part of their 
attempt to prevent this policy change. Similarly, in 2004, in response to Social 
Democratic Schroder's 'Hartz Ipm 346 proposals to reduce unemployment benefits, 347 
45,000 civil rights campaigners, left-wing activists and extremists, demonstrated in 
340 McElvoy, A. (1994, October 4). Germans mark unity day with sulky stay at home. The Times, 14; 
Ramm, 1994, Fest(ungs)stadt Bremen, 2. 
34 1 Rau lobt Engagement ostdcutscher BUrger. (2000, October 4). Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. 
342 Novellierungen des Asylverfahrensgescizes. (1993). Retrieved February 14,2007, from http: H 
www. bamf. de/nn - 
565070/de/asyl/asylrecht/novellierungen/novellierungen-inhalt-3-asylkompromiss - 
vom-061292. htmi. 
343 Lehmann, H. G. (2002). Deutschland-Chronik 1945 bis 2000. Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur politische 
Bildung, 459. 
344 Zehntausende demonstrierten gegen Rassismus und Fremdenhass. (1992, October 5). Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 1. 
345 Zehntausende demonstrierten, 1992,1; Demonstrationen am Tag der Einheit, 1992,2. 
346 Protestzug durch Berlin. (2004, October 4). Saddeutsche Zeilung, 5. 
347 Schroeder routed in Hamburg poll, 2004 retrieved December 20,2007 from http: h 
w,. vw. news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe /3519363. 
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Berlin. 348 The Day of Unity thus served for left and right-wing extremists and 
activists alike as a platform for promoting alternative visions of Germany. 
Conclusion 
Anderson's concept of nations as imagined communities and Hobsbawrn and 
Ranger's work on invented traditions seem particularly pertinent to the findings of 
this chapter. Exploration of the historical, institutional and political context of the 
Day of Unity has supported the idea that nations are not natural entities but rather are 
imagined communities constructed through various processes. In line with Mergel's 
and Stollberg-Rilinger's understanding of the potential of representations such as 
national holidays to not only reflect but also shape the nation and the polity, it is 
striking that the Day of Unity has contributed to the broad, ongoing process of nation- 
building in Germany: by seeking to influence how the nation was imagined by its 
citizens and the rest of the world, the 3rd October anniversaries can be understood as 
part of an attempt to construct and maintain an imagined community. 
The Day of Unity served to connect all Germans in an imagined community 
by, to borrow from Anderson, facilitating a 'consciousness of connectedness. 349 
Furthermore, as a somewhat didactic platform for presenting an idealised image of 
Germany, the German national holiday also had the potential to serve as a mechanism 
for influencing the nature of the imagined community in the future. What is more, 
the western German dominance of the unity anniversaries encouraged the process of 
transferring the model of the Federal Republic to the imagined united Gen-nan 
community. In this way, the Day of Unity political actors imagined unified Germany 
- different not least in terms of territory and population size from the pre-1990 
Federal Republic - not as a novel community but rather as one dating from 1949. 
The constitutional manner of unification had indeed imagined united Germany in this 
way by simply extending the Federal Republic to include the GDR. 
Above and beyond this, the very staging of the Day of Unity celebrations 
contributed to the process of defining the domain of the imagined community. In the 
348 Bocev, 2004, La protestation, 5. 
349 See Anderson, 2006, Imagined communities, 56. 
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same way that the construction of censuses and maps influenced the way in which 
European empires imagined their territories in Southeast Asia in the 19 th century, 350 
the rotating nature of the unity anniversaries has meant that, by going around 
Germany, the celebrations have defined Germany and its borders. The itinerant 
celebrations have thus reinforced the country's bounded territorial space, thereby 
imagining the nation as limited. 
3 rd October can also be considered as a mechanism for contributing to the 
process of nation-building through invented tradition. In itself the Day of Unity can 
be understood as pure invented tradition. It was a new ceremony invented and added 
to the calendar of the Federal Republic. By means of their discourse and the staging 
of the unity events, the German political actors used the German national holiday to 
attempt to influence the construction and maintenance of the united German nation- 
state. Although free from restraints of set protocol for the celebrations, the regional 
actors in any given year nevertheless adopted similar core elements for the festivities. 
These aspects were taken on by later organisers as 'traditional' and used in the 
service of reinforcing particular images of the German nation. Hobsbawm has shown 
that invented traditions 'seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition' and that they 'attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic 
past'. 351 Indeed, on the Day of Unity, the political actors sought to shape the 
development of the German nation through ritual repetition in order to construct a 
nation that was constitutional, democratic, aware of its past, united, federal and 
rooted in Europe. The political actors thereby further established the unified German 
nation in the format of the Federal Republic - they expressed continuity in terms of 
value systems - such as federalism and democracy - as well as in interpretations of 
the past and diplomatic priorities. In this way, the Day of Unity served to construct 
historic continuity between the pre-1990 and post-1990 Federal Republic. The 
novelty of the united German nation-state was thereby concealed and it was 
legitimised by association with the smaller post-war Federal Republic. The Day of 
Unity thus gave, to use Hobsbawrn's terminology, 'rapid and recognisable symbolic 
350 Ibid., 163-186. 
35 1 Hobsbawm, 2006, Introduction, 1. 
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form' to the structures and value systems of the Federal Republic and sought to 
strengthen the authority of the political actors and the political system they 
represented. 352 Symbolically representing the subordination of the GDR, the unity 
festivities thus served to demonstrate and reinforce the superiority of West Germany 
over East Germany. 353 Consequently, the 'traditions' of the Federal Republic were 
fostered at the expense of the 'traditions' of the GDR. 
This research has also underlined the role of bureaucrats in inventing 
tradition. Bernhard Cohn has shown how, in Victorian India, officials were able to 
alter the nature and meaning of the celebrations by changing the form and staging of 
them . 
354 He highlighted that, by creating and developing traditions - from durbarS315 
to the introduction of banners of the coats of arms of Indian princes and chiefs - it 
was bureaucrats who constructed and maintained invented traditions. Similarly, 
Cannadine has demonstrated in his analysis of British coronations that organisers of 
festivities exercise a considerable degree of power in the construction of invented 
traditions. 356 Ranger too has explored, in his analysis of invented tradition in colonial 
Africa, how bureaucrats have the potential to mould and influence how a nation is 
viewed. 357 He showed, for example, how an administrative officer in Uganda, 
Edward Twining (later governor of Tanganyika) invented nearly every aspect of the 
festivities for the coronation of 1937 - from King George's radio broadcast to the 
351 costumes of the boys' parades. He also demonstrated that it was colonial 
administrators who, for example, told the Prince of Wales before his visit to southern 
and eastern Africa in 1925 that 'if he did not appear in full scarlet before the 
v 359 assembled African masses it would be better for him not to appear at all . This 
chapter has shown that the regional organisers of the Day of Unity events similarly 
352 See Ranger, T. (2006). The invention of tradition in colonial Africa. In E. Ilobsbawm & T. Ranger 
(Eds. ), The invention oftradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 211-262, here 237. 
353 For further examples of how invented traditions were used to reinforce superiority of one group 
over another, specifically of the British rulers over Africans and Indians, see ibid. and Cohn, B. S. 
(2006). Representing authority in Victorian India. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds. ), The invention 
ofiradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 165-211, particularly 172-175. 
154 Cohn, 2006, Representing authority, 165-211. 
3" Durbars were meetings at which gifts were awarded to selected Indian individuals by British rulers. 
356 See Cannadine, 2006, The context, performance and meaning of ritual, 118-135. 
357 Ranger, 2006, The invention of tradition in colonial Africa, 211-262. 
358 Ibid., 233-334. 
359 Ibid., 232 
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had control over how their nation was represented. They were afforded considerable 
autonomy to stage the national holiday, and thus to shape the meaning of the rituals, 
as they wished. In this way, by inventing traditions they contributed to the 
construction of the united German nation. Hobsbawm has argued that traditions can 
be invented both 'officially and unofficially'. 360 It is clear that the elements of the 
unity celebrations which established themselves as 'traditional' were officially 
created by political actors seeking to shape and maintain the image of the German 
nation and to propagate this image to others. 
As Hobsbawm. and Ranger have argued, the past of a nation is invented for 
the purpose of nation-building. It is invented in the sense that history is not 'what has 
actually been preserved in popular memory' but rather 'what has been selected, 
written, popularised and institutional ised by those whose function it is to do so'. 361 In 
a modem-day liberal democracy with a pluralistic media such as united Germany it is 
clearly more difficult to distort, falsify and fabricate ideas of the past than, for 
example, in Wh and 19'h century Scotland 362 or Wales. 363 However, it is clear that 
the Day of Unity actors selected and focused on specific aspects of German history 
on the Day of Unity in order to promote certain interpretations of the past in the 
service of creating social cohesion among eastern and western Germans, legitimising 
democratic institutions and encouraging the socialisation of eastern Germans. It is to 
the analysis of the versions of the past presented by the political actors on the German 
national holiday that we now turn. 
360 Hobsbawm, 2006, Mass-producing traditions, 263 
36 1 Hobsbawm, 2006, Introduction, 13. 
362 Hugh Trevor-Roper has shown how Scottish historians - through their 'discovery' of the, in fact, 
fabricated works of Ossian ('the Celtic Homer') and by undermining the idea that Irish-speaking Celts 
had colonised the Highlands - fabricated the myth that Ireland was culturally dependent on Scotland 
rather than vice versa. See Trevor-Roper, H. (2006). The invention of traditions: the Highland 
tradition of Scotland. In E. Hobsbawrn & T. Ranger (Eds. ), The invention of tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1542. 
363 For analysis of how Welsh scholars and patriots in many respects invented a past that had not 
existed see Morgan, P. (2006). From a death to a view: the hunt for the Welsh past in the Romantic 
period. In E. Hobsbawrn & T. Ranger (Eds. ), The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 43-100. 
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2. Redefining the national past 
'He who controls the past, controls thefuture; and he who controls the present, 
controls the past. ' 
(George Orwell, 1903-1950) 
In Germany, the power of the past in framing the present was recognised as early as 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century by Gen-nan idealists like Schelling 
and Hegel. 364 Following the atrocities of the National Socialist era, in the twentieth 
century, preoccupation with the past played an even more important role for German 
political actors. Vergangenheitsbewolligung contributed to the processes of catharsis, 
demonstrating responsibility for the past to victims and overcoming international 
fears and prejudices. Unification in 1990 raised fresh challenges for Germany's 
political actors: how could the international community be reassured that Germany 
would remain committed to taking responsibility for its past despite having reversed 
the 'punishment' of division? How could a shared historical consciousness be 
developed among East and West Germans, divided for more than forty years? How 
should the history of the GDR, Germany's second dictatorship - experienced by part 
of the population and completely removed from the experience of other Germans - be 
framed? In what way could a critical examination of the tribulations in the GDR 
facilitate the integration of East Germans into the Federal Republic? For the 
international actors a different issue was at stake: how could they express their 
concerns, or lack thereof, about Germany's past in the post-Cold War climate? This 
chapter explores how the Day of Unity served as a platform on which German and 
international actors sought to address these questions by constructing, redefining and 
propagating specific 'official' interpretations of the German past. 365 The first section 
364 Schmidt, D. J. (2001). On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, cited in Lebow, R. N. (2006). The memory of politics in postwar Europe. In 
R. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner & C. Fogu (Eds. ), The politics of memory in postwar Europe. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1-39, here 27. 
36' For an analysis of the ways in which the German past was staged in other arenas, such as the media, 
architecture and exhibitions, see Assmann, 2007, Geschichle im Geddchinis. For a general overview 
of the changes in memory culture across Europe after 1989 see Faulenbach, B., & Jelich, F-J. (Eds). 
(2006). 'Transformationen'der Erinnerungskulturen in Europa nach 1989. Essen: Klartext Verlag. 
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concentrates on the depiction of the National Socialist past and begins by examining 
in detail the different trends and phases in the construction of the National Socialist 
past by the German actors on the Day of Unity from 1990 to 2005. It then briefly 
sketches the alternative staging of the past by the international guest speakers. The 
shorter second section concentrates on the redefinition of the GDR past by analysing 
the interpretation of the GDR past presented on 3 rd October from 1990 to 2005. 
2.1 Redefining the National Socialist past 
Recent controversies surrounding the memorials of the National Socialist past 
provide us with examples of how united Germany has struggled to frame itself in 
relation to its troubled paSt. 366 The debates can be explained in part by the fact that, 
unlike other parts of German history such as that of the Weimar Republic or the 
Kaiserreich, the history of National Socialism has become a topic of interest not only 
for the historian but also for politicians, journalists, writers and the broader general 
public in Germany and abroad. 367 In this context, the Day of Gen-nan Unity served as 
an arena in which political actors redefined united Germany's interpretation of the 
National Socialist era in an attempt to influence attitudes on this period of German 
history both at home and abroad. 
Phases of VergangenheitsbewdIfigung 
Political actors of the GDR and the Federal Republic had interpreted the National 
Socialist past in strikingly different ways. 368 The GDR claimed that, having dealt 
with the National Socialist past during a complete system change from capitalism to 
366 For a recent analysis of the political context of the memorial for the victims of the National 
Socialist era see, for example, Endlich, S. (2006). Wege zur Erinnerung- Gedenkstditen und Ortefir 
die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus in Berlin und Brandenhurg. Berlin: Metropol Verlag. For 
examination of the issues and debates the National Socialist past raised in post-1990 Germany see, in 
particular, Niven, B. (2001). Facing the Nazi past: united Germany and the legacy of1he Third Reich. 
London: Routledge. 
367 Frevcrt, 2003, Geschichtsvergesscnheit, 6. 
368 See, in particular, Frei, N., & Steinbacher, S. (Eds. ). (2001). Beschweigen und Bekennen: Die 
deutsche Nachkriegsgesselschaft und der Holocaust. G6ttingen: Wallstein Verlag and Herf, 1 (1999). 
Divided memory: the Nazi past in the two Germanies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. See also 
Fulbrook, M. (1999). German national identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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Communism, 369 the East German 'anti-fascist' state was disassociated from the 
crimes of National Socialist Germany. 370 The Grandungsmythos of anti-fasciSM371 
allowed the GDR to 'universalise 9372 the National Socialist past and, in turn, both 
legitimise the GDR and its Communism and discredit the 'capitalist' Federal 
Republic. 373 Conversely, the Federal Republic, due to pressure both within and 
outside Germany, 374 could neither 'universalise' nor 'extemalise' the past 
convincingly and was thus forced to some extent to 'internalise' it, that is to say to 
turn it into an essential part of its self-understanding. 375 In this context, following 
Rilsen and Jaeger, the memory culture of the Federal Republic saw three main phases 
of confrontation with the National Socialist past. 376 After World War 11, despite an 
official admission of the responsibility for the Holocaust, agreement to pay 
reparations to Jewish survivors and recognition of the state of Israel, 377 the National 
Socialist past was largely ignored 378 through what Fulbrook has termed 'collective 
amnesia'. 379 Later, however, the second generation after the war, the so-called '68- 
ers', advocates of the purposeful use of politicised memory to influence domestic and 
international policy, sought to moralise their parents' involvement in National 
Socialism and its crimes. 380 The 1980s saw considerable debate about the significant 
influence of the past over the present triggered in part by US President Ronald 
Reagen's 1985 visit to the soldiers' graveyard in Bitburg, where SS soldiers had also 
369 Reichel, 1995, Politik mit der Erinnerung, 36. 
37' For an example of an attempt by united Germany to deconstruct GDR anti-fascism, through altering 
the presentation of the 'Buchenwald Child', see Niven, B. (2007). The Buchenwald child: truth, fiction 
andpropaganda. New York: Camden House. 
371 Weigi, M., & Coischen, L. C. (2001). Politik und Geschichte. In K-R. Korte & W. Weidenfeld 
(Eds. ), Deutschland-Trendbuch: Faklen und Orientierungen. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 60. 
372 Reichel, 1995, Polilik mit der Erinnerung, 35. 
373 Weigl & CoIschen, 2001, Politik und Geschichte, 60. 
374 See Kansteiner, W. (2006). Losing the war, winning the memory: the legacy of Nazism, World War 
11 and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany. In R. N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner & C. Fogu 
(Eds. ), The politics ofmemory in postwar Europe. Durham: Duke University Press, 102-146. 
375 Reichel, 1995, Politik mit der Erinnerung, 36. 
376 Rosen & Jaeger, 2001, Erinnerungskultur. 
377 Lebow, 2006, The memory of politics, 3 1. 
378 Rosen & Jaeger, 2001, Erinnerungskultur, 416. 
379 Fulbrook, M. (2002). History of Germany 1918-2000 (2"d ed. ). Oxford: Blackwell, 245. At this 
time, however, individual episodes disrupted the tranquillity of this arrangement as witnessed by the 
Fischer controversy, which had raised questions and criticised convention regarding the aims of 
Germany in World War 1. 
NO Rosen & Jaeger, 2001, Erinnerungskultur, 417. 
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been buried, and culminating in the Historikerstreit. 381 In the years that followed, 
subsequent generations of Germans in the main preferred to historicise the National 
Socialist past, that is to say, although they accepted responsibility for the past, they 
did not believe it should influence policy decisionS. 382 
Despite the striking extent to which former Nazis were integrated into 
positions of power in the Federal RepubliC, 383 through the perpetual renegotiation of 
the interpretation of the National Socialist past, the West German state could credibly 
consider itself as having dealt with the past much more extensively than the GDR. 
However, political actors of West Germany had to some extent also instrumentalised 
memory, albeit very differently. As Harold Marcuse has argued, the Federal 
Republic in many respects based its interpretation of the past on a number of myths: 
the myths of victimisation, ignorance and resistance. As a result of this, Germans in 
the Federal Republic were able to consider themselves victims of Hitler and of having 
had to endure Allied occupation, accusations of collective guilt and demands for 
compensation, and could also claim to have been actively involved in resistance and 
blissfully unaware of Nazi atrocities. 384 Above all, however, by framing the 
Communist regime of the GDR as a dictatorship and clearly defining the Federal 
Republic as 'anti-Communist', the West German state could demonise the GDR and 
385 to some extent exonerate itself as the 'better' Germany. Thus, only with the end of 
the East-West conflict did the political actors of the Federal Republic begin in earnest 
to be self-critical about their own way of mastering the past. 386 Moreover, unification 
381 Ilerf, J. (2002a). The emergence and legacy of divided memory: Germany and the Holocaust since 
1945. In J-W. MCIller (Ed. ), Memory andpower inpostwar Europe: studies in thepresence ofthepast. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185. 
382 Rilsen & Jaeger, 2001, Erinnerungskultur, 418. For an examination of the role of the National 
Socialist past in the phases of memory in post-war Europe see also Rousso, H. (2004). Das Dilemma 
eincs curopaischen Gedichtnisscs. Zeithistorische Forschungen, 1(3), 368-378. 
383 See, for example, Frei, N. (1997). Vergangenheitspolitik. Munich: C. H. Beck and Frei, N. (2001). 
Karrieren im Zwielicht: Hitlers Eliten nach 1945. Munich: Beck. 
394 See Marcuse, H. (200 1). Legacies of Dachau: the uses and abuses of a concentration camp, 1933- 
2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Moeller, R. G. (2003). War stories: the 
searchfor a usable past in the Federal Republic ofGermany. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
... Weidenfeld, W. (2001). Geschichte und Identität. In K-R. Korte & W. Weidenfeld (Eds. ), 
Deutschland-Trendbuch: Fakten und Orientierungen. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 38. 
386 Wolfrum, E. (2005). Nationalsozialismus und Zweiter Weltkrieg: Berichte zur Geschichte der 
Erinnerung - Die beiden Deutschland. In V. Knigge & N. Frei (Eds. ), Verbrechen Erinnern: Die 
Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord. Bonn: Bundeszentiale für politische Bildung, 
167. 
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marked the first opportunity for Germany as a whole to take responsibility for the 
Nazi era. 
Unification consequently marked not a decline but rather an increase in 
concern with the National Socialist past. 387 However, in their attempt to renegotiate 
and redefine ideas about the National past in united Germany's political arenas, 
German political actors immediately faced a major obstacle: different interpretations 
of the past had divided not only generations, perpetrators and victims, fathers and 
sons, those who profited and those who were punished, rich and poor, 388 but also 
East and West Germans. The contrasting 'official' interpretations of the past that had 
informed the respective memories of the GDR and Federal Republic had led to 
dramatic differences in the historical consciousness of East and West Germans. An 
Allensbach survey carried out at the beginning of 1990 asking Germans how the 
history of their country differed from that of other countries showed, for example, 
that whereas 52% of West Germans considered the Nazi past the main distinguishing 
feature, this was true of only 4% of East Germans. 389 
As Federal President Rau argued, at the Day of Unity celebrations in 2002, 
'little has such a divisive effect as different conceptions of history'. 390 Belief in a 
6common legacy' and a 'sense of common fate and destiny 391 can, however, 
potentially create a sense of belonging among groups of people. As mentioned in the 
last chapter, political actors have consequently used national festivities to foster 
historical consciousness in Germany since the 19th century. 392 In this context, the 
Day of Unity was suited from its inception as a platform for constructing a shared 
historical consciousness among all Germans by extending the dominant interpretation 
387 See Niven, 2001, Facing ihe Nazipast, 2. 
389 See Weidenfeld, W., & Lutz, F. P. (1992). Die gespaltene Nation. Das Geschichtsbewusstsein der 
Deutschen nach der Einheit. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1331-32,3-22. 
389 Schröder, K. (2006). Die veränderte Republik: Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung. Munich: 
Verlag Ernst Vögel, 321. 
390 Rau, L (2002). Rede von Bundespräsident Johannes Rau beim Festakt zum Jahrestag der 
Deutschen Einheit im Konzerthaus am Gendarmenmarkt Berlin. Retrieved November 1,2005 from 
http-Ilwww. bundespraesident. deldie-deutschen-bundespraesidentenfjohannes-rau. 
391 Fulbrook, M. (1999). Verarbeitung und Reflexion der geteilten Vergangenheit seit 1989. In C. 
Klessmann, H. Misselwitz & G. Wichert (Eds. ), Deutsche Vergangenheiten - eine gemeinsame 
Herausforderung: Der schwierige Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte. Berlin: Christoph 
Links Verlag, 286-298, here 287. 
392 See Mosse, 1975, The nationalization ofthe masses, 73-99. 
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of the National Socialist past to include the former citizens of the GDR. The 
interpretation of the National Socialist past in the GDF, largely discredited with the 
collapse of the SED state, had provided no viable alternative basis for the official 
memory of united Germany. The political actors thereby encouraged the cultural 
synchronisation of the historical consciousness and 'Wir-Gefahl' of eastern and 
western Germans by staging a shared foundation for a shared future. In this way, the 
Day of Unity served as an arena in which German political actors sought to overcome 
the 'divided past' and competing conceptions of history in the process of 
Vergangenheitsbewalligung. 
The interpretation of the past that the German political actors promoted on the 
Day of Unity changed considerably from 1990 to 2005 due to both internal and 
external factors. The shifts and changes highlighted the way in which the German 
actors used the Day of Unity, within a changing context, as a platform from which to 
influence shifting ideas concerning the place for the National Socialist past in united 
Germany's self-understanding. 
At the unity celebrations in the early 1990s, German political actors staged the 
acceptance of the National Socialist past as a defining feature in united Germany's 
self-portrayal. The 3rd October anniversaries were characterised by a complete 
acceptance of the past, by an emphasis that all Germans were equally accountable for 
addressing the past as well as by repetition that 'never again' should right-wing 
extremist ideas be allowed to dominate Germany. In the very first speech of the 
unification ceremony in 1990, for example, former Volkskammer President Sabine 
Bergmann-Pohl stated that although there was every reason to celebrate German 
unification, there was also a need to recognise the 'dreadfulness of German history' 
for which Auschwitz would remain an 'everlasting warning'. 393 With reference to the 
'commonality of Germans ... in their historical responsibility, 
394 Federal President 
Richard von Weizsdcker, who had famously spoken to the Bundestag in 1985 about 
accepting responsibility for the past, 395 reinforced Bergmann-Pohl's comments. He 
'9' Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
394 See President von Weizsacker's speech in ibid. 
395 See WeizsAcker, R. (1985). Weizsdcker Rede zum & Mai 1985. Retrieved May 21,2007, from 
http: //, www. bundestag. de/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok08. htmi. 
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emphasised that because the National Socialist dictatorship had caused 
'immeasurable injustice and suffering', Germans would 'always remain mindful of 
the ViCtiMS9.396 
The references, in 1990, to the National Socialist past can be understood in 
both a national and international context. Domestically, the rhetoric was designed not 
only to foster a shared historical consciousness among eastern and western Germans 
but also to assuage left-wing West German fears of a nationalist resurgence in the 
wake of unification. Beyond the German context, it sought to lessen the fears of the 
international community. The international responses to unification had 
demonstrated that German unification raised new concerns, not only with regard to 
Germany's size and strength but also with regard to its interpretation of the past. 
Many in the international community, particularly Germany's neighbours and those 
who had directly suffered under the Nazi regime, were concerned that questions 
concerning the GDR dictatorship would overshadow those about Nazi atrocities. 397 
Members of the international community had made it clear in their congratulatory 
messages to Germany during unification, for example, that the latter should not 
signify an opportunity for Germany to break from its responsibility of addressing its 
past, but rather that the opposite was true: an enlarged Germany had an even greater 
responsibility to address and not suppress its National Socialist past. Prime Minister 
Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands, for example, stated, 'We have since the war 
invested a lot in democracy in Europe. It must be possible to prevent history from 
repeating itself. 398 Similarly, President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland hoped that 
German unification would mark a 'new era ... free from aspects of the past, which 
had 
brought Europe misfortune and tragedies'. 399 In this context, in a style reminiscent of 
the Adenauer government in post-war Germany, acceptance of guilt for the 'Third 
396 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
397 Jarausch, K. H. (2002). A double burden: the politics of the past and German identity. In J. 
Leonhard & L. Funk (Eds. ), Ten years of German unification: transfer, transformation, 1ýcorporalion? 
Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 98-144, here 103. 
39' Germany united: Thatcher praises 'friend and ally'. (1990, October 4). The Guardian, 11. 
399 Ibid. For analysis of German-Polish relations before and during unification see Stoklosa, K. (2007). 
Die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands aus der polnischen Perspektive. In G. Besier & K. Stoklosa 
(Eds. ), 15 Jahre deutsche Einheit. Was ist geworden? Berlin: LIT Verlag, 149-158 and G6my, M. 
(2008). Deutsche Einheit. Die Sicht aus Polen. In W. Dergsdorf (Ed. ), Deutsche Einheit. ' Ein Projekt. 
Vienna: Verlag der Bauhaus-Universitat Wien, 23-38. 
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Reich' by German political actors on Germany's national holiday arguably served to 
attain legitimacy and approval for united Germany and further facilitate the country's 
acceptance into the international community. 400 
The following year, German political actors once more placed acceptance of 
the National Socialist past at the centre of Germany's self-understanding by staging 
3 rd October to some extent as a day for remembrance. This was epitomised by the 
symbolic gesture to commemorate victims of the Holocaust: on the morning of P 
October 1991, representatives of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the federal and 
regional governments visited the Neuengamme concentration camp to lay wreaths. 401 
That those involved in the service were members of the government and other 
members from the lower and upper chambers of parliament suggested a cross-party 
consensus on the recognition of responsibility for Nazi atrocities. This served not 
only to reaffirm the 'official' interpretation of the National Socialist past to the 
German population but also, once more, showed the international community that 
united Germany accepted responsibility for its past on its first birthday. The 
emphasis on the National Socialist past at the first anniversary in 1991 can also be 
understood in the context of the numerous racial attacks that had taken place in the 
days preceding the unity celebrations. In light of these attacks, Mayor of Hamburg 
Henning Voscherau drew parallels in his speech between the National Socialist past 
and the present day in the course of his appeal to Germans to vigorously oppose any 
ill treatment of foreigners. 402 
The calls for 'never again' were characteristically central to the speeches of 
the German actors on the second and third anniversaries of unification. In 1992, for 
example, von Weizsucker, again in the context of contemporary racial attacks in 
Germany, called for citizens to support the police in their attempts to deal with racism 
by having the courage to stand up for their own beliefs, lest 'it once more be the case 
400 For an interesting analysis of use of the past in creating legitimacy during the Adenauer era see 
Kansteiner, 2006, Losing the war. See also Herf, J. (2002b). Traditions of memory and belonging: the 
Holocaust and the Germans since 1945. In U. Hedetoft & M. 11jort (Eds. ), The postnational sejr. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 275-294. 
40 1 Dietmar, P., & Timpe, F-W. (Eds. ). (1991, October 3). Sondersendung zum Tag der Deutschen 
Einhell: Live aus 11amburg zum Tag der Deutschen Einhell. NDR: Hamburg. 
402 Voscherau, H. (1991, October 9). Ansprache des Bundesratsprtisidenten. Bulletin, 108,857-859, 
here 858. 
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that we look away, or even look on, whilst helpless people are pursued'. 403 In 1993, a 
year that saw the opening of the national memorial of united Germany, the Neue 
Wache in Berlin, criticised by many as a 'catch-all' for all victims of former German 
crimes in World War I and World War 11,404 Sossmuth was among those who spoke 
of Vergangenheilsbewaltigung by saying that, because Germany's history 'differs 
from that of other nations', Germans must completely embrace the past. 4" The 
Bundestag President linked the past with the present and the future by saying that 
Germans can 'never again look away' when 'people - foreigners or Germans, Jews, 
Christians or Muslims - have their dignity trampled upon'. 
406 Whereas von 
Weizsacker had suggested in 1991 that Germans had 'stood by and watched', 
Sassmuth's avoidance of such references perhaps provides the first sign of a slightly 
less punitive rhetoric. 
While the staging of the National Socialist past by the political actors in the 
early years after unification was characterised by the calls for 'never again', in the 
mid-1990s the interpretation of the past was instead heavily influenced by the 
anniversaries of key historical events. 1994 marked the 50 th anniversary of the 
Warsaw Uprising, when the Polish Home Army attempted to liberate Warsaw from 
German occupation. This anniversary consequently received a great deal of attention 
in the speeches of the German political actors and also influenced the choice of 
international guest speaker, Polish writer Andrzej Szczypiorski, who had taken part in 
the Warsaw Uprising and was subsequently held captive at Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp. Szczypiorski, whose works focused mainly on people in 
totalitarian regimes, was a symbolic guest speaker for the Day of Unity since, despite 
the negative experiences he suffered as a result of German actions, he was a major 
advocate of German-Polish reconciliation. In fact, he later received the 
Bundesverdiens1kreuz (German Federal Cross of Merit). 407 In his Day of Unity 
403 Von Weizsgcker, 1992, Ansprache, 1003. 
404 For the debate surrounding the appropriateness of the memorial see Niven, B. (2006). German 
victimhood at the turn of the millennium. In B. Niven (Ed. ), Germans as victims: remembering the 
past in contemporary Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-25, here 5-7. 
405 Süssmuth, R. (1993). Ansprache der Präsidentin des Deutschen Bundestages. Bulletin. 81,932-934, 
here 933. 
406 jbid. 
407 Orden fUr den polnischen Schriftsteller Szczypiorski. (1995, January 10). Saddeutsche Zeilung, n. p. 
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address, Szczypiorski stated that the erosion of Communist power and its subsequent 
collapse in Poland, which opened the path to unification of the German people, was 
not a paradox of the German-Polish past but rather 'completely self-evident'. 408 
Mayor of Bremen Klaus Wedemeier also sought to reframe attitudes about the 
German-Polish past by stating that the German-Polish border treaty, ratified on 10 
November 1990, represented a 'novelty' in German history since it confirmed the 
borders of the Federal Republic with both internal and external agreement. For 
Wedemeier, the treaty was 'protection against a relapse into the disastrous mistakes 
409 of [German] history and another form of Sonderweg' . Wedemeier made an explicit 
reference to the German atrocities in Poland stating that 'over five million Poles - 
Jews and Christians - were killed through war and annihilation'. He also spoke of 
how Polish President Lech Walqsa, who was a guest at the Day of Unity celebrations 
that year, had, by inviting Chancellor Kohl to the commemoration of the Warsaw 
Uprising on I't August, 'stretched out a hand of reconciliation'. Wedemeier 
interpreted Walqsa's words on the anniversary of the Uprising as having 'ended what 
Brandt started when he fell to his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto', referring to Brandt's 
symbolic gesture on the day of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty of 7Lh December 
1970 in front of a cenotaph of the Jewish ghetto. Wedemeier thereby used the Day of 
Unity as a means to deepen German-Polish relations by underlining that the border 
with Poland was eternally fixed, that Germany was aware of, and took responsibility 
for, the past atrocities against Poles and that Germany and Poland could now go 
'hand in hand into a shared European future'. 410 
Although the discourse about the German-Polish past was by no means 
developed enough to lay to rest the complex and contested issue of the expulsion of 
German refugees from Poland, Wedemeier's rhetoric implied a certain level of 
4normalisation' in relation to the German-Polish past: in simplified terms, Poland and 
Germany had 'dealt with the past' and were ready to look to a joint future. This was, 
in part at least, reflected in Germany's pledge to aid Poland's path to entry into the 
408 Szczypiorski, A. (1994). Ansprache von Andrzei Szczypiorski. Bulletin, 91,844-845, here 844. 
409 Wedemeier, K. (1994). Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundesrates Klaus Wedemeier. Bulletin, 9 1, 
843-844, here 844. 
410 Wedemeier, 1994, Ansprache, 843-844. 
105 
EU as well as by a mutual desire for an improvement in German-Polish relations 
among the political actors of these countries to foster bilateral trade and security. 
Unlike Wederneier and Szczypiorski, Federal President Herzog, albeit still 
focusing on the National Socialist past, did not refer to the Warsaw Uprising in 1994. 
Looking ahead, he sought to influence views on how Germany should consider the 
coming year, in which the 50th anniversary of the end of World War 11 would be 
commemorated. He said that the anniversary would give Germans, 
'the opportunity to agree about the responsibility for history and to keep 
learning for the future: war on German ground nevermore. Violence, 
restrictions of freedom and persecution of those who think differently - or 
look different - on German ground nevermore. That is the motto under which 
we were unified and under which we... want to live - western Germans and 
eastern Germans. 411 
Herzog's speech exemplifies how the discourse of the political actors on the Day of 
Unity not only sought to frame recent and current events - the event of unification, 
xenophobia in contemporary Germany or recent German-Polish relations - but also to 
project an interpretation, even proactively, of the ways in which Germans should use 
the National Socialist past in the future grounding of united Germany's self- 
understanding. Herzog's rhetoric thus reaffirmed the centrality of this issue for 
unified Germany. 
At the unity celebrations in 1995, a year described at the very beginning of his 
Day of Unity address as a 'year of commemoration and remembrance 412 and which 
also saw the publication of Victor Klemperer's diaries with their insider's account of 
Nazi victimisation, Federal President Rau presented unification as a recompense for 
having dealt with the National Socialist past. At the same time, however, he made it 
clear that the process of VergangenheitsbewdIfigung must continue. At the beginning 
of his speech he mentioned key remembrance dates: 27 th January, the date on which 
Auschwitz was liberated, and 8th May, the end of World War 11 in Germany. 4 13 Rau 
used these dates as examples of failure in German history. He went on to cmphasise 
the benefits of dealing with the past by saying that on 3 rd October 1990 Germans 
411 Herzog, R. (1994). Ansprache des Bundesprasidenten Roman Herzog. Bulletin, 91,841-843, here 
843. 
412 Rau, J. (1995). Ansprache des Prasidentcri des Bundcsrates. Bulletin, 77,753-755, here 753. 
413 The following references are drawn from ibid. 
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discovered that history can also be a success: Germans received the opportunity 'to 
start anew together', because they had 'learnt from [their] history'. Rau also 
suggested that the nature of commemoration on the German national holiday was tied 
with the past. He stated that Germans had learrit that 'only democracy ... can protect 
the dignity of each individual ... and is a prerequisite for good neighbourly relations'. 
The 3 rd October celebrations to date, according to Rau, showed this: on that day we 
encounter a Germany, 'which has become much larger, a country that soberly, 
dispassionately and without false pathos is certain of itself, its weaknesses and its 
merits'. Rau thereby demonstrated that the manner of commemoration on the Day of 
Unity was linked to the lessons that Germany had drawn from its past. The deliberate 
discussion of Germany's image in the world, as typified here in Rau's words, 
indicates how considerations of the international community influenced not only the 
interpretation of the past but also the nature of celebration on the Day of Unity. 
Whilst 1996 was dominated by rhetoric about who was responsible for the 
National Socialist past, as discussed in the following section, 1997 was marked by 
anticipation of another anniversary, namely the 1500' anniversary of the revolution of 
1848/49. This marked the first major shift toward a 'normalisation' of the National 
Socialist past on the German national holiday in the sense that it was relegated to a 
chapter in German history alongside other, much more positive eras. 414 Although it 
remained to some extent controversial to talk about 'normality' in Germany, 415 in the 
years after unification not only those on the Right but also left-wing politicians, such 
as Schroder, and left-leaning academics, began to promote some form of 
$normal isation', arguing that post-unified Germany needed 'a public culture of 
memory that [balanced] the commemoration of crimes with a sense of shared 
accomplishment'. 416 In this context, rhetoric on the Day of Unity anniversary in 1997 
414 For an interesting overview of attitudes toward normalisation in the Federal Republic, the GDR and 
the early years of united Germany see Jarausch, K. 11. (1995). Normalisierung oder Re- 
Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen Vergangenheit. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 21, 
571-584. 
41 5 Augstein, F. (2005). Nationalsozialismus und Zweiter Weltkrieg: Berichte zur Gegenwart der 
Erinnerung - Deutschland. In V. Knigge & N. Frei (Eds. ), Verbrechen Erinnern: Die 
Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
243. 
416 Jarausch, 2002, A double burden, 111. See also Jesse, E. (2007). Deutscher Patriotismus. 
DeutschlandArchiv, 40(3), 535-537. 
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shifted away from the National Socialist past and allowed the focus instead to settle 
on a positive event in German history, which represented the struggle of the German 
people for democracy through calls for freedom of the press and the desire for a 
national parliament. 
Rhetoric about the revolution of 1848/49 almost entirely replaced discourse 
about the National Socialist past and served to contrast the potentials of the former 
with the realities of the latter. Minister-President of Baden-Wurttemberg Erwin 
Teufel, for example, spoke of how instead of two World Wars, genocide and 
suppression, the 20th century 'could have', in the words of French-Jewish philosopher 
Raymond Aron, 'been Germany's century'. 417 Teufel called for Germans to be aware 
of not only the negative but also the positive parts of German history, arguing that 
'joy about the positive parts of [German] history [could] be used as a productive force 
for overcoming the enormous problems that [Germans] face due to domestic and 
international challenges'. 419 In this context, Teufel framed the Day of Unity as a 
'historic date for Germany and Europe' by contending that 3 rd October represented 
the final realisation of the goal of the 1848 revolution, namely 'unity in freedom'. 419 
In this way, Teufel emphasised to Germans and the international community that the 
German past was not entirely negative but had actually made constructive 
contributions to the history of Europe. The fact that Teufel, a Christian Democrat, 
focused on the 1848 revolution, a centre-piece of the Left's tradition, serves to 
demonstrate the extent of transformation and convergence of the centre Right and the 
broad based consensus regarding democratic norms and ideas in the post-war period. 
More importantly, it provides a further example of the high degree to which the 
interpretation of the German national past on the Day of Unity was borne on and 
further propagated by a set of now cross-party traditions and self-understanding. 
Just over a week after the Day of Unity celebrations in 1998, the idea of 
drawing a line under the National Socialist past became a major topic of debate in 
Germany and illustrated that not only anniversaries but also cultural and political 
events could influence the interpretation of the past staged on the Day of Unity by the 
417 Teufel, E. (1997). Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundesrates. Bulletin, 80,935. 
418 ibid. 
419 Ibid, 936. 
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German political actors. On I I'h October, at his award ceremony for the Peace Prize 
of the German Publishers and Booksellers' Association at the Frankfurt Book Fair, 
Martin Walser argued that Auschwitz should not be instrumental ised and that there 
should not be a continual presentation of German disgrace. 420 The German 
playwright and novelist's suggestion that Germany had apologised enough for the 
crimes of the 'Third Reich' over five decades, 421 enraged the Chairman of the Central 
Council of Jews in Germany Ignatz Bubis, who left the auditorium. A subsequent 
battle in the press ensued between Walser and Bubis and, although they eventually 
reconciled their differences, the debate brought the politics of the past into the public 
sphere once more. 
Consequently, the following year the rhetoric of the national political actors at 
the Day of Unity mirrored the debate about whether or not a line should be drawn 
under the National Socialist past. This was epitomised by the way in which CDU 
Minister-President of Hesse Roland Koch and SPI) Chancellor Schr6der presented 
contrasting portrayals of the past, as a result of which the traditionally consensual 
presentation of the past on the Day of Unity was barely visible. Schr6der, striving 
to quell the concerns of the international community and of those within his party 
fearful that there would be no place for the memory of the National Socialist era in 
the Chancellor's so-called Berlin Republic, explicitly rejected any suggestion of 
'normalisation'. He used emotive language to describe how the 'crimes of Auschwitz 
are forever burned in the memory of our people: ' for Schr6der there could be 'no 
suppression, no forgetting and no line drawn under the past in any way 
whatsoever' . 
422 He used an international argument to support his interpretation of the 
past, namely that Germany's neighbours were 'considerably less anxious' when 
423 Germany was 'conscious of its past' . In contrast to this, Koch, in somewhat 
ambiguous terms, implied that moving on from the National Socialist past was 
acceptable. He referred to Joachim Gauck's distinction between consciously and 
unconsciously forgetting: the latter, which was acceptable when failure and guilt had 
420 Rathgeb, E. (2005). Deutschland kontrovers. Debalten 1945 - 2005. Bonn: Carl Hanser Verlag, 
403. 
421 Jarausch, 2002, A double burden, 103. 
422 SchrOder, 1999, Rede, 636. 
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been fully accepted, provided a sense of 'wonderful alleviation'. 424 Koch indirectly 
called for a 'normalisation' of attitudes towards the 'Third Reich' by saying that 
although Gauck's words referred to the GDR past, they could be seen as 'valid in 
general' . 
425 Although Koch seemed to retract from the possible implication of these 
words by ambiguously saying that Germans 'must not forget' the 'dictatorship that 
Germany experienced', (one notes here the use of the passive voice), he juxtaposed 
this with positive aspects of the German past, focusing on the significant achievement 
of key political actors in the post-war period. 426 
In the years that followed, the debate about the correct way in which to deal 
with the National Socialist past remained a topic of debate for political actors outside 
the official celebration venues, as exemplified by FDP politician Klaus Kinkel's 
address to the Bundestag in September 2000. In his speech on the status of German 
unity he argued that, on the Day of Unity, it must not be forgotten or suppressed that 
Germans 'have two unjust regimes ... to deal with'. 
427 The opening of the 
controversial Exhibition on the Crimes of the German Army 
(Wehrmachtausstellung) '428 which showed widespread 
involvement of non-SS 
soldiers in Nazi crimes but initially also had clear scientific weaknesses (such as non- 
authentic photographs etc. ), and the David Irving-Deborah Lipstadt libel case in 
which the latter successfully defended having described the avid British Holocaust 
denier as a 'discredited historian', 429 also kept the topic of the interpretation of the 
National Socialist past alive among the general public. Nevertheless, a survey from 
the Institut flir praxisorientierte Sozialforschung showed that, by the end of the 20 th 
century, 56% of Germans favoured drawing a line under the National Socialist 
past. 430 In line with this, at the turn of the century German political actors, once 
more in unison, continued to advocate a 'normalisation' in attitudes toward the 
424 Koch, R. (1999). Rede des Ifessischen Ministerprasident und Prasidenten des Bundesrates, Roland 
Koch. Bulletin, 62,633-635. 
425 Ibid., 635. 
426 ibid. 
427 Bundestag Plenarprotokoll. Klaus Kinkel, FDP (141122). (2000, September 29). Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag, 11714. 
428 See Augstein, 2005, Nationalsozialismus, 242. 
429 See Evans, R. (2002). Lying about Hitler: history, Holocaust and the David Irving trial. New York: 
Basic Books. 
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National Socialist past. This manifested itself at both the CDU-dominated Day of 
Unity celebrations in 2000, organised under the supervision of CDU member 
Biedenkopf and with speeches by him and former CDU member de Maizi6re, and at 
the SPD-dominated 2001 celebrations (both German speakers, Wolfgang Thierse and 
Kurt Beck, were from the SPD, the latter as then Bundesrat President was also 
responsible for overseeing the staging of the celebrations), by an almost complete 
avoidance of the topic of the National Socialist past by the German political speakers. 
Events at the beginning of 2002 showed that the politics of the past still 
played an important role in European politics. At the beginning of February, for 
example, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban had contended that EU 
membership be withheld from Slovakia and the Czech Republic until they revoked 
the Beneg decrees of 1945 that had removed citizenship rights from all Germans and 
Hungarians, with the exception of recognised (Communist) resistance fighters, due to 
their alleged collective support for Nazi Germany. 43 1A week later, Czech Prime 
Minister Milog Zeman's description of ethnic Germans expelled at the end of World 
War 11 as 'Hitler's fifth column' resulted in Chancellor Schr6der, who may have 
supported such a view in 1968, cancelling his visit to Prague on 28 1h February. 432 
Germany's Western partners such as France and the UK had, since 1945, seen 
Germany take responsibility for crimes committed during the National Socialist era. 
By contrast, from behind tile Iron Curtain, Central and Eastern European countries 
had had no opportunity until the collapse of Communism to call Germany to task for 
the crimes committed against the citizens of their nations. Despite the counter- 
indications that the Central and Eastern European countries were not ready for any 
line to be drawn under the National Socialist past, the SPD-dominated celebrations in 
Berlin in 2002 nevertheless saw the trend towards a promotion of 'normalisation' 
continue. For example, echoing the words of the Mayor of Berlin in 1990, Momper 
of the SPD, that Berlin mirrored both the high and low points of German history, 433 
Mayor of Berlin Klaus Wowereit, also of the SPD, framed Berlin as a city where one 
"' Lebow, 2006, The memory of politics, 2. 
432 ihid. 
4" Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
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was confronted not only with two dictatorships but also with unity and freedom. 434 
The combination of the focus on both the positive and negative elements of history, 
rather than simply on the negative epitomised the growing support of 'normalisation' 
in the portrayal of the German past. This was also visible in the address by Federal 
President Rau in which he warned against forgetting the past but, in this context, 
immediately went on to differentiate between nationalism and patriotism and to 
suggest that loving one's country was positive. 435 In this way, the German political 
actors no longer construed the National Socialist era as a defining characteristic of 
united Germany's self-understanding as in the early 1990s. Instead, it would seem 
that the political actors, having accepted guilt for the crimes of the 'Third Reich' 
since 1945 and having stressed this once again in the first few years after unification, 
thought that sufficient time had passed and the moment had arrived to reframe 
attitudes toward the National Socialist past on the Day of Unity - despite the 
indications that this was against the will of Germany's immediate neighbours to the 
East. 
In 2003 National Socialism was again barely mentioned in the speeches of the 
German speakers at the central celebrations. This is particularly surprising in light of 
the fact that the international guest speaker was Jewish-Hungarian novelist Imre 
Kertdsz who, having suffered under both the National Socialist and Communist 
regimes, had made the Holocaust the central theme of his works. It appears that, in 
stark contrast to 1994, when the presence of Szczypiorski had contributed to a 
concentration of rhetoric on the National Socialist past, in 2003 the attendance of a 
former victim was in itself considered sufficient reference to the negative aspects of 
German history. 
That same year, at the unity celebrations in the village of Neuhof in Hesse, 
however, the level of so-called 'normalisation' of the National Socialist past proposed 
by CDU politician Martin Hohmann caused public outrage. In his speech - largely 
interpreted as anti-Semitic, for instance in his suggestion that the atrocities carried out 
434 Wowereit, K. (2002). Rede des Präsidenten des Bundesrates und Regierenden Bürgermeisters von 
Berlin, Klaus Wowereit beim Festakt zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit am 3. Oktober 2002 in Berlin. 
Retrieved December 1,2005 from http: //www. berlin. de/landespressestelle/archiv/2002/10/03/08620/ 
index. html. 
435 ibid. 
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by Communists in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe were somehow essentially 
Jewish acts or in his instrumental isation of the quite openly anti-Semitic rants of 
Henry Ford - Hohmann rejected the claim that Germany was a 'nation of 
perpetrators' during the National Socialist era and also suggested that Germany stop 
paying compensation to Nazi victims to ease the economic problems of post- 
unification Germany. 436 Hohmann's speech, out of touch with the prevailing 
discourse at the time - both in terms of its utter rejection of any serious continued 
engagement by contemporary Germans of the question of responsibility or guilt for 
the acts of National Socialist Germany and in terms of its twisted portrayal of Jews in 
Communist atrocities - resulted in the dismissal of the Hessian politician from 
parliament and later from his party. Bundestag President Philipp Jenninger's 
resignation following his arguably controversial speech on the 50'h anniversary of the 
Jewish pogrom in 1988 had shown the importance attached to the 'official' portrayal 
of the National Socialist past at commemorative events in the Federal Republic. 437 
Although naturally the content of the speech by Hohmann could hardly be compared 
to that of Jenninger, it nevertheless epitomised the continued sensitivity and 
poignancy of the nature of the past promoted by political actors on the Day of Unity. 
It also highlighted the way in which the particular version of the past presented by 
political speakers on the German national holiday could have damaging consequences 
for their political careers if not considered 'politically correct' or in line with the 
dominant discourse of the time. 
Although in 2YO4 there were further signs of resistance to 'normalisation' 
from abroad, as illustrated in Poland in September of that year by the unanimous 
passing of a resolution demanding reparations from Germany, 438 a 'normalisation' in 
rhetoric about the 'Third Reich' was once again perceptible on the Day of Unity. 
German writer and GDR dissident Reiner Kunze, for example, who was invited to 
speak at the fourteenth anniversary, referring to Brandt's symbolic gesture, spoke of 
how 'none of his Slavic or Jewish colleagues' would expect any nation to 'live on its 
436 For the full transcript of the speech see Der Wortlaut der Rede von AfdB Martin Hohmann zum 
Nationalfeiertag. (2003). Retrieved June 20,2008 from http: //www. heise. de/tp/r4/artiket/15/15981/1. 
html. 
437 For an interesting analysis of this speech and its reception see Domansky, 1992, 'Kristallnacht'. 
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knees'. He argued that although a nation that has 'sinned against other nations' must 
kneel down, 'staying on its knees' prevents it from being able to look back-wards or 
forwards . 
439 Federal President K6hler went yet further with lengthy descriptions 
focusing solely on the positive parts of German history citing numerous examples, 
particularly cultural achievements, such as the quality of German universities in the 
19'h century. Further emphasising the extent of western German dominance of the 
unity celebrations and the degree to which the political actors sought to stage united 
Germany as merely an extension of the Federal Republic, K6hler, as in former years, 
once more stressed the great success achieved by Germans in the post-World War 11 
period - which could clearly be applied to the Federal Republic but was removed 
from the experience of East Germans - as a reason for pride. 
440 'Normalisation' was 
also noticeable in the way in which, for the first time by a German political actor on 
the Day of Unity, the idea of Germans as victims in World War 11 was mentioned, 
albeit fleetingly. Reflecting the emerging trend of popularised depiction of the 
suffering of Germans in World War 11 at this time in the media and in publications 
such as J6rg Friedrich's 2003 book Brandstallen (filled with macabre photographs of 
Allied bombing victims in Germany) '44 
1 K6hler - referring to the 12 to 14 million 
Germans who fled the Soviet army or were expelled from Eastern Europe 442 _ spoke 
of how the 'integration of refugees and expellees' after World War II, counted among 
the achievements of German history. 443 It is too early to know whether K6hler's 
rhetoric represented a new enduring emphasis on the notion of Germans as victims in 
the interpretation of the past presented by the German political actors on the Day of 
439 Kunze, 2004, Reiner Kunze Rede, www. thueringen. de. 
440 K6hler, H. (2004). Rede von Bundesprdsident Horst Ki5hler zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit in 
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441 Friedrich, J. (2003). Brandstdtien: Der Anblick des Bombenkrieges. Munich: Propylaen Verlag. 
See also Friedrich's bestseller Friedrich, J. (2002). Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940- 
1945. Munich: Propylaen Verlag. A more recent example of German interest in their own victimhood 
was provided in the spring of 2007 by the film Die Flucht, which depicted the mass exodus of 
Prussians escaping from the Red Amy, a production watched by over ten million viewers. See Drews, 
A. (2007). Konf- Zeitgeschichte als TV-Event. Erinnerungsarbeil und Geschichtsvermitilung im 
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Unity. 444 The topic of Germans as victims was certainly still a delicate political topic 
at this time and, as the Hohmann affair showed, such sensitive topics could have 
devastating political consequences if staged in the wrong manner in an arena such as 
that of the German national holiday celebrations. This may help to explain in part the 
lack of any real attempt to address this topic by the Day of Unity speakers despite the 
growing interest among the German public at that time. 
However, the broader trend of 'normalisation' in the staging of the past 
continued to shape the unity celebrations in the year that followed. In the same year 
that saw the erection of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in the 
country's capital, 'normalisation' was visible on the German national holiday not 
through the emphasis on both the positive and negative parts of history, through the 
portrayal of Germans as victims or through the suggestion that a preoccupation with 
the past was restrictive but simply, as in earlier years, by an almost complete absence 
of rhetoric about the 'Third Reich'. 
International actors: staging a different past 
As we have seen, throughout the period from 1990 to 2005, a high degree of 
consensus existed among the various German political actors regarding the 'official' 
representation of the National Socialist past. However, international actors for the 
most part offered a very different interpretation of the past on the Day of Unity 
anniversaries. In 1998, for example, President of the Czech Republic Viclav Havel's 
depiction of the past stood in stark contrast to that of the German speakers. Havel, 
who had been supportive of German unification, had been asked to speak at the 
Hanover celebrations by Minister-President of Lower Saxony Schr6der, since the two 
politicians had met frequently in the period before the Day of Unity celebrations. 
445 
Havel's rhetoric differed from that of the German speakers in two main regards. 
4" For analysis of the discourse on Germans as victims in Germany after 1945 see, in particular, 
Niven, B. (Ed. ). (2006). Germans as victims: remembering the past In contemporary Germany. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Frei, N. (2004). 1945 und wir. Das Drifte Reich im Bewusstsein der 
Deutschen. Munich: C. H. Beck and Moeller, R. G. (2005). Germans as victims? Thoughts on post-Cold 
War history of World War 11's legacies. History andAfemory, 17(1-2), 145-194. 
445 C. Schr6ter, personal communication, November 14,2006. 
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Before the collapse of the GDR, a large proportion of West Germans had 
become accustomed to the status quo of division 446 and many Leftist Germans had 
even adopted the discourse of philosopher Karl Jaspers that German division was a 
punishment for German crimes in World War 11.447 German political actors on the 
Day of Unity reflected these views and while presenting the time of division as 'bitter 
years "448 nevertheless framed division as a 'necessary' consequence of World War 11. 
At the unification ceremony in 1990, for example, Federal President von WeizsAcker 
had stated that 'without the war, which was started by Germany under Hitler, there 
never would have been division'. 449 In the years that followed, many German 
political actors went so far as to frame the social and economic problems resulting 
from unification as the consequences of division. 450 Havel, however, unequivocally 
presented division as positive in his Day of Unity address by saying that the 
separation of Germany was 'good for the whole world' since 'it is good for the whole 
world when something falls apart that was born from evil 9.451 'This', he continued, 
'is twice as true as far as Germany is concerned, since evil in Germany means evil in 
the whole world 7452 -a remark met with silence by the audience. 
453 
Havel's discourse also differed from that of the German speakers concerning 
who had been responsible for World War 11 in Europe. German political actors 
consistently and unanimously presented the National Socialist past as the collective 
responsibility of all Germans, which inevitably influenced the interpretation of the 
past with regard to advocacy of 'normal isation'. In 1998, for example, Federal 
President Herzog stated that 'all those who knew of the existence of Adolf Hitler's 
intentions ... carry the moral responsibility. Far from, therefore, solely the part of the 
nation that he fanaticised'. 454 In stark contrast to this, however, instead of framing all 
Germans as responsible for the 'Third Reich', Havel focused on the centrality of 
446 Augstein, 2005, Nationalsozialismus, 245. 
447 See Jaspers, K. (2001). The question of German guilt. New York: Fordharn University Press. 
448 Kohl, H. (1990). Femsehansprache des Bundeskanzlers Helmut Kohl. Bulletin, 118,1225. 
449 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
450 See, for exarnple, Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 843. 
45' Havel, V. (1998). Ansprache vom tschechischen Präsident Väclav Havel. Bulletin, 66,829. 
452 ihid. 
453 Richter, P. (1998, October 5). 'A schiane Musi' als Abgesang und Ouvertüre. Neues Deutschland, 
4. 
454 Herzog, R. (1998). Ansprache des Bundespräsidenten Roman Herzog. Bulletin, 66,828. 
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Stalin's role in post-war politics. For Havel, Germany was divided 'because a certain 
former enemy of Hitler, then his friend, then later his enemy again - his name was 
Dschugaschwili - decided, after dozens of millions of his fellow citizens had fallen in 
the war, that it would be good to leave an impression on those that were left'. 455 
Havel was not the first international guest on the Day of Unity to focus on the 
centrality of key actors rather than everyday citizens in the crimes of World War 11. 
In 1996, coincidentally just two months after Daniel Goldhagen had released his 
controversial book, Hiller's Willing Executioners, 456 essentially accusing all Germans 
of having been complicit in the Holocaust due to their so-called inherent anti- 
Semitism during Nazism, 457 Hungarian Prime Minster Gyula Hom implied that 
Germans should not have been associated with the guilt of the 'Third Reich' since 
they themselves were the victims of the dictators . 
458 Horn, invited to speak by 
Minister-President Stoiber as a gesture of thanks for opening the Hungarian border in 
1989459 stated, for example, that although Germans 'already suffered from two 
dictatorships ... the international public consider them guilty. This belongs - so I 
hope 
- once and for all to the past'. Horn, who went on to stress that Germans have been 
'thoroughly healed' through the events of the past, 460 had, like Havel, been entirely 
free to select the topic for his Day of Unity address and the content of his speech was 
not discussed with the organisers of the event before the ceremony. 46 1 Horn and 
Havel in many respects propagated a 'normalisation' of attitudes toward the National 
Socialist past that went ftirther than the 'normalisation' proposed by the German 
political actors in the mid to late 1990s, or indeed, in the case of Havel, by the Czech 
government in later years. 
455 Havel, 1998, Ansprache, 829. 
456 Gol dhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler's willing executioners: ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New 
York: Knopf. 
457 Rathgeb, 2005, Deutschland kontrovers, 394. 
458 A wealth of recent literature has touched on the issue of whether, and also why, Germans were 
complicit in Nazi crimes; see, for example, Lozowick, Y. (2002). Hitler's bureaucrats: the Nazipolice 
and the banality of evil. London: Continuum; Wagner, P. (2002). Hiders Kriminalisten. Die deutsche 
Kriminalpolizei und der Nationalsozialismus. Munich- C. H. Beck and Jarausch, K., & Geyer, M. 
(2003). Shatteredpast: reconstructing German histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
459 W. Meister, personal communication, August 17,2007. 
460 1 lorn, G. (1996). Ansprache des ungarischen MinisterprAsidenten Gyula Horn. Bulletin, 78,83. 
461 W. Meister, personal communication, November 29,2006. 
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In 2003, however, at a time when the German speakers were beginning to 
advocate 'normalisation' of the past more decisively, the role of the international 
speaker was reversed. The discourse of the international speaker continued to offer a 
contrasting interpretation of the past, not by promoting 'normalisation' but rather by 
criticising it. In his works, Nobel Prize winner Kertdsz had long promoted the idea 
that the legacy of the National Socialist genocide had fundamentally influenced, and 
should continue to influence, European society and civilisation. 462 It was therefore 
evident to those involved in the invitation of Kert6sz as main speaker at the Day of 
Unity in 2003 that he would not support a 'normalisation' of the past on the thirteenth 
anniversary of German unity since, according to the author's belief, any attempt to 
draw a definitive line under the National Socialist past would have meant a rejection 
of this event in the German collective consciousness. In a speech containing 
numerous emotive words, such as 'immeasurable suffering', 'barbarism', 'millions of 
people being persecuted and killed' as well as explicit use of the word 'Holocaust, 
which German speakers had often euphemised, Kertdsz interpreted his presence at the 
Day of Unity not as a paradox, but as a symbol of 'working together' with the goal of 
'catharsis' of a past that cannot be recompensed. Kertdsz, referring to the German 
taboos which were being broken 'one after another', criticised the way in which 
rhetoric about drawing a line under the past had emerged from the debate about 
Germans as victims. 463 Kert6sz's stance against 'normalisation' in many respects 
played a very important role on the Day of Unity: it served to ensure that the German 
national holiday could not be exclusively seen domestically or abroad as a platform 
for the advocacy of 'normalisation'. 
The large extent to which the rhetoric of the international speakers was at 
variance with that of the German actors' interpretation of the past regarding German 
division, the responsibility of everyday Germans in Nazi crimes and the 
appropriateness of 'normalisation' also served an additional function: the historical 
interpretation of the National Socialist past on the Day of Unity was to some extent 
462 See for example Kertisz, 1. (2003). Die exilierte Sprache: Essays und Reden. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
463 Kertdsz, 1. (2003, October 4). Wenn die Freudenfeuer verglimmen. Europa in der Generalprobe: 
Rede zur Feier der deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 45. 
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contested and fragmented. Although the German political actors presented a broadly 
consensual version of the past, the fact that international actors were invited to speak 
added a different dimension to the interpretation of the past. The invitation of the 
international actors allowed German political actors to present Germany as open to 
transnational communication and negotiation of the country's history and self- 
understanding. The unity celebrations consequently served to underline the extent to 
which not only domestic but also external actors participated in the negotiation and 
construction of the memory of the German national past. 464 
2.2 Redefining the GDR past 
Unification brought with it the end, and consequently the need to deal with, another 
German dictatorship. United Germany thus confronted, to use the phrase coined by 
465 Eberhard Mckel in the early 1990s, a 'doppelte Vergangenheitsbewaltigung', 
namely the challenge of dealing with both the National Socialist and Stalinist 
dictatorships. As a result of this 'double past', as Frangois and Schulze have argued, 
Germany faced a special responsibility in Europe and the world to address its 
history. 466 In this context, then, it is unsurprising that German political actors also 
used the Day of Unity as a platform to propagate specific interpretations of the GDR 
past. 467 Through treatment of the East German past, they placed not only the history 
of National Socialism but also that of the former East German state at the core of 
Germany's history on the Day of Unity. 
464 For an analysis of the extent to which issues of remembering the National Socialist past, 
particularly the Holocaust, were being shaped by globalisation see, for example, Levy, D., & Sznaider, 
N. (200 1). Erinnerung im globalen Zeftaller: der Holocaust. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkam p. 
465 Jarausch, 2002, A double burden, 99. 
466 Franqois, E., & Schulze, H. (2001). Einleitung. In E. Franqois & 11. Schulze (Eds. ), Deutsche 
Erinnerungsorte - 1. Munich: C. H. Beck, 9-24, here 12. The extent to which the two dictatorships can 
be compared received considerable media and academic attention following unification, yet these 
discussions were largely ignored on the Day of Unity anniversaries. For an interesting recent study 
supporting the theory that the two dictatorships are comparable in numerous respects see Baberowski, 
J., & Doering-Manteuffel, A. (2006). Ordnung durch Terror: Gewaltexzesse und Vernichtung im 
nationalsozialistischen und im stalinistischen Imperium. Bonn: Dietz Verlag. 
46' For recent documentation of the debates and recommendations of the Aufarbeitung der SED- 
Diktatur commission regarding the way in which the GDR past should be remembered see Sabrow, 
M., Eckert, R., Flacke, M., Henke, K-D., Jahn, R., Klier, F., Krone, T., Maser, P., Poppe., U., & 
Rudolph, H. (Eds. ). (2007). Wohin treiht die DDR-Erinnerung? Dokumentation einer Dehatte. Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale flir politische Bildung. 
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The specific interpretation of the GDR past promoted by German political 
actors at the Day of Unity anniversaries had potentially significant implications 
regarding not only practical issues of property and pension rights but also regarding 
the way in which eastern Germans considered themselves. 468 After 1990, various 
public discourses emerged about the appropriate interpretation of the 'second 
dictatorship' including: a renewed application of the theory of totalitarianism 
developed by emigrants such as Hannah Arendt or Carl J. Friedrich's comparisons of 
the National Socialist and Stalinist regimes, the presentation of the GDR as an 
illegitimate state or as a 'giant prison camp', a more sympathetic view of the SED 
regime as a "'noble experimenf' that had gone awry', a complex view of the GDR as 
having had both repressive elements and relative normality and a Diktaturvergleich 
understanding that established not only similarities but also differences in the 
ideological motivations, objectives and systems of repression of the two regimes. 469 
At unity celebrations in the early 1990s, German speakers from across the 
political spectrum stressed that Germans must work through the GDR past. In stark 
contrast to the plethora of various public discourses about the GDR past, however, 
German political actors on the Day of Unity presented for the most part a highly 
consensual, simplified interpretation of the GDR. Unlike the depiction of the 
National Socialist past, this was not complemented by a contrasting discourse by the 
international speakers, who almost entirely avoided any direct reference to the GDR 
in their speeches. Although the political actors consistently stressed negative aspects 
of the GDR, the ways in which they chose to condemn the GDR were adapted to the 
changing concerns and attitudes of the German public in the period from 1990 to 
2005. 
In 1990, an Institut fUr Demoskopie Allensbach survey showed that 54% of 
East Germans agreed with the statement 'in the GDR we were all equal and we had 
work, therefore it was a good time'. 470 Given that a slight majority of East Germans 
""' Jarausch, 2002, A double burden, 100- 10 1. 
469 Ibid., 101. For detailed and nuanced recent historical analysis of the complexities of the GDR past 
see, for example, Fulbrook, M. (1995). Anatomy ofa dictatorship: inside the GDR 1949-1989. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press and Ross, C. (2002). The East German dictatorship: problems and 
perspectives in the interpretation of1he GDR. London: Arnold. 
"" Schr8der, 2006, Die veranderte Republik, 329. 
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considered the GDR positively, it is unsurprising that Gernian political actors stressed 
at length the negative aspects of the GDR on the eve of unification and at the 
unification ceremony in order to promote the assimilation of East Germans into 
united Germany. In a televised address on 2 nd October, for instance, Minister- 
President of the GDR de Maizi&e heavily criticised the GDR, describing its 
distinguishing features as having included the '[Berlin] Wall and barbed wire, ruin of 
the economy and destruction of the environment, ideologically calculated spoon- 
feeding and instigated mistrust'. 47 ' The speakers at the unification ceremony 
similarly emphasised the suppression, corruption and lack of democracy in the 
GDR. 472 In a rare explicit reference to the Stasi files, Federal President von 
Weizsacker went so far as to attempt to influence views on how the files should be 
dealt with, by saying that it would be 'humanly unacceptable and constitutionally 
insupportable' to forget the Stasi rule. 473 The German political speakers thus used the 
Day of Unity from its inception as a forum for propagating the Federal Republic's 
interpretation of the GDR past - an interpretation which served to further justify 
western German hegemony in united Germany. In this way, the political actors 
demonstrated that they saw no place for GDR features in united Germany's self- 
portrayal. 
The following year, rhetoric about the GDR remained equally negative and, in 
contrast to the anniversaries that followed, there was reference to the Berlin Wall 
shootings. 474 The nature of the rhetoric of the first anniversary served to show that 
the negative portrayal of the SED past not only intended to discourage eastern 
Germans from reminiscing about their former state, but also to reinforce to western 
Germans the illegitimacy of the GDR, as a means of countering possible critique of 
the necessity of unification. Political speakers made the need for unification explicit 
and stressed over and again that 'neither those in the West or the East' wanted to 
"' De Maiziýre, L. (1990). Femsehansprache des Ministcrprasidenten Lothar de Maizi&e. Bulletin. 
118,1226. 
472 See, for example, Volk-skammer President Bergmann-Pohl and President von Weizsacker's 
speeches: Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
473 ibid. 
474 Voscherau, 199 1, Ansprache, 85 8. 
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return to how things were. 475 StIssmuth, for example, sought to illustrate the 
importance of unity by citing the events of the Moscow Putsch six weeks earlier, 476 in 
which reactionary Communist members of the Soviet government, critical of the 
extent of reforms, temporarily deposed President Mikhail Gorbachev and attempted 
to take control of the country. 
Reflecting the escalating social problems in eastern Germany at that time and 
epitomising the extent to which current affairs influenced the construction of the past 
on the Day of Unity, the juxtaposition of the security of the GDR with its 
shortcomings characterised the staging of the GDR past from 1992 to 1994. In 1992, 
for example, Minister-President of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Berndt Seite, 
referring to the extensive social security in the GDR, stated that although 'being taken 
by hand from the cradle to the grave may sound tempting, simple and safe [it should 
not be forgotten] that this was made possible through informers, Stasi and the 
suppression of young people'. 477 In 1994, Federal President Herzog went further to 
describe the very questioning of the negative interpretation of the GDR past as futile. 
In his speech he contended that ascertaining whether the GDR could have been 
reformed, whether monetary union and the unification process took place too quickly 
or whether the economic system in the West was more or less humane than that of the 
GDR would be topics that 'historians will argue about one day', thus implying the 
time was not appropriate for such academic debates. 478 
As has been cogently argued, imposing the history of the 'victors', namely the 
Federal Republic, onto the interpretation of the East German past, and 'treating the 
GDR as a footnote of world history, or as a dark background to the shining success of 
the [Federal Republic]' is problematic since it negates the memories of eastern 
Germans. 479 In this context, the discourse at the fifth anniversary of German unity 
was slightly different from that of the preceding and following anniversaries. 
Although, as in 1990, the Stasi files were mentioned and their opening justified and 
... Süssmuth, R. (199 1). Ansprache der Bundestagspräsidentin. Bulletin, 108,855. 
476 ihid. 
477 Seite, 1992, Ansprache, 1006. 
... Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 846. 
479 Jarausch, 2002, A double burden, 110. 
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supported, 480 orators recommended that Germans should not over-generalise the GDR 
experience. Contrary to the black and white portrayal of the GDR era at the early 
unity celebrations, Federal President Rau, for example, emphasised in 1995 that how 
a person lived was more important than the organisation to which he belonged. 481 
Sassmuth, who said as early as 1991 that eastern Germans needed a healthy sense of 
self-worth, 482 and who acknowledged in 1993 that 'people cannot delete their 
biographies', went yet further than Rau, stating that even those who had been 
convinced of the benefits of the GDR system could find their place in united 
Germany. 483 Four years earlier, NDR televised coverage of the Day of Unity 
celebrations in Hamburg in 1991 had made it clear, through an extensive interview 
with former East German television news reporter Angelika Unterlauf, that East 
Germans who had been supportive of the regime would face extreme difficulties 
being accepted in united Germany. 484 That the German actors addressed this problem 
on the fifth Day of Unity would seem to suggest that they considered sufficient time 
had passed to allow those supportive of an unjust regime to be exonerated. This 
could perhaps be construed as a very early sign of support for a historicisation of the 
GDR past. At the very least, it demonstrated an acceptance by the political actors that 
former GDR citizens should not be ostracised but rather must feel accepted so that 
their assimilation into united Germany might be facilitated. 
In the late 1990s, however, rhetoric about integrating those supportive of the 
GDR disappeared from the speeches on the Day of Unity and, instead, there was a 
shift back to an over-generalised negative portrayal of the East German dictatorship. 
This can best be understood in the context of growing nostalgia for the GDR among 
eastern Germans, or 'Ostalgie', at this time. 485 The necessary sudden adjustment to 
capitalism combined with the ever-increasing social and economic difficulties of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s evoked disillusionment with unification among many 
'48') See Süssmuth, R. (1995). Ansprache der Präsidentin des Deutschen Bundestages. Bulletin, 77,757. 
48 1 Rau, 1995, Ansprache, 753-755. 
482 Sossmuth, 1991, Ansprache, 857. 
... Süssmuth, 1995, Ansprache, 756-757. 
484 Dietmar & Timpe, 1991, Sondersendung, NDR. 
4" For an interesting examination of Ostalgie sec Boyer, D. (2006). Ostalgie - oder die Politik der 
Zukunft in Ostdeutschland. DeutschlandArchiv, 39(4), 690-703 and Christoph, K. (2006). 'Ostalgie'- 
was ist das eigentlich? DeutschlandArchiv, 39(4), 681-689. 
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eastern Germans. A Forsa survey of August 2003 showed, for example, that one in 
three eastern Germans regretted that so little remained of the GDR way of life. 486 
Indeed, the extent of nostalgia for the GDR was demonstrated by the renewed rise in 
support for the former SED party, the PDS. The PDS, which frequently secured 15 to 
25 percent of votes in elections in eastern German LlInder from 1990 to 2005, even 
gained 5.1% of the second vote in federatelections in 1998, thereby crossing the 5% 
hurdle necessary to enter the Bundestag. 487 With this backdrop, the Day of Unity 
came to serve as a platform for offsetting Ostalgie. In 1997, for example, Minister- 
President of Baden-Wiirttemberg Teufel made reference to Ostalgie, explicitly 
framing it as unacceptable by quoting sociologist Wolf Lepenies: 'the GDR state is 
, 488 bygone. There is no reason for nostalgia. This state was a criminal state . One 
notes a paradox here that is glossed over in the speeches: on the Day of Unity 
political actors presented eastern Germans both as victims of an unjust regime as well 
as citizens irrationally longing for their former state. 
At the anniversaries that followed, there continued to be a great deal of highly 
disparaging discourse about the GDR and repetition of the motto that 'no one could 
489 
want the GDR back' , particularly in 2004. That year, when the percentage of 
eastern Germans who agreed that they had a 'good time' in the GDR peaked for the 
first time to the same level as 1990,490 criticism of the GDR dominated the staging of 
the GDR past on the Day of Unity. The choice of the guest speaker, GDR dissident 
and well-known eastern German poet Kunze, on the fourteenth Day of Unity 
anniversary can be seen in this context. Although the organisers of the Day of Unity 
"'6 OsIdeutsche vermissen DDR-Alliag. (2003). Retrieved, June 19,2008, from http: //www. rp- 
online. de/public/ article/aktuelles/I 8858. 
487 Bundestagswahl 1998 Endgidlige Slizverteilung nach Landern. (1998). Retrieved June 1,2007, 
from http: //www. bundeswahileiter. de/ergeb98/d/t/sitzv. htm. 
488 Teufel, 1997, Ansprache, 935. 
489 See for example Rau's address on the 10th Day of Unity anniversary: Rau, J. (2000). Rede von 
Bundesprasident Johannes Rau beim Festaki zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit am 3. Oklober 2000 in 
Dresden. Retrieved November 1,2005, from http: //www. bundespraesident. de/dic-deutschen- 
bundespraesidenten/johannes-rau. 
00 According to an Institut far Demoskopie Allensbach survey that asked East Germans, 'If someone 
said that in the GDR we were all equal and we had work, therefore it was a good time, would you 
agree or disagreeT found 54% of East Germans in agreement compared to just 44% the previous year: 
Schr6der, Die verdnderle Republik, 329. 
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did not give Kunze a specific topic for his speech, 491 they invited him in an attempt to 
counteract the growing Ostalgie. 492 Indeed, Kunze's rhetoric predictably 
complemented the version of the past that the German political orators promoted 
regarding the GDR past. He gave Icngthy detailed anecdotes, for example, which 
made evident the restrictions on personal liberty in the GDR. He also emphasised 
that whilst no one starved in the GDR, everyone was repressed, stressing that even 
the good elements of the GDR were tainted. He stated, for instance, that even the 
mucb-admired kindergartens were instruments of a dictatorship. 493 That Minister- 
President of Thuringia Dieter Althaus invited a German rather than international 
guest speaker, suggests that, at this time, he considered national issues to be more 
immediately important than international affairs. In his speech, Althaus was himself 
also particularly critical of the GDR and called upon eastern Germans, for the sake of 
the future, to actively remember why they wanted to rid themselves of the SED. 494 
Althaus, having lived in the GDR, arguably added more legitimacy to his appeal than 
western German speakers could have offered. 
At this time, however, not only eastern Germans but also western Germans, 
suffering from the effects of considerable fiscal transfers to eastern Germany after 
unification for A ujbau Ost - the economic reconstruction of eastern Germany - began 
to question whether the GDR could have continued as it was after all. In this context, 
the Day of Unity actors sought to make it explicit, not only to eastern Germans but 
also to western Germans, that the collapse of the GDR was inevitable and could not 
have been prevented. They stressed that the GDR economy failed by itself and not as 
a consequence of West German intervention. Althaus, for example, who, years 
earlier, in 1998, had described the GDR economy as having 'ruined itself, 
495 now 
stressed in 2004 the extent of the economic problems in more detail, stating that 'the 
GDR was bankrupt, it was completely ruined in every respect' and that the 'whole 
infrastructure ... the state of the 
hospitals, the retirement homes and many other social 
491 M. Meinung, personal communication, November 27,2006. 
492 M. Meinung, personal communication, August 13,2007. 
493 Kunze, 2004, Reiner Kunze, www. thueringen. de. 
494 Althaus, D. (2004). Ansprache des Thüringer Ministerpräsidenten Dieter Althaus zum Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit 2005 am 03. Oktober 2005 im Afeininger Theater. Retrieved May 2,2007, from 
http: //www. thueringen. de /de/tsk/tsk/ministerpraesident/reden/19223/uindex. html. 
4" Herzog, 1998, Ansprache, 827-828. 
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facilities were... in an appalling condition in 1989/90'. Althaus explicitly criticised 
the 'many people - in the West' who believed that the GDR economy could have 
496 
functioned, which led to 'fatal misconceptions' . Indeed, Gorbachev's Glasnost 
policy had revealed that the financial problems in the GDR were considerably worse 
than expected: with 20.6 million dollars of debt to other countries, the state was on 
the verge of bankruptcy. 497 Althaus also attempted to reframe ideas about the GDR 
past by arguing that East Germans themselves had wanted its demise. 498 Minister- 
President of Hesse Koch had attempted to highlight this as early as 1999 by stressing 
that East Germans had demonstrated against the SED regime despite the 'genuine 
danger' involved. 499 
Similarly, in 2005, in an attempt to highlight the supposedly widespread wish 
for unification in the GDR, Thierse, who grew up in the GDR, also sought to call 
attention to the way in which GDR citizens had expressed their desire for the end of 
the SED state not only through demonstrations and mass exodus to the West but also 
through other legal and political processes. He spoke of how the free elections of the 
I Oth Volkskammer gave the demonstrations of 1989 'their democratic legitimacy' and 
gave the East German parliament 'the clear task' of achieving German unity. By 
emphasising both the inevitability of the economic collapse of the GDR as well as the 
desire of East German citizens for that collapse, he attempted to counteract emergent 
rhetoric among eastern and western Germans that unification was a West German 
political decision. Thierse also spoke specifically of the day-to-day hardship and 
restrictions in the GDR, such as the lack of freedom of speech, presumably to stress 
that all East Germans, and not simply dissidents, suffered under the SED regime. 500 
Although Thierse's highly critical rhetoric concerning the GDR was 
characteristic of the dominant discourse in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
, 496 Althaus, 2004, Ansprache, www. thueringen. de. 
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fifteenth anniversary of German unity nevertheless saw a slight shift in the staging of 
the GDR past by another political actor. Minister-President of Brandenburg Platzeck, 
who himself lived in the GDP, framed the GDR in a predominantly positive light. 
Platzeck cited, for example, former Brandenburg SPD politician Regine Hildebrandt, 
who had been involved in the civic movement Demokratie jetzt in 1989, and declared 
that 'no one wants to explain to me why we cannot combine the benefits of both 
systems... '501 One notes here, of course, the echoes of the SPD's suggestion of 1990 
that unification take place under article 146 of the constitution. Platzeck went on to 
outline in detail positive aspects of the GDR, such as the independence of women, the 
child-care system, the organisation of medical care and the polytechnic principle in 
school education. He stated that the political elite were starting to listen to these 
issues with 'open ears' in the current debate about the renewal of Germany. Unlike 
Day of Unity actors in the preceding years, in this way Platzeck implied that the GDR 
should be afforded a place in united Germany. The coming years will show whether 
Platzeck's rhetoric was merely an exception to the established negative depiction of 
the SED-state or whether it represented a fundamental shift in the interpretation of the 
GDR past and a new role for at least certain aspects of the history of the GDR and its 
traditions in united Germany's self-understanding. If the latter were true, it would 
likely be due to the fact that after 'almost a generation' 502 had passed since the 
collapse of the GDR, its past was starting to be historicised. Indeed, the following 
summer, the GDR Museum in Berl in opened its doors with a permanent exhibition of 
everyday life in the GDR. However, the fact that the Bundestag quashed the attempt 
by Alliance 90/The Greens and Die Linken to save the Palast der Republik, a symbol 
of the GDR in Berlin, just three months after Platzeck's speech, suggests that the 
German political actors of united Germany still struggled to find a place for the 
former Communist state in the self-image of their country. 
"' Platzeck, M. (2005). Rede des Präsidenten des Bundesrates und Ministerpräsidenten Matthias 
Platzeck auf dem Festakt zum 15. Jahrestag der Deutschen Einheit. Retrieved May 2,2007, from 
http-: //www. stk. brandenburg. de/cms/ detail. php? id=227181. 
l' See Thierse, 2005, Rede, www. bundestag. de. 
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It is important to note, however, that although at the end of the 20th century 
60% of Gen-nans wanted to draw a line under the GDR past, 503 only recently have 
memorials for the victims of the SED regime and the events of 1989 and unification 
504 begun to emerge. What is more, the erection of these monuments has provoked 
considerable debate, as epitomised by the Unity and Freedom Memorial proposed by 
the CDU/CSU and FDP to commemorate the events of 1989 and 1990. The proposal 
initially failed to win a majority vote in the Bundestag in 2001 since the SPD, with 
support from the PDS, argued that it was too early to erect such a memorial in light of 
the fact that the unity process was not yet complete. 505 In May 2007, however, the 
Deutsche Gesellscha% a political organisation for culture and education, repeated the 
CDU/FDP proposal for the erection of a Unity and Freedom memorial on the Berliner 
Schlossplatz in 2009. Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), Bundestag Vice-President 
Thierse (SPD) and Chairman of Die Linke, the successor of the PDS party, 
Lafontaine, were among the trustees of this non-partisan organisation, created by, 
among others, former Federal President Rau (SPD). 506 A clear majority of members 
of the Bundestag Committee for Culture and Media approved the proposal and 
representatives of all the parliamentary parties agreed on 9 1h November 2007 that the 
time had come to erect a memorial. 507 This serves as a further indication that a cross- 
party consensus on the historicisation of the GDR past was beginning to emerge. 
503 Survey by the Institut far praxisorientierte Sozialforschung commissioned by the Federal 
Association of German Banks in 1999: Augstein, 2005, Nationalsozialismus, 242. 
`A notable exception is the Berlin Wall Memorial, erected on August 13th 1998 by the Federal 
Government 'in memory of the victims of the Communist tyranny'. See Berliner Mauer. (2006). 
Retrieved June 26,2007, from http: //w%vxv. berliner-mauer-dokumentationszentrum. de/cng/index_ 
gedenk. htmi. 
505 Keine Mehrheit im Bundestagfir Einheits- und FreiheitsdenlanaL (200 1). Retrieved May 2,2007, 
from http: //www. bundestag. de/bp/2001/bpOI10/0110031b. htmi. For an analysis supporting the 
erection of a memorial for German unity see Schroder, R. (2007). Brauchen wir ein nationales 
Freiheits- und Einheitsdenkmal? DeuischlandArchiv, 40(l), 131-136. 
116 Ein Denkmal fUr die deutsche Einheit? 'Deutsche Geseltschaft' will an die Wicdervereinigungý 
erinnern. (2007, June 18). Frankfurter A 11gemeine Zeitung, 2. 
117 Weinlein, A. (2007, May 14). Denkinalftir die Einheit in Freiheit. Retrieved June, 2007, from 
http: //www. bundestag. de/daspariament/2007/20-21/kultunnedien/14899006. html. Thumbnail images 
of the competition entries for the memorial are available from the Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der 
SED-Diktatur. 
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Conclusion 
To date, debates about the GDR past have remained for the most part scholarly 
topics. This is perhaps not surprising given that less than twenty years have passed 
since the fall of the Iron Curtain. By contrast, debate about the National Socialist 
past has been pulled into the public arena - most notably in the famous 
Historikerstreit of the late 1980s. 508 This controversial debate played out publicly in 
the serious press - predominantly in letters to the editors of Die Zeit and the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. On one side of this polarised debate stood more 
left-wing historians and intellectuals such as Habermas, Jargen Kocka, Heinrich 
August Winkler, Hans Mommsen, Martin Broszat, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Wolfgang 
Mommsen and Eberhard Jdckel. Their opponents included Ernst Nolte, Andreas 
Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, Joachim Fest, Michael Sturmer, Hagen Schulze and 
Rainer Zitelmann. The debate between Habermas and Nolte formed the core of the 
debate, which can be traced back to the publication of the latter's article Die 
Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will (The past that does not want to pass) in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 6ýh June 1986.509 Nolte, disputing the idea that the 
practice of mass (race) annihilation had originated from the Nazis, essentially argued 
that Auschwitz was a reaction to the (class) annihilation in Stalinist gulags. 
Habermas, in an article in Die Zeit, 510 rejected Nolte's claim, arguing that it amounted 
to eine Art Schadenabwicklung of the Holocaust. At the same time, he criticised 
other right-wing historians, such as StUrmer (a political advisor to Chancellor Kohl) 
and Hillgruber, for attempting to whitewash the German past. Hillgruber - who had 
in fact not completely supported Nolte's argument - had indeed intensified the debate 
508 For a detailed overview of the Historikerstrelt and its impact in Germany see Maier, C. (1988). The 
unmasterable past. history, Holocaust and German national identhy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press and Peter, J. (1995). Der Historikerstreit und die Suche nach einer nationalen 
Identitdt der achiziger Jahre. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
509 Nolte, E. (1986, June 6). Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
25. 
5'0 Habermas, J. (1986, July 18). Eine Art Schadenabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der 
deutschen Zeitgcschichtsschreibung. Die Zeit, n. p. 
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by comparing the Holocaust to the suffering of so-called Heimatvertriebene (German 
expellees from Czechoslovakia and Poland after World War 11). 511 
The debate addressed a number of key questions: were the crimes of the 
National Socialists a reaction to Soviet crimes under Stalin? Could Nazi crimes be 
compared to those committed in Stalin's Soviet Union? Could the Holocaust be 
compared to genocide committed in other parts of the world such as Armenia or 
Cambodia? Did Germany follow a Sonderweg (special path) that inevitably led to 
National Socialism? Should future generations continue to bear the burden of guilt for 
crimes committed by their forefathers? Underlying all these questions arguably lay 
the issue of the extent to which the past should be 'normalised'. Those on the Left 
are generally considered to have prevailed in the historians' debate: following the 
dispute, a fragile consensus temporarily emerged regarding the key issue - that it was 
too early to historicise the National Socialist period and illegitimate to relativise Nazi 
crimes. 
On the Day of Unity, the political actors did not explicitly address any of the 
topics raised in the Historikerstreit. They neither stressed, for example, that the 
crimes committed during the 'Third Reich' were unique nor did they seek to compare 
them. The idea of a Sonderweg was similarly entirely avoided by the political actors 
in their speeches. However, while they may not have directly touched on the specific 
issues of the debate, it is clear that they sought to influence attitudes regarding the 
larger issue of a 'normalisation' of the Nazi past. As we saw, in the early years after 
unification, the political actors echoed the outcome of the historians' debate by 
stressing that a united German nation-state would continue to make responsibility for 
the National Socialist past a central aspect of the country's self-understanding. 
However, following the 'anniversary years' of the mid-1990s, signs of a promotion of 
&normalisation' in the interpretation of the National Socialist past emerged across the 
German political spectrum on the Day of Unity. This 'normalisation' manifested 
itself, on one hand, through the lack of rhetoric about the National Socialist past and, 
on the other, through the increased focus on the positive aspects of German history. 
511 Ilillgruber, A. (1986). Zweierlei Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reichs und das Ende 
des europäischen Judentums. Berlin: Siedler. 
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Thus, for the first time, the argument of those in the Historikerstreit that Germans 
needed to foster pride for their history began to shine through. It would seem, 
therefore, that we are in a period of change. The position of the National Socialist 
past in Germany's self-understanding appears to be shifting. Given that awareness of 
the National Socialist past serves to some extent as a restriction on the construction of 
German national pride this clearly has implications for the future of German 
patriotism or nationalism. Time will tell if Germany's political actors will further 
advocate a 'normalisation' of the Nazi past. Will the National Socialist era be 
relegated to just another chapter in Germany's history? If released from carrying a 
sense of responsibility for Nazi crimes is it possible that younger generations of 
Germans would advocate a resurgence of nationalism? What is clear is that this is an 
issue that deserves closer attention in the future. This chapter has shown that 
examination of representations, as crystallised snapshots of the views of political 
actors at any given time, can be examined to help highlight such changes in united 
Germany's relation to its past. 
In this way, the research has underlined the value of analysing 
commemorations from the perspective of the cultural history of politics. In addition 
to this, the work has also highlighted the poignancy of a number of other theoretical 
tools. To begin, the research has demonstrated the relevance of Wolfrum's concept 
of Geschichtspolilik. As we have seen, the high level of consensus on fundamental 
issues that existed among the political actors meant that the Day of Unity was largely 
removed from party politics. Yet this does not mean that the versions of the past 
presented on the Day of Unity were not politicised. On the contrary: it seems clear 
that the Day of Unity actors, as a group (albeit one comprising individuals with 
different political leanings) promoted specific versions of the past for particular 
political ends. A number of different political agendas appear to have underwritten 
the presentation of the German past at the German national holiday celebrations. 
Firstly, it would seem that the political actors presented the history of the National 
Socialist past in the service of a specific international agenda. By repeatedly 
referring to the National Socialist past, the political actors were able to assure the 
international community that united Germany, like its predecessor, remained 
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committed to addressing that past. Implicitly at least, the political actors thereby also 
stressed the complete impossibility of that past repeating itself. The history of the 
'Third Reich' was thus politicised for the needs of the contemporary political actors. 
Secondly, the Day of Unity actors used history as a means of uniting 
Germans. Indeed, as Anderson has argued, reference to history has traditionally been 
used as means of imagining communities not least by facilitating the imagining of a 
shared past. 512 By stressing, throughout the period from 1990 to 2005, the extent to 
which eastern and western Germans shared responsibility for National Socialist 
crimes, for example, the political actors framed Germans as united in an 
'Erinnerungsgemeinschaft' -a term that can be traced back to writer and politician 
513 Friedrich Karl von Moser in 1765. The way in which the political actors presented 
the GDR past can also be seen in this context. By demonising the GDR, rather than 
presenting a more nuanced interpretation of its history, the political actors encouraged 
East Germans to turn away from any attachment to their former state and to embrace 
their new identity as citizens of the Federal Republic. One notes here, also, a didactic 
dimension characteristic of Geschichispolitik- the political actors' unambiguous 
criticism of both Gen-nan dictatorships was expected to contribute to the process of 
legitimising the democratic political culture of united Germany. 
Thirdly, the political actors played a role in defining and legitimising the 
norms and values of united Germany not only in their presentation of the past but also 
in the way in which they staged the key elements of the unity celebrations. In divided 
Germany, the commemoration and staging of 17ffi June and 7th October in many 
respects reflected the function of the respective states. While the commemoration of 
17 th June adjusted to changes in the sensitive political climate and relations with the 
GDR, 7th October served as an instrument for the SED to exhibit its power and 
demonstrate unity between party and people. For the political actors of united 
Germany, the nature of the staging of the Day of Unity encouraged Germans to 
identify with various key structures and democratic values of united Germany. The 
512 Anderson, 2006, Imagined communities, 197-202. 513 Burgdorf, W. (2008). Die deutsche Nation im ftahneuzeillichen Europa Politische Ordnung und 
kuhurelle Identitat? Retrieved 2008, April 6, from http: //hsozkult. geschichte. hu-berlin. de/ 
tagungsberichte/id=2057. 
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ceremony and citizens' festivals sought to stimulate Germans to relate to their past 
and to each other. The ceremony also provided a site of negotiation for redefining 
ideas in light of changes in the political climate while the citizens' festival allowed 
the general public to be actively engaged in celebrating and identifying with 
unification. The itinerant 3 rd October anniversaries and their organisation by regional 
civil servants served to stage Germany as a federal state and encouraged Germans to 
feel connected to their region and the federal structure of Germany. Meanwhile, the 
symbols and rhetoric relating to the EU sought to foster identification with the EU. 
In this way, the unity commemorations served as indicators of the self-understanding 
of the Federal Republic throughout the period from 1990 to 2005. It remains open 
whether the first fifteen years after unification will in the future be viewed as having 
represented a specific phase of Geschichtspolilik in united Germany. 
This chapter has also underlined the relevance of key aspects of Halbwachs' 
work on collective memory. Tt is striking that the Day of Unity political actors sought 
to support and influence the nature and form of the collective memory of united 
Germany - particularly with regard to the National Socialist and GDR pasts. The 
unity celebrations kept alive specific memories of the past that might otherwise have 
been forgotten. The Day of Unity was a commemoration of German unity, not a 
remembrance day for the Nazi or GDR pasts. Yet, by the very act of talking about 
these dictatorships on the German national holiday, the Yd October commemorations 
contributed to evoking these pasts in the collective memory of united Germany. 
What is more, on the Day of Unity, these socially constructed collective memories 
had the potential to link eastern and western Germans by encouraging Germans to 
identify with a common past. Crucially, this chapter has also supported Halbwachs' 
argument that the interpretation of the past changes with the needs of the present. On 
the Day of Unity, this was epitomised in the shift in the interpretation of the National 
Socialist past in the period from 1990 to 2005: what the German political actors once 
described - particularly in the early 1990s - as the defining era of German history is 
slowly coming to be framed as one episode in that history. Thus the emerging desire 
for a more self-confident identity in the present shaped the social reconstruction of 
the past. 
133 
Finally, the research relates to cultural and communicative memory. The Day 
of Unity can be interpreted as an example of cultural memory. As objectified culture, 
the 3d October commemorations recalled Gen-nan unification: by its very presence, 
the Day of Unity stood as a yearly reminder of unification. In this way, the 
commemorations officially sanctioned unification as an important element of 
Germany's heritage. As we have seen, the inclusion of reference to the National 
Socialist and GDR pasts equally guaranteed a prominent place for these chapters in 
the country's memory. In this way, the Day of Unity commemorations served as 
platforms from which political actors sought to stabilise and convey united Germany 
self-image. In this vein, through ritual repetition, the unity celebrations contributed 
to constructing a sense of identity and coherence among Gen-nans. 
What is particularly fascinating, however, is the interaction between cultural 
memory and communicative memory in the period from 1990 to 2005. While the 
Day of Unity was a site of cultural memory, at the same time, German unity belonged 
to communicative memory. As an event that had recently been directly experienced 
by the majority of Germans, unification remained part of everyday communication. 
It was an ongoing topic - addressed by eyewitness non-specialists in disorganised 
ways. There is thus an overlap here: the Day of Unity was an example of cultural 
memory at a time when the event that it commemorated continued to be part of 
communicative memory. What is more, the Day of Unity actors themselves 
contributed to both cultural and communicative memory: they were involved in 
staging the official memory of unification while, concurrently, unification was part of 
their individual biographies. The interaction of cultural and communicative memory 
in the period from 1990 to 2005 was clear in the way in which the Day of Unity 
actors used the unity celebrations to redefine and influence changing ideas - both 
theirs and the general public's - about unification and the unity process in their 
attempt to improve intra-German relations. It is to analysis of the latter that the thesis 
now turns. 
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Fostering intra-German relations 
'German unity began with dance steps and if later these steps became a little harder, 
the beginning remains unforgeltableforever. ' 
(Imre Kertdsz, 1929-) 514 
After more than forty years of division, East and West Germany stood in 1990 as two 
very different halves of a new whole. Soon after the unanticipated unification the 
extent of the vast differences not only in historical consciousness but also in the life 
experiences, mentalities, psychologies, habits and value systems of eastern and 
western Germans became apparent. It emerged that the fundamental differences, 
initially underestimated, were likely to take decades rather than years to overcome. 
The media and politicians increasingly discussed the idea of 'the Wall in the mind' 
(Mauer im Kopj), implying a psychological wall still dividing Germans of the old and 
new Lander. This chapter will illustrate in three sections the ways in which the 
political actors of united Germany used the Day of Unity as an instrument for 
improving intra-German relations to foster a sense of Wir-Gefahl among eastern and 
515 western Germans. Section one explores the way in which political actors tried to 
cultivate this socio-cultural process by attempting to influence attitudes about 
unification and the unity process. Section two examines the legal, moral, social and 
economic arguments used by the political actors on the Day of Unity to promote a 
specific image of eastern Germans and eastern Germany in order to improve their 
standing among western Germans. Section three sketches the way in which political 
actors paradoxically reframed differences among eastern and western Germans as 
both negative and positive. 
514 Cited from Kertds--'s Day of Unity speech in 2003. See Kertdsz, 2003, Wenn die Freudenfeuer 
verglimmen. 45. 
515 Other attempts of the political actors to foster a sense of belonging among eastern and western 
Germans, such as through inclusion by personal encounters, direct exchange and inclusion through 
exclusion, are not the focus of this chapter. 
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3.1 A new image for the unity process 
The continued social and economic problems associated with unification inevitably 
influenced German public opinion toward unity. From the mid-1990s in particular, a 
kind of 'unity fatigue' became noticeable: the high costs of unification and its 
implications for higher taxation, high unemployment and the seemingly never-ending 
challenge of modernising eastern Germany are just a few factors that account for 
this. 5 16 As a result of the struggles following unification, a certain level of mutual 
recrimination and resentment began to emerge among eastern and western Germans. 
In this context, political, predominantly German, actors on the Day of Unity 
anniversaries from 1990 to 2005 sought to influence attitudes about unification and 
the unity process to ease tensions between eastern and western Germans. Reflecting 
the high degree of cross-party consensus on the need to promote intra-German 
relations, Germans from across the mainstream political spectrum attempted to 
influence attitudes about unification and the unity process in three main ways. 
Firstly, they attempted to reframe initial expectations of the unity process as 
unrealistic. Due to the fast pace of the unification process, there had been much 
ambiguity at the time of unification about the costs that would actually be incurred in 
merging East and West Germany. 517 As a result, the costs were drastically 
underestimated. Initial anxieties about the financial outlay of unification were great: 
in February 1990,75% of West Germans expected that unification would involve a 
rise in taxes. 518 However, the rhetoric about the price of unification that took place in 
the run-up to the first all-German Bundestag elections in December 1990 contributed 
to a change in attitudes among West Germans that the costs of unification would not 
516 For an overview of the social and economic burdens of unification see Ritter, G. (2006). Der Preis 
der deuischen Einheit. Die IViedervereinikung und die Krise des Sozialslaafs. Munich: C. 11. Beck; 
Eckart, K., & Scherf, K. (2004). Deutschland auf dem Meg zur inneren Einheit. Berlin: Duncker & 
Ilumblot; Andersen, U. (1999). Finanzierung der Einheit. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), 
Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrate für politische Bildung, 368- 
383; Welfens, P. J. (Ed. ). (1996). Economic aspects of German unification: expectations, transition 
dynamics and international perspectives. Berlin: Springer Verlag and Lange, T., & Pugh, G. (1998). 
The economics of German unification: an introduction. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
517 Andersen, 1999, Finanzierung, 371. 
518 Glaab, M. (1999). Einstellungen zur deutschen Einheit. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), 
Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 306- 
316, here 314. 
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in fact be immense. During the election campaign, Kohl repeated his famous phrase 
from the day of unification that the eastern German Lander would turn into a 
'flourishing landscape', 519 and added that the latter would be achieved within four 
years. 520 Moreover, whilst SPD Chancellor Candidate Lafontaine underlined that 
unification would necessitate a tax increase and result in considerable financial 
burden for West Germans, the governing CDU coalition, in what Uwe Andersen has 
described as the 'tax lie', stipulated that there was no need to raise taxes. 521 
It was initially estimated that the funds for 'German Unity' (Fonds Deutsche 
Einheit) - established to prevent the five new Lander and their economic needs from 
upsetting the balance of the federal system of financial redistribution (where 
economically strong Lander essentially contribute to fund weaker Lander) - would 
522 
only need to be paid from 1990 to 1994. On l3thMarch 1993, however, the first 
'Solidarity Agreement' between the Federal Government and the Lander (Solidarpakt 
1), came into being which meant that, in addition to the 160 billion deutschmarks 
spent during the first four years after unification, for the period from 1995 to 2004 a 
further 210 billion deutschmarks was transferred to eastern Germany. By the end of 
the 1990s, it became clear that even the goal of the first Solidarity Agreement - 
namely to bring eastern Germany up to an economic standard comparable with 
western Germany - could not be realised within the intended timescale. A second 
Solidarity Agreement (Solidarpakt 11), entailing a further 165 billion deutschmarks, 
was therefore negotiated in 200 1, to provide financial support for the eastern German 
Lander until 20 19.523 
It would thus be fair to say that Kohl's evaluation proved exceedingly overly- 
optimistic. He himself admitted, in somewhat caged terms in his televised Day of 
319 Kohl, 1990, Femsehansprache, 1225. 
520 Weber, T. (2000, October 3). Kohl; mark on history. Retrieved January, 2005, from http: //www. 
news. bbc. co. uk /2/hi/europe/543955. htm. 
521 Andersen, 1999, Finanzierung, 379. For the argument that the misleading comments and policy 
decisions of the Kohl government seriously damaged the German economy see Hefeker, C., & 
Wunner, N. (2003). Promises made, promises broken: a political economic perspective on German 
unification. German Politics, 12(l), 109-134. 
522 Stammen, T. (1999). Federalism in Germany. In P, Wagstaff (Ed. ), Regionalism in the European 
Union. Exeter: Intellect, 98-118, here 105; Andersen, 1999, Finanzierung, 371. 
523 Maller, U. (2005). Supergau Deutsche Einheit. Berlin: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 133; Ragnitz, 
J. (2006). Zur Verwendung der Solidarpakt-Mittel durch die ostdcutschen Lander. Deutschland Archiv, 
39(4), 581. 
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Unity address of 3 rd October 1992, that his prediction had been incorrect, declaring 
that the two years since unity had been a 'learning process' for him . 
524 Again in 
1993, Kohl and Sassmuth both spoke of how they had expected a faster unity 
process. 525 Kohl referred to his miscalculation more explicitly in his speech five 
years later at the Day of Unity celebrations in 1997, where he attempted to encourage 
Germans to continue building up eastern Germany. He argued, for example, that 
though the tasks were harder and taking longer than he had expected, it was 
incredibly important for Germans to continue investing effort into building up the 
East, since the goal had 'not yet been reached'. 526 Throughout the early and mid- 
1990s, other speakers similarly spoke of 'immense expectations' that had 'turned into 
disappointment'. 527 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the continued practical difficulties of unity 
and the fact that the economic reconstruction of eastern Germany was taking much 
longer than envisaged led to a great deal of dissatisfaction and frustration among the 
population. Against this backdrop of discontent, the various German Day of Unity 
actors stressed even more that the reason for disappointment was rooted in unrealistic 
expectations at the time of unification. By continually emphasising the 'high' 
expectations of 1990, the German political actors insinuated that the continued social 
and economic problems resulting from unification were not a sign that the unity 
process had failed. In 2000, for instance, Federal President Rau went to great lengths 
to make the nature of these expectations explicit. 528 He identified three main forms of 
what he termed 'self-deception: ' firstly, the misconception of East Germans that West 
Germany Was full of desirable items free of cost; secondly, the misconception of 
West Germans that unity could be paid for out of petty cash; and thirdly, the 
supposition that the difficulties associated with division would be overcome simply 
524 Kohl, 1992, Fernsehansprache, 2008. 
52' Kohl, 11. (1993). Fernsehansprache des Bundeskanzlers. Bulletin. 81,930, here 930 and Süssmuth, 
1993, Ansprache, 932. 
526 Zusammenfassung Bürgerfest zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit [Television broadcast]. (1997). 
Baden-Baden: Südwestrundfunk. 
527 Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 84 1. 
528 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
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by East Germany adopting West German institutions. 529 The Federal President drew 
attention here to the fact that it was not only the government that had misjudged how 
challenging unity would be but also the German people as a whole. He went on to 
convey respect for these unrealistic expectations by saying that they were rooted in 
good will and great hopes, yet he argued that this 'self-deception' should not be the 
measure for the balance sheet of ten years of unity. 
Secondly, political actors sought to influence attitudes about unification and 
the unity process by increasingly focusing on, and attempting to evoke pride for, what 
had already been achieved. In Schwerin in 1991, for example, at the first celebrations 
in an eastern Land, where, as Minister-President Seite admitted, many Germans 
considered themselves to be the 'losers of unification', 530 the concrete steps being 
taken to overcome the social and economic problems in Germany represented a major 
theme of the speeches . 
531 By the mid-1990s, western Germany was experiencing 
significant economic problems following the sharp post-unification boom stimulated 
by the fiscal transfers to eastern Gen-nany (reflected in low private investment and 
rising unemployment). Unemployment for example, while by no means as dire as in 
the East (20.1 %) nevertheless reached 9.3% in the western Ldrider. 532 In the context 
of these economic woes, an ALBUS survey showed that 83.1% of western Germans 
considered themselves to have benefitted least from unification. 533 Consequently, the 
political speakers on the Day of Unity began to lay even more emphasis on that 
9 534 which eastern and western Germans had 'achieved with [their] combined strength . 
This was a message mirrored by international guest speaker French President Jacques 
529 For examples of how eastem Germans have not simply assimilated to western German society 
despite the adoption of West German institutions see Scheller, G. (2006). Die Transformation 
Ostdeutschlands: 'Verwestlichung' oder Abgrenzung? Deutschland Archiv. 39(5), 790-798. 
530 See speech by Minister-President of Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania Seite: Dietmar, P., & Sadyn, 
A. (Eds. ). (1992, October 3). Festaki zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Live aus dem Theater Schwerin. 
Hamburg: NDR. For an overview of the problems faced by eastern Germans after unification see 
Flockton, C., & Kolinsky, E. (Eds. ). (1999). Recasting East Germany. social transformation after the 
GDR. London: Frank Cass. 
531 See, for example, the speech by Seite: Dietmar & Sadyn, 1992, Festakt, NDR and Kohl's televised 
address: Kohl, 1992, Fernsehansprache, 2008. 
532 Besier, G. (2007). Das Ost-Wcst Verhaltnis. In G. Besier & K. Stoklosa (Eds. ), 15 Jahre deutsche 
Einheit. Was ist geworden? Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2540, here 28. 
533 Wagner, W. (2008). Wirkliche Einheit - gefUhlte Einheit. Grande fdr die Diskrepanz. In W. 
Bergsdorf (Ed. ), Deutsche Einheit: Ein Projekt. Vienna: Verlag der Bauhaus-Universitat Wien, 67-88, 
here 71. 
534 Kohl, 11. (1996). Fernsehansprache von Helmut Kohl. Bulletin, 78,837. 
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Chirac in 2000 who remarked that the whole world admired what had been achieved 
in Germanyjust a decade after unification. 535 
Thirdly, the political actors reframed the unity process as an ongoing 
challenge. Into the late 1990s and early 2000s, German political actors continued to 
accentuate the progress already made, both as praise for what had already been 
accomplished and as motivation for Germans to continue working to overcome the 
challenges of unification. 536 In 1997 the government introduced the yearly Report of 
the Federal Government on the State of German Unity 537 _ outlining development in 
eastern Germany from modemisation of the infrastructure to the construction of 
competitive companies - to be presented and discussed in the Bundestag at the 
beginning of each October. From the mid-1990s, the political actors started to give 
detailed descriptions of the economic and social difficulties within Germany in their 
speeches on the Day of Unity, often mirroring the findings of the report. In this way, 
they attempted to show understanding on the Day of Unity for the problems that 
Germans were facing: 'we have achieved a great deal but still have much to do' 
became a mantra of the unity anniversaries. 
In this context, from the inaugural unification ceremony right up to 2005, the 
German political actors promoted key values considered instrumental to the 
improvement of intra-German relations, such as mutual understanding, flexibility and 
courage. 5" They also gave more focused advice to eastern and western Germans, 
addressing them separately; the specific content of these messages did not change 
significantly throughout this period. Eastern Germans were largely encouraged to be 
positive, not to despair and to persevere in their hard work. Eastern German political 
actors on the Day of Unity, who were arguably more likely than their western 
German counterparts to identify with, and be attended to by, other eastern Germans, 
535 Chirac, J. (2000). Jacques Chirac, Präsident der Republik Frankreich zum zehnten Jahrestag der 
Deutschen Einheit am 3. Oktober 2000 in der Semperoper in Dresden. Retrieved November 15,2005P' 
from http: //www. sachsen. de/de/bf/reden-und-intmiews/reden00/10-C. htin. 
"' See, for example, Minister-President of Lower Saxony, Schröder's speech: Schröder, G. (1998). 
Ansprache des Präsidenten des Bundesrates Gerhard Schröder. Bulletin, 66,826, and President 
Herzog's speech- Herzog, 1998, Ansprache, 827. 
537 Kohl würdigt kostbares Geschenk der Geschichte. (1997, October 2). Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 1. 
"' See for exampte the speeches in 1990: Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF; Kohl, 1992, 
Fernsehansprache, 2008 and Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 84 1. 
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and of course were speaking, at least in part, in their own constituencies, tended to 
focus particularly on what the latter needed to do to progress economically as well as 
on how eastern German attitudes towards democracy should alter. 539 Both eastern 
and western German political actors, however, predominantly directed their didactic 
messages concerning key values toward western Germans. This can perhaps be 
explained, on one hand, by the fact that western Germans made up the majority of the 
population of united Germany and, on the other hand, by the fact that the Day of 
Unity actors were themselves predominantly western Germans. In contrast to the 
praise and encouragement they gave to eastern Germans, many actors on the Day of 
Unity criticised western Germans for not being patient and for being condescending 
towards their eastern German compatriots. 
At the inaugural unification ceremony in 1990, for example, von Weizsdcker 
criticised western Germans for believing that unification need not affect their lives. 
He stressed over and again that western Germans must 'learn to share'. 540 It is 
interesting to note that even after more than a decade had passed since unification, a 
number of political actors continued to speak of eastern Germans and western 
Germans as two very distinct, mutually exclusive groups. Bundestag President 
Thierse, for one, stated in 2001 that eastern Germans 'feel like trainees' in keeping up 
with modernisation, as that was the way they were treated by western Germans. 341 
These generalisations are fairly characteristic of the Day of Unity political actors, 
who also neglected other social differences, such as gender or generation within 
united Germany. There was the notion on the Day of Unity that Germany comprised 
simply two distinct groups of people: eastern and western Germans, and that these 
two groups still necessitated a sense of belonging together as two parts of the whole. 
Paradoxically, this over-simplification and repetition of 'eastern Germans' and 
'western Germans' as separate homogenous groups, on the German national holiday, 
had the potential to actually reaffirm the division. This differentiation between 
s"' See, for example, Althaus, 2004, Ansprache, fflvw. thueringen. de. 
540 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
54 1 Thierse, W. (2001, October 3). Bundestagspräsident Wolfgang Thierse zum Tag der Deutschen 
Einheit. Retrieved November 3,2005 frem http: //www. bundestag. de/aktuell/Presse/200 1/ pý_OI 10021. 
htrnl. 
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eastern and western Germans was also obvious in the attempts to reframe the image 
of eastern Germans and of eastern Germany. 
3.2 A make-over for eastern Germans 
On the eve of unification, Social Democratic politician Egon Bahr compared 
Germany to a young couple that had got married and were now getting to know each 
other. 542 He pointed out that normally this would be the other way round: they 
normally would have gotten to know each other first. He underlined that it was 
important to remember, however, that the two Germanies could never split up. 
Continuing in Bahr's metaphor, it would be fair to say that East Germany was not 
quite the bride that West Germany had expected. At the time of unification, the 
former Federal Republic was, by international comparison, a very prosperous state 
with high living standardS. 543 East Germany was, on the other hand, virtually 
bankrupt. 544 There was consequently the perception among many western Germans 
that the economic costs and challenges of unification precipitated social and fiscal 
strains, in the form of taxation, increasing unemployment, structural changes - such 
as those in the pensions system - and falling income levels. A welfare survey of 
1993 showed, for instance, that 31% of western Germans felt that their living 
conditions had actually deteriorated since unification, despite the fact that this was 
not empirically supported on the whole . 
545 21% of western Germans still considered 
546 their living conditions to have deteriorated by 1998 , at a time when more structural 
problems had become tangible in western German society. A report from the Federal 
Statistics Office of 2004, which was based on statistics from 2002 that were not 
affected by the potentially negative consequences of the health reform or the changes 
542 Tag der Deutschen Einheit - Sondersendung, 1990, RTL. 543 Habich, 1999, Lebensbedingungen. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), Handbuch zur 
deutschen Einheit 1949-1989-1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrale for politische Bildung, 53 1. 
`4 For in-depth recent analyses of the GDR economy see: Zatlin, J. R. (2007). The currency of 
Socialism: money andpolifical culture in East Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and 
Steiner, A. (Ed. ). (2006). Überholen ohne einzuholen? Die DDR Wirtschaft als Fussnote der deutschen 
Geschichte. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag. 
545 For numerous statistics on the living conditions of eastern and western Germans see flabich, 1991, 
Lebensbedingungen, 523-539. 
546 Ibid., 537. 
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to the pension insurance, showed that the perception of a deterioration of living 
547 
standards had continued . Although social challenges in western Germany were 
due only in part to unification, for many western Germans unification with their 
eastern compatriots became a scapegoat for the majority of social difficulties that had 
emerged since the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic. 548 On top of this came the 
fact that many western Germans found it difficult to identify with eastern Germans 
who, having lived in a Socialist state for forty years, had very different values and life 
experiences. 
Consequently, many western Germans began to feel some level of resentment 
toward eastern Germans. Indeed, as Thomas Abbe and Monika Gibas have shown, a 
culturally stigmatising discourse about eastern Germans started as early as 1990.549 
Many western Germans saw 'Ossis', the (slightly derogatory) vernacular term for 
eastern Germans, as undemocratic, work-shy and provincial. 550 A survey fifteen 
years after unification also showed signs that western Germans were essentially 
uninterested in the East: while 96% of eastern Germans had travelled to the western 
Lander, only one in three western Germans had ever been to eastern Germany. 551 
Abbe and Gibas have shown that the discussion of the differences between eastern 
and western Germans in the media has been almost exclusively presented from a 
552 western German perspective. This trend was also visible in the western German 
dominated nature of the Day of Unity, in that the impulse to improve the image of 
547 Lebensbedingungen verschlechiern sich. (2004, August 23). Retrieved March 15,2007, from http: // 
www. spiegel. de/wirtschaft/0,1518,314675,00. html. 
548 For an interesting recent overview of the so-called misconceptions associated with unification and 
the unity process see Schroder, R. (2007). Die wichtigsten Irriamer aber die deutsche Einheit. 
Freiburg: Herder. 
549 Abbe, T., & Gibbas, M. (2001). Der Osten in der Berliner Republik. Aus Politik undZeitgeschichle, 
111-2,19. 
550 For an interesting summary of East and West German stereotypes and opinions see Kaase, M. 
(1999). Innere Einheit. In W. Weidenfeld & K-R. Korte (Eds. ), Handbuch zur deutschen Einheit 1949- 
1989-1999. Bonn: Bundeszentrale fUr politische Bildung, 460. For a compelling analysis of the verbal 
and non-verbal forms of communication that divide eastern and western Germans see Klein, 0. G. 
(2002). Warum Ost- und Westdcutsche aneinander vorbeireden.., 4us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B37- 
38,3.5. A useful overview of the symbols that accompanied the unification process can be found in 
Parr, R. (2005). Identity in difference: collective symbols and the interplay of discourses in the two 
German unifications. In R. Speirs & J. Breuilly (Eds. ), Germany's two unifications: anticipations, 
5 
periences, responses. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 76-100. ex 
35 Thierse: 'Osten ist kein Jammertal'. (2005, October 4). Frankfurter Rundschau, 4. 
552 Abbe & Gibbas, 2001, Der Osten, 19. 
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eastern Germans among their western German compatriots was not matched with a 
corresponding impulse in the other direction. 553 In their attempts to offer a more 
attractive image of eastern Germans and of eastern Germany, political actors used a 
number of different arguments. 
Legal-constitutional arguments were used by the German political actors on 
the Day of Unity to attempt to influence intra-Gen-nan relations as early as 1990. 
Federal President von Weizsdcker, for example, through appeal to the western 
Germans' pride in the constitution and the democratic values of the Federal Republic, 
sought to frame the development of eastern Germany as a constitutional-legal effort. 
Referring to Article 72 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), he called his listeners' 
attention to the order of the constitution that all Germans must have comparable 
living conditions and equal opportunities. 554 Until 1994, a very tightly formulated 
constitutional obligation existed in Germany to protect against regional inequalities 
between the Lander: Article 72 Paragraph 2 stated that the 'maintenance of uniform 
living standards' (Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhaltnisse) was a duty of 
federal PoliCY. 515 In light of the considerable differences in living conditions 
following unification, particularly between eastern and western Lander, von 
Weizs, qcker had already warned, on the second Day of Unity anniversary, that the 
goal of harmonising living conditions in eastern and western Germany was 'too big a 
goal to realistically promise in the next five years'. 556 A year later, the constitutional 
obligation of ensuring regional convergence of living standards remained the central 
topic of the Day of Unity ecumenical service. 557 
In 1994, Article 72 was partially revised to prevent the potential interpretation 
that individual citizens could claim applicability of the entitlement to uniform living 
553 In 1996, Minister-President of Bavaria Stoiber's Day of Unity speech epitomised the western 
German domination of the day: he specifically addressed only western Germans in parts of his speech. 
He asked, for example, 'How closely linked do we feel to the fate of the people in the new Lander? ': 
Stoiber, E. (1996). Ansprache des Prasidenten des Bundesrates Edmund Stoiber. Bulletin, 78,829-830, 
here 830. The German print press reporting on the Day of Unity also often described unity as a'topic 
for eastern Germans'. See, for example, Tag der Abrechming. (2000, October 5). Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 29. 
554 See Tag der Deu1schen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
555 Barl6sius, E. (2006, September 11). Gleichwertig ist nicht gleich. Retrieved March 8,2007, from 
httP: //www. das -pariament. de/2006/37/Beilage/003. html# 18. 
556 Von Weizsacker, 1992, Ansprache, 1001-1004. 
557 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993,1993, Saarlandischer Rundfunk. 
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conditions on a personal level. The new task of the federal policy thus became the 
'establishment of equivalent living standards' (Herstellung gleichwertiger 
558 LebensverhdItnisse). Following the 1994 change in the constitution, German 
political actors used the Day of Unity anniversaries to stress that despite the change, 
Germans should not simply resign themselves to the fact that there were still 
considerable differences in the material living conditions of eastern and western 
Germans. 559 In 2002, for example, Mayor of Berlin Wowereit stated that the 
constitutional requirement of 'establishing equivalent living standards' for all 
Germans remained a 'permanent duty' of all GemianS, 560 echoing almost completely 
the words of Schr6der in 1999.561 Wowereit thereby sought to improve relations 
between eastern and western Germans by reminding them of their constitutional 
obligation to one another. The 2006 Federal Government Report on the State of 
German Unity showed that this goal, of what could be referred to as 'economic 
synchronisation', remained far from being realised: although the average incomes in 
eastern and western Germany had converged to a great extent (with average eastern 
German incomes falling only 18% behind average incomes in western Germany), the 
opportunities for employment and vocational training remained considerably worse in 
the East. 562 
Alongside these legal-constitutional arguments, both German and 
international actors also used moral arguments on the Day of Unity to remind western 
Germans of their moral responsibility to their German counterparts in the East. 
Hungarian Prime Minister Horn, for example, called in 1996 for understanding and 
tolerance towards the citizens of the former GDR in light of the fact that until 1989 
East Germans had had little control over their fate. He argued that, 
'it was not the East Germans who made the pact of the great powers. They were 
not asked if they wanted to live in the Soviet zone of occupation. They did not 
choose the system of arbitrariness. Their fate was decided for them over their 
heads. 9563 
... Mailer, K. (2004, September 9). We unsozial soll die Marktwirtschaft werden? Retrieved January 
24,2006, from http: //www. zeit-fragen. chlarchiv/zf 12 1 b/ tO5. htm. 
5'9 Wowereit, 2002, Rede, www. berlin. de. 
560 ihid 
561 See Schr6der, 1999, Rede, 635-637. 
562 Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, 2006, www. bundesregierung. de. 
563 Horn, 1996, Ansprache, 835. 
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In this manner, Hom distinguished eastern Germans from the SED regime by 
presenting them as victims of history. The following year, Teufel echoed the point 
564 that western Germans consequently had a moral obligation to aid eastern Germans. 
In the years that followed, other German actors repeated this message on the Day of 
Unity. In 2002, for example, Mayor of Berlin Wowereit, stressing that the burden of 
history was extremely unevenly distributed among Germans, 565 remarked that the 
Germans in the West were, and remained, obliged to show solidarity with eastern 
Germans. Two years later, Federal President Kbhler echoed Wowereit's call and 
sought to portray eastern Germans as the victims of division by speaking of Germans 
in the East having 'paid the higher price' after the war for the 'terrible crimes' of the 
Germans. 566 
Despite presenting them as victims, however, German political actors also 
used this moralising strategy of distinguishing GDR citizens from the SED regime in 
order to influence notions of how East Germans had dealt with the National Socialist 
past. To counter possible suggestions that eastern Germans, in contrast to western 
Germans, had not worked through the National Socialist past, political actors in 1990 
were eager to present the divergence in views between the official discourse of the 
SED and the views on the past of GDR citizens. At the inaugural unification 
ceremony, von Weizs5cker, for instance, described the SED as having considered it 
$sufficient to define itself as a Socialist society of the future and thereby free itself 
from the burden of history'. 567 He described GDR citizens, however, as having 
'experienced and interpreted' the National Socialist past differently. According to 
von Weizsdcker, East Germans always felt 'that the responsible remembrance of the 
past [was] an indispensable power of freedom for the future'. 568 Through his rhetoric, 
the Federal President suggested that not only West Germans but also East Germans 
strove to address the National Socialist past in the post-war years. Although there is 
no evidence to support this alleged working through the past by East Germans and 
although opinion polls suggested the opposite was true, von Weizsacker likely sought 
564 Teufel, 1997, Ansprache, 935. 
565 Wowereit, 2002, Rede, www. berlin. de. 
566 Köhler, 2004, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
567 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
568 ibid. 
146 
to propagate this view in order to present all Germans as having a shared 'starting 
point' from which to continue the remembrance of the National Socialist past. 
Contrary to discouraging realities, this artful presentation of alleged East German 
views on the National Socialist past permitted eastern Germans to consider 
themselves equal to western Germans as well as to feel emotionally connected to the 
past. 
To further underline the moral obligation of western Germans, German actors 
on the Day of Unity stressed that East Germans suffered more than West Gen-nans, 
not only in that they assumed the 'lion's share' of the burden of the past but also as a 
result of unification. From the early to late 1990s, various German political actors on 
the Day of Unity spoke a great deal about the everyday difficulties that eastern 
Germans faced. In 1992, Minister-Prcsident of Mecklcnburg-Westem Pomerania, 
Seite, for example, spoke at length of the numerous problems with which eastern 
Germans were confronted, particularly that of high unemployment. 569 The incapacity 
of the GDR industry to compete within a market economy had led to extremely high 
unemployment -a phenomenon essentially alien to those who had lived in a Socialist 
state. That Federal President von Weizsacker also spoke in depth about this topic 
from the same stage as Minister-President Seite is unsurprising, given the fact that the 
central Day of Unity celebrations were held in Schwerin that year, the capital of the 
eastern German Land of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, whose citizens suffered 
particularly high unemployment after unification: 570 as late as 2006, the Federal 
Government's Report on the Slate of German Unity showed that, at 20.3%, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania continued to suffer from the highest unemployment 
rate (a dubious honour shared only with Saxony-Anhalt), of all Gen-nan Uinder. 571 
Particularly from the tenth anniversary of unification, there was a shift in the 
rhetoric on the Day of Unity anniversaries. Speakers focused not so much on the 
day-to-day problems of eastern Germans but rather on the idea that the unification 
process itself had been more difficult for East Germans than for West Germans. 
Eastern German speakers, such as Prime Minister of the former GDR, de Maizi4e, 
569 Seite, 1992, Ansprache, 1008. 
Von Weizsdcker, 1992, Ansprache, 100 1. 
Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, 2006, www. bundesregierung. de. 
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and Bundesrat President and Minister-President of Thuringia, Althaus, were among 
those who spoke at length on this topic. On the tenth unity anniversary, de Maizi&e 
framed Yd October 1990 as having marked the beginning of a 'process of 
transformation' in the eastern Ldrider. 572 De Maizi&e strove to remind people that 
unification involved the introduction into East Germany of a new political, economic, 
legal, educational and value system virtually overnight. To highlight the extent to 
which these changes affected eastern Germans, de Maizi&e stated that only one in ten 
workers remained in the same job, in the same place, as in 1989. Similarly, on Yd 
October 2004 -a month after a Stem survey had revealed that a staggering one in 
five eastern Germans actually wanted the Berlin Wall back573 - Althaus, gave a 
further detailed description of the struggles of East Germans at the time of 
unification. 574 He spoke, for example, of people who suddenly found themselves on 
the streets since the products they produced were no longer marketable. It is possible 
that de Maizi&re and Althaus felt that a decade after unification it was necessary to 
remind Germans of the difficulties East Germans had faced in 1990. In this way, 
Althaus and other political actors on the Day of Unity attempted not only to arouse 
sympathy and understanding from western Germans but also to show understanding 
for the problems and challenges eastern Germans faced following unification. 
In addition to the moral arguments, German speakers on the Day of Unity also 
emphasised the social benefits brought to united Germany by eastern Germans - that 
is to say the latter's contribution to German society as (hard-working and courageous) 
individuals. While the German political actors framed unification as a joint project 
and explicitly expressed thanks to all Germans for their hard work since unification, 
they placed particular emphasis on the role played solely by East Germans before 
unification. Before Yd October 1990, East Germans had expressed their discontent 
and to some extent also destabilised the SED regime through various forms of civic 
action. These included: emigrating via Hungary and Austria, presenting themselves 
572 De Maiziere, L. (2000). Rede des letzten Ministerpräsidenten der DDP, Lothar de Alaiziýre, zum 
zehnten Jahrestag der Deutschen Einheit am 3. Oktober 2000 in der Sempereper in Dresden. 
Retrieved January 8,2006, from http: //www. sachsen. de/de/bf/reden_und_interviews/reden00/10-m. 
html. 
571 Jeder Fünfte will die Mauer zurück. (2004). Retrieved April 10,2008, from http-//www. stem. de 
/pol itik/deutschland/52944 1. html. 
574 Althaus, 2004, Ansprache, www. thueringen. de. 
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at western embassies and at those in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw, demonstrating in 
their tens of thousands (particularly in Leipzig but also in Berlin, Erfurt and 
Dresden), and flooding in masses through the Berlin Wall border crossing on and 
after 9th November 1989. East German political actors also opened the door for 
unification in a number of ways, most notably with the 'round tables' (informal 
committees created to bring together democratic groups and parties in preparation for 
the first free elections), by stripping the SED, on 0 December 1989, of its hegemonic 
role grounded in the GDR's constitution, and by arranging for the new Volkskammer 
elections to take place on 18th March 1990.575 
Throughout the period from 1990 to 2005, all Federal Presidents, Chancellors 
and Bundesrat Presidents underscored on the Day of Unity the major role of East 
Germans, particularly the East German general public, in facilitating unification. 
With reference to the former GDR and other Eastern European states, such as Poland 
and Hungary, Bundesrat President and Mayor of Berlin, Momper, for example, 
described 'the people as the real heroes... ' at the inaugural unification ceremony. 576 
The 'courageous men and women' in the GDR and other Eastern European states 
remained the 'heroes of [the] revolutions, without whom unification would not have 
taken place', for the Mayor of Berlin, Wowereit, twelve years later. 577 Use of the 
evocative word 'hero' by the two Berlin mayors served to present East Germans in a 
very positive light. 
In the early 2000s, the contribution of East Germans to unification was 
increasingly emphasised in elaborate terms. Federal President Rau went so far, at the 
tenth anniversary of unity, as to describe East German citizens as the ones who had 
made the 'most important contribution to German unity' in 1989 and 1990.578 
Federal President K6h1er echoed this by describing the people of the GDR as having 
4written one of the nicest chapters in German history' and of having 'made a gift of it 
to all Germans'. 579 One notes an implication in these speeches that all East Germans 
were demonstrators against the Communist regime in the late 1980s. In reality, 
515 See Loth, 2006,9. November, 123-140. 
576 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
577 Wowereit, 2002, Rede, www. berlin. de. 
578 Rau, 2002, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
579 Köhler, 2004, Rede, w%v%v. bundespraesident. de. 
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although the majority of East Germans promoted a regime change, or at least were 
keen to transform the GDR from within, only a minority actively participated in the 
demonstrations even at the height of the protests: the total number of all protestors 
involved in all the main demonstrations in Berlin and Leipzig, as well as other 
protests elsewhere in the GDR in 1989, was estimated at just over a million 
(1,055,000). 580 By inferring that it was the majority of East Germans that actively 
campaigned, the political actors sought to make it possible for all eastern Germans to 
consider themselves as having played a major role in bringing about the collapse of 
the GDR and thus in unification. The German speakers thus recast the history of the 
demise of the GDR to further facilitate the integration of eastern Germans into united 
Gen-nany. 
The oversimplification of 'East Germans' as a homogenous group was also 
visible in the underscoring of the positive aspectq that East Germans brought with 
them to unification. Former President of the Volkskammer, Bergmann-Pohl, 
attempting to stress that unification was not one-sided, highlighted, at the beginning 
of the inaugural unification ceremony, that East Germans brought with them 
'humanity and a sense of family and neighbourliness'. 581 Bergmann-Pohl thereby 
emphasised that, despite the many negative aspects of the GDR, the former citizens of 
the GDR themselves nevertheless possessed many positive qualities. Bergmann- 
Pohl's endeavour to mould notions about eastern Germans thus focused on promoting 
their values. Federal President von Weizsdcker adopted a similar approach in the 
final speech of the ceremony by presenting the values of eastern and western 
Germans as complementary. 582 He spoke of Germans now being able to merge the 
Verfassungspatriolismus of West Germans with the human solidarity of East 
Germans to create a puissant whole. At the celebrations two years later, WeizsAcker 
continued to allempt to influence attitudes in this way by criticising the claim that 
there were 'teachers there' (in western Germany) and 'pupils here' (in eastern 
5'0 Jarausch, K. H. (1994). The rush to German unity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47. 
58 1 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
582 lbid 
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Germany). 583 He thereby strove to emphasise that western Germans also had much to 
learn from eastern Germans. 
Into the late 1990s, speakers on the Day of Unity continued to make reference 
to what were characterised as typical values of East Germans. Now, however, 
rhetoric focused no longer on what East Germans had brought with them to 
unification. Instead, speakers praised the values and characteristics of eastern 
Germans in the struggle for overcoming the problems of unity. In 1998, for example, 
Federal President Herzog drew attention to how eastern Germans had mastered the 
drastic changes they had faced with 'incredible energy and patience' 584 to emphasise 
that eastern Germans continued to make a contribution to Germany. Herzog, like 
previous speakers on the Day of Unity, thereby attempted to present a specific image 
of eastern Germans as hard-working people with many positive characteristics, to 
counteract the negative image of eastern Germans among many western Germans. 
Finally, the Day of Unity actors used economic arguments to counter 
stereotypes about the eastern German economy. Forty years of a Socialist planned 
economy had left the GDR with a very poor economic infrastructure. At the Day of 
Unity celebrations in Munich, Minister-President of Saxony and former economics 
Professor Biedenkopf, who had grown up in West Germany, told Le Monde reporters 
that it would realistically take at least seventy years to overcome the economic 
discrepancies between eastern and western Germany. 585 Notwithstanding the gloomy 
forecasts regarding the economic synchronisation of eastern and western Germany, 
German political actors across the spectrum started as early as 1994 to counteract the 
stereotype among western Germans of eastern Germany as drab and far behind 
western Germany. In an attempt to present eastern Germany as a 'laboratory of the 
new', 586 they staged the new Lander as home to vibrant cities, modem infrastructure 
5"' Von Weizsacker, 1992, Ansprache, 1004. 
584 Herzog, 1998, Ansprache, 827. 
585 Le Monde reporters remarked, however, that this must be seen in the context of the conflict of the 
Brussels Commission on the topic of the attribution of subsidies to industry: Sixiýme anniversaire 
morose, 4. 
586 Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 841. 
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and creativity. 587 Federal President Herzog, for example, stressed the extent of 
progress made in building up the East since unification and suggested that eastern 
Germany was not only becoming equal to western Germany, but that it was actually 
beginning to surpass it in many respects. He claimed that, 'in the foreseeable future, 
much in the East will be more modem and more competitive than in western 
Germany' . 
588 He reinforced this by saying that the most modem telecommunications 
network in the world was to be laid in eastern Germany. Indeed, in the first ten years 
after unification a total of 5.7 million modem telephone connections were installed. 589 
Despite considerable improvements such as this, however, the differences in the 
economic infrastructure of the old and new Liinder remained considerably greater 
than the German speakers on the Day of Unity seemed willing to admit. Eastern 
employment figures and living conditions also continued to severely lag behind 
western German standards. 590 The Report on the State of German Unity in 2006 
showed, for example, that, at 18.7%, the unemployment rate in the eastern Ldnder 
was twice as high as that of the western Ldrider. 591 
German political actors continued to present eastern Germany as innovative 
throughout the years that followed. The tenth and fourteenth anniversaries offer 
especially poignant examples of the extent to which speakers on the Day of Unity 
attempted to reframe the realities of the state of the eastern German economy. In 
2000, Federal President Rau framed the 'renewed glory of the inner cities' and 'the 
modem infrastructure' 592 as representative of the eastern German economy, whilst de 
593 MaizWe spoke at length of the development of modern, high-tech industry. 
Similarly, Federal President K6hler dedicated much of his 2004 address to a detailed 
587 An early outlier to this discourse was Silssmuth, who as early as 1993 had attempted to shape 
notions about the economy by arguing that the West German economy was actually facing problems 
even before unification. See Silssmuth, 1993, Ansprache, 933. 
588 Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 842. 
589 GMemaker, M. (2003). Kleine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
fUr politische Bildung, 387. For details of the other elements of innovation in eastern Germany 
resulting from A ujbau Ost see Zahlen und Fakten zum A ujbau Ost. (2004). Retrieved January 10,2008, 
from http: //wivw. archiv. bundesregierung. de/artikel, -888671. htin. 
59' Habich, 1999, Lebensbedingungen, 523-539. 
59' Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 2006, www. bpb. de. 
592 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
59' De Maizi&e, 2000, Rede, www. sachsen. de. 
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account of the transformation of Germany through Aujbau Ost, 
594 
the core elements 
of which, he argued, were improving investment, infrastructure and innovation in the 
595 East. 
In this context and in light of the fact that attitudes towards unification and 
unity were closely linked with the topic of the considerable costs involved in building 
up the former ý GDR, 596 German speakers on the Day of Unity continually framed 
Aujbau Ost as a benefit for the whole of Germany. In this way, they sought to 
counter western German frustration over the heavy costs involved in the unity process 
by emphasising that they were not simply giving money away but were investing to 
some extent in their own future. At the inaugural unification ceremony in 1990, 
before the full costs of unity were known (or at least openly acknowledged), Federal 
President von Weizsqcker framed the building up of eastern Germany as a 
responsibility of all Germans. 597 Von Weizsacker focused on the likelihood of 
negative repercussions if the development of the East was not interpreted as a shared 
goal. He sought to stress that, if Aujbau Ost was not seen as ajoint responsibility, the 
problems would 'encumber Germans in the West as much as Germans in the East'. 
In 1992, when it had already become apparent that the costs involved would be 
greater than expected, Minister-President of Mecklenburg-Western. Pomerania, Seite, 
warned of the potential economic problems for future generations, were Germans not 
to see the economy as a joint one. 598 Framed more positively, Chancellor Kohl 
emphasised, in a Bundestag declaration for the Day of Unity in 1994, that the 
expenditure for the new Ldnder was an 'investment in the future of the whole of 
Germany' . 
599 The Chancellor-Elect Schr6der reaffirmed the message of his 
predecessor in his 1998 Day of Unity speech by similarly emphasising the necessity 
594 K6hler, 2004, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
595 For further details about the elements involved in Aujbau Ost from the Federal government's 
website see 15 Jahre deutsche Einheit. (2005). Retrieved January 10,2008, from http: //www. archiv. 
bundesregierung. de/bpaexport/artikeUOO/894600. multi. htm. For facts and figures of the Aujbau Ost 
Frocess see Zahlen und Faklen, 2004, www. archiv. bundesregierung. de. 
For a comparison of contrasting views of the long-term economic consequences of unification see 
Jenkis, H. (2005). Zwei Ansichten Über die DDR: Die Sicht von innen und von aussen. Deutschland 
Archiv, 38(5), 856-862. - 
597 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
5"' Dietmar & Sadyn, 1992, Festakt, NDR. 
59' Kohl, H. (1994). Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers Helmut Kohl. Bulletin, 91,845-848. 
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of building up the East for the whole of Germany. 600 He stated that homogeneity in 
living standards across Germany would ensure stability in the economically strong 
regions. By the same token, at the tenth anniversary Federal President Rau presented 
Aujbau Ost not only as a shared struggle but also as a joint benefit for the whole 
country. 601 In this vein, the Federal Government tent at the citizens' festival in 2001 
was arranged around the theme 'Renewing Germany' and not simply renewing 
eastern Germany. 102 The following year, Federal President Rau was keen to 
emphasise that not only western Germans but also eastern Gen-nans paid the 
unification tax, to counter misconceptions and prejudices that western Germans were 
financing eastern Germans while the latter did nothing to help themselves. 603 Indeed, 
the so-called 'Solidarity Tax' (Solidaritdazuschlag) was introduced in western 
Germany in 1991 and in the East in 1994.604 The German actors thus framed the 
continuous challenge of Aujbau Ost as both a joint task and a joint benefit to all 
Germans. In this vein, the German speakers also sought to emphasise those elements 
that connected all Germans. 
3.3 Staging unity and diversity 
The calls for Germans to focus on reconciliation rather than on that which continued 
to divide them - that is, to 'ask less what divides and more what unites 605 - became a 
topic so often repeated in the speeches on the Day of Unity, particularly by Federal 
President Rau, that the German national newspaper the Saddeutsche Zeitung 
described this phenomenon as the 'Johannes Rau Formula'. 606 Throughout the period 
from 1990 to 2005, actors framed the unity process, not simply the economic aspects 
but also the psychological aspects, as a goal, motivating Germans to believe that it 
'will be achieved without doubt 607 and that it 'just needs more time'. 608 The various 
600 Schröder, 1998, Ansprache, 826. 
'501 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
602 Tag der Deutschen Einheit 2001 in Mainz: Deutschland zu Gast in Mainz [Television broadcast]. 
(200 1, October 3). Baden-Baden: Südwestrundfunk. 
""' Rau, 2002, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de 
604 Görtemaker, 2003, Kleine Geschichte, 384. 
605 See Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 842. 
606 Boeker, 1998, Würdig bis zum letzten Takt, 4. 
607 Rau, 2002, Rede, Nvww. bundespraesident. de. 
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political actors' attempts to frame differences among Germans as negative on the Day 
of Unity focused on two main aspects. 
Firstly, they drew attention to elements that already united Germans. This 
topic first emerged a decade after unification arguably because before this time there 
were less substantial elements linking Germans. Federal President Rau spoke on the 
tenth anniversary, in the context of Brandt's famous dictum at the time of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, that 'that which belongs together, is now growing together'. On the 
one hand, he described cultural achievements, namely the award of a Nobel Prize to 
two Germans in the previous year, 1999 - to Gonther Grass for literature and to 
German-born American researcher GUnter Blobel for medicine - as an element that 
had brought all Germans together. On the other hand, he used sport as an example of 
the ties that already existed between eastern and western Germans and pointed 
especially to the 'nationwide joy and sorrow' when the national football team played 
or when German athletes competed for international medals and CUPS. 609 To seethe 
poignancy of Rau's-words, one need only consider the way in which the Football 
World Cup a few years later, in 2006, helped to articulate a common sense of pride 
and joy among Germans. 
Two years later after his references to the merits of sport as a uniting force, 
Rau turned to another venue in which Germans in East and West came together in 
common cause. In his 2004 Day of Unity speech, Rau, like the German print 
press, 610 pointed to the efforts of both eastern and western Germans to contain the 
river Oder and stem flood damage. In August 2002, eastern Germany had seen some 
of the worst floods in central Europe for decades when the River Elbe split its 
banks .6 
11 Working together along the banks, the tragedy also represented a unifying 
social experience for eastern and western Germans alike. Following these floods, 
many western Germans not only provided financial support in the form of donations, 
but also travelled to eastern Germany to put their own physical strength into the relief 
609 SUssmuth, 1995, Ansprache, 757. 
609 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
6'0 Breuilly, J., & Speirs, R. (2005). The concept of national unification. In R. Speirs & J. Breuilly 
(Eds. ), Germany's two unifications: anticipations, experiences, responses. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1-25, here 2 1. 
611 Müller, H. M. (2003). Schlaglichter der deutschen Geschichte. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 485. 
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efforts. Against this background, the gratitude bestowed upon the helpers during the 
flood catastrophe stood at the forefront of the Day of Unity citizens' festival that year. 
At the central ceremony, Rau referred to the physical and financial support given by 
western Germans as an especially powerful example of solidarity among Germans, of 
tone people' who belong together and who can depend on one another - at a time 
when, according to a Forsa survey, a mere 11% of the population considered there to 
be no differences among eastern and western Gen-nanS612 and, according to an Emnid 
survey, only one in three Germans even believed 'yes, we are one country'. 613 
In addition to such emphasis on strong emotional ties among Germans, the 
actors praised and sought to promote joint initiatives between eastern and western 
Germans. On the eleventh anniversary of German unity, for example, President of 
the Bundestag, Thierse, argued that unity can, must and will succeed, 614 something, 
however, for which more intra-German interaction was necessary in order to 
overcome differences. The following year, Rau in turn expressed his desire for more 
shared experiences among Germans and argued that it was unacceptable that, twelve 
years after unification, many people still referred to the other part of Germany as 
'over there'. 6 15 He called for much more interaction, not only at large events but also 
on the day-to-day level - particularly among young people. He praised the numerous 
initiatives that did already exist, including one, 'schuelerpartnerschaft. de' based on 
the idea that school children should not just have contacts in other countries, but 
should also have partner schools and pupils within Germany itself, which he himself 
616 had helped to set up in 2001 . 
The extent to which actors prioritised and applauded the creation of joint 
eastern-western German initiatives was best illustrated by the introduction of the 
Unity Award (Einheitspreis) in 2002. The Unity Award was instituted to honour civil 
commitment to Germany and to praise exemplary individuals, institutions, projects 
612 Umfrage 13 Jahre nach der deutschen Einheit. (2003). Retrieved April 30,2004, from http: //www. 
axelspringer. de/inhatte/presse/inhatte/presse/2444. html. 
613 Nur jeder dritte Deutsche glaubt: Uä wir sind wieder ein Land'. (2002). Retrieved April 29,2004, 
from http: //www. axelspringer. de/inhalte/presse/inhalte/presse/2445. html. 
614 Thierse, 200 1, Bundestagsprasident, www. bundestagde. 
6 15 Rau, 2002, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
616 ihid. 
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and initiatives which had contributed to the growing together of Germany. 617 The 
Unity Award was divided into three self-explanatory categories: firstly, 'People - 
Actors of Unity'; secondly, 'Project - Construction of Actual Unity'; and thirdly, 
'Media - Observations of Unity'. With a total prize sum of 40,000 Euros, the award 
was sponsored by the Bundeszentrale far Politische Bildung (BPB) and was bestowed 
by a jury of personalities from politics, culture, sport and society. When the award 
was introduced, it received a great deal of media coverage from the Bild-Zeitung, 
which ran articles looking for the 'heroes of unity' over a period of several weeks. 618 
In the years that followed, the award ceremony remained a key event at the Day of 
Unity central celebrations, where people who had created concrete intra-German 
projects, as well as those who had sought to appeal to the 'hearts and minds' of 
Germans, received their prizes and whose efforts were thereby highlighted for 
imitation. Prize winners included: the founder of an eastern German cabaret festival 
entitled 'Laughing together brings one another closer' ('Gemeinsam lachen bringt 
einander naher' ), 619 creators of a German-German memory game ('Das deutsch- 
deutsche Einheitsmemory' )620 - designed for children to match together and reflect on 
pairs of pictures representative of East and West Germany (such as the two different 
styles of traffic lightS)621 - as well as organisers of a youth project involving tours 
focused on everyday life and tourist attractions in two eastern Berlin districts, 
Marzahn and Hellersdorf, aimed at removing the prejudices of western German 
school children of these areas as the 'social terminus of the East'. 622 
In addition to the Unity *Award, numerous other initiatives used the Day of 
Unity celebrations as a platform to promote Germany and 'German-ness' in 2005. 
Representatives of associations such as 'Wir ftir Deutschland' (Ts for Germany'), 
'Du bist Deutschland' ('You are Germany') and 'Deutschland: Land der Ideen' 
617 Einheitspreis 2006 (2006). Retrieved January 25,2006, from http: //www. einheitspreis. de. 
618 Wer bekommt den 'Einheitspreis'? (2002, October 1). Bild-Zellung, 2. 
619 Einheitspreis 2006., Preislrdger 2002. (2006). Retrieved March 9,2007, from http: //www. 
einheitspreis. de/die-preistrager/preistrager-2002. 620 ibid. 
621 Deutsch-Deuisches Einheilsmemory. (2005). Retrieved March 9,2007, from http: //www. kempgens- 
lobisch. de. 
622 Einheitsprels 2006: Prelstrelger 2004. (2006). Retrieved March 9,2007, from http: //www. 
einheitspreis. de/die-preistrager/preistrager-2004. 
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('Germany: Land of Ideas') were present at the citizens' festivals, handing out leaflets 
and memorabilia to passers-by. 623 The 'Germany: Land of Ideas' initiative 
particularly coloured the production of the citizens' festival on the fifteenth Day of 
Unity, which was staged with a mass of black, red, and gold bunting to display the 
colours of the national flag -a symbol rarely seen on the Day of Unity anniversaries. 
The initiative was set up in preparation for the football World Cup of 2006, aimed to 
'show the world' how, for centuries, 'German poets, thinkers, researchers, inventors, 
artists and composers have made life more comfortable, safer and nicer'. The patrons 
of the initiative included Federal President K6hler, the federal government and 
companies represented by the Federation of German Industries and German 
Business. 624 On 3rd October 2005, the Minister-President of Brandenburg Platzeck 
(SPD) attended the 'Germany: Land of Ideas' stand where queues of people were 
being encouraged to sign up to the 'Fan Club Deutschland, to become an 'official 
fan of Germany' and receive membership documents and the opportunity to have 
their views included in the campaign. 625 This initiative was essentially created not 
only to promote Germany to the rest of the world but foremost to promote a sense of 
pride and self-esteem among Germans. 
It would seem then that this project marked the first signs of an attempt to 
encourage Germans to feel proud about being German and openly display positive 
national sentiment. In this way, the initiative served to promote a sense of all 
Germans belonging together in a climate where, according to a representative Emnid 
survey one month earlier, only 53% of Germans thought eastern and western 
Germans had grown closer since unification and almost one in four even thought they 
had grown further apart. 626 It is, as yet, too early to determine whether the overt 
exhibition of patriotism by many Germans during the World Cup in 2006 (as visible 
... See for example: Becker, J. (Ed. ). (1994, October 3). Einheitsjubel [Televised news report]. In RTL 
NachfjournaL Cologne: RTL. 
624 Deutschland- Land der Ideen. (2006). Retrieved January 29,2007, from http: //www. land-der- 
ideen. de/CDA /die 
- 
initiative, I 4,0,, de. html. 
6" Deutschland- Land der Ideen - Fan Club Deustchland. (2006). Retrieved March 9,2007, ftorn 
http: //www. land-der-ideen. de/CDA/fanclub_deutschland, 1267,0,, de. html. 
626 Deutsche sind einander noch fremd. (2005, October 4). Frankfurler Agemeine Zeilung, 1. For 
similar statistics see a survey conducted by the ZDF-Politbarometer: Willershausen, F. (2005). 
Umfrage: Wiedervereinigung war eine gute Entscheidung. Retrieved March 10,2008, from http: H 
www. morgenpost. de /content/2005/09/29/politik /782498. html. 
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through the sea of German flags), represents the beginning of a trend toward a certain 
change or 'normalisation' in attitudes toward the nation or whether this phenomenon 
is limited to sporting events. 
Alongside the depiction of differences among eastern and western Germans as 
negative, however, Day of Unity actors, paradoxically, also suggested throughout the 
period from 1990 to 2005 that homogeneity in all attitudes and aspects was not 
always required or even desirable -a hidden contradiction that was somewhat 
glossed-over in the speeches. As early as the second anniversary of unification, 
attempts to frame differences between Germans as positive are discernible. Minister- 
President of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Seite in 1992, for example, framed 
regional differences as extremely important and criticised centralisation without a 
strong sense of region as providing the potential for dictatorship. 627 Similarly, 
Federal President Herzog called for the differences created by forty years of division 
not to be overstated. Like Seite, he went so far as to suggest that complete 
assimilation was not even desirable by stating that there had only been a centralised 
state between 1933 and 1945, which was the 'worst time of our entire history, for 
Germans as well as for others'. Herzog, from Bavaria, a region with a traditionally 
strong regional identity, referred to the National Socialist past to punctuate the 
importance of differences existing among Germans. To further emphasise that 
disparity was not necessarily negative, he went on in his speech to undermine the 
very concepts of 'inner unity' and 'national identity'. He declared, for instance, that 
he 'still had not found anyone who could explain to him what "national identity" 
actually is - this "national identity" that we are apparently missing and supposedly 
urgently need' . 
628 The concepts of 'inner unity' and 'national identity', so over-used 
and misused by political actors, the press and the general public following unification 
had indeed acquired, he implied, not only multiple but also essentially trite and 
ambivalent meanings with reference to united Germany. 'Inner unity', for example, 
can be understood either in the context of cultural harmonisation or the merging of 
627 Dietmar & Sadyn, 1992, Festakt, NDR. 
629 Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 842. 
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socio-economic structures after 1990 and is surrounded by confusion and ambiguity 
in its use by the media and political actors. 629 
Four years later, on Yd October 1998, Herzog once more presented East/West 
diversity as positive by framing differences as complementary. He contested the idea 
that the existence of different desires among eastern and western Germans, namely 
the preference for greater equality and social provision in the East, and the wish not 
to change the balance of freedom and equality in the West, were reasons to doubt the 
success of unity. 630 Moreover, the Federal President once again warned against too 
much assimilation and criticised the promotion of 'Einheitsdeutsche' (unitary 
Germans): a word chosen to echo the fear of an Tinheitsstaat' (unitary state), the 
bane of many on the Left, as well as of intellectuals such as Grinter Grass, before and 
during unification. , Herzog stated, in summation, that the regional variations in 
Germany had never damaged but rather politically and culturally enriched the 
country. 631 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it had become increasingly clear that the 
differences between Germans from East and West were much more fundamental than 
most German political actors or the German general public had acknowledged at the 
time of unification. In response to this general realisation, German actors on the Day 
of Unity increasingly focused on the differences between eastern and western 
Germans as being regional and traditional. At the tenth Day of Unity anniversary, for 
example, Bundesrat President Biedenkopf of Saxony, a region that calls itself a 'Free 
State' (Freistaat) and, like Bavaria (also a Freistaat), has a strong regional identity, 
suggested that the disparity between eastern and western Germans had in fact been 
largely overcome and that the remaining differences were regional. Biedenkopf 
focused on the traditional regional nature of Germany's political and cultural 
629 On problemising the notion of 'inner unity' see Kaase, Innere Einheit. See also Veen, H-J. (1997). 
'Inner unity' -back to the community myth? A plea for basic consensus. German Politics, 6(3), 1-15. 630 Herzog, 1998, Ansprache, 827. For brief analysis of the different popular values in eastern and 
westem Germany see Ileine, R. (2008). Vereint und doch getrennt? Zur Frage der 'inneren Einheit' 
Deutschlands. Die politischeMeinung, 458,21-25. 
631 Herzog, 1998, Ansprache, 827. 
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landscape, saying that the differences between the regions had always existed. 632 
Mayor of Berlin, Wowereit, and Federal President Rau both touched upon the 
important role of regional diversity in their 2002 speeches. Wowereit emphasised 
that Germany was a federal and not a centralised state and argued that Germans were 
proud of their regional differences. 633 Rau, for his part, stated that the differences in 
'inner unity' between those from Mecklenburg and those from the Rheinland would 
probably never be greater than the differences in 'inner unity' between Franconians 
and Westphalians. In this vein, he even went so far as to suggest that unity between 
eastern and western Germans was a never-ending process and stated that unity 'will 
not just simply be completed sometime'. 634 
A sceptic may think that, given the difficulty in achieving the so-called goal 
of unity, the shift by the political actors to framing differences as positive rather than 
negative could be seen as an example of simply 'moving the goal posts' by saying 
that the aim of eliminating differences was no longer desirable. However, the fact 
that the two discourses ran parallel to each other throughout the period from 1990 to 
2005 suggests this was not the case. Taking a less cynical view, one could thus 
contend that the comparison of East-West differences with those that existed between 
Lander simply allowed the former to be viewed positively. Differences could be 
presented as variety: something that enriched the political and cultural landscape of 
Germany and should be celebrated A la 'unity in diversity' motto. One notes here the 
parallels with the guiding motto of the EU suggesting a further indication of EU- 
isation. 
This valorisation of difference may be tied to the tradition of separate 
statehood in the German lands, discussed in more detail in the following chapter, or, 
at least, that an appeal to such tradition underwrote the political appeals. Moreover, it 
serves as a further example of the way in which a tradition rooted in the Federal 
Republic, namely federalism, was adapted for a new purpose: to eliminate or, at least, 
neutralise differences among eastern and western Germans in united Germany. By 
632 Biedenkopf, K. (2000). Rede des Prasidenten des Bundesrates und Ministerprdsidenlen des 
Frelstaates Sachsen, Prof Dr. Kurt Biedenkopf. Retrieved February 15,2007, from http: //www2. hu- 
berlin. de/francopolis/cons. ivOO-01 /einheit. htm. 
633 Wowereit, 2002, Rede, www. berlin. de. 
634 Rau, 2002, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
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framing differences - at least some of them - among Germans as regional, positive 
and traditional, the German actors on the Day of Unity thus sought to overcome the 
potentially divisive effect of the continued differences between eastern and western 
Germans. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the German political actors have struggled to find ways 
in which to unite eastern and western Germans. This raises the question of what 
understanding of nationhood the political actors sought to promote. Brubaker has 
argued that unlike French understandings of nationhood, which have traditionally 
been state-centred and assimilationist, the German idiom of nationhood has 
traditionally been entirely ethnocultural . 
635 This ethnocultural understanding was 
reflected in the fact that, until 2000, citizenship in Germany remained based on the 
citizenship law of 1913: founded exclusively on the principle of jus Sanguinis, the 
Wilhelmine law defined citizenship restrictively as a community of descent. 
Consequently, although citizenship law was extremely open to ethnic Germans from 
outside Germany, neither birth in German territory nor prolonged residence affected 
the ascription of citizenship to non-German immigrants. 636 Furthermore, 
naturalisation for non-Germans remained difficult - resulting in low naturalisation 
rates. 637 This was evident in the way in which Germany initially welcomed with 
open arms those with German blood from the East after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
638 while continuing to restrict the ascription and naturalisation of non-Germans . 
On the Day of Unity anniversaries from 1990 to 2005, however, the elite 
idiom of nationhood was more complex. The ethnocultural understanding of 
nationhood remained visible in a number of different aspects. It was particularly 
pronounced, for example, in the initiatives such as 'You are Germany' and 'Us for 
Germany'. These initiatives, in their attempt to encourage both Germans and the 
wider international community to interpret Germans more positively, drew on the 
635 Brubaker, 1992, Citizenship and nationhood. 
636 ]bid., 82. 
637 Ibid., 114. 
638 Ibid., 84. 
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idea that generation after generation of Germans have contributed to everything from 
poetry and literature to music and engineering. One notes an ethnocultural inflection 
here based on the understanding of the German citizenry as a community of descent. 
The promotion by the Day of Unity actors of German Nobel prize winners - that is to 
say those of German blood - as figures of whom all Germans could be proud, further 
underlines this ethnocultural idiom of nationhood on the Day of Unity. That even 
German-born American GUnter Blobel was included among the list of German Nobel 
Prize winners by the Day of Unity actors epitomises this. 
At the same time, however, there have been signs of a more civic, state- 
centred and assimilationist understanding of nationhood among the German political 
actors on the Day of Unity. This manifested itself both in the way they presented 
Germans as united through the economy as well as through shared experiences and 
common initiatives - such as the flooding in eastern Germany. Most of all, however, 
civic nationalism expressed itself in the promotion of all Germans as joined through 
their attachment to the constitution. Such constitutional patriotism is not restricted to 
those of German blood but rather is a form of belonging for all those willing to 
adhere to the German constitution. There are thus signs here of an expansive 
definition of citizenship traditionally more associated with the Republican values of 
France than with Germany. 
The promotion of not only ethnic but also civic understandings of nationhood 
by the political actors on the Day of Unity anniversaries would seem to suggest that 
Brubaker's understanding of Germany as a country of pure ethnic nationalism is 
becoming somewhat outdated. The German national holiday did not serve as 
platform from which to simply exclusively celebrate those of German blood and their 
past. Instead, the prevailing elite idiom of nationhood was much more inclusive - 
that is to say, the political actors sought to invite others into the imagined community. 
The reasons for this can perhaps best be explained by considering the historical, 
institutional and political context in which the change in the elite idiom of nationhood 
took place. 
As Brubaker has argued, during the post-war division of Germany, the 
continued ethnocultural definition of citizenship - based on the Wilhelmine law of 
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1913 - meant that East Germans were considered German citizens. 639 Indeed, it was 
the understanding of German citizenry as a community of descent that automatically 
granted passports to East Germans and entitled them to legally enter, work and reside 
in the Federal Republic. On the one hand, unification in some respects reinforced the 
need for an ethnocultural understanding of citizenship. Defining East and West 
Germans as united through blood served, as we have seen in the ethnocultural 
elements of the Day of Unity, as a way of constructing a sense of Wir-Gefiihl among 
two groups of people who, through forty years of division, were no longer so closely 
united through history or culture. On the other hand, however, unification allowed 
changes to the understanding of nationhood in Germany. While the need to leave the 
door open for unification had hindered any major reforms before the collapse of 
Communism, on 9h July 1990 German political actors made a number of reforms to 
the law governing foreigners (Ausldndergeselz). Above all, naturalisation procedures 
were simplified for immigrants aged between 16 and 23 and older immigrants who 
had lived in Germany for more than fifteen years. 640 The size of the immigrant 
population in Germany by this time - 5.3 million by the end of 199064 '- had indeed 
necessitated liberalisation of the definition of citizenship; there was a high level of 
cross-party consensus in Germany that the existence of a large, settled non-German 
population had to be addressed. 642 
The challenges of finding a definition of nationhood that remained ethnic (in 
order to integrate East Germans) but at the same time assimilationist (in order to 
integrate the vast population of non-German immigrants) perhaps helps to explain the 
expressions of both ethnic and civic elite idioms of nationhood on the Day of Unity 
anniversaries throughout the period from 1990 to 2005. In addition to this, the 
advocacy of a postriational form of belonging explored in the following chapters took 
the political actors further away from a purely ethno-centric understanding of 
nationhood. Moreover, in a time of ever-increasing EU-integration, Germany sought 
to synchronise its definition of citizenship to bring its citizenship legislation in line 
639 Ibid., 169. 
640 Green, S. (2000). Beyond ethnoculturalism? German citizenship in the new millennium. German 
Politics, 9(3), 105-124, here 105. 
641 Ibid., I 11. 
642 Brubaker, 1992, Citizenship and nationhood, 173. 
164 
with the prevailing understanding of nationhood and citizenship of its European 
partners. 643 
The turn away from a purely ethnocultural understanding of nationhood was 
indeed institutional ised in the reformed citizenship law of I' January 2000. While 
the complete rejection of dual citizenship in the new law was widely perceived as a 
sign that Germany had not entirely broken with its ethnocultural self- 
understand ing, 644 a number of elements demonstrated that Germany was moving into 
civic nationalism at the turn of the millennium. Most notably, the law introduced for 
the first time a form of jus soli, liberalised the requirements for naturalisation and 
restricted the automatic inheritance of German citizenship for those outside of 
Germany. 645 The automatic inheritance of citizenship had indeed caused problems in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s when, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a vast 
number of Russian immigrants took up the offer to relocate to Germany; they often 
spoke little or no German themselves, brought their (frequently, Russian) families 
with them and proved difficult to integrate. 
More recently, Germany has stepped yet further towards civic nationalism: on 
I" September 2008, the country introduced a citizenship test for immigrants wishing 
to become German. This test, with questions ranging from 'What was the 'Third 
Reich'? ' to 'What is the German constitution called? ' signifies a further dramatic 
shift in the understanding of what it is to be German. 646 The very idea that those of 
non-German blood - having fulfilled certain other requirements such as sufficient 
mastery of the German language and financial independence - can become German 
by answering correctly a number of questions about Germany would previously have 
been unthinkable in Germany. Given that Britain (with its 'Life in the UK' test), 647 
has recently introduced similar procedures and France (with its stringent interviews 
643 Green, 2000, Beyond ethnoculturalism, 120. 
644 See Ibid., 118. 
645 See Ibid., 107-119. 
646 See Moore, T. (2008). German citizenship is put to the test. Retrieved January 14,2009, from 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe/7597534. stm. 
647 See Introduction of language and citizenship knowledge testing. (2008). Retrieved February 12, 
2009, from http: //ukba. homeoffice. gov. uk/sitecontent/newsarticies/2007/ introduction of language 
testing. For more details about the test see Life in the UK test. (2008). Retrieved February 12,2009, 
from http: //www. lifeintheuktest. gov. uk. 
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for citizenship), continues today in its tradition of demanding assimilation, 648 the 
introduction of a citizenship test arguably brings Germany further in line with its EU 
partners. 649 These changes underline the increasingly broad, inclusive nature of the 
prevailing idiom of nationhood in Germany today, which is far removed from the 
purely ethnic form of nationalism outlined by Brubaker in the early 1990s. 
6" The recent case of 'Faiza M', for example - in which a young Moroccan woman (married to a 
Frenchman and with three children born in France) who entered her French citizenship interview 
wearing a burqa was refused citizenship on the grounds of her 'failure to assimilate' - epitomised that, 
not only historically in France, but also today, a person can become French but has to be assimilated. 
See Le Bars, S. (2008). Une marocaine en burqa se voit refuser la nationalitgfranqaise. Retrieved 
March 3,2008, from http: //, A-ww. lemonde. fr/societe/article/ 2008/07/11/une-marocaine-en-burqa-se- 
voit-refuser-la-nationalite-francaise - 
10724013224. httnl. 
"' The degree to which there has been convergence in citizenship matters among the EU states to date 
is contested. See, for example, Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (Eds. ). (2003). Toward assimilation and 
citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. For an introduction to key issues relating to the 
citizenship tests in Europe see Wright, S. (2008). Citizenship tests in Europe - editorial introduction. 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 10(t), 1.9. 
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4. The German national holiday as a regional 
event: a sub-national national holiday? 
The Day of Unity parades in Berlin traditionally commenced with sixteen young 
Germans, one from each of the Ldrider, passing through the Brandenburg gate with 
the Wendefahne. Running intermittently underneath the eight-by-four-metre flag, the 
youngsters alternately displayed the German national flag on one side of the flag, the 
sixteen flags of the federal states on the other. This symbolic opening to the unity 
celebrations in the country's capital epitomises the centrality of federalism in the 
staging of the national holiday. That these were not the main celebrations, which 
were instead hosted on a rotating basis in the Land holding the presidency in the 
Bundesrat, is perhaps the most striking manifestation of this. 
Since the eighteenth century, when it was first used in the modem, political 
sense, federalism has been an implicit element of German national consciousness and 
a 'continuous sub-current of German history'. 650 Unlike centralised unitary nation- 
states such as France, the 'national-federal state' became the 'specific German type of 
nation-state' . 
65 1 The formation of regions and regional states and identities has 
historically preceded national integration and state formation and, as Abigail Green 652 
and Siegfried Weichlein 653 have recently shown, a dualism of nation and region has 
traditionally existed in Germany. Undermining the 'assumption that kleindeutsch 
German unification was inevitable 654 and questioning the strength of German 
nationalism at the time of the first unification, 655 recent literature has shown that 
territorial loyalties and identities remained fundamental even in the period of relative 
centralisation in nation-state formation of the late 19'h centUry. 656 
"0 Umbach, 2002, German federalism, 5. For an interesting recent overview of regional identiflcation 
from 1871 to 1918 see Klein, M. B. (2005). ZwIschen Reich und Region: Identildisstrukturen im 
Deutschen Kaiserreich (1871-1918). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
65 1 Dann, 0. (1993). Nation und Nalionalismus in Deutschland 1770-1990. Munich: Beck, 313. 
652 Green, 200 1, Fatherlands. 
653 Weichlcin, S. (2004). Nation und Region: Inlegrationsprozesse im Bismarckrelch. Dosseldorf. 
Droste Vcrlag. 
654 Green, 200 1, Fatherlands, 15. 
655 Aid., 6. 
616 See, for example, Levinger, Matthew. (2000). Enlightened nationalism: the transformation of 
Prussian political culture, 1806-1848. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hagemann, K. (2002). 
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In the early twentieth century, however, the Weimar Republic, a 
'decentralised unitary' rather than federal state, 657 weakened federal political 
structures, although not necessarily regional identities, 658 and National Socialism 
replaced the federation with a highly centralised state . 
659 In post-war Germany, two 
divergent trends developed in the zones of occupation. In the Soviet zone, the GDR 
rapidly developed into a centralised one-party state and East Germany was stripped of 
any remaining federal character, when the Lander were abolished de facto in 1952 
(and de jure in 1958) . 
660 In contrast, the western Allies - especially the US and 
France - insisted that West Germany must be federal . 
66 1 This was also the preferred 
choice especially of the Christian Democrats under Konrad Adenauer in the 
Parlamentarischer Rat, the body which drafted Germany's new constitution. West 
Germans thus did not interpret the introduction of federalism by the Allies as a 
'hostile plot to subdivide the nation' but instead accepted it as an 'authentic 
expression of German identities', despite the fact that few of the new Lander 
resembled former states of the Old Empire or the Bismarckian Empire. 662 Federalism 
consequently became a cornerstone of the German Basic Law of 1949. 
Unification in 1990 raised new challenges for German federalism. The 
manner of unification, through Article 23 of the Basic Law, meant that the West 
German federal arrangement was extended to the new Under. 663 Thus one of the 
greatest problems for the German polity was the constitutional obligation of assuring 
fiscal equalisation through the so-called Landerfinanzausg1eich across five new 
economically weak federal states (Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, 
'Mdnnlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre'. Nation, Militar und Geschlecht zur Zeit der 
Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens. Paderborn: Ferdinand Sch6ningh Verlag. Katherine Aaslestaad 
has gone yet farther, arguing that in the case of Hamburg, there was almost a complete absence of 
nationalism: Aaslestad, K. B. (2005). Place and Politics. Local Identify, Civic Culture and German 
Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era. Leiden: Brill Academic. 
6" Gunlicks, A. (2003). The Lander and German federalism. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 164. 
658 Johnson, N. (1999). Territory and power: some historical determinants of the constitutional 
structure of the Federal Republic of Germany. In C. Jeffery (Ed. ), Recasting German federalism: the 
legacies of unification. London: Pinter, 28. 
659 See Noakes, J. (2002). Federalism in the Nazi state. In M. Umbach (Ed. ), Germanjederalism: past, 
present, future. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, It 3-145. 
660 Gunlicks, 2003, The Lander, 39. 
661 Johnson, 1999, Territory and power, 33. 
662 Umbach, 2002, German federalism, 5. 
663 Johnson, 1999, Territory and power, 35. 
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Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania, Thuringia); united Germany soon also faced the 
difficulties of representing the interests of the Lander on a European stage. 664 Despite 
these challenges, the federal nature of unification served to confirm the stability and 
legitimacy of German federal iSM665 and assuaged international fears of a possible re- 
emerg ., ence of a centralised 
German state. 
The staging of the Day of Unity celebrations suggests that the traditional 
dualism of nation and region, which Green describes as 'perhaps the most distinctive 
aspect' of the 'new' 19th century German nation, 666 has also become a defining 
characteristic of the new unified German nation. Attachment to federalism and to the 
EU has become the foundation of unified Germany's self-understanding. This 
chapter focuses on the aspect of federalism, arguing that the Day of Unity, a day 
created to commemorate unification, has served as a yearly platform on which to 
stage Germany as a federal system. This appeal especially to the constituent parts, 
the individual federal states of unified Germany, will be cast as sub-national. The 
chapter will demonstrate that this sub-national dimension to the staging of the unity 
celebrations can be explained through international, political and economic factors. It 
will illustrate the denationalisation of the commemorations through their federal 
staging, to highlight that to some extent German mainstream political actors 
presented the Day of Unity as a postnational national holiday. 
The chapter comprises five sections. Section one draws attention to the sub- 
national elements of the Day of Unity by outlining its decentralised arrangement and 
the inclusion of regional elements in the mise-en-scýne of the celebrations. Sections 
two to five offer different, but complementary explanations for the sub-national 
staging. Section two argues that the regional staging of the day provided a platform 
for constructing and fostering regional identities to encourage regional pride. Section 
three focuses on the political motivations of regional actors to argue that the regional 
staging of the Day of Unity can be understood in the context of particular political 
interests. Section four explores the economic interest in staging the Day of Unity 
664 For a sense of the varieties of the challenges of federalism since unification in terms of fiscal 
equalisation and European integration see Jeffery, C. (Ed. ). (1999). Recasting German federalism: the 
le acies of unification. London: Pinter. 66F Johnson, 1999, Territory and power, 3 8. 
666 Green, 200 1, Fatherlands, 2 1. 
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regionally and argues that the Day of Unity celebrations were used as an arena to 
economically promote the respective LAnder, particularly in eastern Germany. The 
final section demonstrates that the Day of Unity was staged regionally in order to 
influence German political culture by promoting democratic values and federalism on 
a sub-national level. 
4.1 A sub-national national holiday? 
The national dimension of the celebrations in front of the Reichstag on the eve of 
unification should not be underestimated; a number of national flags were visible in 
the crowd 667 and at the stroke of midnight a sixty-square-metre German flag was 
668 raised on the Platz der Republik. However, the hesitancy among the audience and 
the political actors to sing the national anthem implied an underlying apprehension of 
displaying nationalistic sentiment. 669 The staging of the inaugural unification 
celebrations the following day suggests that at the time of unification, German 
political actors were eager not to allow national symbols, with their potential 
connotations of nationalism, to be dominant on the German national holiday. 
Consequently, solely the flags of each of the federal states adomed the stage. 670 
A significant regional dimension contributed to the denationalisation of the 
Day of Unity anniversaries in the years that followed. Four core aspects indicate the 
way in which sub-national elements permeated the unity anniversary 
commemorations. 
Firstly, the rotating, decentralised structure of the central celebrations ensured 
the German national holiday was organised at a sub-national level. This 
organisational form, interestingly, mirrors the European Capital of Culture 
competition, an EU initiative that enables winners to revamp their cultural legacy and 
receive considerable international attention and where the country from which the 
winning city is chosen changes on a rotating basis every year. This aspect represents 
the most obvious example of the sub-national dimension of the German national 
667 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
668 flier k6nnen Sie mitfeiern. (1990, October 2). Bild-Zeilung, 3. 
669 Bresson, 11. (1990, October 4). Les trois coups de l'unitd allemande. Le Monde, I 
670 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
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holiday. The decentralised arrangement led to regional differences in the staging of 
the event, further shaping the regional dimension of the unity celebrations. Due to 
the absence of set protocol for the staging of the Day of Unity celebrationS, 671 the 
regional actors in the host federal state enjoyed a high degree of autonomy to stage 
both the ceremony and the citizens' festival as they saw appropriate - in terms of 
everything from the core structures to the flags and symbols. 672 As we have seen, 
despite their high level of discretionary power, unity organisers opted for the most 
part for a similar approach to the staging of the core elements, adopting newly 
invented traditions largely derived from the 1991 commemorations. The variation in 
the staging that did exist among the various Lander can only to a limited extent be 
accounted for by changes in the political climate, shifts in attitudes towards unity, 
political and world events, party politics and regionalism. To a greater extent, 
differences arose as a result of, on the one hand, unique geographical and cultural 
highlights in specific federal state capitals. Dresden, for example, situated on the 
River Elbe, was able to offer its Day of Unity visitors a cultural exhibition from all 
sixteen of the Lander on its historic Weisse Flotte paddle steamers. 673 Berlin's 
unveiling of the Brandenburg Gate after a twenty-two month restoration period serves 
as a further example of an event not available to unity organisers in other Lander: 
amid lights, music and political VIPs, including former US President Bill Clinton and 
Chancellor Schr6der, designer Willy Bogner abseiled down a twenty one metre long 
zip 674 to reveal a symbol of German unity. On the other hand, differences in the 
celebrations arose in part from the date of the celebrations: 'round' anniversaries, 
namely those marking the fifth, tenth and fifteen anniversaries of unification, offered 
overall more extensive event programmes than most other years. At the fifth 
anniversary celebrations for example, ARD staged a televised gala, 'Germany's 5', 
671 C. K6nig, personal communication, October 25,2006. 
672 C. K6nig, personal communication, October 25,2006; K. Sondergeld, personal communication, 
November 16,2006; A. Buchhold, personal communication, November 28,2006; M. Meinung, 
personal communication, November 27,2006; H-FL Zschemack, personal communication, November 
27,2006; A. Clausing, personal communication, November 6,2006; M. Ffjger, personal 
communication, November 28,2006. 
67' 3. Okiober 2000 Dresden: 10 Jahre deutsche Einheit. (2000). Dresden: Saxon State Chancellery. 
674 See Ruhle, S., & Lingesleben, T. (Eds. ). (2002, October 3). Spat Ahendschau: Zusammenfassung 
der Feierlichkeiten zum 3. Oklober. Berlin: RBB and Kopp, 11. (Ed. ). (2002, October 4). Konzert der 
No Angels zum Tag der Deutschen Finheit [Televised news report]. Cologne: RTL. 
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attended by Minister-President Rau, political representatives and five hundred 
citizens pooled from all of the sixteen Lander . 
675 To fully comprehend the roots of 
the differences, one must, however, consider the respective wealth of the host federal 
states. 
Differences in the wealth of the respective federal states led to eastem-westem 
German variation in the staging of the unity events. A combination of funds from the 
federation (Bund), the host Land and sponsors traditionally financed the central Day 
of Unity celebrations. 676 The majority of Lander recouped a large proportion of the 
cost, at times as much as seventy percent, 677 from sponsorship and leasing. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the host Land itself was obliged to take over a share of the 
expense for the celebrations that cost as much as a million Euros, 678 meant that a 
correlation was discernible between the prosperity of the respective Land and the 
scale of events offered at the citizens' festival. An analysis of the forms and extent of 
the celebrations reveals that the less wealthy Lander, particularly those in the former 
GDR in the first decade after unification, tended to offer a more limited programme 
than more prosperous Lander. In 1992, the Land government of Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania, which hosted the second unity anniversary celebrations in 
Schwerin, for example, was careful to ensure that the costs for the celebrations 
remained low. In this vein, it chose to abandon plans for presentation stands of all the 
Lander and, as later in Dresden in 2000,679 a fireworks display was forsaken as a 
further money saving measure. 680 Minister-President Seite justified the decision by 
stating that as Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania had, of all the Lander, suffered the 
most economic difficulties since unification, there would be little understanding for 
costly events. 681 
675 Rinf Jahre Deutschland: Die Gala zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit [Television coverage]. (1995, 
October 2). Cologne: WDR. 
676 C. Schr6ter, personal communication, November 14,2006; M. Meinung, personal communication, 
November 27,2006; K-H. Petry, personal communication, December 13,2006; Anonymous, personal 
communication, December 18,2006. 677 Bremen feiert, 1994,2. 
67' A. Clausing, personal communication, November 6,2006. 
679 Martens, P. (2000, October 2/3). Feiern ohne Ballern [10 Jahre deutsche Einheit supplement]. 
Sdchsische Zeilung, 2. 
""0 Zum National feiertag starke Sicherheitsvorkehrungen, 1992,2. 
691 ibid. 
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Economic improvement in the eastern Lander during the early 2000s 
manifested itself through larger scale staging of the unity events. In contrast to the 
modest celebrations in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt and to some 
extent Saxony, the celebrations in Thuringia in 2004 and Brandenburg in 2005 
offered an impressive catalogue of events at both the ceremonies and citizens' 
festivals. At the ceremony in Erfurt, for example, the Big Band, conducted by 
Stanley Blume, performed the world premiere of the composition 'Reunion' by 
Zurich pianist Ralf Ruh . 
682 By inviting Peter Heppner to sing, accompanied by the 
Babelsberg Film Orchestra, 683 Potsdam also offered a more notable musical highlight 
than was customary at the unity ceremonies. At its citizens' festival, Erfurt presented 
a wide-ranging programme including a parade involving hundreds of people, a 
multimedia show with lasers and music, a music concert with well-known bands and 
fireworks. 684 Potsdam similarly offered one of the most extensive array of events and 
activities of all the previous citizens' festivals. The extensive programme of the 
Erfurt and Potsdam unity events suggests that, due to the economic improvement in 
the eastern Lander by the mid 2000s, more funds were available for staging large- 
scale unity celebrations than in the early years following unification. It perhaps also 
became more important to celebrate unity in a climate of Ostalgie. Although from 
1990 to 2005 the disparity in scale and ambition in the staging was predominantly 
due to the respective means of the host Land, the decentralised sub-national 
arrangement nevertheless provided a driving force of the significant regional 
variation. 
The sub-national features, secondly, were visible at the citizens' festival. 
Examples of federalism-related elements of the staging include Minister-Presi dents 
cutting an Einheitstorte into Under-sized pieces at the citizens' festival in 2005 695 
and a giant 'memory game' based on the federal states. 686 However, the 
Landermeile, an exhibition of the culinary and cultural specialities of each of the 
682 Festakt Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1989 bis 2004: 15 Jahre Frieden und Freiheit für Europa 
Erfurt, 3. Oktober 2004. (2004). Erfurt: Thüringer Staatskanzlei. 
683 Möller, 11. (2005, Oetober 4). Tag der Freude, Tag der 1 loffnung. Hamburger Abendblalt, 2. 
684 M. Meinung, personal communication, November 27,2006. 
685 Möller, 2005, Tag der Freude, 2. 
686 Impressionen vom Tag der Deutschen Einheit 2005 in Potsdam. (2005). Retrieved November 15, 
2007, from http: //www. stk. brandenburg. de/cms/detail. php? gsid=Ibm 1. c. 292392. de&-siteid=3 1. 
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Under at the central celebrations, served as the most prominent example of sub- 
national elements at the unity citizens' festivals. One notes here, once more, parallels 
with the staging of EU events, specifically the Europe Day celebrations, again 
indicative of EU-isation. The Ldndermeile formed the core of most unity citizens' 
festivals not least because the huge white marquees dominated the squares and streets 
of the host city. These Landerpavillions, traditionally adomed with flags and 
symbols from the respective Land '687 presented 
forcefully - visually, spatially and 
689 thematically - the image of a Germany consisting of many parts. In this way, the 
nation was represented as mediated through its Under, in a form that avoided the 
explicit use of national symboIS. 689 National symbols, specifically flags and hymns 
(since neither memorials nor monuments were relevant in this context) '690 barely 
featured at the citizens' festivalS. 691 
Thirdly, regional flags, music and cordons contributed a further sub-national 
dimension to the unity ceremonies, in addition to the sub-national focus of the 
citizens' festivals. Though unity organisers did employ national symbols in the 
staging of the central ceremonies, regional symbols, particularly in the form of flags, 
cordons and music, were inextricably linked in their use. Considering the use of 
flags, at the celebrations in Bavaria and Baden-Warttemberg, for example, although a 
large German national flag served as the main backdrop to the stage, it was both 
literally and figuratively overshadowed by the sixteen coats of arms of the Under, 
depicting the duality of region and nation. Moreover, at the Schwerin celebrations in 
1992, a Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian, a German and an EU flag stood on the 
central stage whilst both sides of the stage displayed large regional symbols, namely 
the coats of arms of each of the Under. 692 
687 C. Flume, personal communication, -Novembcr 28,2006; K-11. Petry, personal communication, 
December 13,2006. 
68' Dietmar & Tim pe, 199 1, Sondersendung, NDR. 
... For an interesting examination of how political goals have been represented through symbols see 
Bausinger, H. (2003). Zwischen Passion und Spiel: Identifikation durch Symbole. In A. Domheim & 
S. Greiffenhagen (Eds. ), Identital undpolifische Kultur. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 47-53. 
"" Peter Reichel defines the key national symbols as flags, hymns, commemorative days, memorials 
and state erections. See Reichel, 2005, Schwarz-Rot-Gold. 
69 1A notable exception, the 2005 celebrations, can be understood in the context of the Deutschland 
Fan initiative discussed in Chapter Three. 
692 See, for example, Dietmar & Sadyn, 1992, Festakt, NDR. 
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One could therefore argue that, at times, the regional dimension of the staging 
was more dominant than the national; this regional dimension in each case at least 
subverted any emphasis on the nation and directed attention instead to the constituent 
parts. This was certainly true of the ceremony in the Free Hanseatic city of Bremen, 
a Land with a long civic tradition of city government, where regional symbols 
entirely replaced national representations on the Day of Unity. For example, a large 
rectangle displaying the sixteen federal states' flags formed the full backdrop to the 
stage. Moreover, aside from the traditional singing at the end of the ceremony of the 
693 national anthem, the only national symbol present that day, was a solitary national 
flag sandwiched between an EU and Bremen flag at the side of the stage. 694 
The respective unity organisers also established a strong sub-national 
dimension in the staging of the music at the ceremonies on the Day of Unity. 
Regional factors frequently motivated the choice of musical composition and 
orchestra for the ceremony. For instance, alongside Day of Unity standards, such as 
Ludwig van Beethoven and Georg Friedrich Hdndel, Hamburg-born Johannes 
Brahms provided the musical arrangement for the 1991 celebrations in Hamburg. 695 
In turn, Munich-born Richard Strauss' 'Concerto No. I for Horn and Orchestra in E 
Flat Major, Op. I I' was a highlight of the Bavarian unity celebrations. Similarly, the 
Mainz celebrations saw sections performed from Max Bruchs' 'Loreley Opera Op. 
16', 696 based on the famous legend of a betrayed young woman who jumped to her 
death from a high rock in the Rhine Valley, in today's Rhineland-Palatinate, and went 
on to lure sailors to their death with her siren-like voice. Regional aspects influenced 
not only the choice of musical arrangement but also the selection of orchestra and 
choir. Traditionally, an orchestra from the host Land, such as the Hamburg 
Philharmonic State Orchestra in 1991697 and the Chamber Orchestra of the 
61' The national anthem comprised the third verse of the Deutschlandlied, as confirmed in a letter 
exchange between the Federal President and Federal Chancellor in August 1991. See Reichel, 2005, 
Schwarz-Rol-Gold, 45. 
694 See, for example, Festaki zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Live aus dem Bremer Congress Centrum 
[Television broadcast]. (1994, October 3). Bremen: Radio Bremen. 
615 Deutschland feiert den Jahrestag seiner Vereinigung. (1991, October 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 2 
696 Tag der Deutschen Einhell 2001,2001, SUdwestrundfunk. 
697 Deutschland feiert, 1991,2 
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Mecklenburg Federal State Theatre in Schwerin in 1992,698 played the selected 
compositions accompanied by a choir, often a youth choir of the host Land, such as 
the Pestalozzi-Grammar School Choir in Munich in 1996 699 and the Choir of the 
700 Hanoverian Academy of Music and Theatre in 1998. 
A further sub-national element was supplied by the cordons of people dressed 
in regional garb marking the path of the Day of Unity VIPs from one element of the 
celebrations to the next. Emphasising and fostering historical, regional inheritance 
and tradition, in Hamburg in 1991, for example, police students dressed in knee 
breeches, tights and long skirtedjackets lined the path of the Day of Unity guests 
from the entrance of the Chamber of Commerce over the courtyard to the town 
hal 1.701 Similarly, the Dresden unity organisers staged a cordon of 2,000 miners, 
marksmen groups and traditional associations clad in traditional dress to accompany 
the guests of honour from the Kreuzkirche, where the ecumenical service had been 
held, to the ceremony in the Semperoper. 702 
Fourthly, not only the central celebrations but also the parallel celebrations in 
Berlin often promoted regional symbols. That the Wendefahne frequently marked the 
beginning of the unity parades was only one of many manifestations of the 
interdependency of national and regional symbols in the capital. On the whole, the 
focus on the federal states was considerable in Berlin. This was particularly true of 
the staging of the parades that, aside from the national flag on the Wendefahne, 
traditionally contained few national symbols. They comprised instead a 
representation of Germans from each of the sixteen federal states. The customary 
Day of Unity Marktplatz in Berlin, presenting traditional foods from each of the 
LAnder (similar once more to the staging of the Europe Days), further emphasised the 
regional aspect in the staging of the events. A selection of culinary specialities from 
each Land encouraged Germans to celebrate Germany through its variety. The 
698 Dietmar & Sadyn, 1992, Festakt, NDR. 
699 Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Eine Zusammenfassung aus München und Berlin [Television 
broadcast]. (1996, October 3). Munich: Bayerischer Rundfunk. 
... Festakt zum Tag der Deutschen Einhelt: Ubertragung aus dem Kuppelsaal des Congress Centrum 
Hannover [Television broadcast]. (1998, October 3). Hamburg- NDR. 
701 Kauntz, 1991, Der Jugendchor, 3. For a historic analysis of local identities in Hamburg see 
Aaslestad, 2005, Place and Politics. 
702 3. Oklober 2000 Dresden, 2000, Saxon State Chancellery. 
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staging of regional music, here in Berlin as before in each of the regional 
celebrations, likewise promoted regional variation and contributed a further sub- 
national dimension. In 1998, for example, as each representation of the Lander 
passed through the Brandenburg Gate, a well-known singer or band of predominantly 
Schlager or Volksmusik from the respective Land performed on an adjacent stage. 703 
Regional aspects thus intertwined with, at times even replaced, national 
arrangement and national representations on the Day of Unity. Consequently, the 
Day of Unity developed a sub-national dimension. Yet why was Germany's national 
holiday staged to some extent on a sub-national basis? It is to the investigation of this 
question that this chapter now turns. 
4.2 Constructing sub-national pride 
The history of German federalism is 'unthinkable' without the cultural idiom of 
regional iSM. 704 'Patriotism first formed in Germany as LandespatriotisInUS' 705 and 
this Landespatriotismus in turn played a decisive role in the formation of the German 
nation. 706 In this vein, historians have called attention to the importance of 'pre- 
national loyalties and identities 9707 in the nineteenth century when 'most Germans 
were Austrians or Prussians, Bavarians or Saxons, first and foremost'. 708 The historic 
roots of the federal structure of the German Fesikultur and remembrance rituals 
largely stem from the independent identities of the German stateS. 709 Until the middle 
of the 19th century, national days in their original forms were celebrated on a regional 
level; Bavaria, Prussia and Austria, essentially served as nations with their own 
national symbol S. VO Yet despite the traditional importance of regional patriotism in 
7" Deutschlands Fest [Television broadcast]. (1998, October 3). Mainz: ZDF. 
704 Umbach, 2002, German federalism, 7. 
705 Dann, 1993, Nation und Nationalismus, 313. 
706 Breuss, S., Liebhart, K., & Pribersky, A. (1997). Rituate des nationalen Gedenkens - die Schweiz, 
Frankreich, Österreich und Deutschland im Vergelich. In E. Brix & 11. Stekl (Eds. ), Der Kampf um das 
Gedächtnis: Öffentliche Gedenktage in Mitteleuropa. Cologne: Böhlau, 409. 
707 Green, 200 1, Fatherlands, 3. 
709 Ibid. 
' 
1. 
709 Breuss, Liebhart & Pribersky, 1997, Rituale, 409. 
710 Schellack, 1990, Nationalfeiertage, 8. 
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Germany, 711 the sub-national staging of the Day of Unity was motivated less by 
regionalism than by federalism: it was not strong regional identities that motivated 
the regional, rotating organisation of the Day of Unity but rather the aspiration of the 
German political actors to present Germany as a federal state. 
Nevertheless, regionalism did play a role in the mise-en-scýne of the Day of 
Unity festivities since regional aspects were particularly prevalent in Lander with 
strong regional identities. The federal arrangement of the Day of Unity anniversaries 
served to construct and reinforce regional identities in order to promote regional 
pride. Two key examples illustrate this. These are, firstly, the staging of the 1996 
unity celebrations in Bavaria and, secondly, the way in which the Berlin festivities 
commemorated history through regional traditions. 
Unity organisers traditionally liaised with their counterparts in LAnder that 
had already hosted the unity celebrations. The level of interaction varied from 
nominal contactwith the organisers of the previous year712 to discussion with 
organisers from all previous host Lander; 713 the majority of organisers liaised with 
organisers, from at least one of the former host Lander. 714 The Bavarian organisers, 
however, did not liaise with any former organisers of either the ceremony or the 
715 citizens' festival. This suggests an intention by the regional actors to stage the 
1996 celebrations entirely from a unique, Bavarian perspective. The Free State of 
Bavaria, the geographically largest federal state in Gen-nany, which itself comprises 
three distinct regions - Bavaria proper, Swabia and Franconia - is well-known for its 
long tradition of regionalism and regional traditions. The unity celebrations in 
Munich, described by one journalist as 'visually magnificent but lacking in terms of 
""' For an analysis of regional identification historically see Wollersheim, 11-W., Tzschaschel, S., & 
Middell, M. (1998). Region und Idenliflikation. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag. 
712 W. Schempp, personal communication, February 19,2007; Anonymous, personal communication, 
December 18,2006. 
713 This was true of the Wiesbaden citizens' festival organisers: K-11. Petry, personal communication, 
December 13,2006. 
714c. Flume, personal communication, November 28,2006; K. Sondergeld, personal communication, 
November 16,2006; W. Schempp, personal communication, February 19,2007; H-R. Zschernack, 
personal communication, November 27,2006; A. Clausing, personal communication, November 6, 
2006; M. Meinung, personal communication, November 27,2006; M. Filger, personal communication, 
November 28,2006. 
715 W. Meister, personal communication, November 29,2006. 
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content', 716 emphasised regional pride more than any of the previous unity events. 
The Bavarian unity celebrations provided a platform for demonstrating such regional 
pride; regional aspects featured in most elements of the festivities, from the cordons 
and the ceremony to the citizens' 
i6stival, as in previous and later festivities, but with 
particular emphasis. 
More than in Hamburg or Dresden, regional staging dominated the cordon 
marking the path of the Day of Unity guests of honour. Gebirgsschatzen, a militia- 
like association with roots in the fifteenth century and considered a central Bavarian 
institution, marked the path of the guests from the ecumenical service in the 
Frauenkirche to the ceremony in the Herkulessaal of the Manchner Residenz. As a 
further demonstration of the regional pride and consciousness as 'Bavarian Germans', 
the Vorderlader- und B61lerschutzverein Unterkn6rigen, a traditional Bavarian 
sharpshooters' association, stood dressed in traditional garb, firing volleys outside the 
Frauenkirche. 717 
At the ceremony, the national anthem was followed by Bavaria's official 
hymn since 1966, the Bayernlied . 
71 8 This was a striking example of the duality of 
region and nation - the official ceremony of the national holiday ended with a 
regional hymn. A Day of Unity concert at the citizens' festival similarly concluded 
with the national anthem and the Bayernlied . 
71 9 To celebrate Bavarian traditions, 
organisers staged the citizens' festival with hundreds of people and musicians in 
traditional garb carrying the Bavarian flag. 720 The presentation of displays of 
regional dress and traditions aimed to cultivate a regional identity and to encourage it 
to flourish. In this vein, the Bavarian organisers also staged a ballet at the citizens' 
festival based on Bavarian composer Carl Orff s spectacle Carmina Burana. 721 to 
716 Viel Glück Deutschland, viel Glück Europa! (1996, October 4). Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4. 
717 Endgültiger Programmablauffür die zentralen Veranstaltungen zum 'Tag der Deutschen Einheit' 
am 2. und 3. Oktober 1996 in München (BII/Afe). (1996). Munich: Bavarian StateChancellery. Onthe 
Gebirgsschützen as they sec themselves, sec Bund der Bayerischen Gebirgsschützen-Kompanien: 
Geschichte der Bayerischen Gebirgsschützen. (2005). Retrieved November 21,2007, from http: // 
www. gebirgsschuetzen. org/geschichte-der_bayerischen_geb. htm. 
719 Einladung - Enthüllung des Mähnmals zum Gedenken an die Teilung Deutschland. (1996). 
Munich: State Chancellery. 
719 Programm zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit. (1996). Munich: Bavarian State Chancellery. 
720 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit. ý Eine Zusammenfassung, 1996, Bayerischer Rundfunk. 
721 Programm, 1996, Bavarian State Chancellery. 
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further promote regional pride through examples of Bavarian achievements. One 
could argue that the unity organisers exhibited Bavarian elements for tourism 
purposes in an attempt to promote the Land economically. Whilst, as discussed in 
section four below, this has been the case for many other Lander, it would seem that 
this was not the priority of the Bavarian unity organisers. That their main goal of the 
citizens' festival was instead the 'involvement of the Bavarian population 9722 suggests 
that the unity events were targeted more at the local community than at Germans 
from other Lander - that is to say they sought to mediate participation in the nation 
through participation in the Land. 
In this way, the regional staging of the unity events can be understood in part 
as a means of celebrating regional idiosyncrasies, to both support diversity in 
Germany and promote pride on a regional rather than national level. Unlike national 
pride, regional pride provided an 'acceptable' form of patriotism without negative 
connotations of nationalism for Germans or for the international community. The 
promotion of regional identity thus sought to allow Germans to be bolder by 
promoting pride about being 'federal Germans'. The endorsement of sub-national 
pride, specifically to the Land, in this way underlined Germany's commitment to 
federalism - that is to say commitment to its decentralised political system and 
moderation in the use of economic and political power and influence it implied. 
Whilst regional aspects of the staging were especially dominant in Bavaria, 
representations of the nation were nevertheless visible in the celebrations. The best 
example of this was the enormous national flag covered with the regional coat of 
arms, as in Baden-Wurttemberg, a Land with an almost equally strong tradition of 
regionalism. The similarity of the Munich and Stuttgart celebrations can be explained 
in part by the fact that the head of Stuttgart's protocol department in the State 
Chancellery personally attended the celebrations in Munich. 723 The national 
dimension of the Munich celebrations was intensified by the speech of Minister- 
President of Bavaria Stoiber. Stoiber, who greeted the audience with a 'Griiss 
722 W. Meister, personal communication, November 29,2006. 723 W. Schempp, personal communication, February 19,2007. 
180 
Gott', 724 a form of greeting with confessional-Catholic connotations much used in 
Bavaria, was criticised by the German national press for mentioning the German 
nation twenty-two timeS, 725 whilst barely alluding to Europe. 
During the first unification of Germany, local identity was fully compatible 
with the development of a united German nation-state. 726 Indeed, as Alon Confino 
has shown, to some extent unification was made possible by Germans imagining the 
nation as an extension of the region. 727 Moreover, as far back as Imperial Germany, 
Germans have been accustomed to celebrating the nation through celebrations of the 
region at national festivals. 729 Historians have indeed argued that 'nation, 
nationalism' and 'region, regionality and -regionalism' need not be 'alternative 
or ... antagonistic constructions'. 
729 Instead, constructs of the region and the nation can 
offer mutual legitimacy: 'the region is granted recognition of its identity claims while 
the nation is granted recognition of its claims of sovereignty'. 730 
The integral, dominant role of the regional staging on the Day of Unity 
reflected the interdependence of regional and national symbols; the nation was 
imagined simply as an extension of the region. In fact, of all the Day of Unity 
anniversaries, the national dimension of the celebrations appeared most dominant in 
the Lfinder with strong regional identities and regional traditions - that is to say, 
LAnder with a strong regional identity have been more comfortable in emphasising 
national elements at the unity events. These Lander, particularly Bavaria and Baden- 
WOrttemberg, but also other federal states with a history of regionalism, such as 
Bremen, presented nation not as a contradiction to region, but rather as a sum of the 
regional parts. By emphasising the importance of regional elements, the Day of 
724 Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Eine Zusammenfassung 1996, Bayerischer Rundfunk. 
725 Viel Glück, 1996,4. 
726 See Applegate, C. (1990). A nation of provincials: the German idea of 11eimat. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
727 Confino, A. (1997). The nation as a local metaphor: WOrttemberg, Imperial Germany and national 
memory 1871-1918. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Confino, A. (2006). Germany as 
a culture ofrememhrance: promises andlimits ofhisiory writing. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press and Weichlein, 2.004, Xation und Region. 729 ibid. 
729 Haslinger, P., & Holz, K. (2000). Selbstbild und Territorium. Dimensionen von Identitat und 
Alteritlit. In P. Haslinger (Ed. ), Regionale und nationale Identildlen: IVechselwirkungen und 
Spannungsfelder im Zeitalter moderner Slaatlichkeit. WOrzburg: Ergon Verlag, 28. 
730 Haslinger & Holz, 2000, Selbstbild, 28. 
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Unity could thus overcome the possible tensions of presenting national symbols in 
isolation. The symbiotic duality of regional and national symbols served to legitimise 
both the region and the nation. 
The processions of the sponsored celebrations in Berlin, like the Munich 
event, promoted regional identities by displaying traditional groups and dress from 
each of the Lander. An analysis of the procession reveals that many Lander chose to 
stage themselves not only with regional products, but also with specific historical 
traditions. Brandenburg, for example, frequently represented itself by the Langen 
Kerls, based on the soldiers of Frederick-William 1 (1713-1740) whom the 'Soldier- 
King' had selectively recruited from across Europe for being over six foot tal 1.73 1 
Saxony, meanwhile, chose to present itself by men on horseback - dressed as knights 
and holding jousting sticks - representing Henry 1 (876-936), 732 Duke of Saxony and 
later King of the Eastern Franks, in 933 when he and his Germanic tribes successfully 
prevented a Magyar invasion. 
As explored in Chapter Two, unified Germany struggled to celebrate its 
stigmatised national past. These examples illustrate that in Berlin, the 'capital of 
remembrance', 733 the unity celebrations overcame this tension to some extent by 
serving as a platform for celebrating history through regional traditions. While the 
pre-1945 national past for western Germans and pre-1990 past for eastern Germans 
failed to evoke feelings of pride, regional traditions preceding and thus 'untainted' by 
National Socialism and the Communist era provided a source of historical pride. The 
regional staging of the Day of Unity therefore served as a platform to promote 
German feelings of pride by celebrating the German past, albeit at a regional, rather 
than national level. 
If one considers the virtually uninterrupted success of the regionalist CSU 
party in Bavaria since 1946, one could argue that strong regional identities have 
political implications: the success of the CSU was due in part to its regional 
73 1 Lange Kerls. (2005). Retrieved November 30,2007, from http: //www. potsdam-tourismus. com/ 
content/potsdam-a-z/ 1 03. php. 
711 See, for example, Deutschlands Fest, 1998, ZDF. 
733 Reichel, 2005, Schwarz-Rot-Gold. 
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affiliation. 734 This suggests that there was also a political motive in fostering regional 
identity on the Day of Unity: Minister-President Stoiber's effort to strengthen 
regional identities through regional staging must also be considered within the 
context of attempts to secure a strong voter base. While this example may be specific 
to Bavaria and cannot perhaps be generalised to other LAnder, it is evident that 
political interests have shaped the Day of Unity. The unity celebrations can be 
explained not only in terms of attempts to foster regional pride but also as an attempt 
by regional political actors to secure more influence over the staging of the 
celebrations. It is the political interest in staging the unity events regionally that this 
chapter will now examine. 
4.3 Centralised vs decentralised organisation 
At the 1994 Deutschlands Fest in Berlin, Bundestag President and patron of the 
Berlin celebrations, Sossmuth, told reporters that the capital should be the 'central 
location' for future unity celebrations. Rejecting this argument of a national political 
figure, regional politician Wederneier, Mayor of Bremen and host of the central 
celebrations in 1994, criticised the suggestion of centralising the unity events, arguing 
that 'in the federal tradition' the celebrations must rotate through the Lander. 735 
Wedemeier's predilection is not surprising given that, as host of the central 
celebrations, the regional actors could stage and propagate their chosen image of 
Germany on the German national holiday - an opportunity that would not be open to 
them if the celebrations were centralised. These remarks, ahead of a debate on the 
question in the Bundesrat, 736 also illustrate an ongoing conflict between regional and 
national actors in united Germany. This has been particularly apparent in the recent 
federal reform debates and subsequent constitutional reform of 2007 that aimed for 
greater clarity of federal and federal state competences with the aim of reducing 
blurred 'mixed competence' and the resulting institutional impasses. Indeed, for a 
734 See, for example, Ilepburn, E. (2008). The neglected nation: the CSU and the territorial cleavage in 
Bavarian party politics. German Polifics, 17(2), 184-202. 
735 Uphoff, L. (1994, October 5). Feier zurn Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Immer in Berlin. Berliner 
Morgenpost, 2 1. 
736 See Bundesrat Plenaiprolokoll. Beibehaltung der dezentralen Ausgestaltung der Felern zum Tag 
der Deutschen Einheit (121675). (1994, October 14). Berlin: Deutscher Bundesrat, 547D-549B. 
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long time the number of parliamentary bills requiring the agreement of the Bundesrat 
737 
continually increased . Moreover, 'in connection with German unification and 
European integration, the Lander have adopted common initiatives with the aim of 
extending still further the significance of the Lander in [national] politics . 
738 
Thus, the debates about the decentralised nature of the unity celebrations 
demonstrate that the regional arrangement of the unity celebrations is also politically 
charged: in a struggle for influence over the staging of the celebrations, regional 
actors favoured a regional arrangement to the celebrations, national actors a national 
one. National actors consequently predominantly supported the parallel celebrations 
in Berlin, with Sossmuth as their patron. The debate over the decentralised 
organisation reached its peak in 2006, by which time each of the Lander had hosted 
the central celebrations once. At the 2006 Minster-Presi dent Conference and the 
2006 Conference of the Heads of the State Chancelleries, those regional actors who 
had pressed for maintenance of the status quo won out, ensuring the unity 
celebrations would remain on a rotating, decentralised basis. 719 The regional 
arrangement afforded regional political actors too significant an opportunity - to 
augment their own authority and to further their own political agendas - for them to 
willingly derogate the potential for influence over the staging back to the politicians 
in Berlin. The 1998 unity celebrations serve as a key example of how regional actors 
influenced the unity celebrations whilst a brief analysis of the Berlin celebrations 
demonstrates how this parallel event competed with the central celebrations. 
On Yd October 1998, Schr6der was not only Chancel lor-Elect but also 
Minister-President of Lower-Saxony, President of the Bundesrat and thus host of the 
eighth unity anniversary celebrations. Schr6der's influence in the staging of the 
celebrations epitomised the extent to which the event was shaped by regional actors. 
Breaking with what had become the tradition of the Day of Unity citizens' festival, 
Schr6der, with an eye to a strained federal state budget, chose not to stage a 
Landermeile at the 1998 event in Hanover, in order to save money. 740 Instead, he 
737 Stammen, 1999, Federalism in Germany, 107. 
738 ihid. 
739 K-1 1. Petry, personal communication, December 13,2006. 
740 C. Schr6ter, personal communication, November 14,2006. 
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presented an Objektmeile of ninety metal blocks, each one metre twenty centimetres 
tall and sixty centimetres wide to represent key events in Germany's post-1945 
history - the fact that the same number of blocks were allocated to events in both East 
and West Germany highlights the way in which Schr6der was keen to afford a place 
for positive elements of the GDR's history in united Germany's self-understanding, at 
odds with the generally consensual interpretation of the past presented by political 
actors on the Day of Unity. These blocks, designed to depict the history of Germany 
from its separation in 1949 to unification in 1990 and the growing together of East 
and West Germany on the path into a shared future, were staged in the heart of the 
city on the Hanover Opernplatz . 
74 1 The two parallel sets of blocks were separated 
during the period representing 1961 to 1989 by a 2.5-metre high sculpture of the 
Berlin Wall. They converged once they both arrived at the Tor der Zukunfl (gate of 
the future), a miniature replica of the Brandenburg Gate to frame East and West 
Germany as two parts of a whole, separated artificially during the years of division 
and finally united again. Through the 'gate of the future', a 'park of innovation' 
allowed German-based technology companies to showcase videos of their new 
projects and goods as an advertising mechanism for the World Expo 2000 exhibition, 
which was to be held in Hanover a year and a half later. 742 At a cost of five thousand 
deutschmarks per block, companies, organisations and institutions were able to 
sponsor up to ten blocks. In consultation with T&T Marketing, the agency 
responsible for the Ohjektmeile, sponsors, including the Deutsche Bahn, Volkswagen, 
Deutsche Messe AG and the Hannoversche Allgemcinc Zeitung, could ornament or 
array the sponsored block with sculptures, picture collages or multimedia installations 
of their own design. Each block sought to represent political, economic, lifestyle and 
world events, with topics ranging from Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorism to the 
debut of the bikin i. 743 Schr6der's decision to replace the Landermeile, traditionally 
funded by the host Land, with this sponsor-funded event shaped the citizens' festival 
that year; for once, sponsors gained the opportunity to influence the staging of the 
74 1 Treffpunkt Deutschland: Betelligungsm6glichkelien for Ohjekipaten. (1998). Hanover: T&T 
Marketing GmbH. 
742 Letterfi-om Gerhard Schr6der to potential Day of Unity sponsors, 1998, June 19. 
74' Treffpunki Deutschland, 1998, T&T Marketing GmbH. 
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main Day of Unity attraction for the citizens and to some extent the interpretation of 
the past propagated on the German national holiday. 
As host of the unity celebrations, Schr6der had discretionary power not only 
over the citizens' festival but also over all aspects of the ceremony from the selection 
of the speakers to the staging of the flags and music. His controversial choice of the 
latter further demonstrated the degree of power that the decentralised organisation of 
the Day of Unity gave to regional political actors. In August 1998, Schr6der sparked 
a political squabble when the Lower-Saxon government announced that Berlin 
composer Henning Bardo would conduct his 'hymn mix' entitled Wariationen zum 
Thema Deutschland' at the unity celebrations. 744 Despite accusations from the CDU 
and CSU that Schr6der's selection of the music, an amalgamation of the German 
national anthem, the GDR anthem and Peter Kreuder's Schlager hit 'Good bye 
Johnny', reflected the SPI) politician's 'disturbed relationship' with German unity, 745 
the Big-Band played the music on 3 rd October. In protest at Schr6der's deliberate 
undermining of a national symbol, the CSU refused to attend the unity 
celebrationS, 746 conveniently providing them with the opportunity to attend a 
747 commemoration for CSU founder Franz Josef Strauss instead . 
Henning's composition received mixed responses from the Day of Unity 
audience. While Chancellor Kohl slowly and unenthusiastically clapped without 
even removing the programme from his hand, Havel was not quite able to stop his 
foot from tapping to the music. 748 In an open demonstration of support for the 
composer and his controversial compilation, SchrOder jumped up to shake Henning's 
hand and then, boldly mimicking the Bavarian dialect to mock the CSU, started his 
speech by describing the music as 'a schiane MUSi'. 749 Through the hymn mix, which 
implied that the GDR hymn could serve a function in united Germany, Minister- 
President Schr6der was able to bring into question the very symbols of the German 
nation and the interpretation of its past. In this way, he once more implied there was 
744 Mierke, 1998, Bundesregierung, RTL. 
745 Schick, C. (Ed. ). (1998, August 14). Streit um DDR-Nationalhymne in Musikstilck zum Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit [Televised news report]. In RTL NachYournal. Cologne: RTL. 
746 Mierke & Hofmann, 1998, Gute Stimmung, RTL. 
747 Richter, 1998, 'A schiane Musi', 4. 
748 Bocker, 1998, Wardig bis zurn letzten Takt, 4; Mierke & Hofmann, 1998, Gute Stimmung, RTL. 
74' Richter, 1998, 'A schiane Musi', 4. 
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a place for elements from the former GDR in united Germany's self-understanding. 
Despite being Chancel lor-Elect, it was his function, and thus his discretionary 
powers, as a regional actor that permitted Schr6der to influence these national issues 
on the Day of Unity. 
The centrality of the main celebrations and thus potential influence of the 
regional actors has, however, been eroded by the entirely sponsor-funded parallel 
celebrations in Berlin. A weak correlation is discernible between the high attendance 
at the Berlin celebrations and the low attendance at the central ceremonies, and vice 
versa. In 1999, for example, when, with 900,000 gUeStS750 Wiesbaden staged one of 
the most popular citizens' festivals, Berlin only attracted 80,000; 751 this was roughly 
70% less than its typical attendance of around a quarter of a million in years when the 
central celebrations attracted approximately 150,000 to 350,000 guests. On the other 
hand, the Berlin and ccntral celebrations competed for media attention. While the 
private national company RTL frequently reported on the central and Berlin 
celebrations, its public counterpart ZDF, repeatedly transmitted only a live 
programme of the Berlin parade; 752 the main citizens' festivals meanwhile appeared 
almost exclusively on regional television alone. 753 The television coverage of the 
unity celebrations in Hanover, which was representative of other anniversaries and 
which reflects the regional dominance in reporting, included, for example, two hours 
of live reporting on N3, a brief summary in the Lander programmes, short news 
reports in the Tagesthemen of ARD, and brief reports in DAS and Hallo 
Niedersachsen. 754 The national print press, whilst reporting on the main ecumenical 
service and ceremony of the central celebrations, rarely mentioned the citizens' 
festival and often gave details instead of various events and rallies in Berlin. The 
latter showed how demonstrators, too, often favoured Berlin as their chosen platform 
750 K-H. Petry, personal communication, December 13,2006. 
751 Bartsch, M. (1999, October 4). Kanzler warnt vor neuen sozialen Grenzen durch Deutschland. 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. 
752 See, for example, Deutschlands Fest, 1998, ZDF and Deutschlands Fest [Television broadcast]. 
(1996, October 3). Mainz: ZDF. 
753 See, for example, Ruhle & Lingesleben, 2002, Spät Abendschau, RBB; Festakt zum Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit, 1994, Radio Bremen; Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993,1993, Saarländischer 
Rundfunk; Tag der Deutschen Einheit 2001,2001, Südwestrundfunk; Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Eine 
Zusammenfassung, 1996, Bayerischer Rundfunk. 
754 Treffpunkt Deutschland, 1998, MT Marketing GmbIl. 
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for political protest. The most important way in which Berlin competed with the 
central celebrations, however, was financial. 
While some national companies sponsored the central unity events in the 
regional capitals, the majority of sponsors were local companies. The main sponsors 
of the tenth central anniversaries, to give one example, included local companies such 
as Sdchsisches Staatsweingut GmbH, Sachsen Lotto, Gasversorgung Sachsen Ost 
GrnbH, Sachsische Dampfschiffahrt, Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe, Dresdner Neueste 
Nachrichten, Dresdner Industrie- und WohnungsbaugeselIschaft and a few companies 
with their headquarters in Germany such as Audi AG, ADAC and Kabel 
Deutschland. With the exception of Swiss multinational company Nestl6, which 
sponsored the children's unity event Kinderland, 755 the central anniversaries attracted 
no international sponsorship. The Berlin events also failed to attract international 
funding, yet in contrast to the central celebrations, the events in the capital, fully 
funded by sponsors, customarily attracted national companies. Traditionally, two 
dozen companies, including those from the car industry and other big businesses, 
such as Ruhrgas, 756 staged and funded the Deutschlands Fest under the direction of 
Deutschland Fest GmbH Director Wilhelm von Boddien. 757 Among the many 
national companies whose presence was particularly evident in Berlin, the (still partly 
state-owned) Deutsche Post was an especially prominent sponsor. 
The Deutsche Post sponsorship repeatedly dominated the Berlin celebrations 
through their mass of characteristic yellow marketing balloons, banners and baseball 
caps for children. Delegates from the Deutsche Post, dressed in their yellow 
758 
uniforms, even introduced each federal state's contribution to the procession. As a 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalist reported, the sponsorship influenced the 
staging of the Berlin celebrations to such an extent that Berlin could be described as 
celebrating unity 'under a yellow flag' ; 759 indeed the Deutsche Post marketing was 
more dominant than either national or regional symbols. Although some political 
735 Programm zum Bürgerfest 110 Jahre deutsche Einheit supptementl. (2000, October 2/3). 
Sächsische Zeitung, 7. 
756 Deutschlands Fest, 1996, ZDF. 
757 Ilebel, 1994, Sponsoren statt Parolen. 4. 
758 See, for example, Deutschlands Fest, 1996, ZDF. 
759 Schuller, K. (1997, October 4). Berlin feiert unter. gelben Fahnen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
3. 
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discussions did take place at various locations in the city, the Frankfurter Rundschau 
similarly emphasised the extent to which the Berlin celebrations were driven by 
consumerism, remarking that speeches had been replaced by sponsors . 
760 This 
reflected a criticism of many who attended the Berlin celebrations, namely that it was 
politically vapid. Contrary to the central celebrations, this apolitical staging of the 
Berlin celebrations encouraged a Volksfeststimmung. 761 One might deduce from this 
that an emphasis on the political elements of unification and on celebrating 
enthusiastically were mutually exclusive. In the context of the economic and social 
problems resulting from unification this might well be indicative: by distancing 
themselves from the actual - invariably negative - political and economic issues 
associated with unity, the Berlin celebrations were able to encourage more 
enthusiasm for celebrating in its own right. The central celebrations, however, not 
least through the speeches at the ceremony and ecumenical service, were unable to 
escape from the realities and problems of unification. The largely apolitical 
atmosphere of the Berlin celebrations is one possible explanation for how Berlin 
attracted national sponsors. 
A more probable explanation, however, is that the Berlin celebrations often 
offered a wider programme of high profile events than the central celebrations. The 
celebrations in 1994 epitomise how the Berlin celebrations competed with the central 
telebrations for sponsorship. In 1994, the celebrations in Bremen, overshadowed by 
violent riots, offered a far more modest programme than the Berlin event. Bremen 
showcased its highlights through a presentation of its 'culinary variety', a high-tech 
exhibition at its World Trade Centre, art exhibitions, discussion events, revue and 
cabaret. 762 Though this programme was more extensive than many of the central 
unity events in other years, the Berlin celebrations were staged on a far grander scale. 
Singers including Elton John, Paul Young and bands such as the Gypsy Kings and 
Karat performed to an audience of 30,000 fans on Europe's largest music stage 
760 Hebel, 1994, Sponsoren statt Parolen. 4. 
711 See, for example, discussion with guests at the Berlin celebrations, Wolff, A. (1994, October 4). 
Nachlese zu den Feierlichkeiten zurn Tag der Deutschen Einheit [Televised news report]. In Guten 
Morgen Deutschland. Cologne: RTL. 
762 Bremen feiert, 1994,2; Vier Jahre deutsche Einheit, 1994,2. 
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constructed in front of the Brandenburg Gate. 763 The Brandenburg Gate itself 
provided a 'symbol of unity' with which the central celebrations in Bremen were 
unable to compete. 
As a correspondent from The Times observed, the Berlin organisers adopted a 
'bread and circuses approach' to the staging with street fairs, beer festivals and the 
world's longest sausage. 764 There was, for example, as in other years, a 3.5km 
765 procession through the Brandenburg Gate, a highlight of the Berlin celebrations 
that few of the central celebrations attempted to match on that scale, not least because 
of the practical difficulties involved in staging large scale events. 766 Given the 
extensive programme of events in Berlin and its suitability as a location of large-scale 
events, it is perhaps not surprising that the Berlin celebrations generally attracted 
more national sponsors than the regional events. Moreover, as the capital and 
location largely associated with German unity, Berlin also attracted so-called 
Einheitstouristen, tourists from outside Berlin who, particularly for the tenth 
anniversary, chose to celebrate unification in Berlin rather than at the central 
celebrations. 767 
Berlin thus attracted mainly national companies while the central celebrations 
attracted local and regional sponsors. That it was largely local companies that 
underwrote the costs of the central celebrations not paid for by the respective State 
Chancelleries, could, however, also be understood as an attempt by regional actors to 
benefit from the decentralised arrangement of the celebrations. There was thus an 
economic dimension to the Day of Unity that will be explored in more detail in the 
following section. 
4.4 Economic interest: a platform for Under marketing 
The unity celebrations provided an opportunity for sponsors and the host Land to 
promote and market their goods and tourist attractions. Indeed the promotion of the 
763 Krawalle bei Einheitsfeier, 1994,1 
764 McElvoy, 1994, Germans mark unity day, 14. 
765 Ein Festzug vielMltiger Stereotype, 1994,2. 
766 A notable exception was the large parade in Erfurt. 
767 See Schubmann & Hofmann, 2000, Feierlichkeiten, RTL. 
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host Land was an explicit goal for many organisers of the Day of Unity 
celebrations. 768 Although the respective Lander incurred costs as a result of financing 
the unity events, not all of which could be recouped through sponsorship, there were 
nevertheless potential economic advantages to hosting the event regionally for both 
the host Land and its local economy. Additionally, the unity celebrations also served 
as a platform for guest Lander and sponsors to present themselves in a different 
federal state on a yearly basis. The regional arrangement of the Day of Unity can 
therefore be understood as being of economic benefit to regional actors of the host 
Land and to other German federal states. The eastern German Lander, seeking to 
counteract their drab and technologically inferior image among many western 
Germans, particularly exploited the opportunity to boost their economies by raising 
awareness of their products and touristic potential on the Day of Unity. Though this 
was only to some extent valid for Thuringia, it was especially true of Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg. 
Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania, more so than any of the other federal 
states, overtly presented itself as a tourist location on the Day of Unity. Its marketing 
stood in stark contrast to that of the richer western German regions with more 
powerfully fostered traditions of regionalism, which more subtly promoted their 
distinctiveness and appeal for tourism at the unity celebrations. Bavaria, for example, 
tended to present itself at numerous Ldndermeile with beer, long tables and benches 
in efforts to re-create a Bierfest atmosphere, 769 Bremen frequently presented its city 
musicians 770 and Schleswig-Holstein its folk music dancing groups and Frisian 
MUSiC. 771 In contrast, in 1992, when it hosted the celebrations, and at previous and 
subsequent celebrations, Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania explicitly staged its 
section of the citizens' festival as a tourist office. At the very first unity anniversary 
in Hamburg, for example, it used the Day of Unity as a platform for tourism by 
providing a mass of leaflets about the region as well as presenting an artificial 
71g A. Causing, personal communication, November 6,2006; K. Sondergeld, personal communication, 
November 16,2006; H-R. Zschernack, personal communication, November 27,2006. 
769 See, for example, Impressionen vom Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 2005, www. stk. brandenburg. de. 
770 Tag der Deutschen Einheit: Eine Zusammenfassung, 1996, Bayerischer Rundfunk. 
771 See, for example, Dietmar & Timpe, 1991, Sondersendung, NDR. 
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wildlife scene as a showcase of its landscape. 772 Its tent at the citizens' festival in 
Saarbrucken in 1993 similarly displayed large floor-to-cciling photographs with 
enticing images of the region's lakes and coasts. The images were accompanied by 
text in German and in French, in an attempt to market holidays in north-eastern 
Gcn, nany to an international audience. 773 More than a decade later, in 2005, 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania continued to use images of beaches and rolling 
pastures in a tent bedecked with Mecklenburg-Westem Porneranian flags and 
balloons. 774 One notes here, once more, the parallels with the way in which the 
European Capital of Culture served as both as a platform for marketing purposes and 
for an image-makeover. 
When its turn to host the central unity anniversary celebrations came, Saxony 
presented itself in more creative forms to promote the Land as a whole and 
specifically its capital, Dresden. As host of the celebrations in 2000, the unity event 
organisers focused on the history and culture of Dresden, as well as on its culinary 
specialities and technological capabilities to promote the local economy. There was, 
for example, an exhibition in the town hall entitled 'Welcome to Dresden - High 
Tech and Baroque', information stands in the city centre with leaflets and books 
about the legends and traditions of Saxony, and a presentation of food from fifty 
representatives of the Saxon food industry. 775 Saxony, like Mecklenburg-Westem 
Pomerania, also took advantage of the unity celebrations hosted in other Under. In 
1991, for example, they marketed an extensive selection of Saxon produce, from 
marjoram mincemeat to handmade ceramics and glaSS. 776 
Saxony-Anhalt, unlike most Lander, 777 created special titles for the citizens' 
festival in order to promote itself. One of the main goals of the event organisers was 
to present the potential of Saxony-Anhalt and to improve the image of the Land and 
772 ibid. 
773 Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3. 
774 See, for example, Impressionen vom Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 2005, NVWW. stk. brandenburg. de. 
775 Programm zum Bfirgerfest, 2000,5-7. 
776 Dictmar & Timpe, 199 1, Sondersendung, NDR. 
777 M. Mcinung, personal communication, November 27,2006; W. Meister, personal communication, 
November 29,2006; K-H. Petry, personal communication, December 13,2006; K. Sondergeld, 
personal communication, November 16,2006. 
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its capital Magdeburg. 778 As host in 2003, it developed two themes to market its 
attractions, 'UNESCO-World Heritage in Germany' and 'Innovative Saxony-Anhalt'. 
The UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) 
topic was selected to advertise that Saxony-Anhalt, with four world heritage sites, had 
one of the largest number of heritage sites in Germany. The topic innovation was by 
contrast designed to show recent achievements in the region. It sought to promote 
companies that had found innovative solutions for a variety of different sectors in 
recent years. These topics were intended to emphasise to visitors the historical as 
well as the modem dimension and capabilities of Saxony-Anhalt. 779 
Brandenburg, as host of the celebrations in 2005, similarly focused on its 
tourist and economic potential. A tourism marketing company, TMB Tourismus- 
Marketing Gesellschaft, was employed to present Brandenburg as a 'holiday 
destination with ... unmistakable charm'. 
780 It sought to offer visitors to the unity 
celebrations a 'cultural, historical and culinary journey through [Brandenburg] and to 
encourage visits to Brandenburg's idyllic villages and historic cities' . 
78 1 The 
marketing of Brandenburg was staged in a variety of forms, from information leaflets 
to culinary displays of food from various areas within the Land. One of the main 
objectives of the organisers was the presentation of the future amusement park 
'Tropical Island' in Brand. A further major focus of the advertising was to promote 
Brandenburg's capital Potsdam in preparation for its application as European Capital 
of Culture 20 10. The organisers emphasised Potsdam's 'grand scenery, its unique 
architecture and its traditional film scene 9782 in various ways. The marketing 
campaign for Potsdam was, for example, extended to the very advertising of the unity 
celebrations. As an iconic example of how the promotion of the host Land 
778 A. Clausing, personal communication, November 6,2006. 
779 Ibid. In addition to the domestic advertising of Saxony-Anhalt in 2003 and at other unity 
celebrations, Halle-bom Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also promoted the Land abroad. At 
a reception of 2000 people held for him in the US by President George Bush on 3 rd October 1991, 
Genscher used the Day of Unity as a platform on which to promote the benefits not only of investing in 
Germany as a whole but particularly the advantages of investing in his own Land, Saxony-Anhalt. See 
Kaps, C. (1991, October 4). Genscher wirbt ftir seine Heimat. FrankfurlerAllgemeine Zellung, 3. 
7'0 Feierlichkeiten zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit. (2005). Retrieved November 2,2007, from http: // 
www. stk. brandenburg. de/cms/detaii. php? gsid=51bmi. c. 180836. de. 
791 ibu 
792 ihid 
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intertwined with the unity celebrations, leaflets advertising the fifteenth unity 
anniversary displayed the image of a statue of Frederick the Great, a historical 
symbol of Potsdam, with an official Day of Unity pass around his neck. 
The regional arrangement and staging of the Day of Unity can therefore be 
explained in part as being economically motivated. The eastern German LAnder in 
particular, used the Day of Unity as an arena for marketing to overcome the 
consequence of more than forty years of planned economy under Communism. 
Communism had not only shaped the economy of the GDR but also the democratic 
views of its citizens who, at the time of unification, had no experience of West 
German political culture. It is to the analysis of how the Day of Unity attempted to 
influence the political culture of united Germany that this chapter now turns. 
4.5 Reinforcing political culture: democracy and federalism 
Unification raised new questions regarding Germany's political culture. 
Commitment to liberal democracy had become a deeply-rooted value among West 
Germans in post-war Germany. 783 Germany's increased responsibility, due to its 
enlarged size and population, made it more important for German political actors to 
strengthen democratic values among western Germans in post-1990 Germany. At the 
same time, united Germany faced the challenge of 'westernising' East Germans who 
had lived under Communism and had little experience of Western democracy - even 
though the chants of the East German demonstrators of 1989, 'Wir sind das Volk' 
(we are the people) might be construed as an inkling of this. 784 As Abbe and Gibas 
have demonstrated, East Germans were not a group with a clear, politically 
formulated group consciousness . 
785 Nevertheless, typical eastern German political 
values and views can be identified that vary from those of the average western 
German, even today. 786 One clear example of the divergence is the considerably 
lower, and declining, support for democracy among eastern Germans. Although 
793 See, for example, Linden, M. (2007). Wie frustriert sind die Deutschen? Deutschland Archiv, 40(6), 
977-987. 
784 Breuilly & Speirs, 2005, The concept of national unification, 22. 
7's Abbe & Gibbas, 2001, Der Osten, 20 
716 For a detailed statistical analysis of the difference among German views, East and West, on 
democracy see Ibid., 15-22. 
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support for democracy has dwindled since unification across both eastern and western 
Germany, 787 a decade after unification, at 92%, the vast majority of western Germans 
still considered democracy to be the best form of government, compared to only 78% 
of eastern Germans . 
788 As Arrid Bauerk4mper has demonstrated, a 'fragmentation' 
existed in the political values of East and West Germans both in 1989 and in the years 
that followed . 
789 Bauerkamper has shown that eastern Germans have different 
political values to their western German counterparts both because of 'life and 
socialisation' in the GDR and because of the very process of unification and the rift 
between eastern and western Germany after unification. He has convincingly argued 
that the Communist dictatorship 'deeply ingrained' basic attitudes and that this 
history 'penetrated individual attitudes and unspoken assumptions' which has made 
adaptation to the changes since unification difficult. 790 The continued lack of 
convergence in the views of eastern and western Germans towards democracy has 
also been highlighted in a recent study by Oscar W. Gabriel, Jargen W. Falter and 
Hans Rattinger. 791 This study, on the political views of Germans in united Germany, 
confirmed that the gulf between eastern and western Germans' views towards 
democracy has actually increased in recent years. The editors' typology, based on 
responses to basic values and to contentment, showed that whilst the percentage of 
4non-democrats' in western Germany was 13% in 1994 and dropped to 8% by 2002, 
in eastern Germany the number actually rose from 28% in 1994 to 33% in 2002.792 
There were, however, not only differences in values regarding democracy, but 
also regarding federalism. While federalism was an established core of Germany's 
political culture for most West Germans and an essential element of West Germany's 
787 Walter, F. (2006, November 3). Diebstahl an Demokratie. Retrieved March 2007, from http: //www. 
spiegel. de /politik/debatte/0,15 1 8,446234,00. html. 
... Fuchs, D., & Roller, E. (2004). Demokratie und Sozialstaat. In Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed. ), 
Datenreport 2004: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung, 649. 
7'9 Bauerkamper, A. (2002). The incorporation of a fragmented society: historical roots of values in 
individuals' choices after 1989. In J. Leonhard & L. Funk (Eds. ), Ten years of German unification: 
transfer, transformation, incorporation? Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 81-97. 
790 Ihid., 83. 
791 Gabriel, 0. W., Falter, LW., & Rattinger, 11. (Eds. ). (2006). Wächst zusammen, was zusammen 
gehört? Stabilität und Wandel politischer Einstellungen im wiedervereinigten Deutschland Baden- 
Baden: Nomos Verlag. 
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self-understanding, 793 the same was not true of East Germans. Although in many 
respects a broad form of GDR state consciousness attempted to '[override] pre- 
existing regional diversity'794 in the highly centralised GDR state, regional traditions 
survived throughout the existence of the GDR. 795 At the same time, and in 
contradiction, the SED also '[fosteredl... regional identities for the purpose of 
attracting tourism' and '[attempted] to link the new claims to legitimacy of the GDR 
with a longer-standing more deep-rooted emotional identification with a local or 
regional Heimal'. 796 However, though regionalism was not eradicated in the GDR, in 
contrast to West Germans, at the time of unification, East Germans had had no 
experience of federalism. In 1990, Germany thus stood as a country in which eleven 
of its federal states had a deep-rooted attachment to federalism and five, little 
attachment at all, possibly with the partial exception of Saxony with its long historical 
tradition of statehood. 
In this context, the rotating character of the Day of Unity celebrations can be 
explained as an attempt to influence the political culture of united Germany by 
promoting democratic values and federalism. One of the roles of political days in a 
liberal democracy is to create consensus and legitimacy for the political culture and to 
have it supported by the citizens. 797 In this vein, unity organisers used the Day of 
Unity as a platform, not only to deflect international fears, to promote regional 
identity and for political and economic interest, but also to influence the political 
culture of united Germany; they sought to support democracy in all parts of Germany 
and to strengthen and promote federalism, particularly in eastern Germany to 
encourage cultural synchronisation. 
Unity organisers stated that involving citizens in the national holida 98 and 
providing information about the L! inder, the federal institutionS799 and German 
791 See, for example, Gunlicks, 2003, The Lander. 
794 Fulbrook, M. (2002). Democratic centralism and regionalism in the GDR. In M. Umbach (Ed. ), 
Germanfederalism: past, present, future. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 167. 
791 See Palmowski, J. (2006). Regional identities and the limits of Democratic Socialism in the GDR. 
Journal of Contemporary History, 41(3), 503-526. 
796 Fulbrook, 2002, Democratic centralism, 167. 
797 Winkler, 1995, Die Visibilitat der Macht, 223. 
798 K. Sondergeld, personal communication, November 16,2006. 
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federalism 800 were the main aims of the citizens' festivals. '[Political] remoteness 
can create alienation and a reluctance to participate in elections. It can be seen as a 
contributory factor to the disillusionment with politics (PolitikVerdrossenheily. 801 It 
is in line with this that the staging of the German government marquees on the Day of 
Unity can be understood, namely as an attempt to encourage a greater political 
consciousness and more extensive involvement in the political system among 
Germans. From 1990 to 2005, the federal governments at the unity celebrations 
focused particularly on attempting to inform Germans about their activities, in an 
effort to encourage Germans to be politically active. At the first celebrations in 199 1, 
for example, dignitaries from various ministries, including the normally distant 
foreign ministry, greeted people at the government marquee to inform them about the 
activities of the government. 802 Similarly, at the Saarbrucken unity events in 1993, 
members of various government ministries presented 'Sternstunden', a selection of 
key political moments from the past. 803 At the majority of citizens' festivals, key 
political actors, such as the Minister-Presidents 804 and at times even the 
Chancellors 805 and the Federal Presidents 806 have spoken with members of the public 
in attempts to, quite literally, bring politics to the people. 
In a further attempt to overcome potential Politikverdrossenheit, the 
government also sought to emphasise that it was involved in issues affecting German 
citizens. At the Potsdam celebrations, for example, the government underlined its 
role in improving infrastructure since unification; it staged a pathway leading up to 
the unity marquee with various questions: in order to find the answer to questions 
such as 'How many kilometres of motorway have been built since 1997 as part of the 
traffic project "German Unity"T Germans had to enter into the information-laden 
goo W. Schempp, personal communication, February 19,2007. 
... Bulmer, S. (1999). Efficiency, democracy and post-unificatio 'n 
federalism in Germany: a critical 
analysis. In C. Jeffery (Ed. ), Recasting Germanfederalism: the legacies of unification. London: Pinter, 
312-328, here 313. 
802 Kauntz, 1991, Der Jugendchor, 3. 
803 Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3. 
804 See, for example, Tag der Deutschen Einheit. ý Eine Zusammenfassung, 1996, Bayerischer 
Rundfunk. 
... See, for example, Ruhle & Lingesleben, 2002, Spdl Ahendschau, RBB. 
... See, for example, KUhne, D. (Ed. ). (1996, October 3). Feiem am Tag der Deutschen Einhcit 
[Televised news coverage]. In RTL A kluell. Cologne: RTL. 
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marquee. 807 The government also sought to politically involve the younger 
generation and to increase their awareness of politics. On the Day of Unity in 
Stuttgart, for instance, the government strove to inform youngsters about the move of 
the seat of parliament by displaying competition entries of school children based on 
proposed designs for the Berlin Reichstag building. 808 The government marquees 
thus intended to create political awareness of Germans in the host Land by informing 
them about the role of government, by emphasising how politics influenced their 
everyday life and by involving the next generation of voters. 
The political discussion rounds and events at the unity citizens' festivals can 
also be understood in the context of attempting to politically socialise Germans and to 
stir them to be politically active. As NDR reported at the first unity celebrations, the 
citizens' festival should not be described a Fressfest since it was a Volksfest - but 
with culture and discussion at its core rather than Bratwurst. 809 Unity organisers 
staged discussion rounds on the Day of Unity to involve the local population in 
debates of topics ranging from Germany's self-image abroadglo to German unity and 
its consequences. 811 The citizens' festival discussions have taken the form of 
informal question and answer sessions with politicians and the audience, discussion 
between various political actors on a stage in front of spectators as well as televised 
debates or a combination of these. 
Munich, for example, adopted a number of approaches meant to foster 
political thinking. Grammar school children discussed German unity with Minister of 
State Hans Zehetmair in the State Chancellery while Bayerischer Rundfunk televised 
a discussion about unification with German pupils and a number of high-ranking 
politicians, including Minister-President Stoiber, CDU/CSU Chairman Schauble, 
Deputy Chairman of the SPD Thierse and Federal Commissioner for the Records of 
the State Security Service of the former GDR, Joachim Gauck. 8 12 The attempt to 
... Personal observation, 2005, October 3, Potsdam. 
80' Zusammenfassung Bürgerfest, 1997, Südwestrundfunk. 
809 Dietmar& Timpe, 199 1, Sondersendung, NDR. 
810 MeEvoy, 1994, Steady rise, 12. 
811 Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3; Zum Nationalfeiertag starke 
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involve the local population in the politics of unity was further emphasised by the 
decision to erect a 'Memorial for the Remembrance of German Division' in Munich's 
large municipal park, the English Garden. This monument, unveiled by Stoiber as 
part of the unity celebrations on the 2 nd October, implied a desire on the part of the 
Bavarian Minister-President to commemorate unification on a regional level in order 
to make Bavarians feel connected to unification. The very invitation to the unveiling, 
which approximately six hundred people attended, was decorated with the Bavarian 
Great Coat of ArmS813 emphasising Bavaria's attempt to stage unity as a regional 
event in a Land where Germans had little direct experience of unification. In this 
vein, directly following the memorial unveiling, Stoiber opened a unity exhibition at 
the Haus der Bayerischen Geschichte entitled 'Growing Together -An Interim 
Appraisal'. 814 
The tenth unity celebrations in the eastern German city of Dresden offered an 
even more extensive programme of events to involve Germans, particularly Saxons, 
in a critical discussion of politics in united Germany. Unlike most citizens' festivals, 
which had little direct connection to the official unity ceremony, a large screen in the 
marquee (named Treffpunkt Deutschland) on the Theaterplatz transmitted the 
ceremony live. 815 This pavillion, staged by the Leipziger Volkszeitung, 
Deutschlandfunk and the Saxon State Chancellery offered a diverse political, musical 
and cultural programme! 16 Saxons were able to walk between discussions and 
interviews with a plethora of political guests: Deutschlandfunk interviewed Chair of 
the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland) Paul 
Spiegel, and Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Harald Kujat, while the television 
broadcaster MDR (Central German Broadcasting) staged a programme called Auf den 
Punkt comprising podium discussions with Minister-President of Saxony-Anhalt 
Reinhard H6ppner, Minister-President of the Free State of Saxony, Biedenkopf, and 
former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 817 A so-called class-reunion 
(Klassentreffen) formed a further highlight of the political buffet for citizens. 
813 Einladung-Enthallung des Mahnmals, 1996, Bavarian State Chancellery. 
814 Endgalliger Programmablauf, 1996, Bavarian State Chancellery. 
8'5 Program rn zurn Bargerfest, 2000,6. 
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Presenter Bdrbel Romanowski also conducted numerous interviews with members of 
the last cabinet of the GDR under de Maizi6re. 818 Political discussion rounds thus 
provided Germans in the host Land with a forum in which they could gain a sense of 
participating more fully in political debates. 
The extensive eleven-page programme of these Dresden unity events 
produced by the Sochsische ZeiIunZ19 serves as an example to show that the regional 
arrangement of the Day of Unity encouraged not only the involvement of the local 
population but also of the local press. The regional television and print press focused 
predominantly on the citizens' festival in 'their' Land (though this was also paired 
with an inverse trend which saw little regional coverage of unity celebrations in other 
regions). The Day of Unity thus provided an opportunity for the local press to report 
the Day of Unity from their perspective, bestowing a further sense of participatory 
legitimacy to the regional arrangement of the event. 
By staging a significant political event not in the capital, but on a rotating 
basis through the Lander, the unity celebrations brought politics to the citizens of 
each host Land. The federal arrangement was thus democratic; it made politics 
hargernah and served to spread democratic values by providing Germans with the 
opportunity to feel politically involved and connected to the political system. This 
was particularly important in the eastern German Lander where, at the time of 
unification, there was little experience of liberal democracy; the regional arrangement 
provided a platform for exporting the political culture and democratic values long 
established in the Federal Republic. 
The Day of Unity was also used as a platform for promoting federalism. The 
regional arrangement of the Day of unity, the sub-national mise-en-sc6ne of the 
citizens' festivals and the intentions of the eastern German organisers imply that the 
Day of Unity sought particularly to promote federalism in eastern Germany. Given 
the lack of a long continuous tradition of federalism in the eastern German Lander, it 
is unsurprising that unity organisers of the eastern Germany celebrations, more than 
their western German counterparts, explicitly sought to promote federalism and 
... Ibid 
819 10 Jahre deutsche Einheit: Die Jubillurns-Festveranstlatung in Dresden. (2000, October 2/3). 
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excitement about the variety of the Lander. 820 In this vein, the extensive regional 
staging of the citizens' festivals, particularly the Landermeile and regional flags, 
sought to socialise eastern Germans into Germany's federal structure and to 
encourage them to be enthusiastic about federalism. The rotating arrangement of the 
German national holiday celebrations similarly drew attention to, because it rested 
upon, the federal structures in Germany. While gauging the actual effectiveness of 
this rotating structure precisely would require an analysis of the reception of the day, 
rather than its staging, the attempt to bring a grass-roots attachment of politics and 
federalism to the local population is clear enough. The celebrations were structured 
to draw eastern Germans into a stronger identification, both with their own federal 
state and with the federal system as a whole. The unity celebrations thus served as a 
platform for the cultural synchronisation of eastern Germany and western Germany 
by extending the latter's regional, federal tradition of constitutional decentralisation 
and regional cultural identities to the East. The Day of Unity thus served as a 
platform to influence Germany's political culture by reinforcing and promoting 
democracy and federalism, particularly in the eastern German Lander. 
Conclusion 
The promotion of postriationalism on the Day of Unity by the country's political 
actors as seen in their staging of sub-national and, as we will see in the next chapter, 
supra-national, elements had the potential to serve a number of functions on the 
national holiday. First and foremost, it could act to reassure the international 
community and secure legitimacy for the country by showing that Germany, though 
now a united nation-state was committed, to some extent, to postriational ideas - and 
thus assuage fears of an overly powerful Germany or a repeat of the horrors of its past 
as a nation-state. Secondly, at a time when the challenges of the unity process 
contributed significantly to the re-emergence of support for right-wing groups and 
activities, the promotion of postriationalism offered a way of thinking for Germans 
920 C. Flume, personal communication, November 28,2006; A. Clausing, personal communication, 
November 6,2006; M. Meinung, personal communication, November 27,2006. 
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that had no place forjingoistic sentiment. 821 Thirdly, the benefits, not least financial 
and commercial, that Germany received through affiliation with the transnational 
institutions, such as the EU, made attachment to postnational ideas evermore 
appealing. Also, the growth of globalisation stood to threaten, to some degree, the 
very utility and legitimacy of the nation-state. 822 Related to this, the promotion of 
postriationalism in the form of sub-national affiliation on the Day of Unity, 
particularly in attachment to regions, served to counter, to some extent, growing 
anxiety about the impact of globalisation. 
The political actors' attempts to stage the Day of Unity to some extent as a 
postnational event draws attention to certain tensions on Yd October. Since World 
War IT, Germany has striven not to be (seen as) nationalistic. The crimes and horrors 
committed by Germans in a unitary nation-state during the 'Third Reich' had 
discredited the concept of 'nation' in Germany. 823 The extent of international 
anxiety, particularly in the early post-war years, about the dangers of a German 
nation-state had indeed been demonstrated by the way in which the Allies initially 
carved post-war Germany into occupation zones and the Americans and British 
created new regional (federal) states with especially the US and France then 
influencing the strongly federalist character of the Basic Law constitution. 824 In the 
post-war period, (West) German political actors sought to stress that Germans no 
longer saw the 'nation' as their only main frame of reference or as the core of their 
self-understanding. 825 They also sought to counter any possible renaissance of 
nationalism among the German population . 
82' This desire to overcome the challenge 
of nationalism had motivated Germany's integration into transnational institutions, 
"' For a thorough analysis of attitudes to nationalism at the time of unification see Fulbrook, M. 
(2005). Nationalism in the second German unification. in R. Speirs & J. Breuilly (Eds. ), Germany's 
two unifications: anticipations, experiences, responses. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 241-260. 
822 See Juergensmeycr, M. (2002). The paradox of nationalism in a global world. In U. Iledetoft & M. 
11jort (Eds. ), The posinalional self Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3-17. 
121 See Jarausch, 1995, Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung, 572. 
824 See Jarausch, K. (2006). After Hitler: Recivilising Germans, 1945-1995. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
115 See Iferf, 2002b, Traditions of memory and belonging. 
826 See Fulbrook, 2005, Nationalism in the second German unification, 244. 
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such as the EU, which encouraged ideas of citizenship that transcended the nation- 
state. 927 
However, the creation of an enlarged German nation-state through unification 
of the GDR with the Federal Republic raised new challenges for Germany's political 
actors. While nationalism had not been the 'driving force' behind the largely 
unexpected unification, it was nevertheless 're-appropriated ... as an acceptable 
political idiom' in 1989/90.828 Debate consequently emerged about a resurgence of 
German nationalism. These debates did not only take place among academics. 
Instead, like the Historikerstreit of the late 1980s, the topic entered the public space 
and was hotly debated at length in the serious German press around the time of 
unification - particularly in publications such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
the Saddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Stern and FocUS. 829 
At the heart of the debate were questions about what kind of nation Germany 
should be. 'Third way' dissidents in the GDR as well as some on the West German 
Left adopted the view that a German nation should not exist at all; they proposed 
instead that a separate, reformed, postriational GDR should be allowed to evolve. At 
the other end of the political spectrum, a number of 'New Right' historians, most 
notably Rainer Zitelmann, argued that unification marked an opportunity for 
Germany to loosen its ties with the West and to become a more self-confident 
nation. 830 The main debate, however, took place between left-liberal and right-wing 
historians, academics and intellectuals who proposed different possibilities for the 
German nation. Habermas, Grass, Walser and Karl Heinz Bohrer were among the 
key figures of this debate. Strongly arguing against any form of German nationalism, 
Habermas promoted instead a model of constitutional patriotism. Constitutional 
patriotism in many respects overcame the tension of nationalism in that it promoted a 
$27 Schlesinger, P. (2002). Media and Belonging. The Changing Shape of Political Communication in 
the European Union. In U. Iledctoft & M. Hjort (Eds. ), The postnational self Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 35-52. 
92' Fulbrook, 2005, Nationalism in the second German unification, 24 1. 
829 Willer, 2000, Another country, 14. 
830 Ross, C. (2005). Historians, unification and the 'new national paradigm. In R. Speirs & J. Breuilly 
(Eds. ), Germany's two unifications: anticipations, experiences, responses. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 261-273, here 266. 
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form of belonging removed from the national context: it prioritised attachment to the 
constitution over any sense of belonging to a nation. 
Grass, like many among the West German left-wing cultural elites, had 
interpreted the division of Germany as a punishment for the crimes of the 'Third 
Reich'. In 1989/90, criticising any creation of a unitary nation-state, he called instead 
for a confederation of two equal states and the construction of a new constitution (i. e. 
through article 146 of the Basic Law). 831 Grass advocated the concept of a 
Kulturnation (cultural nation) to unify all Germans. This concept, which can be 
traced back to the 18th century, understands people as united through language, 
traditions, religion and culture. 
In stark contrast to Grass, whose recently published diaries reflect his strong 
aversion to unification around 1990,932 novelist Walser had been a fervent advocate 
of unification in the years of German division. 933 Although he was originally 
considered to be left-wing, conservatives seized on Walser at the time of unification 
as a 'conservative icon'. 934 Walser had framed German division as something that 
must be overcome and promoted a German nation. It is thus not surprising that he 
declared himself supportive of Kohl's strategy for unification. In the 1990s, Walser 
argued that the relation of Germans to their nation and their history (the German 
question), could not be reconciled until Germans had dealt with the issue of what they 
had done to Jews in the Holocaust. For Walser, future generations did not carry a 
sense of collective guilt but rather a sense of collective responsibility for German 
history. 835 As we saw, his attitudes toward the National Socialist era provoked heated 
debate with Bubis in the late 1990s. 
831 See Grass, G. (1990). Deutscher Laslenausgleich - Wider das dumpfe Einheitsangebot: Reden und 
Gesprache. Frankfurt: Luchterhand and Grass, G. (1991). Gegen die verstreichende Zell: Redel; 
Aufsdtze und Gesprache. Frankfurt: Luchterhand. See also Moller, 2000, Another country, 64-89 and 
Butler, M. (2005). Cultural polarities? Grass, Walser, Wolf. reflections on the process of unification. 
In R. Speirs & J. Breuilly (Eds. ), Germany's two unifications: anticipations, experiences, responses. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 274-291. 
932 See Grass, G. (2009). Unterwegs von Deutschland nach Deutschland. Tagebuch 1990. G6ttingen: 
Steidl. 
... Sce Walser, M. (1988). Ober Deutschland reden. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
334 Moller, 2000, Another country, 152. 
135 Ibid., 172-174. 
204 
Bohrer similarly advocated German unification, albeit, as Maller has shown, 
as a 'remedy for [the Federal Republic's] shortcomings'. 936 For Bohrer, a united 
nation-state was essential for modem German culture - he argued that it would allow 
Germans to rediscover German traditions such as Romanticism. Unlike many on the 
Left, who argued that unification could lead to a dangerous turn away from dealing 
with the past, Bohrer stressed that all Germans had to be united in a nation in order to 
'remember together'. According to Bohrer, in so doing, Germans in a unified 
Germany could be reconciled with the past and, at last, with the concept of nation. 837 
How do these debates relate to the tensions on 3 rd October anniversaries? The 
German national holiday presented particular challenges with regard to nationalism. 
The very existence of a national day for a country in which the majority of citizens 
were socialised into not being nationalistic is surely a contradiction in terms: 
celebrating the nation for becoming a (larger) nation would seem to be a paradox of a 
postriational nation-state. In simple terms, the political actors were faced with the 
difficulty of commemorating a national day, which they did not really want to have in 
the first place. Until unification, the Federal Republic's 'national' holiday, by 
commemorating the GDR uprising, did not create the same tensions. It may have 
stood, at least at certain times, as a symbol of future German unification yet it is clear 
that the 'national' day of one half of a divided Germany presented less challenges 
with regard to nationalism than a national holiday of a united, enlarged German 
nation-state celebrating the ftilfilment of that national unification. 
As a national day, the Day of Unity has been an occasion when German 
political actors - increasingly moving toward a more assertive identity - have sought 
to influence attitudes within Germany. However, at the same time, the political 
actors have been aware that on an occasion such as their national day some in the 
international community would look to Germany for reassurance that there were no 
signs of renascent German nationalism. This balancing act of managing both 
domestic expectations and international concerns clearly presents certain challenges 
and has produced certain contradictory results on the Day of Unity. On the one hand, 
836 Ibid., 178. 
837 Ibid, 191-193. 
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initiatives such as 'We are Germany' and the advocacy of 'normalisation' of the 
National Socialist past have provided evidence of attempts by the political actors to 
foster pride among Germans for being German. On the other hand, however, careful 
attempts to avoid overt expressions of nationalism have been apparent in the 
prevalence of sub-national and, as we will see next, supra-national elements in the 
staging of the national day. This was also evident in the way in which the political 
actors struggled to find discourses that could be used as the basis for uniting Germans 
that did not seem nationalistic. They espoused instead a wide range of different 
arguments to encourage a sense of Wir-Gefahl - from reframing attitudes toward the 
unity process and eastern Germans to depicting differences among eastern and 
western Germans as both negative and positive. Put simply, the political actors 
attempted to cultivate a sense that eastern and western Germans should be united 
while avoiding any explicit mention of the nation as the frame of reference or to 
anything that could be construed as nationalism. This would certainly seem to 
suggest that we are in a period of change. A desire to promote a more assertive self- 
image for Germany may well be emerging. However, in the period from 1990 to 
2005 this desire was undoubtedly tempered by an awareness of concerns - both 
within and outside Germany - of this change. 
The calls from those in the unification debate for a more self-confident form 
of German patriotism, therefore, while gaining some ground, have only to a limited 
extent been heard on the German national holiday. Grass' idea of a Kulturnation in 
the period from 1990 to 2005 also enjoyed little attention. 938 By contrast, flabermas' 
vision for a very different non-nationalistic united German nation-state has not 
completely fallen on deaf ears. It was clear, for example, that the political actors 
implicitly promoted attachment to the constitution. This was visible in their choice of 
date for 3d October (commemorating a constitutional act) as well as in the way they 
framed Aujbau Ost and equality in living standard of eastern and western Germans as 
... For the few explicit references to the notion of Kulturnallon see S(Issmuth, 1993, Ansprache, 933. 
For indirect references of the ability of culture to unite Germans see S(Issmuth, 1995, Ansprache, 756 
and Schr6der, 1999, Rede, 636. 
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constitutional obligations. However, the Day of Unity actors rarely explicitly referred 
to constitutional patriotism. 839 
It is perhaps surprising that neither the concept of constitutional patriotism nor 
of a Kulturnation were exploited on the Day of Unity. These concepts may well be 
6elite concepts', lacking in public support. Yet the Day of Unity has, in any case, 
been used to present a somewhat idealised image of Germany. Advocacy of 
constitutional patriotism or of a Kulturnation on the German national holiday would 
surely seem to offer a number of advantages for Germany. Both would encourage a 
reflected form of pride without calling on instinctive national sentiment. In this way, 
they have the potential to allow Germans to be proud in a manner acceptable both to 
those wary of German nationalism within Germany as well as to the wider 
international community. Such postnational forms of belonging would also seem to 
be in line with other forms of belonging both below and above the nation-state that 
the political actors did actually advocate on the Day of Unity. Furthermore, they 
would complement the increasingly civic idiom of nationhood emerging in Germany 
by encouraging an expansive, inclusive definition of membership: constitutional 
patriotism or a Kulturnation are not limited to those of German blood but rather can 
be used to unite all those with German citizenship - and even others living on 
German territory. This could potentially serve as a way of integrating the large 
immigrant population. 
At the very least, constitutional patriotism or a Kulturnation understanding 
would seem to provide a framework for uniting eastern and western Germans. 
Indeed, constitutional patriotism appears to offer the opportunity to transcend 
East/West differences: through the development of 'post-conventional identities', it 
promotes identification with universal values. g'(' Similarly, a Kulturnation could 
939 Von Weizsdcker's 1990 and 1991 speeches are exceptions here and can best be explained by the 
President's personal support for Verfassungspatriotismus. See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF 
and Von Weizs: icker, R. (1991). Fernsehansprache des Bundesprasidenten. Bulletin, 108,853-854. 
840 See Moller, 2000, Another country, 60. At a conference in Berlin on Yh-6th October 2006, organised 
by the Sonderforschungsbercich 640 and entitled 'Wege zur Bundesrepublik. Deutsche Mythen, 
Mentitaten und Selbstbilder' (Paths to the Federal Republic. German myths, identities and self-image), 
Clemens Albrecht pointed out the 'charm' of the concept of constitutional patriotism: the question of 
inclusion and exclusion is defused through a constitutionally shared core. For the full conference 
report see: Hausteiner, Eva. (2006). Wege zur Bundesrepublik Deutsche Mythen, Identitaten und 
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provide a possible framework for uniting Germans while at the same time promoting 
and celebrating diversity. If united through their attachment to the constitution or 
through culture, Germans would no longer need to work toward some distant 'goal of 
unity'. Instead, the goal would essentially already be reached: no further 'growing 
together' would be necessary and differences could be seen as enriching the political 
culture. 
One could therefore argue that the political actors missed an opportunity to 
unite behind a coherent way of framing the nation by exploiting the concept of 
constitutional patriotism or a Kulturnation. This can perhaps be explained by the fact 
that these specific terms were themselves to some extent politically contested. While 
the Day of Unity commemorations were characterised by a high level of consensus, it 
would have been much more difficult to achieve consensus on such specific concepts. 
At the same time, however, there are actually signs that German political actors from 
across the political spectrum are promoting constitutional patriotism in other arenas. 
Recently, in their discussion in parliament regarding the European House of History, 
for example, Germans advocated a form of patriotism for EU citizens based on 
common values. 841 
Fascinatingly, the recent 2008 unity festivities were celebrated for the first 
time under the motto 'Kulturnation Deutschland. 842 This may suggest that 
Germany's political actors are beginning to recognise the potential of Kulturnation as 
a concept for overcoming the tension of celebrating the national holiday without 
wanting to appear nationalistic. The 2008 celebrations may well be an exception - 
not least given that they were organised for the first time under a CDU/Green 
coalition. However, they may indicate that we are in a period of change in which 
Selbstbilder. Retrieved January 15,2007, from http: //www. hsozkult. geschichte. hu-berlin. de/tagungs 
berichte/id=1397. 
... For an overview of the ideas motivating the construction of a European House of History see 
Conceptual basisfor a European House ofHistory. (2008). Brussels: Committee of Experts. 
' See Wo sich Bein an Bein reibt. (2008, October 5). Frankfürter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26; Wiegand, 
R. (2008). Der Ernst des Lebens. Retrieved October 4,2008, from http: //www. sueddeutsche. de/ politik 
/809/312722/text; Deutschland feiert 18. Jahrestag der Einhelf. (2008). Retrieved October 4,2008, 
from http: //www. sueddeutsche. deAist/211563; Kohler: Fehler be! Wiedervereinigung, aber vie/ 
erreichl. (2008). Retrieved October 4,2008, from http: //www. faz. net/s/rub594835 and Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit in Hamburg wirdzum Kulturfest. (2008). Hamburg: Hamburger Staatskanzlei. 
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Germany's political actors are possibly (re)discovering new ways to address the 
historically difficult relationship with nationalism in Germany. 
Many European actors have propagated German federalism as a template for 
European unity. Indeed, many aspects of Gen-nan federalism have been influential, if 
not formative, in the development of the EU. This highlights that sub-national and 
supra-riational elements need not be contradictory or mutually exclusive but can 
instead go hand in hand. On the Day of Unity, German actors sought to emphasise 
not only Germany's commitment to federalism, but also its dedication to the EU. 
Consequently, the Day of Unity was denationalised to some extent not only by sub- 
national but also by supra-national aspects. It is to the examination of this further 
manifestation of the somewhat postriational character of the German national holiday 
that the analysis now turns. 
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5. Denationalisation through EU-isation: 
a supra-national national holiday? 
'We do not want a German Europe, we want a European Germany. ' 
(Thomas Mann, 1875-1955) 
The struggle of the Germans to find their place in Europe shaped the course of 
European history for much of the 19th and 20'h century. Unification of Germany in 
1990 evoked fears among the country's neighbours that Germany's political actors 
would submit to renewed consideration the role Germany played in Europe. In post- 
war West Germany, the orientation of the mainstream political parties toward 
Western Europe had been unambiguous: multilateral ism, that is to say, 
'institutional ised co-operation that co-ordinates relations among three or more states 
on the basis of generalised principles of conduct', 943 formed the core of the Federal 
Republic's foreign policy. 844 German Christian Democrats, aware of the dangers of a 
Germany sandwiched between the democratic West and the totalitarian East, 
provided the initial impetus for integration into the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 845 The 
Social Democrats, although originally sceptical about its possible adverse effects on 
German unification, also shifted to support Western integration from the mid-1950s 
onwards, especially following their pivotal Bad Godesberg conference in l9sq. 846 
The desire of West Germany's mainstream political actors to attain international 
legitimacy and maintain peace on the continent converged with the Allied demand for 
decentralised power, which secured Germany's cross-party commitment to what has 
843 1 lyde-Price, A. (2000). Germany and European order: enlarging NATO and the EU. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 22. 
844 For a comprehensive, recent overview of foreign policy in the post-war Federal Republic see 
Lappenkilper, U. (2008). Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990. Munich: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag. 
945 See Kaiser, W. (2007). Christian democracy and the origins of European Union. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
846 See Paterson, W. (1974). The SPD and European integration. Lanham: Lexington Books and 
Paterson, W., & Campbell, 1. (1974). Social democracy in post-war Europe. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
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been described, in comparison with other larger European states like France and 
847 
Britain, as 'exaggerated multilateralism' . 
Unification in 1990 redefined Germany's geopolitical environment. No 
longer a 'divided country in the centre of a divided continent"848 Germany had long 
since become the most economically powerful state in Europe. 849 The international 
community, including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and, briefly, French 
President Franqois Mitterrand, concerned for European security, questioned whether 
Wesibindung (commitment to multilateralism in Western structures) would remain 
the central tenet of German foreign policy. 850 Many of those who did not doubt that 
Germany would remain deeply anchored in Western institutions nevertheless feared 
that a powerful, united Germany would turn away from its 'civilian power' status or 
851 dominate the EU . 
Although the end of the Cold War transformed Germany, Europe and the rest 
of the world, German foreign policy from 1990 to 2005 largely continued the 
traditions of the Federal Republic. 952 After the fall of the Berlin Wall, West German 
political actors fervently sought to integrate East Germany into the EU and NATO. 113 
This was facilitated on one hand through the support of the EU and, on the other, 
through the chosen legal form of unification, as a result of which the former GDR, by 
acceding to the Federal Republic, also acceded to the later's institutional affiliations. 
While transformations in the international climate influenced foreign policy making 
in united Germany, the three main principles -underlying these policies, namely the 
Gcommitment to multilateralism, a preference for non-military instruments of foreign 
policy, and a defence strategy based in equal measure on deterrence and reassurance', 
847 Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C., & Paterson, W. E. (2000). Germany's European diplomacy: shaping the 
regional milieu. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 6. 
849 Hyde-Price, 2000, Germany and European order, 4. 
849 Otte, M., & Greve, J. (2000). A rising middle power? German foreign policy in transformation. 
1989-1999. New York: St. Martin's Press, 3. 
'50 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 14. 
'51 Hyde-Price, 2000, Germany and European order, 2-6. 
152 Maul 1, H. W. (2006). Introduction. In H. W. Maull (Ed. ), Germany's uncertain power: foreign policy 
0 the Berlin Republic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-14, here 1. 
843 Anderson, J. (1999). German unification and the union ý of Europe: the domestic politics of 
integration policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55. 
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nevertheless remained unchanged. 854 The continuity in German foreign policy can 
largely be ascribed to three key factors: firstly, the foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic had proved so successful that there was little motivation for change; 
secondly, reticence in the use of force had become ingrained in Germany's political 
culture; thirdly it served political and economic benefits since Germany, closely 
linked with the European and international institutions, may have suffered 
economically by withdrawing from them. '55 German political actors framed the 
accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic in a European context. In the fine print 
of the 2+4 Treaty it was agreed that Germany would remain rooted in the EU856 and 
during the unification process, Germany amended Article 23 of the Basic Law to 
pledge commitment to developing the EU. 957 
This chapter explores the way in which German political actors sought to 
frame united Germany's relation to the EU on the country's national holiday from 
1990 to 2005. The chapter does not focus on the staging of Germany's relation to 
NATO nor to other multilateral Western institutions since these did not serve as 
major points of reference on the unity anniversaries. Instead it will argue that the 
unity celebrations were to some extent denationalised through EU-isation, that is to 
say through a focus on rhetoric, aesthetic elements and bilateral relations linked to the 
EU. By examining the signs of erosion of national elements through EU-isation and 
the extent to which the Day of Unity can be described as a supra-riational event, this 
chapter further contributes to the understanding of the postnational elements of 3 rd 
October. To illustrate the extent of EU-isation on the Day of Unity, the chapter 
explores how the day was used by political actors both to underline Germany's 
854 Berger, T. (2002). The power of memory and memories of power: the cultural parameters of 
German foreign policy making since 1945. In J-W. MLIller (Ed. ), Memory and power in postwar 
Europe: studies inthepresence ofthepast. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 76-99, here 78. 
855 Hellmann, G. (2006). Europaisches Deutschland oder deutsches Europa? Deutsche Wege in der 
Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik seit der Wiedervereinigung - Analyse und Umfragedaten. In J. Weber 
(Ed. ), Illusionen, Realildlen, Erfolge: Zwischenbilanz zur deutschen Einheit. Munich: Olzog, 242-243. 
956 Szabo, S. F. (2004). Parting ways: the crisis in German-American Relations. Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 15 1. 
157 Berghahn, V., Flynn, G., & Latzeler, P. M. (1997). Germany and Europe: finding an international 
role. In K. H. Jarausch (Ed. ), After unity: reconfliguring German identities. Oxford: Berghahn, 173-200, 
here 184. 
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dedication to the EU and to foster strategic alliances, primarily with specific EU 
partners. 
The chapter comprises two sections. Section one argues that the Day of Unity 
operated as an arena in which German political actors stressed Germany's 
commitment to the EU in order to overcome international fears of German hegemony 
and to cultivate German public support for, and interest in, the EU. It identifies three 
key manifestations of Germany's loyalty to the EU on the 3 rd October anniversaries, 
which reflected shifts in the domestic and international political climate. Firstly, it 
shows how German political actors used the Day of Unity as a forum for 
promulgating Germany's continued commitment to multilateralism in united 
Germany. Secondly, it illustrates how German political actors promoted the EU, 
chiefly in times of 'Euro-scepticism'. Thirdly, it demonstrates that both German and 
international speakers used the Day of Unity to endorse eastern enlargement of the 
EU. 
Section two argues that Genrian political actors used the Day of Unity to 
strategically foster relations with certain international partners important due to 
historical relationships as well as for reasons of trade and security. Firstly, it shows 
how the Day of Unity operated to cement and improve relations, outside of Europe, 
with the US. Secondly, it demonstrates that the Day of Unity actors predominantly 
sought to improve relations with strategic EU partners: it argues that to some extent 
German political actors sought to cultivate the alliance with Germany's traditional 
EU partner France but that, primarily, they attempted to foster relations with the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Finally, it briefly argues that the German 
political actors dedicated less attention to other bilateral relations, occasionally with 
negative repercussions. 
5.1. Germany's commitment to the EU 
5.1.1 United Germany and the EU: an unbreakable partnership? 
Signs of denationalisation of the German national holiday through EU-isation were 
visible in a number of elements of the staging throughout the period from 1990 to 
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2005. Guest speakers from EU member states traditionally served as the main 
speakers on the 3 rd October anniversaries. German Day of Unity actors presented 
these European speakers as symbols of EU unity. 858 Furthermore, the blue EU flag 
with its twelve gold stars, adopted by the EU in the 1980s, stood centre stage at the 
vast majority of unity ceremonies alongside the regional and German flags. Even in 
Bavaria and Baden-WCirttemberg, where organisers did not include the EU flag in the 
staging of the ceremony, but instead emphasised regional elements, the EU flag 
nevertheless appeared at various locations throughout their citizens' festivals. In 
addition to this, orchestras performed 'Ode to Joy', the official EU hymn since 1985 
based on the final movement of Beethoven's ninth symphony, at numerous unity 
celebrations: the anthem featured at a number of ceremonies 859 and accompanied 
various theatrical performanceS860 and laser shows at citizens' festivals. 86 1 
These elements of the EU-isation of the unity events were habitually staged 
by German political actors from across the political spectrum throughout the period 
from 1990 to 2005. However, the particular discourses regarding the EU that were 
adopted by the political actors varied throughout the time period of analysis reflecting 
changes and concerns in the domestic and international political climate. 
Particularly in 1990 and 1999, years in which the EU-isation of the unity 
events was especially pronounced, the German political actors focused on EU topics 
in order to reassure the international community that united Germany would remain 
committed to the foreign policy of the post-war Federal Republic. 
At the stroke of midnight on 2 nd October 1990, barely perceptible amid the 
fireworks and jubilant cries, Federal President von Weizsacker gave a brief statement 
of three sentences in front of the Reichstag, to mark the birth of united Germany. 
862 
In sum, the Federal President pledged united Germany's commitment to a united 
Europe. At the official unification ceremony hours later, the EU defined the nexus of 
"" See, for example, Herzog, 1994, Ansprache, 841-843 and Thierse, 2001, Bundestagspräsident, 
www. bundestag. de. 
859 See, for example, Glockengeläut, Feuerwerk und Volksfeste, 1990,1. 
"0 See, for exampie, Tag der Deutschen Einheit. Eine Zusammenfassung, 1996, Bayerischer 
Rundfunk. 
861 See, for example, Zum Nationalfeiertag starke Sicherheitsvorkehrungen, 1992,2. 
862 See Reuth, R. G. (1990, October 4). Sie tanzen, singen und trinken auf das vereinigte Vaterland. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3. 
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rhetoric: each of the Day of Unity orators emphasised at length Germany's continued 
commitment to the EU in the post-Cold War setting. Bundestag President SlIssmuth 
and Federal President von Weizsdcker stressed that Germany's loyalty to the EU was 
not newfound but rather a continuation of foreign policy since 1945. 'We gained 
trust after - 1945', Sassmuth stated, a trust that, as von Weizs5cker described 'grew 
with the Federal Republic'. 'We want', SUssmuth continued, 'to maintain that trust 
and not to disappoint'. 863 The Bundestag President further stressed Germany's 
commitment to the EU by expressing the country's desire for a 'United States of 
Europe', a phrase promoted by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in his 
Zurich address of 1946.864 Reflecting the diluted enthusiasm for the project of EU 
integration, in Germany as well as much of the EU from the early 1990s, 865 this 
particular term with very strong federalist connotations did not, however, re-emerge 
again on the Day of Unity in the period from 1990 to 2005. Mayor of Berlin Momper 
similarly expressed Germany's continued dedication to the EU as a means of 
countering fears of 'many Europeans ... who look with concern at [the] new, large, 
German state' . 
866 Former Volkskammer President Bergmann-Pohl went yet further 
by placing German self-understanding as inextricably linked to the EU, 'We 
promise', she stated, 'to be as European as we are German'. 867 References to the EU 
thus played an important role on the German national holiday from its inception. 
Day of Unity actors underlined Gennany's allegiance to the EU in other ways 
at the unity anniversaries that followed, as we will see, yet it was not until 1999 that 
they did this in the context of explicitly reaffirming Germany's commitment to 
traditional foreign policy values. Throughout his 1999 Day of Unity address, 
Chancellor Schr6der pledged Germany's commitment to multilateral ism, particularly 
to the EU, and underlined that the German tradition of a 'culture of reticence' with 
regard to the use of force remained integral to Germany's self-understanding. He 
underlined that Germany remained committed to only using military force when 
863 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
'64 For the fall speech see The Churchill Society London: Churchill's speeches. (2000). Retrieved 
May 7,2008, from http: //www. churchill-society-london. org. uk. 
965 See Otte & Greve, 2000, A rising middle power, 13 1. 
966 See Momper's speech: Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
$67 See Ibid. 
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absolutely unavoidable and necessary to secure peace and security in Europe. 868 
Against this backdrop, Hesse Minister-President Koch emphasised the strong bond 
between Germany and the EU, without which, he stressed, German unification could 
not have taken place. The symbolic invitation of newly elected European 
Commission President Romano Prodi as the main guest of honour that year similarly 
served to place Germany's continued steadfastness to the EU at the centre of the Day 
of Unity. Koch remarked that it was particularly fitting that Prodi should hold his 
first speech as President of the European Commission in Germany and on the Day of 
Unity. 869 
The emphasis of German commitment to the traditional foreign policy 
principles on the ninth Day of Unity anniversary can be accounted for by three key 
factors that had unsettled the international community. Firstly, Schr6der had been 
elected as Chancellor in late September 1998. Schr6der, unlike his forerunner Kohl, 
did not belong to a generation for whom European integration represented 'a matter 
of war and peace'. 970 Instead, the new Chancellor, a 'sixty-eighter' whose political 
socialisation took place in a democratic, westernised, post-war Germany, 871 
considered his generation not to be Europeans 'because [they] have to be' but because 
'[they] want to be', as a result of which they were 'freer in dealing with others'. 872 
More so than his predecessors, Schr6der thus unabashedly focused on the national 
costs and advantages for Germany in EU matters, particularly with regard to the 
financial burden of EU enlargement. 973 Budgetary concerns had indeed become more 
pressing in united Germany in light of the considerable financial burden of Aujbau 
Ost. The stance of the new Chancellor raised concern among Germany's EU 
"" Schr6der, 1999, Rede, 635-637. 
16' Koch, 1999, Rede, 633. 
... Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 8. A number of studies have explored the 
extent to which German foreign policy altered during the Red-Green government see, in particular, 
Harnisch, S., & Maull, 11. (Eds. ). (200 1). Germany as a foreign power? The foreign policy of the 
Berlin Republic. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Wittlinger, R., & Larose, M. (2007). No 
future for Germany's past? Collective memory and German foreign policy. German Politics, 16(4), 
481-495. 
871 1 lyde-Price, 2000, Germany and European order, 5. 
872 Schr6der made this announcement shortly after his election: see Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's 
European diplomacy, 109. 
$73 See Slown, J. (2003). 'Responsibility for Europe': The EU policy of the German Social Democrats 
since unification. German Politics, 12(l), 59-78. 
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partners, particularly Germany's traditional core EU partner France, about the extent 
to which Germany would remain committed to the EU. 874 
Secondly, between September 1998 and March 1999, the newly formed 
governing coalition of SPI) and Greens came to the decision to commit Bundeswehr 
air-force units to a combat mission in Serbia under NATO command. 875 German 
forces were, in contrast to the intervention in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, acting for the 
first time without a UN mandate. German participation in the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo evoked fears, not least within the coalition parties themselves, that Germany 
was turning away from established post-war foreign policy, namely its traditional 
'culture of reticence'. 876 
Thirdly, the move of political power from provincial Bonn to the more 
cosmopolitan Berlin, originally decided in 1991,877 sent further alarm bells ringing in 
the international community. The values Bonn had symbolised, namely modesty and 
Westbindung, looked threatened in the move to this imposing eastern German city 
and former capital of Prussia and Imperial Germany. 879 Moreover, Chancellor 
Schr6der framed the supposed end of the 'Bonn Republic' and the beginning of a so- 
called Berlin Republic as marking the transition to a new start for Germany. 
Consequently, the Chancellor argued, key topics, such as 'drawing a line' under the 
National Socialist past and German self-assertiveness and influence in EU matters, 
could be brought into question . 
879 Against this background, many feared that they 
were witnessing a turning-point in Germany's relation to the EU and the rest of the 
world. It was in this context that German political actors underlined, at the ninth Day 
874 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 3-58. 
875 Hacke, C. (2002). Between benevolent multilateralism and new zest for action: German foreign 
policy after ten years of reunification. In J. Leonhard & L. Funk (Eds. ), Ten years of German 
unification: transfer, transformation, incorporation? Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press, 
115-123, here 123. 
$76 See Berger, 2002, The power of memory, 77-78. 
$77 For details of the negotiations and debates that led to this decision see From Bonn to Berlin: the 
decision to move to Berlin. (2000). Retrieved, January 8,2008, from http: //www. bundestag. de/ 
htdocs-e/art-arch/bonntoberlin/decis. html. 
878 Ilyde-Price, 2000, Germany andEuropean order, 219. 
$79 See Paterson, W. E. (2000). From the Bonn to the Berlin republic. German politics, 9(l), 2340. See 
also Brunssen, F. (2001). Das neue Selbstverstdndnis der Berliner Republik. Aus Polilik und 
Zeitgeschichle, B1 -2,6-14. 
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of Unity celebrations, that Germany under a new government and in a new capital 
remained committed to the country's traditional foreign policy tenets. 
5.1.2 A platform to counter Euro-scepticism 
The EU-isation of the 1993 celebrations in Saarbrucken and those in 2005 in Potsdam 
served a very different purpose. At these celebrations, the political actors did not so 
much attempt to influence attitudes abroad, but rather to change opinions at home. 
More so than the other unity festivities, these 3 td October anniversaries served to 
promote the EU to the Gen-nan public in order to maintain their support for this 
supra-national organisation. 
Of all the unity celebrations from 1990 to 2005, those in SaarbrUcken were the 
most EU-centric. Three key elements underline the denationalisation of the German 
national holiday by EU-isation on the third anniversary. Firstly, the President of the 
European Commission Jacques Delors was selected as the main speaker. Known to 
the world media as 'Mr. Europe', 880 Delors, President of the European Commission 
from 1985 to 1995, was the 'recognisable voice - and face - of European 
integration'. 881 On the Day of Unity, Delors stood as a guest symbolic of Germany's 
inextricable link with the EU. 
Secondly, the rhetoric of the German political -actors was dominated by 
references to the EU. Both Bundestag President StIssmuth and Minister-President of 
Saarland Lafontaine explicitly underlined the necessity of the unbreakable ties 
between Germany and the EU in their speeches. SlIssmuth stressed that Germany 
held a 'great responsibility' for Europe and called for Germans to understand that 
4only with Europe' would they 'have a future'; she was keen on this being mentioned 
much more frequently in united Germany. 882 Lafontaine devoted the majority of his 
Day of Unity address to the promotion of the EU. The Saarland Minister-President 
8'0 Drake, H. (2000). Jacques Delors: perspectives on a European leader. London: Routledge, 1. 
"' Ibid., 15. In 1990, conscious of Germany's importance to the EU and eager for the latter to have 
some influence in the unification process, Delors had strongly advocated the importance of unification 
taking place within a European framework. In that vein, in January of 1990, he argued that East 
Germany should be viewed as a 'special case' and granted a place within the community. See 
Anderson, 1999, German unification, 34. 
892 SfIssmuth, 1993, Ansprache, 934. 
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called for a postnational understanding of Germany's relation to the EU, stating that 
dovercoming nation-states in a united Europe must remain our goal'. With the 
analogy of a Russian doll, he described how he envisaged a 'nation in a nation, in a 
nation... ' to promote a trilogy of regional, national and European affiliation, which 
characterised the staging of the Day of Unity anniversaries from 1990 to 2005. 'If 
Europe really wants to become Europe, he argued, quoting renowned SPD politician 
and academic Carlo Schmid's declaration of the early 1970s, 'there must one day be a 
'nation Europe'. 883 
The Saarland was occupied by France after World War I but became 
reintegrated into the German Reich in 1935; it was then again separated from 
Germany in 1946 when it became an economically and politically dependent territory 
of France before it rejoined the Federal Republic on I't January 1957 through a 
referendum of the Saar population. 884 On the Day of Unity, Lafontaine, who was 
born in Saarland in 1943, presented the history of his home Land as a tale of a federal 
state torn between two nation-states to illustrate the need for Germans to overcome 
thinking about nations in terms of nation-states . 
885 As a further example of the high 
level of influence of regional actors, as Bundesrat President in 1993, Lafontaine, 
responsible for the staging of the third unity anniversary, told reporters that since he 
wanted the German national holiday to frame the nation in a European context the 
event had been organised as a 'festival of solidarity' and a 'festival of friendship 
between peoples'. 896 
Thirdly, the EU elements largely replaced national elements at the citizens' 
festival. Saarland became a member of SaarLorLux, a 'Euroregion' encompassing 
Saarland, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Western Rhineland-Palatinate and Wallonia in 
1971. Lafontaine explained that he had invited representatives from these states and 
regions, such as Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jacques Santer, as well as a number of 
883 Lafontaine, 0. (1993). Ansprache des Prasidenten des Bundesrates. Bulletin. 81,930-93 1, here 93 1. 
894 For a recent analysis of the Saarland's history 'see Elzer, 11. (2007). Die deutsche 
Wiedervereinigung an der Saar. St. Ingelbert: 116hrig Universitatsveriag. 
... Lafontaine, 1993, Ansprache, 930 - 93 1. 816 Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3 and Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993,1993, 
Saarlandischer Rundfunk. 
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7 businesses, to emphasise the European dimension of the Day of Unity. 88 From the 
St. Johanner Markt and along the south bank of the Saar River, businesses from these 
regions promoted tourism and their local produce. 88' Representatives from other EU 
member states meanwhile provided entertainment throughout the streets of the city. 
A group of flag-throwers from the Italian region of Tuscany, for example, who 
represented a key highlight of the citizens' festival, performed 'for a better European 
future'. Wanda Kirst from the Italian Consulate, who accompanied the group, said 
that since German unification was a 'European affair' it was important for Italy, as 
represented through one of the regions, to be present on the Day of Unity. 889 
This can be understood in the broad context of a 'Europe of regions'. Recent 
literature has suggested that a form of 'new regionalism' has developed in Europe as 
a result of global isation. 890 'Regions' also became a favoured political entity within 
the EU with rhetoric of a 'Europe of the regions' as part of what political scientists 
have described as 'multilevel' governance. Such a 'Europe of regions' was to some 
extent institutional ised in the EU through the formation of the Brussels-based 
Committee of the Regions, which was created in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty and 
which sat for the first time in 1994 to increase the participation of regional actors in 
EU affairs . 
89 1 German political actors rarely explicitly referred to the concept in their 
Day of Unity speecheS892 and only a very small number of speakers indirectly made 
887 Der Jahrestag der Deutschen Einheit. (1993, Oetober 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2. 
... Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3. 
889 Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993,1993, Saarländischer Rundfunk. 
890 See, for example, Bonss, W. (2007). Globalisicrung, Rcgionalisierung, Glokalisierung. Zur 
Bedeutung des Regionalen in der modernisierten Moderne. Jahrbuchfar Regionalgeschichle, 25,15- 
28; Koziol, K. (2003). Globalisierung oder die Renaissance der Region. In A. Dornheim & S. 
Greiffenhagen (Eds), Identital und polilische Kultur. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 54-63; Telb, M. 
(200 1). (Ed. ). European Union and new regionalism: regional actors and glohal governance in a post- 
hegemonic era. Aldershot: Ashgate; Ilettne, B., Inotai A., & Sunkel, 0. (Eds. ). Globalism and the new 
regionalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; Keating, M. (1998). The new regionalism in Western 
Europe: territorial restructuring andpolitical change. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
891 EU funding programmes, legitimised and underwritten by this regional rhetoric, also created 
financial and economic motives for especial attachment to the idea of regions. For an overview of the 
EU's regional funding programs see Grants, funds andprogrammes by EUpolicy. (2008). Retrieved 
July 11,2008, from http: //ec. curopa. cu/grants/index 
- 
en. htm#policy and particularly ERDF. European 
Regional Development fund. (2008). Retrieved July 11,2008, from http: //europa. cu/scadplus/leg/en/ 
lvbA60015. htm. 
992 Mayor of Berlin Momper made one of the very few references in his 1990 address: see Tag der 
Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
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893 
reference to the idea by describing their Land as rooted in Europe. The notion 
nevertheless expressed itself in the staging of the unity events where regional, 
national and EU elements intertwined. Regional actors, for example, spoke about EU 
topics, regional and EU flags stood either side of the national flag at the majority of 
Day of Unity ceremonies and the EU-isation of the event, as explored in this chapter, 
took place in a regional arena owing to the rotating, sub-national organisation of the 
celebrations. 
The citizens' festival in SaarbrOcken attracted around 300,000 people, 894 an 
average attendance for the Day of Unity celebrations. Nevertheless, both Chancellor 
Kohl and Federal President von WeizsAcker sought to frame the EU-dominated event 
as, in Kohl's words, 'by far the most successftil' celebrations so far. 895 Stressing the 
link between the German nation and the EU, von WeizsRcker told reporters he 
considered it 'wonderful' that key German political actors had given speeches 
alongside the President of the European Commission on the German national 
holiday. 896 Their enthusiasm for the way in which the event was staged implies that 
the German Chancellor and Federal President also sought to promote the EU on the 
third Day of Unity by influencing attitudes about the success of the EU-isation of the 
German national holiday. This, combined with the promotion of the EU elements by 
other speakers and organisers, points to a consensus on the merits of the EU staging 
among political actors from across the political spectrum. 
The promotion of the EU and the extent of denationalisation of the German 
national holiday through EU-isation in 1993 can be attributed to a number of factors. 
To some extent, it can be explained by Lafontaine's own influence over the 
celebrations. The location of the unity event also especially lent itself to an EU- 
centric organisation. As StIssmuth stated in her unity address, 'where better' could 
the preamble to the constitution, 'a united Germany in a united Europe', be expressed 
on Germany's national holiday than in the Saarland, a border Land in the heart of the 
893 See, for exainple, Koch's speech: Koch, 1999, Rede, 633-635. 
894 Kauntz, 1993, Das schwarz-rot-goldne Band, 3. 
'95 Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993,1993, Saarländischer Rundfunk. 
896 ibid. 
221 
EU . 
897 However, one must look predominantly to the shift from 'Euro-optimism' to 
'Euro-scepticism' in Germany in the early 1990s, as emphasised in the speeches of 
998 both Delors and Sassmuth. In 1992 and 1993, there was evidence of 
disillusionment with the EU among citizens of its member states. On 2 nd June 1992, 
for example, the Danes unexpectedly rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum; 
three months later, on 20'h September, the same treaty was only narrowly accepted by 
the French. 899 For Germany, the Maastricht Treaty was of symbolic as well as of 
substantive importance: Kohl's early pledge of his country's commitment to 
Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU), after the fall of the 
Wall, an issue at the core of the treaty, had in many respects facilitated unification. 
Since EMU would increase the ties between Germany and the EU, for many in the 
international community it symbolised the opportunity to 'tie Germany down in 
Europe'. 900 
However, in the early 1990s public opinion in Germany became sceptical of 
the Maastricht Treaty, 901 which was signed on 7th February 1992. Concerns about the 
domestic economy, arising from the challenges created by unification and fomented 
by the media hype about the death of the deutschmark, together with the European 
exchange rate crises of 1992 and the general inertia in EU affairs, bred discontent 
about the EMU. There were serious concerns among many Germans that 
unrestrained political, and more importantly, financial commitment to Europe would 
902 be disadvantageous to their country. The Maastricht Treaty, widely considered 
both by German and EU elites as central to the deepening of the EU, eventually 
entered into force on I't November 1993 after a second successful Danish 
referendum, less than a month after the third Day of Unity celebrations in 
Saarbrucken. The EU-centric staging on 3 rd October 1993 can thus largely be 
understood as an attempt to address and militate against Euro-scepticism. The Day of 
897 Sossmuth, 1993, Ansprache, 932. 
'9' ibid., 934 and Delors, J. (1993). Ansprache des Prasidenten der EG-Kommission. Bulletin. 81,934- 
935, here 934. 
19' Anderson, 1999, German unification, 45. 
9'0 McCarthy, P. (1999). France, Germany, the IGC and eastern enlargement. In D. Webber (Ed. ), 
(1999). The Franco-German relationship in the European Union. London: Routledge, 41-57, here 48. 
'01 Otte& Greve, 2000, Arising middle power, 118. 
9" Anderson, 1999, German unification, 46-47. 
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Unity served as a platform for both German and EU political actors to promote the 
importance and benefit of the EU to the German public. This was in the interest not 
only of the German political actors, keen for their citizens to be enthusiastic about the 
EU project in the service of enhancing its democratic legitimacy, but also for the EU 
guests and speakers, particularly for Delors, whose Commission had provided the 
momentum for the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The German political actors once again used the Day of Unity as an 
instrument for overcoming Euro-scepticism in a climate of so-called 'Eurosclerosis' 
in 2005. On 29th October 2004, representatives from each of the EU member states 
had signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). This treaty, 
which aimed to restructure decision-making and to codify human rights, was subject 
to ratification by each of the twenty-five member states. In Germany, where the 
Basic Law does not provide for referenda, the Bundestag and Bundesrat had ratified 
the European 'Constitutional Treaty. On 29'h May 2005, however, the French 
electorate rejected the treaty in a referendum; three days later, the constitution also 
failed to receive sufficient support for ratification in the Netherlands. As a result, 
other EU member states chose to halt the ratification process in their countries. The 
breakdown of the constitution's ratification process plunged the EU into crisis. 
Following a 'period of reflection', political actors from across the EU began to accept 
that, if popular support for the EU was to be achieved, they must promote the 
community as more than simply an economic space. 903 Within this context, many 
believed that emphasis on shared values which united all EU member states - 
particularly respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and the respect for human rights as outlined in Article Two of the drafted 
Constitutional Treaty 904 _ could help overcome public apathy towards the EU. In this 
context, on the Day of Unity later that year, Bundestag President Thierse argued that 
for 'inner unity' in Europe -a term traditionally reserved for intra-German relations 
on the Day of Unity anniversaries - the EU must look beyond economic competition 
903 For a recent analysis of the need to focus on values rather than policies in an attempt to construct a 
sense of EU-consciousness see, in particular, Karolewski, I. P., & Kaina, V. (Eds. ). (2006). European 
identity: theoretical perspectives and empirical insights. Berlin: LIT Verlag. 
904 Mulvey, S. (2004). EU Values: unified in diversity? Retrieved January 28,2008, from http: // 
wNvw. news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe/3280697. stm. 
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and build a common social community with shared values. 905 Minister-President of 
Brandenburg Platzeck similarly stressed that Germans must remain committed to the 
EU and criticised the way in which, although Europeans were no longer afraid of 
Germany, Germany was now afraid of its future and of its role in Europe. 906 Forthe 
German public, uncertainty about the future of the EU was fuelled not only by the 
waning 'permissive consensus' 907 on the desirability of the EU and further integration 
but also by its enlargement to the East. 908 
5.1.3 German unity and European unity: 'two sides of the same coin' 
Particularly in the early years after unification and again in 1997 and in 2004, the EU- 
isation of the Day of Unity manifested itself in the considerable amount of rhetoric 
dedicated to EU enlargement. As part of a larger discourse about Germany's 
commitment to the EU more generally, the Day of Unity served as a platform for 
German political actors to promote EU eastern enlargement. It also acted as a forum 
for representatives from other EU member states, particularly France, to do so. 
Dedication to, and promotion of, 'widening' the EU manifested itself both in the 
fostering of relations with particular Eastern European partners, as discussed later, as 
well as through the staging of the unity events. 
In the twentieth century, Germany's challenging and fragile relationship with 
Central and Eastern Europe was shaped by conflict and catastrophe. During World 
War 1, Germany had attempted to draw Eastern and South-Eastern Europe further into 
their sphere of economic and political influence. In the subsequent decades - before, 
during and after World War 11 - Germany's relations with its Eastern European 
neighbours saw a number of different phases: conflict annihilation, suppression, 
"5 Thierse, 2005, Rede, www. bundestag. de. 
906 Platzeck, 2005, Rede, www. stk. brandenburg. de. 
907 This is a phrase originally coined by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold: see Lindberg, L.. ' & 
Scheingold, S. (1970). Europe's would-bepolity. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
90' For statistics of changes in German attitudes toward the EU since unification see Busch, K., & 
Knelangen, W. (2004). German Euro-scepticism. In R. Harmsden & M. Spiering (Eds. ), 
Euroscepticism: party politics, national identity and European integration. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 83- 
98, here 85-86. For an examination of the possible implications for the future of negative attitudes 
toward the EU see Fligstein, N. (2008). Euroclash. - the EU, European identity and the future of 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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liberation and d6tente. 909 At the end of the Cold War - an ending which opened the 
gateway to the West for Germany's eastern neighbours - the German government 
provided the momentum for the eastern enlargement of the EU; 910 they spearheaded, 
for example, EU assistance programmes such as the 'Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
for Restructuring their Economies' (PHARE) initiative and the 'Technical Aid to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States' (TACIS) programme. 911 
At the first Day of Unity anniversary, Mayor of Hamburg Voscherau stated 
that with the process of German unity complete, Germany must stand by the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 912 A year later, Minister-President of Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania Seite also stressed the 'heavy responsibility' of Germany in 
Eastern Europe. 913 In 1997, Gen-nan political actors, particularly Chancellor Kohl, 
spoke at length about Germany's 'moral responsibility and duty' to its neighbours to 
the East, stressing that Germany must 'push forward with the unification of Europe at 
full power'. 914 To reassure the international community that Germany's commitment 
to eastern enlargement would not lead to the country becoming a non-aligned broker 
between East and West, an idea chiefly popular among the SPD in the early years 
after World War 11, Kohl stated that 'Germany cannot and will not be a 'bridge' 
between East and West'. The Chancellor instead implied that Germany, no longer 
anxious on account of its Millellage in Europe, could only assist the CEE states by 
being fully rooted in the West; Germany, he argued, could 'hold open the door' to the 
EU for the new democracies. 9 15 The promotion of eastern enlargement in 1997 can 
be understood in the context of the publication of the first Agenda 2000 report and the 
signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In July 1997, the European Commission 
published the Agenda 2000, a document which outlined the EU's vision for its 
enlargement. This report signified a major step towards eastern enlargement as it 
highlighted a group of states, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
9" MChle, E. (2003). Introduction. In E. MUhle (Ed. ), Germany and the European East in the twentieth 
century. Oxford: Berg, 1-6, here 1. 
910 Berger, 2002, The power of memory, 94. 
911 Anderson, 1999. German unification, 53. 
912 Deutschland feiert, 1991,1-2. 
9" Seite, 1992, Ansprache, 1007. 
914 Kohl, 11. (1997). Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers. Bulletin, 80,936-939, here 937. 
915 Ih id. 
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Slovenia, Estonia, plus Cyprus, with which the EU could begin accession talks. 916 In 
addition to this, on 2 nd October 1997, the day before the seventh German unity 
anniversary, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed. This treaty, which came into force 
on I' May 1999, increased the powers of the European Parliament, deepened the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and aimed to reform the EU institutions in 
preparation for enlargement. In 2004, six months after ten new member states had 
acceded to the EU on I" May, the Day of Unity celebrations were once more devoted 
to the topic of eastern enlargement. The festivities in Erfurt were staged to celebrate 
15 years since the peaceful revolution not only in East Germany but also in Central 
and Eastern Europe, as a gesture toward the new members of the EU. The latter were 
invited to present themselves at stands on the Landermeile as part of the citizens' 
festival entitled '1989 to 2004: 15 Years of Peace and Freedom for Europe. 91 7 The 
multimedia event 'In Every Way: Germany in Europe', largely dedicated to the 
peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe and the enlargement of the EU, formed the 
highlight to mark the end of the 2004 unity celebrations. 918 Although the regional 
actors had full discretionary powers in staging the events - and thus had the potential 
to influence international topics - without exception, they all chose to underline 
Germany's habitual commitment to the EU, in line with the prevailing discourses 
among mainstream German political actors in united Gen-nany. 
The focus on EU enlargement on the 3 rd October anniversaries by the German 
political actors can be understood not only as part of Germany's strategic trade and 
security priorities and 'moral obligation' as discussed later, but also as a further 
opportunity to frame German unification as a supra-national (EU) event. At the 
inaugural unification ceremony, Federal President von Weizsdckcr framed the 
division of Germany at the end of World War 11 as the 'defining symbol of European 
unity'. 919 In this context, Bundestag President Stissmuth portrayed German 
unification as an 'important building block' for Europe. 920 At the subsequent unity 
anniversaries, regional, national and international guest speakers similarly depicted 
'" On this process see Anderson, 1999, German unification, 54. 
917 Festakt Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 2004, Thüringer Staatskanzlei, 5. 
"' M. Meinung, personal communication, November 27,2006 and February 15,2007. 
919 Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
920 ibid. 
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German unification in European terms. For Minister-President of Bavaria, Stoiber, 
for example, the opening of the Iron Curtain 'changed the face of our continent' and 
'did not give only Germans unity'. Instead, he stated, it brought about the possibility 
for Europe to 'become a truly pan-European community' . 
92 1 Federal President Rau 
went so far as to present German unity and European unity as 'two sides of the same 
coin'. 922 Foreign guest speaker Polish writer Szczypiorski similarly considered 
German unity a 'step toward the unity of the whole of Europe'. 923 The Hungarian 
Prime Minister Horn also stressed the extent to which German unification had shaped 
the future perspectives of the EU. 924 He went on to further present 3 rd October as a 
Day of European Unity by stating that the Day of Unity represented the 'promise of a 
united Europe'. 925 In this way, denationalisation of the German national holiday was 
promoted not only by the German but also by the international political actors. 
The focus on the EU, rather than German domestic topics, allowed the 
international guest speakers to promote their own agendas pertaining to eastern 
enlargement. In 1999, main speaker European Commission President Prodi exploited 
this opportunity to call for readiness for reform from the EU member states, so that 
the 'exciting and ambitious project' of enlargement might be realised. 926 The 
following year, in line with other Day of Unity speakers' appeals for rapid integration 
of the CEE states, main speaker French President Chirac dedicated over half of his 
speech to the promotion of eastern enlargement and the consequent need for EU 
reform. For Chirac, enlargement did not threaten the 'solidarity' among existing EU 
member states, but, he argued, considerable institutional reform was nevertheless 
necessary to ensure the EU was not weakened. 927 In expressing the EU's 
commitment to its eastern neighbours, Chirac employed particularly emotive 
'21 Stoiber, 1996, Ansprache, 829. 
922 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
923 Szczypiorski, 1994, Ansprache, 844. 
924 Horn, 1996, Ansprache, 834. 
925 Ibid. ' 837. 926 Prodi, R. (1999). Rede des Präsidenten der Europäischen Kommission Professor Romano Prodi. 
Bulletin, 62,637. 
927 Chirac, 2000, Jacques Chirac, wmv. sachsen. de. 
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language, 'We are waiting impatiently for you! ' he declared, 'Our support will not be 
928 lacking'. 
Chirac's emphasis on EU enlargement in his Day of Unity address can be 
accounted for by a number of factors. Firstly, France held the rotating EU 
Presidency; the main goal for the French EU Presidency, as Chirac expressed in his 
3 rd October speech, was the reform of the EU institutions. Secondly, an 
intergovernmental conference was due to take place just two months later on 110, 
December. Its task was to streamline decision-making in the EU in preparation for 
enlargement (as a result of the conference, the Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 th 
February 2001 and came into force on I' February 2003). Thirdly, Chirac's 
enthusiastic support of eastern enlargement can be understood as an attempt by the 
French President to woo the CEE states - by the late 1990s, Chirac had become 
929 determined to 'stop seeing eastern enlargement as an inevitable defeat for France'. 
Many political actors in France were indeed concerned that, in stark contrast to its 
German neighbour, their country was not benefiting sufficiently from progressive 
association and integration of the CEE states . 
930 Finally, by concentrating on the 
reform of EU institutions, Chirac had selected a topic on which both French and 
German political actors agreed. In a climate of strained Franco-German relations, the 
emphasis that 'deepening' of the EU was a prerequisite for its 'widening', served to 
unite the two governments. 931 It is to the way in which the Day of Unity served to 
improve international, predominantly EU relations, the chapter now turns. 
928 ihid. 
97,9 McCarthy, 1999, France, Germany, 53. 
930 Accession of the CEE states to the EU had, in many respects, presented more opportunities for 
Germany than for France. Germany was geographically better situated than its western ally to benefit 
economically from the transition of the CEE states and their eventual inclusion in the EU. See Otte & 
Greve, 2000, A rising middle power, 59. Moreover, the once-deliberated enlargement of the EU across 
the Mediterranean, in which France had considerable security and economic interests, ceased to be a 
priority as a result of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the need to integrate the CEE states in the 
EU. See Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 115. In 1991, the Weimar Triangle, 
comprising the defence ministers and heads of state or government from France, Germany and the 
largest of the CEE states Poland, was formed, not least to allow France to feet more involved in 
enlargement policy. See Martisen, K. D. (2005). The end of the affair? Germany's relationship with 
France. German Politics, 14(4), 401416. 
931 See Stark, H. (2006). The Franco-German relationship, 1998-2005. In IT. W. Maull (Ed. ), 
Germany's uncertain power: foreign policy of the Berlin Republic. Basingstokc: Palgrave Macmillan, 
109-121. 
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5.2. Fostering relations with strategic partners 
Alongside the EU-isation of the events visible in the attempts to stress Germany's 
commitment to traditional foreign policy tenets, to overcome Euro-scepticism and to 
promote EU enlargement, it also manifested itself in the hierarchy of bilateral 
relations presented by the political actors on the Day of Unity. Day of Unity 
organisers invited international guests to give the main address on the German 
national holiday as a gesture towards the respective speaker's country. 932 The choice 
of international speaker influenced the topic of the speeches of the German political 
actors, who exploited the visitor's presence as an opportunity to redefine Germany's 
'official' view toward, and strengthen relations with, the respective country. Other 
elements of the staging also suggest that the Day of Unity served as an arena in which 
the German political actors tried to improve bilateral relations with strategic partners. 
An examination of the staging of the unity celebrations from 1990 to 2005 reveals 
that German political actors sought to foster bilateral relations with countries 
particularly important for reasons of shared history, shared commercial interests and 
shared security concerns - to some extent the US, but predominantly EU states. 
5.2.1 Germany and the US after 1990: old friends, new challenges 
German-US relations dominated the seventh unity anniversary, played a minor role 
on the eleventh anniversary and formed the focus of the twelfth Day of Unity 
commemorations. In 1997, Minister-President of Baden-Wtlrttcmberg Teufel stated, 
in his Day of Unity address, that Germany did not 'owe a great deal' but rather 
'everything' to the US. 933 In this context, he invited Former US President George 
H. W. Bush as a gesture of gratitude to the US. 934 The US had indeed assisted 
Germany in a number of ways: by providing considerable financial support, 9's 
932 K. Sondergeld, personal communication, November 16,2006. 
933 Teufel, 1997, Ansprache, 934. 
934 ibid. 
935 During the Cold War, the US assisted Germany in many ways. In economic terms, the US devoted 
approximately 1.7 billion dollars to West Germany as part of the Government and Relief in Occupied 
Areas (GARIOA) programme. The US also developed the Marshall Plan in 1948 to stimulate the 
economic recovery of West Germany and other European states, through which the US made a further 
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protecting the German security environmen ? 36 and by remaining largely supportive 
of unification throughout the Cold War period. 937 
In the context of the aid provided to Germany by the US during the Cold War, 
it was particularly fitting that Bush was invited to speak on the Day of Unity in 1997: 
a number of German political actors, including Chancellor Kohl, had just 
commemorated the 50th anniversary of the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 
Washington in May that year. 1997 also saw another gesture of German-US alliance. 
On 5h June 1972, to celebrate the imminent 25d'anniversary of the Marshall Plan and 
as a gesture of thanks to the US, West German Chancellor Brandt had announced the 
creation of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), a German-funded 
institution developed to establish and strengthen cultural, educational and business 
ties between Germans and Americans. In 1997, despite having fulfilled its 
commitment to fund the institution for twenty-five years, the German Bundestag 
nevertheless decided to continue its yearly endowment of 10 Million deutschmarks 
and established the German Program for Transatlantic Contact. 938 
The US, with George H. W. Bush as its President, had supported German 
unification and played a major role in convincing many of Germany's more sceptical 
European neighbours. 939 Unification was indeed to some extent made possible 
loan ofjust under 1.4 billion dollars to the western LAnder and, from'1949, the Federal Republic. See 
Maier, C. S., & Bischof, G. (Eds. ). (1991). The Marshall Plan and Germany. Oxford: Berg; llogan, M. 
J. (1987). The MarshallPlan: America, Britain andthe reconstruction of 9esternEurope. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press and Abclshauser, W. (1975). Mrischafi in lVesideutschland 194.5-1948: 
Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen Zone. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- 
Anstalt. 
936 Perhaps most famously in the Berlin Air Lift of June 1948 to May 1949 when Soviet troops blocked 
road and rail access to West Berlin. Later the US provided Germany with significant American 
military presence and promoted German entry into NATO in 1955. 
9'7 This was expressed in a number of symbolic and practical ways. On 2e June 1963 in his famous 
'Ich bin ein Berliner' speech at the Rathaus Sch6neberg in Berlin, US President John F. Kennedy 
allayed West German concerns of a lack of US interest in German unification following the 
construction of the Berlin Wall. As a further expression of US solidarity, on 12d' June 1987, US 
President Ronald Reagan challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to 'tear down' the Berlin Wall. 
When the Wall finally fell in November 1989, the US, as Teufel stressed in his Day of Unity address, 
had 'stood by Germany'. Teu 
, 
fel, 1997, Ansprache, 934. 
9'a Stern, S. (2001). Marshall Plan 1947-1997. a German view. Retrieved January 10,2008 from 
httP: //www. germany. info/relaunch/culture/history/marshall. htmi. 
939 For a detailed overview of the US's role in unification see Zelikow, P., & Rice, C. (1995). Germany 
unified and Europe transformed Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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through German-US diplomacy. 940 On the seventh Day of Unity anniversary, both 
Chancellor Kohl and former President Bush, key actors in the unification process, 
emphasised the importance of the transatlantic alliance of 1989/90. In speeches 
dominated by mutual back-patting - Bush, for example, referred to Kohl's 
contribution to unification seventeen times 941 _ these two architects of unification 
reminisced about the German-US partnership and emphasised the continued 
importance of strong German-US relations in united Germany. Kohl, for instance, 
stated that because close diplomatic co-operation with the US was of 'existential 
importance', 942 in the same way that Germans 'could and can rely on the United 
States', the US has, 'now and in the future', a 'reliable friend and partner' in 
Germany. 943 
On the eleventh Day of Unity anniversary, German political actors expressed 
sympathy for, and pledged solidarity with, the US following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
less than a month earlier. 944 In this particular context, the staging of the eleventh Day 
of Unity also sought to strengthen the alliance. As part of the international year of 
volunteers, a 'Courage Gala' was organised in the Mainz Staatstheater, at which high- 
profile German politicians awarded the most prestigious prize to a courageous 
American fire-fighter who rescued numerous victims from the collapsing World 
Trade Tower buildings on September II th. 945 Furthermore, at the citizens festival, in 
a space provided for them, a large group of US firemen surrounded by US flags sold 
badges marked with '11.9.2001' to raise funds for the families of firemen killed 
during the 9/11 rescue efforts. Despite the strong sýnse of attachment exhibited in 
2001, during the following year German-US relations underwent a turbulent 
transformation, predominantly over divergent interpretations, not least among the 
political leaders of the two countries, of whether or not it was necessary to declare 
war on Saddam. Hussein's Iraq. By 2002 then, unlike the seventh, and to some extent 
940 Szabo, 2004, Parting ways, 4. 
94' See Bush, G. (1997). Ansprache von US-Prasident a. D. George Bush. Bulletin, 80,939-940. 
942 Kohl, 1997, Ansprache, 937. 
943 Ibid., 936. 
944 See, for example, the speeches of Thierse and Beck: Thierse, 2001, Bundesiagsprasident, www. 
bundestag. de; 11 Jahre deutsche Einheit. ý Alainz 2001 Tag der Deutschen Einheit. (2001). Mainz: 
Staatskanzlei Rheinland Pfalz. 
945 Ibid., i. 
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the eleventh, anniversaries, which had both attempted to further strengthen an already 
firm alliance, the twelfth Day of Unity was strapped with the task of improving a 
somewhat soured relationship. 
Although a small number of well-known international poets, novelists and 
former politicians also stood as main speakers on the-Day of Unity, German political 
actors principally expressed their country's 'friendship' toward another nation by 
inviting the incumbent head of state of the respective country. For the twelfth 
anniversary, however, the American invited to give an address on the Day of Unity 
was not President George W. Bush. Chancellor Schroder had angered the US 
President during his re-election campaign, when, on 3 rd September 2002, he explicitly 
stated that, even with a UN resolution, Germany would not support a war in Iraq. 946 
On 22 nd September Bush and his administration were disappointed when Schroder 
narrowly won the election on an 'anti-war ticket'. 947 Just two days after his re- 
election, aware Ofthe strategic importance of the transatlantic alliance, Schroder met 
with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a key ally of the US President, for advice on 
how to repair German-US relations. 949 By the Day of Unity two weeks later, 
however, Bush's congratulatory letter for German unity, addressed not to Schroder 
but rather to Federal President Rau, suggested that renewed rapprochement had not 
yet commenced. The German media interpreted the US President's letter as an olive 
branch to Germany. 949 However, close analysis of the letter reveals that while Bush 
did not directly refer to the proposed intervention in Iraq in his missive, he 
nevertheless strongly emphasised all that the US had done for Germany, implying 
that the US had expected reciprocation. Federal President Rau's Day of Unity 
address correspondingly stressed that Germany remained grateful to the US; Rau 
946 Szabo, 2004, Parting ways, 55. 
947 Boyes, R. (2002, October 2). Germany softens hard line against Iraq war. Tile Times, 15. 
948 Szabo, 2004, Parting ways, 135. 
949 See for example the half-page spread dedicated to the letter in the Bild-Zeitung- US-Prasident 
gratuliert den Deutschen zur Einheit. (2002, October 4). Bild-Zeitung, 2. See also Robeck, 2002, 
Feiern zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit, RTL and Rau ruft zum Beginn einer gemeinsamen Zukunft 
auf. (2002, October 4). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1, 
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highlighted the historical ties between the two nations and particularly praised the 
contribution of Kennedy and George H. W. Bush to German unity. 950 
Given the strained relations with President Bush in 2002, it was very 
conceivable that the German public would not welcome the US President in a climate 
of strained German-US relations; moreover, Bush was unlikely to accept such an 
invitation. Host of the celebrations SPD Mayor of Berlin and Bundesrat President 
Wowereit instead invited former President Bill Clinton to celebrate the twelfth 
anniversary of unification in Berlin. Clinton presented a number of advantages over 
Bush: as a Democrat, he was closer in terms of political orientation to the German 
Chancellor and Mayor Wowereit than his Republican successor - Schr6der openly 
admired Clinton's emphasis on 'jobs, jobs, jobs'; 951 he was also, as evidenced by the 
way in which he was enthusiastically greeted on the Day of Unity, 952 much more 
popular among the German public. Clinton, who in 1994 had been the first US 
953 President to go through the Brandenburg Gate, did not undertake the traditional 
role of the guest of honour on the Day of Unity: instead of speaking at the central 
ceremony, removed from the general public, he stood on a platform raised above the 
masses at the Brandenburg gate to watch its unveiling and gave only a brief speech in 
which he called Germans 'a wonderful people'. 954 The staging of the former 
President's visit allowed around a million people in front of the Brandenburg gate, 
together with a vast number of reporters who had gathered, not least, to witness the 
long-awaited unveiling of 'Berlin's diva' after twenty-two months of restoration, 955 to 
observe the former US President smiling and laughing with the German Chancellor 
and other leading German politicians. This symbolically powerful attempt to 
9" Wirtz, C. (2002, October 4). Rau lobt Hilfe der USA bei der Wiedervereinigung. Saddeutsche 
Zeitung, 6. The idea that Germany was indebted to the US was later taken up by I lungarian novelist 
Kertdsz who repeated this in his 2003 Day of Unity address six months after the invasion of Iraq had 
commenced. In response to this Gerhard Schr6der defended German foreign policy and largely 
avoided explicit references to German-US relations. See Kertdsz, 2003, Wenn die Freudenfeuer 
verglimmen, 45 and Schröder, G. (2003). 'Vor uns liegt noch ein langer und beschwerlicher Weg. 
Retrieved May 2,2007 from http: //www. zeit. de/reden/deutsche 
-innenpolitik/schroeder-einheit03. 9" Szabo, 2004, Parting ways, 12. 
952 'Die Deutschen sind ein wunderbares Volk', 2002,2. 
953 For Clinton's speech in front of the Brandenburg Gate on 12th July 1994 see 'Berlin Isfree'. (2001). 
Retrieved January 28,2008, from http: //www. usa. uscmbassy. de/etexts/ga6-940712. htm. 
954 'Die Deutschen sind ein wunderbares Volk', 2002,2. 
955 This was a term coined by The Guardian to describe the Brandenburg Gate: see Connely, 2002, 
Zipper gate, 14. 
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underline the importance of German-US relations served to demonstrate, as Clinton 
said in his speech, that Germany was a 'genuine friend' of the US. 956 The very day 
before the twelfth anniversary, Schr6der had met with French President Chirac to 
957 discuss a united European front at variance with US plans for Iraq. The Day of 
Unity thus served as a platform on which to emphasise that, despite differences in 
foreign policy, Germany nevertheless esteemed its relations with the US. 
The end of the Cold War had in many respects transformed the main raison 
d'91re of the transatlantic alliance. Germany no longer needed a Superpower to 
protect it from the Soviet Union nor, with the country united, an advocate of 
unification. Why then, did the German political actors prioritise relations with the US 
on the German national holiday? Despite its reduced dependence on its transatlantic 
partner, united Germany had considerable interest in maintaining strong relations 
with the US for three key reasons. The first reason can be understood in the context 
of the attempts of the German political actors on the Day of Unity to emphasise 
continuity between the foreign policy of the old and new Federal Republic. By 
underlining, on the German national holiday, the continued importance of German. 
US relations, the German political actors reinforced the message that united Germany 
remained committed to the traditional foreign policy tenets of West Germany, 
specifically the importance of the transatlantic partnership. Secondly, the focus on 
German-US relations on P October anniversaries can also be understood in the 
context of trade interests. The US remained united Germany's second most 
important trading partner after France between 1990 and 2005: Germany exported on 
average 48.4 billion dollars of goods and services each year to the US, while imports 
from across the Atlantic amounted to'an average of 34.4 billion dollars annually. 959 
At the same time, the inability of the EU and its member states to stop the bloodshed 
in the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s and in Kosovo in 1998 
demonstrated that united Germany, like its other EU neighbours, to a large extent still 
required US military strength for security in a post-Cold War world. For these 
156 Hooper, 2002, Zipper gate, 16. 
957 Bremner, C. (2002, October 3). Schr6der tries to mend French link. The Times, 19. 
958 Statistics calculated through figures provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development: see OECD International Trade by Commodities Statistics. (2006). Retrieved January 28, 
2007 from http: //oberon. sourceoecd. orglvl=9691712/cl-19/nw=l/ýpsv/-3948/vl73ni/S5/pi. 
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reasons, the Day of Unity celebrations fostered the traditionally important and 
beneficial transatlantic relationship. To a far greater extent, however, the German 
national holiday can be understood as an arena for the promotion of relations with 
partners within the EU. 
5.2.2 A new hierarchy of strategic diplomacy? Strengthening relations 
with old and new EU partners 
Saxon Minister-President Biedenkopf invited Chirac to give the main address at the 
tenth jubilee celebration of unification in Dresden; Gerrnan and international political 
guests interpreted the invitation to the head of the French state on this key 
anniversary as symbolic of the importance attached to the Franco-German 
partnership. 959 In his address, Chirac also acknowledged the symbolic gesture, 
960 describing it as an expression of how 'close' Franco-German relations remained. 
While de Maizi&e from the former GDR, who dedicated his speech almost entirely to 
the discussion of intra-German relations and the economic and social problems 
resulting from unification, barely referred to the Franco-German alliance, both 
Biedenkopf and Federal President Rau paid tribute to France by framing the latter as 
a role model for Germany. Biedenkopf gave a description of France's positive and 
defining influence on Germany since the French Revolution of 1789,961 while Federal 
President Rau argued that Germany could learn from the French how to celebrate a 
national holiday. 962 
Franco-German relations had been pivotal to the maintenance of peace and 
prosperity in Europe following World War 11.963 Unification, however, posed new 
959 Bei der Feier, 2000,1-2. 
960 Chirac, 2000, Jacques Chirac, www. sachsen. de. 
961 Biedenkopf, 2000, Rede, www2. hu-berlin. de. 
962 Rau, 2000, Rede, www. bundespraesident. de. 
963 The main aim of the partnership was to build a Europe so integrated that war between its nation- 
states would be unthinkable. This goal motivated the creation of greater economic and institutional ties 
between France, Germany and other European states in the form, originally, of the ECSC in 1951 and, 
eventually, in the establishment of the present-day EU. The Franco-German interaction was widely 
considered 'privileged' on one hand, because of the volume and extent of institutional ties and 
interaction between the governments of the two states and on the other because, at least initially, the 
Franco-German partnerships played the role of 'motor' in European integration. See Bulmer et al., 
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challenges for the Franco-German alliance. Although France, keen to keep Germany 
firmly anchored in the EU, ultimately supported German unification in a European 
context, French President Mitterrand was initially highly sceptical about the creation 
of a larger, more powerful Germany. After 1990 a number of difficulties contributed 
to a deterioration of Franco-German relations. Firstly, French political actors became 
increasingly concerned that Germany would assume a leadership role in the EU 
creating an asymmetrical partnership between the two countries. Secondly, 
negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty, a treaty considered crucial for France to 
counter the possibility of an economically far superior neighbour, put strains on the 
relationship. French political actors became concerned about Germany's 
commitment to the development of the EU. The German 'policy of equidistance' 
between France and the US together with fears of German hegemony in Central and 
964 Eastern Europe spurred further worries. Despite the strained relations, France 
nevertheless remained crucial for Germany for reasons which help explain the 
attention paid to Franco-German relations by the various domestic and international 
actors on the German national holiday. The historic tension and bloody history 
between France and Germany underlined the never-ending importance of loyalty to a 
firm partnership between the two countries. Furthermore, as with US relations, 
emphasis on the continued importance of this 'old friendship', can be understood as a 
further expression by German political actors that Germany remained committed to 
its traditional diplomatic international relations, despite having started a new 
'relationship', as we shall see below, with the CEE states. In addition to this, from 
1990 to 2005, France remained Germany's main trading partner in terms of the 
imports and export of goods and services: the former represented on average 48.0 
billion dollars per year, the latter 62.1 billion dollars. 965 As a neighbour and powerful 
ally in the EU, France was also a vital geo-strategic partner in terms of security. 
The invitation to Chirac and the rhetoric about the Franco-German tandem on 
the tenth anniversary demonstrated that German political actors in united Germany 
2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 52-53 and Webber, D. (1999). Introduction. In D. Webber 
(Ed. ), The Franco-German relationship in the European Union. London: Routledge, 1.19. 
964 See Stark, 2006, The Franco-German relationship, 109-121 and Otte & Greve, 2000, A rising 
middlepower, 145. 
965 See OECD, 2006, v; mv. oecd. org. 
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still attached substantial importance to the long-standing relationship. However, 
outside the tenth unity celebrations, the Franco-German partnership received little 
attention on the Day of Unity anniversaries. With the exception of the first three 
anniversaries, at which some German political actors made brief reference to the 
importance of the Franco-German partnership and the fourth and eleventh 
anniversaries where fleeting comparisons were made between Franco-German and 
German-Polish relations - that is to say the former as an example for the latter 966 _ 
Franco-German relations were not prioritised on the German national holiday. Given 
that bilateral relations with France were on the whole stable and strong, the German 
political actors instead devoted their efforts on the Day of Unity to strengthening 
relations with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Political actors sought to contribute to the process of easing the historically 
troubled relations between Germany and the Czech statC967 on a number of Day of 
Unity anniversaries. The year before Germany signed a treaty for good relations with 
Czechoslovakia on 27ýh February 1992, for example, the Prague Philharmonic 
orchestra had played alongside orchestras from Hamburg's other twin-cities, as a 
gesture of 'friendship' on the German national holiday. 968 It was not until 20h 
December 1996 that a 'Declaration of Reconciliation' was signed between Germany 
and the Czech Republic, divided from Slovakia through the Velvet Divorce of V 
969 January 1993 . In light of this declaration, Foreign Minister 
Kinkel travelled to 
Prague on the seventh Day of Unity to commemorate the role of Czechoslovakia in 
966 See Szczypiorski, 1994, Ansprache, 843 and Thierse, 2001, Bundestagsprasident, 
www. bundestag. de. 
967 On 30th September 1938, as a result of the Munich Pact between the heads of government of 
Britain, France, Italy and the German Reich, Hitler had given a guarantee of peace in exchange for the 
6return' to Germany of the Czechoslovakian border area, the Sudetenland. Six months later, on 14' 
March 1939, Slovakia became a Nazi client state. The following day, Hitler violated the Munich 
agreement when his troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia, which remained under German control 
until the end of World War 11. The Nazi occupation of the western half of Czechoslovakia shaped the 
troubled 'relationship' between Germany and the Communist state during the Cold War. Even 
relations between the GDR and Czechoslovakia were not troubic-frce within the Soviet bloc, when the 
SED leadership offered GDR troops to put down the Prague Spring in 1968, although the Sovict Union 
declined the offer because of the obvious historical connotations. 
968 Deutschland feiert, 1991,1-2; Kauntz, 1991, Der Jugendchor, 3. 
96' Gasteyger, C. (2006). Europe: from division to unification. Bonn: Bundeszentrale f(Ir politische 
Bildung, 249-250. 
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unification. Following the July 1997 'Agenda 2000' talks, at which Gen-nan political 
actors strongly advocated EU enlargement to the East, the Czech Republic was 
970 invited to begin negotiations for accession to the EU in March 1998. Six months 
later, German-Czech relations once more played an important role on the Day of 
Unity. At the central celebrations in Hanover, Schr6der selected President of the 
Czech Republic Havel to give the main address. As a consequence of this, the 
rhetoric of German speakers focused on their country's partnership with its eastern 
neighbour. Havel's speech was particularly interesting: symbolising the need for 
united Germany to both strengthen ties with, and reassure, its Eastern neighbour and 
indicative of the gulf in attitudes between existing and candidate EU member states, 
with the latter widely accepting the EU as a guarantor for their security, President 
Havel said that 'obviously nobody knows' whether or not Europe will live in safety, 
freedom and peace. 971 
Compared to German-Czech relations, German-Hungarian relations received 
greater attention from the German political actors on the Day of Unity. These 
relations were not nearly so strained historically (precisely because of close German- 
Hungarian co-operation in both World Wars). 972 The emphasis on German- 
Hungarian relations on the German national holiday was particularly evident in the 
symbolic invitations to two Hungarian guest speakers. Nobel Prize winner Kertdsz' 
presence as main speaker in 2003, and the attention his country received in the 
speeches of the German political actors that year, demonstrated that German- 
Hungarian relations were considered crucial for Germany a year before Hungary's 
accession to the EU. 
In the earlier years running up to Hungary's entry into the EU, German- 
Hungarian relations also received attention on the Day of Unity anniversaries, most 
markedly in 1996. While the German Foreign Minister celebrated the sixth 
anniversary of unification in the German Embassy in Budapest, back in Munich 
Hungarian Prime Minister Hom gave the main Day of Unity address, four years after 
970 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 104. 
971 Havel, 1998, Ansprache, 829. 
972 During World War 11, the Hungarian authoritarian-fascist regime had collaborated with the Nazi 
regime. The country was only occupied after this regime had fallen, towards the end of the war. 
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Germany and Hungary had signed a treaty of co-operation and friendly relations on 
6 th February 1992 . 
973 Horn974 - who had physically opened the border between 
Hungary and Austria allowing many GDR citizens to escape to the West and 
triggering to a large extent the subsequent collapse of the GDR - and Bavarian 
Minister-President Stoiber 975 described at length Hungary's significant contribution 
to unification and celebrated the German-Hungarian partnership. Stoiber's rhetoric 
and his invitation to Horn can perhaps be understood as a further example of how 
regional and EU aspects intertwined on the Day of Unity: the Bavarian Minister- 
President's regional agenda benefited from the promotion of good relations with the 
CEE states. As seen in policy papers published on the Common Agricultural Policy 
in 1995 and the Structural Funds in 1996, Bavaria, located on what was then the EU 
border (with the Czech Republic), involved itself in EU enlargement debates in order 
to promote specific Bavarian agendas, such as those related to subsidies and 
deregulation. Furthermore, Bavaria had a vested. interest in maintaining some 
influence over the nature of the enlargement. 976 In these ways, the staging and 
rhetoric of the Day of Unity celebrations drew attention to the importance German 
political actors assigned to German-Hungarian relations. Of all the bilateral relations 
German actors sought to promote on the Day of Unity, however, it was those with 
Poland that received the most attention. 
With the thorny question of the Oder-Neisse border finally settled in 
1990/1991, united Germany was able to start building bridges with Poland 977 -a 
process to which the majority of Day of Unity anniversaries sought to contribute. At 
the unification ceremony in 1990, both former Volkskammer President Bergmann- 
973 Gasteyger, 2006, Europe, 249. 
974 See I lorn, 1996, Ansprache, 834-837. 
975 See Stoiber, 1996, Ansprache, 829-830. 
976 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 113. 
977 German-Polish relations - refracted through the prism of the Prussian role in the Polish divisions in 
the eighteenth century and ethnic and territorial conflicts after 1918 - reached their nadir at the end of 
World War 11. The German Reich, which attacked Poland in September 1939, was responsible for the 
death of six million Poles (of which approximately three million were Jews), one-fifth of the entire 
population. Since the countries were separated by the Iron Curtain, repairing relations during the Cold 
War was arduous. It was thus only after 1989/90 that a conducive climate for rapprochement slowly 
developed. Zaborowski, M. (2004). Germany, Poland and Europe: conflict, co-operation and 
Europeanisation. Manchesten' Manchester University Press, 170-171. For a recent overview of 
German-Polish relations before and after unification see Cordell, K., & Wolff, S. (2005). German 
foreign policy. towards Poland and the Czech Repuhlic. London: Routledgc. 
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Poh1978, and Federal President von Weizsdcker 979 echoed the message of Kohl's 
televised address the previous evening in which the Chancellor stressed that a united 
Germany sought 'permanent reconciliation between the German and Polish 
people'. 9go The following year, German-Polish relations similarly received 
considerable attention from the German Day of Unity speakers. 981 
On 5h April 1994, Poland applied for membership of the EU; during the 
German Presidency of the EU from July to December 1994, German political actors 
pushed forward concrete plans, resulting in the so-called Europe Agreements for EU 
candidate states. 982 During the same year, Polish writer Szczypiorski was invited by 
Mayor of Bremen Wedemeier to give the main speech on the Day of Unity as a 
gesture of 'friendship' toward his country. 983 Both Szczypiorskig&4 and Wedemeierý85 
devoted virtually their entire speeches to fostering German-Polish relations by paying 
tribute to the troubled German-Polish past, framing the end of the Cold War as a new 
opportunity for the 'relationship' between the two nations and celebrating Poland's 
path toward the EU. 
In 2001, German-Polish relations once more stood at the ccntre of the Day of 
Unity celebrations when Polish President Aleksander Kwdsniewski was the main 
speaker. Minister-Presi dent of Rhineland-Palatinate Beck invited the Polish head of 
state from the SPD's sister party there to complement his vision for 'the European 
perspective' as the 'focal point' of the Day of Unity, 996 a gesture which Bundestag 
President Thierse framed as a 'wonderful symbol of Europe pulling together'. 987 
Kwdsniewski, who focused exclusively on his country's relations with Germany and 
who made, for example, no direct reference to the 9/11 attacks, suggested that since 
German-Polish relations had 'become so matter of fact', so 'boring', Germans and 
9" See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF- 
9'9 See Ibid. 
980 Kohl, 1990, Fernsehansprache, 1225. 
9" Bresson, 199 1, Le gouvemement, 6. 
992 Bulmer et at., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 106. 
"' K. Sondergeld, personal communication, November 16,2006' . 9: 4 Szczypiorski, 1994, Ansprache, 844-845. 
95 Wedemeier, 1994, Ansprache, 843-844. 
9146 Grabenstr6er, M. (2001, October 4). Tief im Westen ein Blick nach Osten. Frankfurter Rundschau, 
n. p. 
997 ibid. 
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Poles must become more enthusiastic about the 'relationship'. While he praised 
initiatives that already existed between the citizens of the two countries he argued that 
more must be done to bring its citizens closer together; the Polish President ended his 
speech by thanking Germany for its support of Poland's accession to the EU. 988 Four 
years later, during the 'German-Polish Year 2005-2006' the staging of the fifteenth 
Day of Unity anniversary in Potsdam also underlined the priority of German-Polish 
relations. This was most evident in the way that the Mazowsze Ensemble, a 
celebrated Polish dance group, was invited to open the two-day citizens' festival. 
Dressed in traditional Polish garb, hundreds of dancers entertained a modest 
crowd. 9" 
The focus on German relations with the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
particularly Poland by the German political actors on the Day of Unity anniversaries 
can best be traced to a combination of three factors. Firstly, it can be understood in 
the context of Germany's tradition since 1945 of reconciliation with former enemies 
and with those who had suffered during World War 11. Relations with the CEE 
states, and the integration of these countries into Western institutions, have been 
described as 'deeply personal' issues for many German political actors. 990 As a 
number of German Day of Unity actors emphasised, united Germany considered 
itself to have, as Kohl described in 1990, a 'moral obligation' to support the transition 
of the CEE states to Western democracy. 991 At the time of unification, German- 
Czech relations were strained as a result of the difficult relations during Nazi 
occupation, ethnic cleansing and the inability of the two countries to address these 
issues from either side of the Iron Curtain, combined later with the tensions that 
emerged over the Czech government's refusal to revoke the Beneg Decrees of 1945. 
German-Hungarian relations were likewise fragile given the relations of the two 
988 Kwagniewski, A. (200 1). Ansprache des Prasidenten der Republik Polen, 41eksander Kwagniewski, 
beim Festakt zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit am 3. Oktober 2001 in Maln7. Retrieved April 27,2007, 
from http: //w%vw2. hu-berlin. de/francopolis/ws2OOl-O2/Sim. 01-02/kwasniewski. htm. 
"" Programm zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit. (2005). Potsdam: Brandenburg State Chancellery. For 
photographs of the event see Tag der Deutschcn Einheit. (2005, October 4). Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. 
990 McCarthy, 1999, France, Germany, 52. For exploration of the argument that Germany's 
commitment to reconciliation was a key element of post-war identity and remains so in united 
Germany see Berghahn et al., 1997, Germany and Europe, 173-200. 
991 Kohl, 1997, Ansprache, 937. 
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states during World War 11. The German-Polish past which, as we also saw earlier in 
Chapter Two, was especially complicated, received particular attention from the 
German political actors at the Day of Unity commemorations. 
However, the fact that German political actors did not use the opportunity 
presented by the Day of Unity celebrations to focus on fostering relations with all 
CEE states but rather concentrated specifically on the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, suggests a second motive: strong relations with these three large CEE states 
carried potential significant economic benefits for Germany. 992 Put simply, for the 
political elite to facilitate and encourage trade with these important EU applicant 
states, relations had to be mended: the Day of Unity served as a cog in the wheel of 
that process. In terms of trade, the emerging markets of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and primarily Poland presented considerable economic opportunities for 
neighbouring Germany. 993 Benefiting from the preferential trading agreements 
arranged between the EU and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as part of the 
'Europe Agreements' of December 199 1, the number of exports from Germany to the 
Czech Republic was able to reach 23.1 billion dollars by 2005. To put this into 
perspective, this amounts to per capita German exports to the Czech Republic of 
2,257 dollars - 654 dollars more than per capita German exports to France. Trade 
with Hungary was also significant, representing 17.7 billion dollars in imports and 
16.7 billion dollars in exports in 2005. Trade with Poland, however, was the most 
substantial, particularly with regard to the export of German goods and services: 
while imports reached 19.8 billion dollars by 2005, exports represented 26.8 billion 
dollars . 
994 Get-many thus became the leading trading partner of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland995 and had a vested interest in these countries developing trade 
992 For a consideration of the economic hegemony of Germany in eentral and Eastern Europe see 
Baun, M. (2005). Germany and Central Europe: hegemony re-examined. German Politics, 14(3), 371- 
389. 
993 For an interesting recent analysis of German hegemony in general in Central and Eastern Europe 
after 1990 see Phillips, A. L. (2000). Power and influence after the Cold War: Germany in East. 
Central Europe. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
994 All statistics available from OECD, 2006, www. oecd. org. For a recent analysis of how economic 
aspects influenced German-Polish relations from 1900 to 2007 see Bingen, D., Loew, P. O., & 
Nikolaus, W. (Eds. ). (2008). Interesse und Konflikt. Zur polifischen Okonomie der deuisch-polnischen 
Beziehungen, 1900-2007. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. 
'" McCarthy, 1999, France, Germany, 43. 
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996 
patterns more oriented toward Germany before their accession to the EU in 2004. 
Indeed the economic benefits German industry drew from these countries became 
increasingly important for Germany. 997 The economic potential was particularly 
noted by Chancellor Schr6der who promoted EU enlargement and strong relations 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, not just for reasons of 'moral 
obligation' or to bestow them with the "'gifV' of Western democracy', 998 but because 
they provided new markets for Germany. 999 
However, trade reasons alone cannot explain the special attention paid to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. To be sure, bilateral relations with countries 
such as China or India as huge emerging markets, or even those with Germany's key 
trading partners, such as the Netherlands, received absolutely no attention from the 
German political actors on the Day of Unity. Instead, a third factor contributed to the 
strategic fostering of relations with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: the 
German political actors had a strategic interest in strengthening ties with these 
countries to ensure German security. An Eastern Europe in chaos would have been at 
odds with the German political actors' desire for stability on Germany's borders; 
united Germany thus had a vested interest in assisting the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, the first three CEE states to join NATO, to 'perform [their] role as a 
buffer zone'. 1000 Without EU enlargement, Germany may have been forced to cope 
single-handedly with re-emerging nationalism and economic disorder on its eastern 
border. 1001 In this context, German sup-Port of EU enlargement has frequently been 
understood as an 'instrument for stabilising' the CEE states and as a 'guarantor of 
German security'. 1002 The particular attention paid to Polish relations on the Day of 
Unity can be understood not only in economic terms, but also in the context of the 
particular geopolitical importance of Poland: with 38 million inhabitants, it was the 
largest of the CEE states and thus could become an important actor in the EU; '001 
996 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 134. 
997 Ibid., 105. 
998 Niven, 2002, Facing the Nazi past, 5. 
999 Szabo, 2004, Parting ways, 53. 
1000 Berghahn et al., 1997, Germany and Europe, 185. 
10" McCarthy, 1999, France, Germany, 43. , 
1002 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germany's European diplomacy, 105. 
1003 Zaborowski, 2004, Germany, Poland and Europe, 174-176. 
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furthermore, with the exception of Russia, it was the only former East bloc country 
with significant armed forces. 1004 As Adrian Hydc-Price has argued, 'a stable, 
prosperous and secure Poland [was] vital for a stable, prosperous and secure 
Germany'. 1005 
5.2.3 Other EU states and Russia: a tale of neglect 
As a consequence of the decision by German political actors to foster strategic 
partnerships on the German national holiday with the US and specific EU and 
accession states, relations with other EU member states and Russia considered further 
down the hierarchy of importance received less attention. Relations with Ireland and 
Spain, for example, countries whose governments, according to Kohl's memoirs, 
were the only European partners to support German unification from the outset 1006 
received no mention at all in either the rhetoric or mise-en-sc6ne of the unity events. 
This is not surprising given the largely smooth relationship of Germany, historically, 
with these countries and their low importance in terms of considerations such as 
security - these partnerships arguably required no special attention from the German 
political actors on the Day of Unity. The role in the celebrations of Ally and former 
occupying power Britain was also insignificant. The sponsors of the separate Berlin 
celebrations occasionally invited British veterans, such as those involved in the Berlin 
Airlift, to participate in the capital's unity parade. 1007 With the exception of sporadic 
expressions of thanks to the four Allied powers by German political actors, 1008 British 
political actors at the central Day of Unity events, however, were limited to a role of 
occupying a seat in the audience and were not invited to speak. Thus, while political 
actors of the Federal Republic attached considerable importance to cultivating 
relations with its World War 11 adversary, the German Day of Unity organisers did 
not prioritise diplomacy with Britain, whose policy priorities were often at odds with 
1004 McCarthy, 1999, France, Germany, 44. 
1005 Hyde-Price, 2000, Germany and European order, 217. 
1016 Dclattre, L. (1996, October 3). Us confessions dc M. Kohl sur la rdunification de I'Allcmagnc. Le 
Monde, 3. 
100' See, for example, Deutschlands Fest, 1998, ZDF., 
1008 See, for example, Rau, 2000, Rede, - www. bundespraesident. de and Rau, 2002, Redo, 
www. bundespraesident. de. 
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those of united Germany. 1009 The lack of deep-rooted institutional isation between the 
two countries, compared, for example, to those between France and Germany, 
together with the divergence between the British government's more 
intergovernmentalist approach to European integration and the more integrationist 
policy favoured by the German government, made celebration of relations with the 
UK an unlikely component of the Day of Unity festivities. As has been argued, 
united Germany's political actors staged the Day of Unity in such a way to facilitate 
bilateral relations to certain ends, in the service of which the inclusion of Britain 
would have proven rather vapid. 1010 
Relations with Russia were also overlooked to a large extent on the Day of 
Unity. In their Day of Unity addresses of 1990, Chancellor Kohl, 1011 Federal 
President von WeizsAckcr 1012 and Mayor of Berlin Momper 1013 underlined the vital 
contribution to German unification made by the last President of the Soviet Union. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, through his reform policies of perestroika and glasnost and 
summit conferences with US President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl had brought an 
end to the Cold War. At subsequent Day of Unity anniversaries, however, 
Gorbachev's achievements were rarely mentioned. Furthermore, in 1997, the former 
President - arguably an uneasy role model on the Day of Unity given that he was 
essentially not a democrat by western standards - was not even invited to attend the 
celebrations. An insulted Gorbachev told the Leipziger Volkszeilung that Kohl must 
explain to the German people why he had not been invited. ' 014 In an obvious attempt 
to address this issue, all Day of Unity actors uncharacteristically praised Gorbachev 
liberally for his role in'facilitating unification. 10's Gorbachev was, however, the only 
Russian figure to whom German Day of Unity actors referred from 1990 to 2005. 
10'9 For analysis of German-British* strategic interests both before and after unification see Schweiger, 
C. (2007). Britain, Germany andthefuture of1he European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
1010 Bulmer et al., 2000, Germanyi European diplomacy, 73. 
10" See Kohl, 1990, Fernsehansprache, 1225. 
1012 See Tag der Deutschen Einheit, 1990, ZDF. 
1013 See Aid. 
1014 Henkel, P. (1997, October 4). Kohl sieht keine 'Mauer in den K6pfen'. Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. 
1("s See Kohl, 1997, Ansprache, . 936-939; Teufel, 1997, Ansprache, 933-936 and Bush, - 1997, 
Ansprache, 939-940. 
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The lack of attention afforded to German-Russian relations by the German 
political actors on the Day of Unity from 1990 to 2005 can likely be understood in the 
context of the very turbulent Russian domestic politics and the abuses of human 
rights in Russia in the first decade after unification. 1016 What is particularly 
surprising, however, is that Chancellor Schr6der's well-known unique interests in 
fostering close diplomatic relations with Russia, particularly Putin, in order to secure 
oil and gas supplies - largely at the expense of close relations with Poland, the Baltic 
States and the Ukraine - were not reflected on the Day of Unity celebrations. As we 
have seen, the respective Day of Unity organisers and regional political actors were 
afforded considerable flexibility in staging the unity celebrations - something fully 
exploited by actors, including Schr6der. What is thus striking is that, despite the 
clear and often-discussed tight relationship between Putin and Schr6dcr, especially 
regarding the North Stream project, the Day of Unity was used to promote other 
bilateral relations priorities. Indeed, the diplomatic priorities presented by the 
political actors on the German national holiday remained essentially unchanged 
throughout the period from 1990 to 2005 and was not particularly influenced by 
changes in either federal or local government. 
In 2000, the diplomacy prioritisations of the German political actors on the 
Day of Unity actually served to provoke international tensions. For the tenth unity 
celebrations, the political actors failed to invite the head of state of Austria. As a 
result of the rotating organisation, the invitation of guests lies in the hands of the 
regional actors. This episode demonstrated that whilst regional actors may not have 
intentionally interfered in disrupting the 'harmony' and consensus of the image of 
German foreign policy and diplomatic interests presented on the German national 
holiday, they nevertheless had the power to influence not only regional and domestic 
but also international politics. -The task of easing the subsequent tensions evoked by 
the invitation that never arrived, however, fell to Parliamentary State Secretary Fritz 
Rudolf K6rper. He was faced with the challenge of countering accusations that the 
1016 For analysis of German-Russian relations in the first decade after unification see, in particular, 
Stent, A. (2000). Russia and Germany reborn: unification the Soviet collapse and New Europe. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press and Ncwnham, R. E. (2002). Deutsche Mark diplomacy: positive 
economic sanctions in German-Russian relations. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. 
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German federal government had had a hand in 'not inviting Austria' to this important 
celebration. In his written responses to questions from members of the Bundestag 
three days after the event, K6rper argued that Austria, like other EU member states, 
had in fact been represented through the attendance of EU Troika delegates. 
Moreover, he stated, inviting the Austrian head of state was not included in the 
protocol and the Austrian Ambassador had taken part in the celebrations. 1017 
The German and Austrian media, as well as a number of leading politicians 
from both countries, nevertheless sternly criticised the 'oversight'. Politicians, 
particularly those from the CSU such as Klaus Rose'018 and Max Straubinger, 1019 
perhaps on account of the stronger ties of Bavaria with Austria and their party with 
the Austrian People's Party (OVP) of Chancellor Schtissel, called for the German 
government to apologise for having 'excluded' Austria from the celebrations. In 
Austria, a number of political actors expressed outrage that neither the Austrian 
Federal President Thomas Klestil nor any member of the government had been 
invited to the unity ceremony. Foreign Minister Ferrero-Waidncr, for example, 
expressed her dismay to journalists that the German government had 'forgotten the 
important role of Austria' in bringing about the fall of the Iron Curtain, 1020 referring 
to the way in which the Austrian government had permitted thousands of GDR 
citizens to flee through its border with Hungary and had subsequently undertaken a 
number of logistic and bureaucratic tasks before German unification. Chancellor 
Schilssel similarly criticised the German government saying that 'in contrast to the 
German people ... many of those. in power' no -longer 
remembered Austria's 
contribution to German unification. 1021 
The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, meanwhile, linked the lack of invitation 
to an Austrian head of state or government to the recent EU sanctions against his 
country. Following the success of J6rg Haider's Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) in 
1017 Bundestag Drucksache: Fritz Rudolf Körber, Parl. Staatssekretär beim Bundesminister des Innern 
(1414206). (2000, October 6). Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 11 795B -1 1797C. ""' Bundestag Drucksache: Klaus, Rose, CSU (1414206). (2000, October 6). Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag, 11793D-11795B. 
1019 Bundestag Drucksache: Max Straubinger, CSU (1414206). (2000, October 6). Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag, 11795B - 11797C. , ;-'- ""Österreichsichtsichbrüskiert. (2000, October4). FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung, 2. 
1021 Rau lobt Engagement 2000,1. 
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the Austrian legislative elections of October 1999, this anti-immigration and extreme 
right-wing party was included in the new Austrian coalition government with the 
OVP. In protest, on 31" January 2000, the fourteen other EU member states 
announced that they would suspend bilateral ties with Austria, reduce interaction with 
Austrian ambassadors and oppose Austrian candidacy for international positions. 1022 
Schr6der and the SPI) had played a leading role in marginalising the Austrian 
government with the OVP Chancellor (sister-party of the German CDU and CSU) 
and the FPO. The Austrian Ambassador in Berlin stated that he was 'astounded' that, 
particularly in light of the EU-14 sanctions on Austria, Germany had not sought to re- 
establish strong Austro-German relations on the German national holiday. 1023 This 
incident highlighted that the Day of Unity thus operated not only as a platform for 
improving bilateral relations but also provided, through the mechanism of neglect, 
perceived and genuine, the potential to damage relations. In this way, it further 
underlined the important role of the staging of the German national holiday. 
Conclusion 
The denationalisation of the German national holiday through both sub-national and 
supra-national elements highlights that the German political actors strove to some 
extent to stage the Day of Unity as a postnational event. In some regards, other forms 
of belonging were already starting to emerge in divided Germany at the expense of 
national consciousness. In the GDR, the SED attempted to foster a separate 'state- 
consciousness' (Staalsbewusstsein) and a consciousness based on class rather than 
nationality -a so-called 'class-consciousness' (Klassenbewusstsein). In the Federal 
Republic, by contrast, emphasis was instead on what could be described as somewhat 
postnational fonris of belonging, expressed not least by avid promotion of integration 
into transnational institutions such as the EU as well as by promotion of 
1022 See Kaiser, W. (2007). 'Warum lernen Sie nicht aus der Geschichte? ' Deutschland und die 
Sanktionen der EU-14 gegen Österreich. In M. Gehler & 1. Böhler (Eds. ), Verschiedene europäische 
Wege im Vergleich. Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945149 bis zur Gegenivart. 
Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 531-547 and Howard, M. M. (2000). Can populism be suppressed in a 
democracy? Austria, Germany and the European Union. East European Politics and Society, 14(2), 
18-32. 
1023 Osterreich sieht sich braskiert, 2000,2. 
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constitutional patriotism. 
1024 Through the promotion of a postnational self- 
understanding for the Federal Republic, a notion first forwarded by Bonn historian 
Karl Dietrich Bracher in 1976, the Federal Republic became to some extent, in the 
words of Christian Joppke, Europe's first 'culturally postnational state'. 
1025 Both 
before and since unification, postriationalism has, however, predominantly been a 
utopian and elite concept, rather than a widespread, popular understanding by the 
population. 1026 
Postnationalism. is a highly contested idea. In the German context, Habermas 
is arguably the most prominent advocate for postriational forms of belonging. 
Reasoning that globalisation is challenging the relevance of the nation-state, 
Habermas has called for solidarity among individuals based on universalistic 
principles that go beyond ties of nation, place, language and heritage. 
1027 There are 
signs, however, that some circles of German academics and intellectuals are moving 
away from postriational ideas. Renowned historian Heinrich August Winkler, for 
example, who once avidly stated that 'the nation-state definitely belongs to the past' 
recently described united Germany as 'a democratic post-classical nation-state'. 
1028 
To date, much of the broader debate among scholars surrounding 
postnationalism has focused on citizenship and rights - that is to say who belongs to a 
nation and who is entitled to the rights the nation-state affords. 
1029 Brubaker's 
position is largely representative of one side of this polarised debate. For Brubaker, 
the nation-state remains the central frame of reference. Despite the challenges of 
migration, new forms of citizenship rights afforded to migrants as well as steps 
toward economic and political union, he argues that in a European context, 
1024 See Habermas, 200 1, The postnational constellation. 
1025 Joppke, C. (2005). Selecting by origin: ethnic migration in the liberal state. Cambridge: I larvard 
University Press, here 172. 
1026 See Maller, 2000, Another country. 
1027 See Habermas, 2001, The posinational constellation. 
1021 See Berger, S. (1995). Historians and nation-building in Germany after unification. Past and 
Present, 148,187-222, here 217 and Berger, S. (2005). A return to the national paradigm? National 
history writing in Germany, Italy, France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present. Journal ofAlodern 
History, 77,629-678. See also Winkler, H. A. (1993). Abschied von einem dcutschen Sondcrwcg: 
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citizenship is a 'last bastion of sovereignty'. 1030 Through his exploration of the 
different idioms of nationhood in France and Germany, Brubaker maintains that the 
freedom of the nation-state in deciding who has what rights as regards to citizenship, 
underlines its continuing importance. 1031 
A number of academics have broadly supported this viewpoint. In his 
comparative study of post-war immigration politics in the United States, Germany 
and Britain, Joppke, for example, concludes that, in relation to immigration at least, 
nation-states remain 'resilient'. 1032 He interprets constraints on sovereignty in 
immigration issues in contemporary liberal democracies not as signs of 
postnationalism but rather as 'self-imposed' by the respective nation-states. Joppke 
reasons that the restrictions stem from self-limitation among domestic interest groups, 
autonomous legal systems and moral obligations toward specific immigrant 
groups. 1033 Through an examination of the relation between identity and territory in 
Europe in their recent interdisciplinary edited volume, Mabel Berezin and Martin 
Schain have equally stressed the persistence of the nation-state. ' 034 They contend 
that, if theorised in terms of territory, the nation-state as an entity 'calibrates power, 
nature and culture in bounded physical space'. 1035 Adopting a more empirical 
approach, Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham have reached a similar conclusion. 1036 
In their comparative study based on content analysis of daily newspapers, they have 
argued that the nation-state remains the main frame of reference for the claim-making 
of migrants and ethnic minorities in Britain and Germany. More recently, Dina 
Kiwan has argued that citizens' rights are dependent on membership of a political 
`0 Brubaker, 1992, Citizenship and nationhood, 190. 
1031 Ibid., 180. 
1112 Joppke, C. (1999). Immigration and the nation-stale. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
1033 Ibid., 262-263. See, also, Joppke & Morawska, 2003, Toward assimilation. 
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). (2003). Europe without borders: remapping territory, 
citizenship and identity in a transnationalage. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
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community. 1037 In this way, she has highlighted the role of the nation-state in 
administering those rights. 
The argument that the nation-state remains the key frame of reference in 
liberal democracies has, however, not gone unchallenged. Yasemin Soysal's work on 
the incorporation of migrant workers in post-war western nation-states is particularly 
representative of the other side of the debate. 1038 Rejecting the idea that citizenship 
can be explained solely through reference to the nation-state, Soysal has instead 
advocated a postnational model of membership. 1039 She reasons that individual rights 
are no longer based on national belonging but rather are organised and legitimated on 
the principle of 'universal personhood'. 1040 From her perspective, 'the logic of 
personhood supersedes the logic of national citizenship' suggesting that the 
transnational rights of migrants has had the effect of eroding the significance of 
national citizenship. 104 1 David Jacobson has adopted a similar line of reasoning to 
support this postnational view in his study on migration in the United States, 
Germany and France. 1042 Jacobson argues that transnational migration and 
international human rights law have eroded national sovereignty and that 'as rights 
have come to be predicated on residency, not citizen status, the distinction between 
4b citizens" and "alien" has been eroded'. 1043 Using a political economy argument, 
Saskia Sassen has also supported postriational ideas by arguing that the autonomy of 
the nation-state in immigration policy is increasingly limited. - Sassen maintains that, 
since money, goods, ideas and rights transcend national borders due to international 
human rights and economic globalisation, state,, attempts to control the movement of 
1037 Kiwan, D. (2008). A journey to citizenship in the United Kingdom. International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies, 10(l), 60-75. 
10" Soysal, Y. N. (1994). Limits of citizenship: migrants and posinational memhership in Europe. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
1039 For a prdcis of Soysal's main arguments see Soysal, Y. (1996). Changing citizenship in Europe: 
remarks on postnational memhership and the nation-state. In D. Ccsarani & M. Fulbrook (Eds. ), 
Citizenship, nationality and migration in Europe. London: Routledge, 17-29. 
1040 Soysal, 1994, Limits ofcitizenship, 136. 1041 Ihid., 164. 'ýII ý' - 1041 Jacobson, D. (1996). Rights across horders: immigration and the decline oftifizenship. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press. 
1043 ihid., 8-9. 
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people are also highly restricted. ' 044 More recently, Sassen has shown that at times it 
is the very processes of denationalisation of the nation-state's institutions and 
networks that facilitate and shape globalisation. 1 045 Damian Tambini has similarly 
drawn attention to how economic globalisation and transnational institutions together 
with cultural denationalisation and migration have threatened the power of national 
citizenship in providing equality, liberty and civic participation. 1046 For Tambini, 
although nationalism continues, the institutions as well as the meaning of nationhood 
have been transformed. 1047 At the same time, Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson 
have framed citizenship as increasingly postriational in a globalised world in which 
people belong to more than one political community. 104' They have drawn attention, 
for example, to the development of European citizenship as a form of supra-national 
membership. Indeed, European citizenship is often cited as representing instances of 
post-national rights. "'9 Above and beyond this, the fact that a number of EU citizens 
are beginning to describe themselves as European, if not as their first, then as their 
second form of identification, has been interpreted by some as a sign that a 
postriational European identity is beginning to emerge. 1050 
The findings of the analysis of the Day of Unity commemorations are able to 
contribute to this polemic debate about the role of the contemporary nation-state. On 
1044 Sassen, S. (1998). The de facto transnationalizing of immigration policy. In C. Joppke (Ed. ), 
Challenge to the nation-state: immigration in western Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 49-85. 
1045 Sassen, S. (2006). Territory, authority, rights: from medieval to global assemblages. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
1046 Tambini, D. (200 1). Post-national citizenship. 'Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24(2), 195-217. 
1047 Ibid., here 207. 
1049 Castles, S., & Davidson, A. (2000). Citizenship and migration: globalization and the politics of 
belonging. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
1049 For the ongoing debates surrounding European citizenship see Kostakopoulou, T. (2001). 
Citizenship, identity and immigration in the European Union: between past andfuture. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press; Kostakopoulou, D. (2006). Thick, thin and thinner patriotisms: is this all 
there is? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 26(l), 73-106; Kostakopoulou, D. (2007). European Union 
citizenship: writing the future. European Law Journal, 13(5), 623-646; Dunkerley, D., I lodgson, L., 
Konopacki, S., Spybey, T., & Thompson, A. (Eds. ). (2002). Changing Europe: Identifies, 'nations and 
citizens. London: Routledge; Dell'Olio, F. (2005). The Europeanization of citizenship., between the 
ideology of nalionality, immigration and European identity. Aldershot: Ashgate'and Eder, K., & 
Giesen, B. (Eds. ). (2001). European citizenship: national legacies and transnaflonal projects. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
1050 See, for example, Armbruster, H., Rollo, C., & Meinhof, U. 11. (2003). Imagining Europe: everyday 
narratives in European border communities. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 29(5), 885-899 
and Grundy, S., & Jamieson, L. (2007). Europcan identities: from absent-minded citizens to passionate 
Europeans. European Identities, 41(4), 663-680. 
252 
the one hand, the research has shown that there are indeed aspects which support 
postnational arguments to some extent. The nation-state was certainly eroded by both 
sub-national and supra-riational elements on the German national holiday. The 
dcriationalisation through sub-national elements was pronounced in the decentralised 
staging of the commemorations, in the staging of the citizens' festival as well as in 
the regional flags, music and cordons. The supra-national elements, as manifested in 
the EU-isation of the event, were visible in the concentration of rhetoric relating to 
the EU, in the mise-en-scýne of the celebrations as well as in the way in which the 
German political actors prioritised EU relations. At the same time, however, the 
degree of postnationalism should not be overplayed. It is important to remember that 
the arena in which these postnational elements played out was a national day. 
Despite attempts by some of the Day of Unity actors to frame 3 rd October as a 
European event, the unity anniversaries celebrated, by their very name, German 
Unity. This was not a holiday of all EU countries, but rather of the German nation- 
state. Furthermore, the continued significance of the nation as a frame of reference 
was underscored by the topics the political actors chose to address in their speeches at 
the festivities. The National Socialist and GDR pasts and intra-German relations are 
- at least as long as the construction of a European memory remains a distant reality - 
arguably essentially national topics. These topics continued to receive considerable 
attention on the German national holiday undermining the argument that the nation- 
state has become obsolete. 
This 'centrist' position, that there are -signs of postnationalism but that the 
nation-state still matters, resonates most closely with the work of Lydia Morris. 
Morris has demonstrated, for example, that even European citizenship can be 
interpreted as a 'derivative status'; although it affords rights to EU citizens that 
supersede nation-states, one must in the first place belong to one of the nation-states 
1651 1, in order to receive those rights. ,, ndeed, 
beyond this, as Brubaker has shown, the 
very rules for attaining citizenship tol those nation-states are at the discretion of the 
105' See Morris, L. (1997a). Globalization, migration and the nation-state: the path to a post-national 
Europe? British Journal ofSociology, 48(2), 192-207, here 198-199 and Morris, L. (I 997b). A cluster 
of contradictions: the politics of migration in the European Union. Sociology, 31(2), 241-259. 
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respective nation-states. 1052 Morris has also explored the rights of third country 
nationals in Europe to highlight that while rights may go beyond the nation-state, the 
latter continues to grant those rights. ' 053 Furthermore, rejecting the claim that all 
rights have become 'universal', Morris has convincingly argued - particularly with 
regard to employment, family unification, asylum and unlawful presence - that 
variation exists between European nation-states in the rights that they grant to 
migrants. ' 054 This 'civic stratification' 1055 highlights the limits to the power of 
transnational rights and thereby underlines the persistence of the nation-state. 
The extent to which national variation exists among nation-states in Europe is 
indeed demonstrated by the degree to which Germany's own citizenship law remains 
different to that of its neighbours. The 2000 citizenship law did signify a step toward 
harmonisation. However, the continued avoidance of dual citizenship in the law, 056 _ 
at odds with the citizenship laws of both France and Britain - is a clear example of 
the enduring sovereignty of the nation-state. Similarly, Germany's new immigration 
law, which came into being on I" January 2005, represents another major shift 
toward synchronisation of policies among the nation-states of the EU. 1057 However, 
owing not least to the realities of different labour market needs, norms and 
procedures for third-country nationals continue to vary both within and across the EU 
member states. 1058 
1052 See Brubaker, 1992, Citizenship and nationhood. 
1053 See Morris, L. (2001). Stratified rights and the management of migration: national distinctiveness 
in Europe. European Societies, 3(4), 387411 and Morris, L. (2002). Alanaging migration. London: 
Routledge. 
1054 Aid. 
1055 This was a concept originally developed by David Lockwood stemming from Thomas 11. 
Marshall's work on citizenship. See Lockwood, D. (1996). Civic integration and class formation. 
British Journal of Sociology, 47,531-550 and Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1056 For a fascinating overview of the broader debate about postnational arguments and dual citizenship 
see Bloemraad, 1. (2004). Who claims dual citizenship? The limits of postriationalism, the possibilities 
of transnationalism. and the persistence of traditional citizenship. International Migration Review, 
38(2), 389426. 
1057 For an interesting overview of the debates surrounding this legislation sce Bauder, 11. (2008). 
Media discourse and the new German immigration law. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
34(l), 95-112. 
" See, for example, Favell, A., & Hansen, R. (2002). Markets against politics: migration, EU 
enlargement and the idea of Europe. Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 28(4), 581-601 and 
Morris, L. (2007). New Labour's community of rights: welfare, immigration and asylum. Journal of 
Social Policy, 36(l), 39-57. 
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In a broader context, it is clear that the EU plays a role in contributing to 
postnationalism. Its legal penetration, economic integration and multi-level 
governance facilitate the emergence of a postnational identity. Indeed, the very fact 
that many within the EU use the term 'foreigner' to refer only to non-EU citizens is 
telling. Above and beyond this, the steps toward convergence of citizenship and 
immigration policies among the EU states and the way in which states appear to be 
influencing each other - not least in the promotion of civic nationalism - could be 
interpreted as further manifestations of postnationalism. Perhaps more systematic 
attempts will be made in the future to construct a form of European nationalism. 1059 
Such a form of nationalism would surely raise new challenges - not least for 
transatlantic relations, as it could lead on to a more assertive EU external policy 
which may well be at odds with US preferences and policies. What is apparent, 
however, is that the construction of any such form of postnational belonging is, at 
most, in its early stages. What is more, it is clear that we are currently in a state of 
transition: only time will tell if the future will bring the further evolution of 
postnational constructions and attitudes or a back-lash of nationalism. 
1059 There arc indeed those who are setting out to construct such a form of nationalism. See, for 
example, Couloubaritsis, L., De Lecuw, M., Noel, & Sterck-x, C. (1993). The origins of European 
identity. Brussels: European Intcruniversity Press. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has adopted a cultural history approach to understanding politics, recently 
advocated by a number of historians, as a means of analysing how political actors 
utilise political representations as vehicles for their various agendas. In this 
framework, representations such as the Day of Unity are not merely secondary, 
inconsequential reflections of politics. Instead, they are used by political actors for 
framing and reconstituting political agendas and discourses in the public sphere. In 
this understanding, then, analysis of the Day of Unity sheds light on the political 
history of united Germany by providing insight into the political agendas pursued by 
political actors in this one arena. 
The thesis has shown that the staging of the Day of Unity was to some extent 
structurally determined by certain elements. Foremost, the celebrations were 
organised regionally, a fact that bore consequences for the staging not only in terms 
of geography but also with regard to interests served, organisation, personnel and the 
scale of the events. The staging of the individual anniversaries lay in the hands of 
regional actors, empowering a wide array of institutions and personalities to shape the 
festivities. Furthermore, the Day of Unity celebrations took place in a global context 
over which the individual organisers held little influence but the orbit of which they 
could not escape. Finally, as the Day of Unity began to lose its novelty, later 
organisers had to contend with some aspects of the staging that, through constant 
repetition by their predecessors, had become invented traditions. This is the 
framework that determined, but only to a certain extent, what the unity organisers 
might do in any given year. Yet for all these traditions and constraints, the organisers 
still retained extensive discretionary power in deciding how to stage the Day of Unity 
commemorations in their Land. 
The Day of Unity was thus a vehicle for the furthering of political agendas 
within the structural restraints set by those relatively static aspects of the staging. It is 
important to realise that -I not least because the political actors involved in organising 
and speaking at the celebrations changed from year to year - the Day of Unity was 
not beholden to any single political agenda but rather was a vehicle that enabled the 
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framing and reshaping of various discourses and political goals. Turning to the 
conclusions of the thesis, then, this final chapter will summarise the various agendas 
in the service of which the Day of Unity was used by political actors. It will become 
evident that these various agendas did not necessarily co-exist in complete harmony; 
they were, considered side-by-side, sometimes at odds with one another and rarely 
very coherent. Moreover, certain agendas were pursued with particular verve one 
year, only to fall into disregard the next as regional interests, geographic realities and 
the domestic and international political climate changed. Nonetheless, upon 
analysing the years between 1990 and 2005, it becomes clear that the staging of the 
Day of Unity was largely determined by a small number of factors. This chapter thus 
sums up the eight main findings of the empirical chapters. It then briefly summarises 
the way in which the work has contributed to broader debates. It ends by exploring 
how the findings of the thesis might inform further research. 
To begin with, the thesis has shown that the Day of Unity served as an 
instrument for presenting and promoting a specific image of united Germany to 
Germans and the international community. The image of Germany presented, 
foremost by Gennan political actors, sought to address challenges stemming from 
unification and to define, redefine and promote specific ideas about united Germany's 
core political and cultural values. Eight key aspects were staged as central to united 
Germany's self-definition: 
Firstly, the political actors framed Germany as a polity based on the 
structures, traditions and values of the post-war Federal Republic. This was 
particularly visible in the western German dominance of the staging of the 
celebrations, which served to reinforce West German conventions and to present 
united Germany as an extension and continuation of post-1945 Germany. This was 
also evident in the way in which German political actors stressed that united 
Germany, like its predecessor, would continue to take responsibility for its National 
Socialist past. Furthermore, it was apparent in the way in which the German political 
actors cmphasised continuity with West German foreign policy priorities, most 
notably the commitment to multilateralism and to strong bilateral relations with the 
US and France. 
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Secondly, as epitomised by their choice of 3rd October as the German national 
holiday, the German political actors promoted the image of a constitutional Germany. 
Contrary to 9'h November, which would have placed an emphasis on the role of grass 
roots civic action, P October -a date celebrating the legal unification - accentuated 
a constitutional act as the foundation of united Germany's self-understanding. 
Thirdly, the extent of rhetoric devoted to the history of the two German 
dictatorships on the Day of Unity anniversaries illustrated how German political 
actors propagated the image of a Germany aware of its past. 
Fourthly, by stressing that eastern and western Germans were already 
beginning to grow together despite forty years of division, the German political actors 
defined their country as united, or, at the very least, on the path to becoming united. 
Fifthly, they depicted the image of a democratic Germany. This manifested 
itself predominantly in the democratic organisation of the celebrations - the rotating 
structure, the presence of Germany's five key constitutional bodies and other political 
figures - in the promotion of democracy at the citizens' festivals, as well as in the 
condemnation of right-wing, anti-democratic extremism in the speeches. 
Sixthly, as expressed in the sub-national elements of the staging, the Day of 
Unity served as a platform from which the German political actors staged Germany as 
a federal system and framed federalism as a cornerstone of united Germany's self- 
understanding. 
Seventhly, as manifested in the mise-en-sc6ne of the unity celebrations, as 
well as in the rhetoric regarding the EU and its enlargement, German political actors 
represented Germany as a country both committed to and rooted in the EU. 
Eighthly, they orchestrated the staging to depict Germany as a country 
attached, to some extent, to postriational ideas, as best illustrated in the sub-national 
and supra-riational elements of the Td October commemorations. 
In consequence of the political actors' desire to promote these images of 
Germany, the National Socialist and GDR pasts, intra-German relations, federalism 
and the EU dominated the discourses on the Day of Unity. We saw, however, that 
certain elements of the staging limited the scope and transformed the intended messages 
of the political actors in their attempts to stage Germany in a specific way. This 
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potential divide between the messages transmitted and those received can explain 
certain unintended consequences. While the media played the most considerable role in 
this process of subversion, other elements - sometimes derivative of the basic principles 
of the staging, as above, and sometimes accidental - also limited the effectiveness of the 
Day of Unity, most notably, the rotating organisation of the unity events, the lack of 
unity event literature for non-German speakers, the advertising, the lack of symbols at 
the festivities and the date chosen for the celebrations. 
As its second main result, the thesis has highlighted that, while the promotion of 
the above key elements of Germany's representation remained largely unchanged 
throughout the period from 1990 to 2005, there was nevertheless a diachronic dimension 
to the unity celebrations in this period. Shifts and transformations in certain topics on 
the Day of Unity highlighted the changing domestic and international concerns of 
political actors. In particular, the political actors altered the specific staging of the 
National Socialist and GDR pasts as time passed; they framed intra-German relations in 
different ways in the light of social and economic problems and public attitudes; and the 
various forms of EU-isation, or the way in which Germany's commitment to the EU 
was pledged, changed in response to shifting domestic and international realities. In this 
way, the Day of Unity contributed to the process of inventing, forgetting and reinventing 
elements of the image of Germany's self-understanding, both at home and abroad, from 
1990 to 2005. In this way, the research has shown that we appear to be in a period of 
change. 
Thirdly, the research has demonstrated that the Day of Unity was characterised 
by a high degree of consensus in the presentation of key ideas by German political 
actors across the political spectrum, from the moderate Left to the moderate Right. This 
consensus shaped the largely uniform approach of the regional actors in staging the 
celebrations. Despite their considerable discretionary powers, the regional political 
actors opted to adopt invented traditions based on the Hamburg celebrations. With only 
few exceptions, most notably Bavaria in 1996 and Hanover in 1998, there was thus 
broad consensus on the nature of the core constituent elements of the celebrations as 
well as on the staging of those elements throughout the fifteen year period. Even the 
very date of the Day of Unity itself had been achieved as the result of broad cross-party 
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consensus. On the presentation of the National Socialist past too, there existed 
considerable consensus among the German political speakers, even though this did not 
always extend to the international speakers. The depiction of the GDR past similarly 
enjoyed a consensual interpretation, with the notable exceptions of Schr6der's 
Objektmeile and hymn mix and Platzeck's 2005 speech. There was likewise consensus 
among all political actors - given to making sweeping generalisations on the topic - that 
intra-German relations should be improved. As we have seen, consensus also 
manifested itself in cross-party support for federalism and promotion of the EU. Finally, 
there was broad consensus on the hierarchy of bilateral relations as instantiated on the 
Day of Unity. 
The high degree of agreement with regard to the values and understanding of the 
past, present and future in many ways simplified and reinforced the messages, serving to 
present a homogenous value system. This served to project the image of a Germany, not 
riven by ambiguity and self-doubt, but instead deeply grounded in its established 
traditions. It also provided legitimacy for that which was presented through repetition 
and facilitated cultural synchronisation more easily than would likely have been possible 
through more complex messages. 
Although the official central celebrations were characterised by consensus and 
thus escaped partisan politics for the most part, 3d October nevertheless served as a 
political tool in other arenas. This was most notable in 2000 at the CDU and SPI) party 
congresses, in the media and in the Bundestag - where inter-party squabbles about the 
gownership' of unification were played out in an attempt to gain credibility and 
undermine the legitimacy of the political opponents - as well as in demonstrations 
throughout the period from 1990 to 2005. In these demonstrations, right and left-wing 
extremists attempted to use the Day of Unity to promote images of united Germany very 
different from those presented by the political actors at the official events. While the 
right-wing extremists envisaged and propagated a nationalist and nco-fascist Germany, 
the left-wing extremists questioned the very merits of unification and of a Gen-nan 
nation-state and sought to undermine a number of governmental political reforms. 
Fourthly, the thesis has demonstrated that the Day of Unity was used by the 
political actors to construct and redefine united Germany's interpretation of the past. 
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The political actors placed the history of National Socialism and of the East German 
dictatorship at the core of Germany's history and attempted to influence attitudes on 
these two aspects. 
Interpretation by the German political actors of the relevance of the National 
Socialist era for united Germany changed dramatically from 1990 to 2005. In the early 
1990s - when they sought to reassure the international community that a united 
Germany would not turn its back on the process of Vergangenheitsbewalligung, to 
assuage fears of a nationalist resurgence in the wake of unification and to extend the 
dominant interpretation of the past of the Federal Republic to eastern Germans - the 
rhetoric concentrated on the National Socialist past. Key topics in these years included 
Germany's acceptance and accountability of its past as well as emphasis that the past 
should and would never repeat itself. In this way, the political actors staged 
responsibility for National Socialism as a defining feature of united Germany's self- 
portrayal. The mid-1990s saw the interpretation of the past as presented by the political 
actors moulded by the anniversaries of key historical events: the 50 th anniversary of the 
Warsaw uprising shifted focus to the German-Polish past; the liberation of Auschwitz 
and the 50th anniversary of the end of World War 11 generated more rhetoric about the 
need for all Germans to continue dealing with the National Socialist past as a duty to the 
international community; and the 150'h anniversary of 1848/49 gave German political 
actors the opportunity to draw attention to positive aspects of German history and to 
redefine the National Socialist era as merely one chapter in a far more differentiated 
German past. This last development represented the first indication at the Day of Unity 
commemorations of 'normalisation' in the presentation of the National Socialist pastý 
reflecting the German political actors' desire to reframe the place of the National 
Socialist past in their country's self-understanding. In the late 1990s and early 2000s 
this trend continued and manifested itself not only through a greater focus on the 
positive aspects of Gen-nan history but also through the absence of references to 
National Socialism as well as through mention of German victimhood. 
As for the GDR past, German political actors presented a thoroughly negative 
image throughout the period from 1990 to 2005, though here too, shifts were visible, 
most notably in the particular tone of condemnation. Thus they censured the GDR 
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immediately after unification, softened their rebukes in the mid-1990s to allow eastern 
Germans to take pride in their biographies, and vehemently criticised the GDR and 
stressed the reasons for its collapse in the late 1990s and early 2000s at a time of nascent 
Ostalgie among eastern Germans and disgruntlement among western Germans. 
Fifthly, the thesis has highlighted that the German political actors used the Yd 
October anniversaries to improve intra-German relations. In this way, they sought to 
facilitate the construction of a Wir-Gefahl among Germans. To this end, the German 
political actors redefined ideas about unification and unity by reframing initial 
expectations as overly ambitious, by evoking pride for that which had already been 
achieved and by staging unity as an ongoing challenge. To improve the image of 
eastern Germans and eastern Germany among western Germans they also used legal 
arguments (stressing western Germans' constitutional obligation in the context of 
Aujbau Ost), moral arguments (emphasising that eastern Germans had taken the 
burden of the past and had struggled most during and since unification), social 
arguments (highlighting eastern Germans' positive values and their role in 
unification), and economic arguments (framing eastern Germany as innovative and 
staging reconstruction in the East as beneficial to all Germans). In a further attempt 
to improve relations between Germans, East and West, the German political actors 
also framed differences among these two groups paradoxically as both negative and 
positive. Whereas the former was evident in the emphasis on elements that already 
united Germans, from cultural achievements to sports and joint initiatives, the latter 
manifested itself in the way in which uncritical and undifferentiated homogeneity was 
criticised as a recipe for dictatorship and differences were praised as traditional, 
regional, complementary and enriching of German political culture. 
Sixthly, the thesis has revealed that the German national holiday served as a 
mechanism for cultural synchronisation by extending West German value systems and 
frameworks to eastern Germans through the promotion of specific (West German) 
versions of the past, present and future. In this way, German political actors encouraged 
cultural synchronisation on West German terms. The 3rd October anniversaries thus 
sought to encourage social integration and assimilation of eastern Germans into the 
Federal Republic in the service of the broad, ongoing process of integration, 
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convergence and cohesion of eastern and western Germans. The western German 
dominance of the celebrations served to encourage this cultural synchronisation - it 
stopped elements from the GDR from finding a place in the staging of united Germany's 
self-understanding. This cultural synchronisation was supported by politicians from 
across the mainstream political spectrum including, with the exception of Platzeck, the 
eastern German political actors. Above all, the political actors used the Day of Unity to 
create Germans who were aware of their past and were democratically, regionally and 
EU-minded. 
The German political actors used the German national holiday as an arena for 
reinforcing the Federal Republic dominant interpretations of the past among western 
Germans and bringing these aspects to eastern Gen-nans, as a means of encouraging 
cultural synchronisation in views of the past. In this way, the political actors fostered a 
shared historical consciousness among eastern and western Germans and facilitated the 
construction of a common interpretation of the past as a foundation for a shared future. 
This was particularly apparent with regard to the National Socialist past in the calls for 
all Germans to acknowledge responsibility in addressing the history of the 'Third 
Reich'. The political actors also encouraged cultural synchronisation in attitudes toward 
the GDR past through their thoroughly negative depiction of this past. The 
unambiguously negative portrayal sought to stem eastern German reminiscence about 
positive aspects of the GDR. It also underlined the Federal Republic's moral, political 
and economic superiority over the GDR and justified the continuity between the 
established traditions and frameworks of the Federal Republic and united Germany. 
Furthermore, it stressed that there was no constitutive place for the GDR in united 
Germany's self-understanding. 
The unity commemorations also served to influence Gen-nany's political culture 
by reinforcing and promoting democracy and federalism, particularly in the eastern 
Under, to overcome the gulf in attitudes on these issues between eastern and western 
Germans. It served to encourage cultural synchronisation by extending the regional, 
federal traditions of the Federal Republic to the former GDR. The citizens' festivals, in 
particular, were geared toward providing information about the democratic political 
system, the Under and German federalism. In the service of spreading democratic 
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values and countering Pofilikverdrossenheit in a federalist frame the government 
marquees, with information stands and various dignitaries, informed Germans about the 
actions of the government. The discussion rounds with politicians and politics-based 
competitions for adults and children similarly fostered critical understanding and 
awareness in an effort to stimulate greater political participation. The regional 
organisation meanwhile promoted federalist democracy through its immediacy, by being 
hargernah and by involving Germans from each of the Ldnder in contemporary political 
questions and concerns. The Day of Unity thus served to encourage throughout 
Germany enthusiasm for, and understanding of, federalism by urging Germans to 
identify with their own federal state and with the federal system as a whole. 
The Day of Unity also served to encourage cultural synchronisation among 
Germans in the belief that the country's future should be entwined with that of the EU. 
German and international actors sought to market the EU to eastern Germans and to 
maintain support for it among western Germans, particularly in times of Euro- 
scepticism. 
Seventhly, the research has highlighted that the German political actors 
attempted, to some extent, to stage the German national holiday as a postnational 
event. Postnational aspects of the Day of Unity manifested themselves in the ways in 
which the unity celebrations were denationalised to some degree through sub-national 
and supra-national elements. The German political actors at times underlined the place 
of regions and the EU in their country's self-portrayal: they staged the nation as one 
made up of parts and rooted in the EU. While there was reticence on the part of the 
German political actors about using national symbols, we saw that regional elements 
appeared in various fanns: from the decentralised, sub-national organisation of the 
celebrations, to the staging of the citizens' festivals, the regional flags, music and 
cordons of the ceremonies at the central celebrations as well as the staging of the parallel 
events in Berlin. The promotion of federalism can also be seen in this context as a 
somewhat postnational expression of sub-national loyalties and self-understanding. 
Signs of denationalisation through supra-national elements, as seen in the EU-isation of 
the commemorations, were also visible. This expressed itself in the concentration of 
rhetoric relating to the EU, in the mise-en-scýne of the celebrations, in the status of 
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the international guest as main speaker and in the way in which specific EU relations 
were prioritised on the Day of Unity. 
The postriational elements in the staging of the German national holiday 
presented a number of advantages for the German political actors. By stressing that 
the united German nation-state was committed, to some extent, to postriationalism 
they were able to reassure a potentially wary international community and to assuage 
fears of an overly powerful Germany. The sub-national and supra-national elements 
particularly served to militate against the possible connotations of German 
nationalism inherent in the use of national symbols. In addition to this, 
postnationalism served to counteract the trend of renascent nationalist tendencies in 
the German population. Furthermore, it was to Germany's economic benefit to 
promote transnational institutions. Promotion of postnationalism in the form of sub- 
national affiliation, particularly through attachment to regions, also served to offset 
growing anxiety about the impact of globalisation. The aspects, of postnationalism on 
the day as manifested specifically through the sub-national elements of the 
celebrations also allowed the political actors to construct and foster regional, rather than 
national, pride and loyalties. This legitimised national pride within a regional context by 
encouraging Germans to express pride for being German on their national holiday but in 
a form of patriotism devoid of negative connotations for Germans or the international 
community. There was thus a symbiotic duality of regional and national elements, 
which served to legitimise both the region and the nation. The sub-national staging also 
had specific advantages for the regional actors in that it gave them authority to shape the 
staging of the German national holiday and therefore influence not only regional but 
also national affairs. It also provided them with the opportunity to boost their local 
economy by providing a platform for marketing the Land's tourist attractions and 
products. The sub-national dimension to the staging ftirther helped to reinforce aspects 
of the political culture, particularly democracy and federalism. The postnational 
elements of the Day of Unity as presented specifically through the supra-riational 
aspects of the staging also assisted Germany's political actors in the processes of 
underlining Germany's commitment to the traditional foreign policy priorities of the 
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Federal Republic, of promoting the EU to its citizens and of promoting eastern 
enlargement of the EU. 
Eighthly, the thesis has demonstrated that the German national holiday was used 
to influence bilateral relations. We saw that while international guests from across the 
world were traditionally invited to attend the celebrations, there was a hierarchy of 
bilateral relationships, which the German political actors chose to foster at the unity 
events. German politicians prioritised diplomacy with partners especially important for 
Germany historically as well as for reasons of trade and security. To some extent, they 
sought to reinforce and improve relations with the US but predominantly, the Day of 
Unity served as an arena for fostering EU partnerships. German political actors sought 
to strengthen the Franco-German 'friendship' and, above all, to cultivate relations with 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We discovered, however, that the German 
national holiday also had the power to damage bilateral relations with countries not 
prioritised by the German political actors. 
The research has also contributed to a number of theoretical and intellectual 
debates. To begin, the work contributed to ongoing debates about nationalism. It 
supported the idea that nations are not natural entities but rather can be conceived of as 
imagined communities. It demonstrated that the Day of Unity contributed to the broad 
ongoing process of nation-building in Germany. Indeed, we saw that P October is a 
form of invented tradition. In their discourse and the staging of the unity events, the 
political actors constructed, defined and maintained the self-image of united Germany. 
We also discovered that Germany is increasingly moving away from a purely ethno- 
centric understanding of nationhood toward a form of civic nationalism. In addition to 
this, the work was able to contribute to the debates about the politics of memory. In the 
context of Geschichtspolitik, the research highlighted that interpretations of the past 
were politicised by the political actors in the-scrvice of both domestic and international 
agendas. We also saw, in line with the notion of collective memory, that the Day of 
Unity kept alive images of the past that may otherwise have been forgotten. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the past presented by the political actors changed in 
light of the needs of the present. Alongside this, the research illustrated that the Day of 
Unity stood as an example of cultural memory. At the same time, however, since 
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German unity remained part of everyday communication, cultural memory and 
communicative memory overlapped on the Day of Unity. In addition to this, the 
research referred to the historians' debate in the late 1980s and the public debate in the 
press about the resurgence of nationalism at the time of unification. The work showed, 
above all, that we are in a period of change. The role of the National Socialist past in 
Germany's self-understanding appears to be declining. There are also signs that 
Germany's political actors are searching for new ways to define the German nation. We 
ascertained that the very existence of a national day in a state attempting to avoid 
recourse to nationalism created certain tensions on the Day of Unity. Finally, the 
research was able to contribute to the debate about postnationalism. It revealed that 
I while there were some signs of postnationalism emerging, the nation-state remained an 
important frame of reference. It is too early to know whether postnational constructions 
of identity and allegiance will continue in the future, and whether they will be effective 
with the population at large or remain an elite phenomenon. What the research as a 
whole has shown, however, is that the analysis of representations from the perspective 
of the cultural history of politics can provide key insights into identifying such changes. 
How can these findings be used for further research? In the German context, the 
findings of the research would be fruitful for a reception-based analysis of the Day of 
Unity commemorations. A research project with extensive time and financial resources 
could conduct large-scale, representative surveys into attitudes within Germany to 
explore why the German national holiday was so unpopular. By detailing the nature of 
the unity celebrations, this thesis offers a rich basis for questions for such surveys - 
how, for example, did people feel about the choice of topics in the Day of Unity 
speeches? Were they likely to attend a unity celebration in a Land other than their own? 
Did they see any advertising for the celebrations? Did the social and economic problems 
following unification stop them wanting to celebrate the German national holiday? What 
would have made the celebrations more relevant to them? 
More broadly, by highlighting the role of the Gen-nan national holiday, the 
research opens up threads for further research into the function of representations in 
other modem liberal democracies. The thesis has illustrated that the concept of the 
cultural history of politics can be employed to further understand the ways in which 
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political actors attempt to influence agendas and discourses and to construct and 
propagate particular versions of a country's past, present and future. Specifically, the 
research has presented a model for exploring how a contemporary national holiday can 
serve as a mechanism for redefining the nation, legitimising the state, sustaining 
democratic principles, highlighting shifts in the political culture, creating consensus, 
creating a sense of belonging and influencing bilateral relations. In this way, the 
research provides a framework for identifying changing priorities and concerns of the 
political actors of other countries over time to provide insight into domestic politics and 
social tensions. Furthermore, the approach taken in this research has shown that 
representations can be examined to highlight condensed 'official' versions of the past as 
well as to examine the extent to which the nation is used as a frame of reference by a 
country's elite. It has also provided a basis for 
, 
identifying a hierarchy of bilateral 
relations to shed light on the diplomatic interests of a given country's political actors. 
The research could also provide the foundation for an innovative comparative 
study. In the tradition of comparative (contemporary) historical research' 060 and 
adopting the approach of cultural transfer, ' 061 it could be particularly insightful to 
conduct research into the extent to which representations in other EU states have been 
similarly denationalised. On the basis of this thesis, new projects could compare any 
sub-national elements of representations in other countries in an effort to examine the 
degree of the erosion of the nation-state as the key political frame of reference and to 
shed light on the development of a 'Europe of Regions'. Comparison of the supra- 
national elements, specifically the extent of EU-isation, in political commemorations in 
other countries would draw out idiosyncrasies and similarities of the German case and 
lead to further understanding of the place that political actors of other states afford to the 
EU in their country's self-portrayal. Comparison with commemorations in France and 
the CEE states particularly lend themselves for comparison here. Have French 
1060 See Haupt, H. G., & Kocka, J. (Eds. ). (1996). Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse 
international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag and Kaelble, 
H., & Schriewer, J. (Eds. ). (2003). Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- 
und Kulturwissenschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
l"" See Middell, M. (2000). Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik - Thesen zu ihrem 
Verhältnis. Comparativ, 10(1), 7-41 and Paulmann, J. (1998). Internationaler Vergleich und 
interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. 
Jahrhunderts. Historische Zeitschrift, 267,649-685. 
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commemorations - in a country with a long tradition of commitment to the EU, like 
Germany - also been denationalised through EU-isation to some extent? Certainly the 
presence of German tanks within the five-nation Eurocorps on the Champs Elys6es on 
14th July 20031 062 suggests that there are at least preliminary signs of such EU-isation 
and thus of latent shared characteristics of the national holidays of contemporary France 
and Germany. Have the political actors in the newly formed post-Communist nation- 
states, newcomers to the EU scene, used their official representations to foster 
enthusiasm among their citizens and to define their countries as rooted in the EU in the 
same way as their counterparts in the West? In the vein of this thesis, such a project 
would espouse an approach largely neglected by British contemporary historians and 
would offer the potential for considerable conceptual transfer and innovation. 
1062 See Cirimonles nationales. (2003). Retrieved March 8,2008, from http: //www. elysee. fr/elysee/ 
elysec. fr/ francais-archives/actualites/a-I-Slysee/2003/J*uillet/ccremonies-nationales-album. 5215. htmi. 
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Appendix 1: coding categories for Day of Unity 
speeches 
Bold text: I" Stage coding 
Non-formatted text: 2 nd Stage Coding 
Abbreviation Explanation 
Role of national days 
Sedantag: Criticism of Sedantag 
WR days: Controversy surrounding national days in the Weimar Republic 
NS days: Criticism of commemorative days during National Socialism 
17 th June Comparison of P October with 17th June 
Bastille Day: Comparison of 3 rd October with French national holiday 
(Bastille Day) 
rd Independence Day: Comparison of 3 October with US national holiday 
(Independence Day) 
Gift: 3 rd October as an important date/reason for celebration/gift 
Inability: Inability of Germans to celebrate 
3 rd October as appropriate/inappropriate date for German national holiday 
Pro-3/1 0: Defence of 3 rd October as the correct date 
Anti-3/1 0: Criticism of 3 rd October as the wrong date 
Pro-9/1 1: Promotion of 9h November 
Anti-9/1 1: Criticism of 9th November 
Political Party Aspects 
Pro-CDU: Promotion of CDU 
Pro-SPD: Promotion of SPD 
Pro-other: Promotion of other political parties 
Anti-CDU: Criticism of CDU 
Anti-SPD: Criticism of SPD 
Anti-other: Criticism of other political parties 
Manner of Unification 
Pro-article 23: Support of unification through Article 23 
Anti-article 23: Criticism of unification thr6ugh Article 23 
Pro-article 146: Direct/Indirect reference to possibility of unification through 
Article 146 
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Extremism 
Anti-Left extreme: Criticism of left-wing extremism 
Anti-Right extreme: Criticism of right-wing extremism 
National Socialist Past 
V13 FRG: Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in the Federal Republic 
VB GDR: Vergangenheitsbewd1figung in the GDR 
Joint view NS: Joint interpretation of the National Socialist past in united 
Germany 
Responsibility NS: Increased responsibility to address past in united Germany 
Unique NS: Germany as unique due to National Socialist past 
Joint culpability NS: All Germans as responsible for National Socialist past 
Elite NS: National Socialist elite responsible for National Socialist past 
Division Punishment: German division as a punishment for World War 11 
Anniversaries: Commemorative anniversaries 
Berlin Republic: Support/Criticism of 'Berlin Republic' 
NS one part: National Socialist past as only one chapter in German history 
Positive past: Positive aspects of German history 
Victims: Germans as victims 
GDR/SED Past 
Responsibility GDR: Need to address the GDR past 
Doppelte VB: Doppelle Vergangenheilsbewaltigung 
Joint view GDR: Joint interpretation of the GDR past among all Germans 
Anti-GDR: Negative aspects of the GDR 
Ostalgie: Ostalgie as unfounded/unhelpful 
GDR implode: GDR collapsed independent of other events 
German unification/unity 
Redefine unity: Need for continual redefinition of unity 
Progress: Progress already made 
Take longer: Unity will take longer than envisaged 
Expectations: Expectations of the German people were too high 
Citizens' assistance: How Germans can improve unity 
Children: Children as a symbol of unity 
Inner unity: Intra-German relations, inner unity 
Elements unite: Elements which unite all Germans 
Values unite: Values which unite all Germans 
Pro-differences: Differences as positive 
Eastern Germans 
EG role in unity: Eastern Germans made unification possible 
EG Values/Skills: Values and skills of eastern Germans 
EG not SED: Eastern Germans as separate from SED 
EG burden NS: Eastern Germans carried the burden of the National Socialist 
past 
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EG burden unity: Unification as more difficult for eastern Germans than western 
Germans 
EG innovative: Eastern Germany as innovative 
A0 economy: -Aujbau Ost economically important for the whole of Germany 
AO constitution: Aujbau Ost as a constitutional obligation 
Federalism 
Pro-federalism: Merits of federalism 
Federalism EU: Federalism as an example for the EU 
Regionalism 
Regional identity: Regional traditions/culture 
Europe of regions: Europe of regions 
Economy 
Regional produce: Regional products/specialities 
Globalisation: Alterations required for globalisation 
Foreign policy con 
international fears: 
Continuation FRG: 
Multilateral ism: 
Commitment EU: 
Pro-EU: 
imitments 
International fears of united Germany 
Continuation of Federal Republic foreign policy 
Commitment to multilateralism 
Commitment to EU 
Praise of EU 
EU enlargement 
European unity: German unity as a step toward European unity 
Enlargement: EU enlargement 
International relations 
US: German-US relations 
France: Franco-German relations 
Poland: German-Poland relations 
Czech Republic: German-Czech Republic relations 
Hungary: German-Hungarian relations 
Gorbachev: Praise of Gorbachev 
Allied Powers: Praise of Allied Powers 
Other IR Other international relations 
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Appendix 2: questionnaire template 
Informationsblatt zum Fragebogen 
Ich danke Ihnen sehr herzlich für Ihre Bereitschaft, den nachfolgenden Fragebogen 
zum 'Tag der Deutschen Einheit (Jahr) in (Stadt)' zu bearbeiten, um somit mein 
Forschungsanliegen im Rahmen meiner Doktorarbeit zu unterstützen. Bevor Sie den 
Fragebogen ausfüllen, möchte ich Ihnen vorab einige Informationen zu meiner 
Person, zur Forschungsarbeit und zum Fragebogen geben: 
INFORMATIONEN ÜBER MICH 
Befragerin: Charlotte Ball 
E-Mail: ballcharlotte@hotmail. com 
Beruf- Doktorandin 
Universitdt: University of Portsmouth, England 
Stipendien: Stipendium des Centre for European and International 
Studies Research, Stipendium des Instituts fbr Europdische Geschichte 
INFORMATIONEN ZUM PROJEKT 
Titel des Projekts: Inszenierung des Tages der Deutschen Einheit (1990 - 2005) 
Ziel des Projekts: Erstellung einer detaillierten Analyse der Inszenierung des Tages der 
Deutschen Einheit auf regionaler, nationaler und internationaler Ebene flür den Zeitraum 
1990 bis 2005. 
Veröffentlichung: Optionale Veröffentlichung als Dissertationsschrift und/oder in Fonn 
einzelner Forschungsartikel in wissenschaftlichen Zeitschriften. 
INFORMATIONEN ZUM FRAGEBOGEN 
Ziel des Fragebogens: Ermittlung von Detailinformationen zu den offiziellen 
Feierlichkeiten des 3. Oktobers. Im Mittelpunkt stehen organisatorische Fragen, 
Fragen zum konkreten Ablauf sowie Fragen zum Umfang der Vorbereitungen der 
Feierlichkeiten. 
Grund, warum Sie als Ansprechpartner ausgewählt wurden: Sie verfügen über 
wertvolle Fachkenntnisse in Bezug auf die Organisation der offiziellen, zentralen 
Feierlichkeiten des Tages der Deutschen Einheit in (Stadt) im Jahr (xxxx). 
Für die Durchführung der Forschungsarbeit ist eine möglichst vollständige 
Beantwortung des Fragebogens von großem Vorteil. Selbstverständlich steht es Ihnen 
trotzdem frei, nicht alle Fragen des Fragebogens vollumfängli h zu beantworten. 
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Ich versichere Ihnen, dass die Ergebnisse dieses Fragebogens mit den Organisatoren 
aus anderen Bundesländern nicht diskutiert werden. 
Wenn Sie anonym bleiben möchten, wird Ihr Name an keiner Stelle meiner Arbeit 
oder in zukünftigen Publikationen erscheinen. 
Der Fragebogen umfasst 56 kurze Fragen. Er gliedert sich in 4 Teile: (1) Angaben zu 
Ihrer Person (2) Fragen zum ökumenischen Gottesdienst (3) Fragen zum offiziellen 
L Festakt und (4) Fragen zum Bürgerfest. 
' Fragebogen i 
1. Angaben zu Ihrer Person 
1. Geben Sie Ihr Einverständnis, dass ich die Antworten dieses Fragebogens in 
meiner Dissertation und in potenziellen Publikationen benutzen darf'.? 
2. Bitte nennen Sie Ihren vollständigen Namen, sofern Sie nicht anonym bleiben 
möchten: 
3. Wie lautet Ihre aktuelle Berufsbezeichnung? 
4. Was war Ihre Berufsbezeichnung am 3. Oktober (Jahr)? 
2. Fragen zum Ökumenischen Gottesdienst zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit 
1. Gab es grundsätzlich einzuhaltende Vorgaben (Protokoll), auf denen die 
Organisation des ökumenischen Gottesdienstes basierte? Wenn ja, beantworten 
Sie bitte auch Frage 2. Wenn nein, gehen Sie bitte zu Frage 3. 
2. Welche Hauptpunkte umfasste das Protokoll? 
3. Wie wurde entschieden, in welcher Kirche der ökumenische Gottesdienst 
stattfinden soll? 
- 4. Auf welche Weise wurde das Kernthema für den oder die liauptredFer des 
ökumenischen Gottesdienstes festgelegt? 
5. Wie wurde entschieden, wer die Reden für den ökumenischen Gottesdienst 
halten soll? 
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6. Wer waren der oder die Redner für den ökumenischen Gottesdienst? 
7. Nach welchen Kriterien wurden Ehrengäste zum ökumenischen Gottesdienst 
eingeladen? 
3. Fragen zum offiziellen Festakt zum Tag der Deutschen Einheit 
1. Gab es ein Protokoll, auf der der offizielle Festakt basierte? Wenn ja, 
beantworten Sie bitte auch die Fragen 2 und 3. Wenn nein, gehen Sie bitte zu 
Frage 4. 
2. Welche Hauptpunkte umfasste das Protokoll? 
3. Führte die Umsetzung des Protokolls vereinzelt zu Schwierigkeiten? (z. B. 
unzureichender Platz) 
4. Bestand im Vorfeld Kontakt zu Organisatoren anderer Bundesländer, dii' 
Festakt der zentralen Feierlichkeiten bereits in der Vergangenheit organisiert 
hatten? 
5. Gab es - neben dem ggf. vorhandenen Protokoll - aus den Vorjahren Elemente der zentralen Feierlichkeiten in den anderen Bundesländern, die Sie übemommen 
haben? Wenn ja, welche und warum? 
- 6. Gab es Elemente der zentralen Feierlichkeiten in anderen Bunie sländern, die Sie 
nicht übernommen haben? Wenn ja, welche und warum? 
7. Haben Sie regionale, nationale oder europäische Symbole im Rahmen des 
Festakts verwendet? Wenn ja, welche? (z. B. Flaggen, Hymne) 
8. Konnten Sie entscheiden, welche regionalen, nationalen und europäischen 
Symbole im Rahmen des Festakts verwendet wurden? 
9. Nach welchen Kriterien wurden die nationalen Festredner ausgewählt? 
10. Wurde den nationalen Festrednem ein bestimmtes Thema für ihre Rede 
vorgegeben? Wenn ja, beantworten Sie bitte auch die Fragen 11 und 12. Wenn 
nein, gehen Sie bitte zu Frage 13. 
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11. Was war dieses Thema? 
12. Wer hat dieses Thema ausgewählt? 
13. Wurde der Inhalt der nationalen Reden mit den auftretenden 
Rednern/zuständigen Redenschreiben im Vorfeld abgesprochen? 
14. Nach welchen Kriterien wurden die nationalen Gäste des offiziellen Festaktes 
ausgewählt? 
15. Gab es nationale Festredner oder Ehrengäste, die eine Einladung abgelehnt 
haben? Wenn ja, wer und warum? 
16. Gab es internationale Festredner? Wenn ja, beantworten Sie bitte auch die 
Fragen 17 bis 21. Wenn nein, gehen Sie bitte zu Frage 22. 
17. Nach welchen Kriterien wurden die internationalen Festredner ausgewählt? 
18. Wurde den internationalen Festrednem ein bestimmtes Thema für ihre Rede 
vorgegeben? Wenn ja, beantworten Sie bitte auch die Fragen 19 und 20. Wenn 
nein, gehen Sie bitte zu Frage 21. 
19. Was war dieses Thema? 
20. Wer hat dieses Thema ausgewählt? 
21. Wurde der Inhalt der internationalen Reden mit den auftretenden 
Rednern/zuständigen Redenschreiben im Vorfeld abgesprochen? 
22. Nach welchen Kriterien wurden die internationalen Gäste des offiziellen 
Festaktes ausgewählt? 
23. Gab es internationale Festredner oder Ehrengäste, die eine Einladung au-gelehnt 
haben? Wenn ja, wer und warum? 
24. Worin unterschied sich der Festakt in Ihrem Bundesland von den Festakten 
anderer Bundesländer in den Vorjahren? 
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25. Wie wurde der offizielle Festakt finanziert? 
26. Wie groß war das Budget für den offiziellen Festakt? 
27. War das Budget ausreichend? 
4. Fragen zum Bürgerfest am Tag der Deutschen Einheit 
1. Gab es ein Protokoll für das Bürgerfest? Wenn ja, beantworten Sie bitte auch 
Frage 2. Wenn nein, gehen Sie bitte zu Frage 3. 
2. Ergaben sich Schwierigkeiten/Hürden bei der Umsetzung des Protokolls? Wenn 
ja, welche? 
3. Bestand im Vorfeld Kontakt zu Organisatoren anderer Bundesländer, die das 
Bürgerfest der zentralen Feierlichkeiten bereits in der Vergangenheit organisiert 
hatten? 
4. Gab es - neben dem ggf. vorhandenen Protokoll - aus den Vorjahren Elemente der Bürgerfeste in den anderen Bundesländern, die Sie übernommen haben? 
Wenn ja, welche und warum? 
5. Gab es Elemente der vorhergehenden Bürgerfeste in anderen Bundesländern, die 
Sie nicht übemommen haben? Wenn ja, welche und warum? 
6. Haben Sie regionale, nationale oder europäische Symbole im Rahmen des 
Bürgerfests verwendet? Wenn ja, welche? (z. B. Flaggen, Hymne) 
7. Konnten Sie entscheiden, welche regionalen, nationalen und europäischen 
Symbole im Rahmen des Bürgerfests verwendet wurden? 
8. Worin unterschied sich das Bürgerfest in Ihrem Bundesland voii den 
vorhergehenden Bürgerfesten? 
9. Hatte das Bürgerfest ein zentrales Thema? 
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10. Haben Sie bei den Organisatoren vorhergehender Bürgerfeste Informationen 
eingeholt, um die Zahl der Besucher abschätzen zu können? 
11. Wieviele Besucher erwarteten Sie zum Bürgerfest? 
12. Wieviele Besucher sind zum Bürgerfest tatsächlich gekommen? 
13. Welche Ziele wurden mit dem Bürgerfest verfolgt? 
14. Wie sind Sie vorgegangen, um zu überprüfen, ob die mit dem Bürgerfest 
verbundenen Ziele erreicht wurden? 
15. Wie wurde das Bürgerfest finanziert? 
16. Wie groß war das Budget für das Bürgerfest? 
17. War das Budget ausreichend? 
uiLit es aus in 
der Deutschen 
Fragebogen 
Kommentar? 
zur Inszen 
i Einheit, die - entgegen Ihrer Erwartungen - im 
nicht enthalten waren? /Haben Sie sonstigen 
kts zum Tag 
vorliegenden 
zusätzlichen 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre freundliche Unterstützung! 
ge 
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Magdeburg Mr. Andreas Clausing November 6,2006 
Erftirt Mr. Michael Meinung November 27,2006 
Potsdam Mr. Manfred Foger November 28,2006 
Organisational documents from Day of Unity organisers: 
Guest lists 
Invitation templates 
Layout plans 
Marketing material for sponsors 
Programmes 
Security guidelines 
Bundestag plenary minutes & Bundestag printed papers (1990-2005): 
Legislative period 11,1987-1990 
Legislative period 12,1990-1994 
Legislative period 13,1994-1998 
Legislative period 14,1998-2002 
Legislative period 15,2002-2005 
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